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Introduction: The Quagmire of  Public Morality 
 
 
The search for eudaimonia 
 
Public values are, as George Frederickson put it, the soul of public administration. To 
Frederickson the fact “that values inhabit every corner of government is given. Who studies 
public administration studies values and who practices administration practices the allocation 
of values” (1994: 32). Politics and administration deal with the distribution of sometimes 
limited ‘public goods’ or services among various different sections of society and with this 
normative questions inevitably arise. In his famous 1940s polemic with Herbert Simon, Robert 
Dahl argued that public administration was actually based on a preference for particular values 
while claiming to be value-free (Dahl, 1947; Denhardt, 2004: 70-71). In a similar vein Rutgers 
wrote how “public administration is primarily about values, some masked as accepted facts. 
Assessment of information, such as the appraisal of the importance and meaning of facts and 
values is […] the very essence of the work of the public administrator. Administration is all 
about what we accept as relevant facts; that is, what we value” (2008a: 43). 
Government might indeed, as Dwight Waldo once argued, serve to ensure the greatest 
amount of ‘happiness’ for most citizens. Waldo wrote how he was “at pains to enumerate the 
values, both spiritual and material, which will be served, and to delineate the right relationship 
of man to his God, his State and his fellows” (2007: 65). However, one soon realizes that ideas 
on that ‘right relationship’ can hardly be objective, let alone universal. This was already noted 
by Aristotle (cf. Van Erp & Van Gils, 1987: 45) who said each person has his own idea of what 
is good or what brings happiness. People in any society simply disagree on public values, on 
assumptions of right or wrong public official conduct and on what government should or 
should not do. In deciding how to attain ‘the good’, different desires, assumptions and 
requirements almost inevitably collide or, as Herodotus wrote: “if the whole human race was 
given a free field and was instructed to choose the best laws from all the laws in existence, after 
due consideration they would each choose their own laws – so convinced are they respectively 
of the immeasurable superiority of their own” (cf. Toynbee, 1952: 141). Administrators are 
likewise constantly making value choices and often take themselves as point of reference. 
Some values are incorporated while others are simply ignored. Admirable as Waldo’s goal may 
have been, what he spoke of is – as a result – difficult if not impossible to obtain. There is no 
set of values or assumptions of correct public behaviour that pleases everyone. This, however, 
makes it even more important to study them.  
 
The context of political corruption: who, where, and when 
 
Public values are inextricably linked to political corruption because the latter tells us what we 
do and do not value. Some have defined political corruption as the degeneration of whole 
societies. Many ‘classic’ authors, such as Plato, Montesquieu and – in part – Machiavelli, all 
spoke of the corruption of the body politic in a very general sense (cf.  Dobel, 1978: 957). In 
that case corruption is a broad concept simply referring to anything that is not working 
Hidden Morals, Explicit Scandals 
 
10 | 
‘properly’ (i.e., as it is expected to) or is subject to some form of decay or degeneration away 
from an ideal state of affairs. More recent authors often take a more narrow definition, such as
the abuse of public office and/or public funds for private gain (Friedrich, 1966: 74; Van 
Klaveren, 1989: 25-28; Nye, 1967; Scott, 1972: 4). In that case, corruption becomes something 
else entirely. I will return to the matter of defining corruption in chapter one. However, for 
now it already has to be mentioned that even given a specific definition it remains difficult to 
establish when or why an act is corrupt. The seemingly simple question whether someone is 
corrupt turns out to be much more difficult at closer inspection.  
First, it is difficult to assess political corruption because public values are subjective and 
differ from person to person. What constitutes political corruption often depends on who one 
asks for an opinion. Again: people simply often disagree about what is right and wrong and 
often – and I will discuss this later on – these differences are due to different ideas on what 
exactly is a public interest or a common good throughout society and among various groups or 
individuals. A legal scholar might judge an act differently to a politician because their roles 
serve different purposes or interests. A social anthropologist might have a different view on 
corruption than an economist. A judge might have a different view than any member of the 
general public and each individual is likely to have a different view on similar supposedly 
wrongful acts.  
Second, what is called political corruption differs depending on where one looks. Behav-
iour that is acceptable in one place can be frowned upon elsewhere. Such acts as gift giving, 
certain forms of patronage or nepotism can be viewed differently across various ‘cultural’ 
contexts. Ethical relativists, for instance, offer the view that individuals, groups, societies and 
cultures, differ in their view of what is good or bad, in relation to character, conduct and 
context; relative to any given situation. This results in a ‘non-judgmental’ approach to morality, 
which holds that one should not sit in moral judgment over others. The question where one 
looks is also appropriate when looking at the same kind of behaviour that can provoke 
different moral judgments depending on the setting of an act (cf. Jacobs, 1992). Character 
traits, values and forms of behaviour are, for one, always contingent: “thou shalt not kill” 
acquires a different meaning depending on the situation (Van Wart, 1998: 6) or, as Rose-
Ackerman (op. cit. Johnston, 1996: 323; Rose Ackerman, 1978: 9) wrote: “one does not 
condemn a Jew for bribing his way out of a concentration camp”. Adjectives, as MacIntyre has 
aptly put it, acquire meaning in a context of expectations associated with a public office (1981: 
17-18). 
Third, what constitutes political corruption or immoral public official behaviour de-
pends on when we ask whether a certain act is corrupt. Arnold Heidenheimer (1989a: 3-4) once 
asked in what way perceptions of political corruption are a product of their time. This relates 
to the fundamental issue that practices that were tolerated in the past might now be con-
demned and signals that we cannot be sure how people will view things in the future. What 
was once detestable behaviour might very well be condoned again some day. In Plato’s Politeia 
(1998: 20, 24, 25-26) the Sophist and representative of the oligarchy, Tracymachus, speaks to 
Socrates of what he sees as good behaviour, justice and the morality of the state. To Tracyma-
chus good behaviour is whatever is in the interest of the strongest, while justice and morality 
are only a means for the powerful to bind the weak with rules, albeit for mutual benefit. To 
Tracymachus immorality, reversely, can never be bad. After all, Tracymachus tells us: “honest 
people in public office are worse off than dishonest ones because they neglect their own affairs 
and not take from the treasury what they want. They will get into a fight with their families and 




friends because they refuse to abuse their position to help them”. An immoral life, on the 
other hand “provides a man with more possibilities, more freedom and more power, if only 
that immorality is carried out far enough”. Tracymachus’ view on public morality would 
nowadays likely be considered corrupt. Yet, he might have represented a majority or ruling elite 
at the time and his ideas can nowadays still be heard.  
 
The quagmire of public morality 
 
Public values and political corruption form a quagmire of contextual and contingent elements 
because they are subject to changing environments and interpretations. At the same time they 
can hardly be called unimportant or uncontested concepts. First, relating to political corrup-
tion, there is the rather obvious matter of how or why public authority, power and funds are 
used. Second, but less obvious, there are also more fundamental issues at stake. Knowledge of 
public values and perceptions of political corruption leads us to have a look at core issues of 
human political interaction. The term ‘corruption’ immediately denotes assumptions, interests 
and values of countless actors in a changing political and social environment. Investigating 
contextual and changing public values and perceptions of political corruption therefore helps 
to get a clearer understanding of these assumptions, interests and values and enables us to 
determine changing ideas concerning the good life, the common good, the public interest, 
proper administration or the necessity of a delineation between public and private. It also helps 
to understand key topics from various academic disciplines. We can think of political science 
and public administration (on political legitimacy, private gain and public benefit, democratiza-
tion, representation or political trust), anthropology and sociology (on forms of human 
interaction and human organization), law (on anti-corruption legislation) and administrative 
history (on change and continuity of morality or the workings of bureaucratization to counter 
political corruption).  
The study of changing public values and political corruption helps to better understand 
and determine the entire purpose and function of ‘government’ or – even wider – ‘the public 
sector’. This is because condemning certain acts as corrupt has as much to say about any 
individual official or group of officials as it has to say about what government or the public 
sector as a whole should or should not be about. It is mainly for this reason that public values 
and political corruption are such fundamentally contested concepts. On various institutional 
levels and among various actors there is often little agreement on what political corruption is 
and which public values are most relevant. Of course, the fact that people often disagree on 
these matters has consequences for scientific debate and outcomes. This is summed up by 
Caiden (2010: 10) who writes: “the closer researchers get to specific forms of corruption the 
more they resemble the parable of the blind man and the elephant, that is, by concentrating 
only on one part (psychological, sociological, economical, political, religious, cultural, legal, 
administrative), they fail to see the whole and thereby oversimplify. To put things in their 
proper perspective, they need to step back a little and interact more with specialists in other 
fields”. This implies that interdisciplinary action helps us find a way out of the quagmire of 
public morality. In the following I will discuss just how this present study aims to contribute to 
this goal. 
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Research question, aims and assumptions 
 
A way out of the quagmire was offered in the project ‘Under Construction: The Genesis of Public 
Value Systems’ funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). The 
project aimed to study the history and development of public values and value systems over a 
period of three centuries of Dutch history by investigating political corruption scandals 
between 1650 and 1950. It focused on explicit debate on often implicit public values and 
perceptions of political corruption. It sought to assess the moral grounding of power in the 
Netherlands in this period and to combine a theoretical social scientific and philosophical 
perspective with empirical historical research. This was meant to complement existing 
knowledge of these issues in the Dutch setting as well as in a wider theoretical and thereby 
international context.  
The period 1650 – 1950 was cut into three parts, each with similar aims and questions. 
Research for the first part, The ancien regime in optima forma (1650 – 1750), was conducted by 
Michel Hoenderboom at VU University Amsterdam. Work for the third part, The ‘modern’ 
constitutional state (1850 – 1950), was conducted by Ronald Kroeze, also at VU University 
Amsterdam. This present study is the result of the second part: The ancien regime in transition 
(1750 – 1850). Its emphasis on transition obviously stems from the fact that it is positioned 
between the other two but is also derived from the fact that some major political and social 
transition occurred in this period. This study is first and foremost about changing public values 
in the context of public administration in the Netherlands1 between 1748 and 1813, in 
particular in the province of Holland (see chapter three for a discussion of the parameters of 
this study). Second, it is about political corruption in a double sense. On the one hand it is 
used as a tool to study changing public values. By looking at explicit cases of political corruption 
we gain significant knowledge of implicit and/or hidden public values. On the other hand it is 
also regarded as a topic (or rather: a negative public value) in its own right. This leads to the 
following research question: which changes in public values and public value systems become apparent from 
scandals of political corruption in the Netherlands between 1748 and 1813?  
This research question relates to two central and closely intertwined aims of this study. 
The first aim is descriptive and consists of a set of ‘what’ questions with an empirical or ‘fact 
finding’ objective. I aim to investigate which public values and perceptions of political 
corruption were prevalent, mentioned and/or considered important in public administration as 
they become apparent in three large political corruption scandals in Holland. This then leads to 
a second aim to find out whether, and if so how, why and when the meaning and/or interpre-
tation of certain public values and value systems changed over time. This is explanatory in the 
sense that I aim to provide meaningful relations or causality between changing morality and a 
wider historical context. This causality, however, can neither be clear-cut nor straightforward 
(see chapter three). This second aim consists of a set of theoretical and methodological 
questions that are in turn closely linked. Both sets are aimed at better understanding the 
‘when’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ of public value change in historical institutional context. Theoretically 
the aim is to better understand how public values and perceptions of political corruption are 
                                                 
1 The Netherlands did not as such exist yet. However, it is used here to denote various subsequent forms of state 
between 1748 and 1813: The Republic of the Seven United Provinces (1555 – 1795), the Batavian Republic (1795 – 
1806), The Kingdom of Holland (1806 – 1810), as part of the first French Empire (1810 – 1813) and the Kingdom of 
the Netherlands (1813 – 1815). See chapter four for an overview of Dutch political history. 




shaped, acquire new meaning, appear, disappear or evolve over time and why and when this 
happened. This essentially concerns investigating public value dynamics (see chapter one). 
Methodologically I consider the question how to best research changing public values and 
perceptions of political corruption in historical context. This methodological view is provided 
in chapter three and equally functions – much like political corruption in this study – as both a 
tool to study changing public values and perceptions of political corruption and as a topic of 
study in its own right.  
The research question and aims hinge on two basic assumptions underlying this study 
(discussed in more detail in chapters two and three). First, the study examines political 
corruption and public values from a historical point of view. The observant reader might have 
noticed that history is not among the ‘elephants’ in Caiden’s parable discussed earlier. Nor is it 
mentioned as a possible way of avoiding the elephant altogether. This is surprising, especially 
since historical research takes into account or covers many of the disciplines that Caiden does 
highlight. Raadschelders and others (2000: 782), for instance, point out that the multi-
disciplinary study of public administration benefits from historical research which has “at its 
core the insight that a phenomenon can only be studied holistically, precisely because of its 
contingent qualities in time and space”. It is the assumption in this study that historical 
research is actually more than merely one of the elephants. Instead, it is best considered the 
matriarch of the herd.  
A second basic assumption of this study concerns the relevance of theorizing about 
public value dynamics despite the inherent contextual, contingent and ever-changing nature of 
public values and perceptions of political corruption. The virtue of theorizing is, after all, that 
it reduces confusion, simplifies and allows us to look beyond the superficial and to generate 
new questions. While providing a single universal standard for a definition of political 
corruption or a single category of public values that transcends time and place is impossible or 
meaningless (see chapter one), stepping back still shows us that throughout history behaviour 
has always been judged as being good or bad, right or wrong or honest or corrupt and why this 
was the case. This study aims to shed theoretical and empirical light on these conventions that 
are supposedly breached and to the circumstances that in the past either led to or prevented 
political corruption and might still do so today. Its aim is to better understand the way in which 
morality underlying public administration is perceived and shaped in social-historical institu-
tional processes. This way we not only have a better knowledge of our history but also of our 
present as it allows us to understand ourselves, our institutions and our values and why we 




This book is divided in three parts. Part one consists of three chapters. Together they make up 
the theoretical, conceptual and methodological framework of this study. Chapter one, Public 
values and political corruption, provides the first part of this framework with a discussion of the 
two main objects of research in this study. Chapter two, Administrative history and public value 
dynamics, offers the second part of this framework with a discussion on the use of history for 
public value research, on Max Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy and on historical institutional 
analysis. Chapter three, Research design, explicitly ties together theory, concepts and methods and 
sets parameters. This study expressly aims to combine historical and social-scientific explora-
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tions and aims to contribute to assessing and developing new methodological and theoretical 
avenues or frames for historical comparative research into changing public values and political 
corruption. For this reason the three chapters of part one are allotted a significant amount of 
space.  
In part two I turn my attention towards the historical and philosophical context of the 
later case studies and the first empirical chapter. Chapter four, Political history and political culture 
(1748 – 1813), offers the historical (socio-political) context in which early modern Holland 
administrators operated. This is essential to understand the later case studies and why certain 
public values were or were not in existence, why some behaviour was or was not considered 
corrupt and why such things changed. The chapter also offers a view on the main elements of 
Dutch political culture in the period under investigation. Political culture, of course, also has a 
bearing on the research question. Chapter five, Best-opinion and morality of the time (1748 – 1813), 
offers a first empirical chapter and examines the so-called ‘morality of the time’ or best-
opinion on public morality as it was offered in a number of crucial writings of the period. This 
chapter serves a dual purpose. It provides context to situate the later case studies but also 
offers empirical evidence in its own right. Because of the interdisciplinary nature of this study – 
which handles the cross-section of history and the social sciences – parts of chapters four and 
five will offer familiar scenes to historians of Dutch politics and administration while to those 
unfamiliar with Dutch history these may be new and therefore essential. 
The third and final part consists of three in-depth empirical case studies of Dutch po-
litical corruption scandals between 1748 and 1813 and a concluding chapter. The three cases 
coincide – not accidentally – with three different phases in Dutch political-administrative 
history examined in chapter four and are linked to the political culture as described in chapters 
four and five. The cases take into account multiple views on political corruption from a wide 
range of sources. Every case is concluded with a similar section that provides analysis and 
conclusions in three parts. First, a brief interpretation and overview is provided of some of the 
core values and value statements as they emerged from the case. This provides an elementary 
view on the terminology used and allows one to partly assess what political corruption actually 
consisted of. Second, there is a discussion on the comparison between the various sources of 
public values investigated for each case study (see chapter three). Third, I address the question 
of change and continuity of public values and perceptions of political corruption. Chapter six, 
Taxes, political corruption and moral reform (1748 – 1756), offers a first case study on political 
corruption, bureaucratization and moral reform in the context of Holland’s changing system of 
taxation around 1750. Chapter seven, Princely patronage and patriot cause (1770s and 1780s), offers a 
second case study of political corruption in the years of Patriot agitation and revolt. Chapter 
eight, Gin, cloth and meat: political corruption in the Batavian Republic (1798), is a final case study on 
political corruption in the context of major transformations of the Dutch state following the 
Batavian revolution of 1795. While each case study is followed by its own analysis and 


















“Every system of public administration is the product of many influences. Its form and 
content reflect its historical origin; existing patterns are a composite of practices and  
procedures both ancient and contemporary. No administrative system can be well understood 
without some knowledge of what it has been, and how it came to be what it is.” 
 
Leonard D. White,  
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This chapter provides a discussion of the two main focal points of this study: public values and 
political corruption. First I discuss public values and value systems and the assessment of their 
change and continuity in historical perspective. In the same paragraph, since this study is about 
public values and political corruption, the public-private divide and notions of ‘publicness’ are 
discussed from a historical perspective. I then turn to the problem of conceptualizing, 
investigating and defining political corruption and propose a specific ‘neo-classical’ approach 
to the study of public values and political corruption. I end with a brief overview of existing 
work on Dutch political corruption to situate this study in its historiographical setting. 
 
1.2 Public values: dynamics, classifications and ‘publicness’ 
 
Values are the subject of intense debate and study, especially when it concerns public life. 
‘Good’ public administration can mean something different to every individual or group. 
Therefore, in making and executing public policy values are often contested and choices for 
specific values invariably have to be made. The importance of public values is reflected in 
much recent social scientific inquiry. Questions include what public values are (Bozeman, 
2007, 2009; Gortner, 1994; Kamto, 1997; Kernaghan, 2000; Rezsohazy, 2001: 14; Stever, 2001: 
629; Van Wart, 1998) or how to classify or arrange them (Bozeman, 2008; Rutgers, 2008b; 
Schein, 1987, 1999; Schreurs, 2003; Van Wart, 1998). Other questions concern public value 
‘trade-offs’ in actual policy implementation (Bozeman, 2008; Dobel, 1999; De Graaf & Van 
der Wal, 2010) or which values are appropriate for public administration given its specific 
nature and responsibility (Bozeman, 2002, 2007; Denhardt, 2004; Gilman & Lewis, 1996; 
Spicer, 2001; Van der Wal, 2006, 2008). Likewise, the ‘balancing’ of values is a constant 
concern for many (Copp, 1995; Goodsell, 1989; Hood, 2000; Van Wart, 1998). Moynihan 
(2009: 820), for instance, mentions Wise who suggests that the ultimate legitimacy of admini-
stration rests on its ability to offer a framework to manage competing values and trade-offs. 
Values, as MacIntyre (1981: 5-6) writes, are tied to changing social settings. For this rea-
son a sociological definition provided by Oyserman is adopted in this study. To Oyserman 
“values are patterns of regulations, accepted as desirable by persons in a given culture or family 
environment, and serve as guiding principles in their lives […] they can be thought of as 
priorities, internal compasses or springboards for action – moral imperatives. In this way 
values or mores are implicit or explicit guidelines for action, general scripts framing what is 
sought after and what is to be avoided” (2001: 16148, 16150). Oyserman furthermore writes 
how “values are at the heart of human enterprise; embedded in social systems, they are what 
makes social order both possible and resistant to change. Values are more than individual 
traits. They are social agreements about what is right, good to be cherished” (Ibid., 16151). 
Obviously, different societies or social orders judge behaviour differently and perceptions of 
what is right or good invariably change. As a result, ideas about what is considered corrupt 
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become highly contextual and contingent, implying that understanding changing values and 
perceptions of political corruption requires a historical contextual approach (see chapter three). 
Value systems are collections of values. Again, Oyserman provides a suitable definition 
for this study. He writes how value systems “represent what is expected and hoped for, what is 
required and what is forbidden. Value systems are not reports of actual behaviour but systems 
of criteria by which behaviour is judged and sanctions are applied” (Ibid., 16151) More than 
one value system can therefore exist at any one time, which sometimes causes clashes of values 
in the same administrative system. This is essentially what Riggs (1964) has called ‘polynorma-
tivism’: the need to answer to two (or more?) normative frameworks, which are usually but not 
always incommensurable. Von Thiessen (cf. 2009: 94-98; 2010) takes a historical perspective 
on this and speaks of Normenpluralität or value pluralism (see also chapters eight and nine). 
Others equally point to this. Schreurs (2003: 37-39) has noted how value systems sometimes 
support one another but can also co-exist in completely isolated spheres. 
 
Public value dynamics: diversity, change and continuity 
 
In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber (1864 – 1920) wondered how 
banking and other money-making pursuits become honourable at some point in the modern 
age “after having stood condemned or despised as greed, love of lucre, and avarice for 
centuries past?” (cf. Hirschman, 1977: 9, 130-131; Weber, 1958: 74). Weber’s question 
essentially concerned diversity, change and continuity (cf. Raadschelders, 2000: 88; Tholfsen, 
1967: 6-7) of public values and value systems. He noticed that acts are judged differently 
throughout time and depending on context (compare also the work of Norbert Elias). In the 
scale of medieval values money lending was for instance ranked lower than honour or courage. 
It is one of the essential aims of this study to shed light on how such value dynamics might 
occur. For Weber (see also chapter two) bureaucratization was a core element in this. From a 
Weberian point of view corruption is the deficient rationalization of the public service. It is a 
phase on the route from patrimonial to rational legal authority (Hoetjes, 1977: 53-55; see also 
Rubinstein, 1983). As such, Weber had a notion of changing value systems as a transition from 
one phase to another. “For him”, write Rubinstein & De Graaf, “corruption was the hallmark 
of an earlier, more ‘primitive’ stage of society, and would eventually vanish with the triumph of 
a professionalized bureaucracy” (2010: 21).  
Clashing value systems do not, of course, necessarily have to lead to public value  
dynamics or evolution of values and value systems. Clashes are, in other words, neither 
necessary nor sufficient cause for change. At the same time, research has provided some 
interesting results with regard to this link. Various recent historical studies have shown how 
public values do come to change as a result of clashes and transitions between different phases 
of development. Wagenaar & Van der Meij (2006) have done so when discussing the moral 
dilemmas of a seventeenth century Dutch bailiff. In a different article (2005), they applied 
Riggs’ idea of polynormativism to a seventeenth century case of corruption to the same effect 
(compare also Nützenadel, 2009; Von Thiessen, 2009, 2010). In a corruption case of a 
seventeenth century public magistrate, Hoenderboom and Kerkhoff (2008) have shown how 
accusations of political corruption often occurred when different value systems clashed. 
Attempts to show the existence of different value systems over time have been made by 
Kerkhoff et al. (2010) and by Wagenaar (2010: 1-2) who juxtaposed so-called face-to-face 
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societies with more bureaucratic ones. Face-to-face society’s highly personal and ‘particularis-
tic’ norms could easily come into conflict with the impersonal and ‘universalistic’ norms 
attached to the budding bureaucracy also known in early modern society. In effect, there were 
often two distinct moral codes and administrators would often be judged according to both. 
Behaviour was considered corrupt as soon as the balance was disturbed (cf. Kerkhoff, et al., 
forthcoming). 
Aforementioned studies show that clashes and coexistence of values and value systems 
bring about change in or at least debate on public values. They show that any public value 
system, as Alasdair Roberts puts it, is “the product of social struggles and popular arguments 
about proper conduct […]. They are artefacts of human behaviour instead of inevitabilities” 
(1994: 412). This means that when value systems clash, people on all levels, in all times and in 
all functions have to balance old and new values. Somewhere and somehow, for instance, 
‘bureaucratic’ values such as impartiality or neutrality might take over or are added to existing 
‘pre-bureaucratic’ values such as honour or wealth. Rezsohazy stresses this very point when he 
writes that value systems are always ‘moving’. Values are “constantly being added, lost, 
strengthened, weakened which has an impact on the system as a whole” (2001: 16153). It is 
also “hierarchically built up, it is a scale of values. The more a value is deeply rooted, the more 
it takes a central place and the more it is lived intensely, arouses emotion, and mobilizes 
vehement energies […]. A set of values is a living system, very complex, open to seesaw 
motions and variations” (Ibid., 16154). This provides part of an explanation for historical 
diversity, change and continuity of public values. “Men”, as Reszohazy writes, “progressively 
learn the rules of their society”, and that values and value systems are “maintained by condi-
tions of real existence, i.e., if a value or value system appears to work as an efficient guide to 
life there is no reason to change them. Values are also maintained, reinforced, and changed 
through social approval or disapproval. Conformity is rewarded, deviance is penalized” (Ibid., 
16154). Values in a system of course also change as they are “upgraded, downgraded, incorpo-
rated or exiled, intensified or weakened etc. according to changes in social environment”. This 
is in line with Beck-Jørgensen’s argument (2009: 456) that approaches to value change need to 
read values in their relevant political-ideological and philosophical context. This position is 
adopted in this present study as well. 
 
Classifications of public values 
 
While few would really argue that values are not contextual, contingent or changing, this has 
not stopped people from making lists and/or classifications. Well known are the four cardinal 
virtues of determination (fortitudo), temperance (temperentia), justice (justitia) and practical 
wisdom (prudentia), or the three theological virtues of hope (spes), faith (fides) and charity (caritas) 
as they are provided by Plato’s Politeia, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics or Cicero’s De Officis and 
by Christian scholars such as Thomas Aquinas (Nieuwenburg, 2001: 33). In more recent times 
many others have tried to distinguish levels, classifications or categories of public values (See 
for overviews: Rutgers, 2008b; Schreurs, 2003). Recent attempts at categorization and 
classification can be found in the work of Schein (1987: 15-18; 1999: 15-26), Gilman & Lewis 
(1996: 517), Van Wart (1998: 166-171), Stever (2001: 629) and Beck Jørgensen & Bozeman 
(2007: 360-361). These attempts, despite definite merit, reveal some crucial difficulties that 
ensure that this present study does not provide a quantitative analysis, theoretical classification 
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and/or categorization of public values found in the cases between 1748 and 1813. A first 
difficulty, exemplified by the work of Schein and Van Wart (cf. Rutgers 2008b: 100-101), is 
that the basis for many classifications of and distinctions between different types of public 
values are not clear and that they often remain abstract and thus lack (much desired) precision. 
A second problem is that any classification and/or categorization inherently negates the 
contextual and contingent nature of public values. Rutgers (2008b: 109), for instance, states 
that “despite all these attempts it is hard to find any self-evident core values, or categorizations 
or hierarchies of values that can simply be applied universally in theory or practice”. Schreurs 
(2003: 41) similarly argued that lists, rankings and classifications do not actually teach us much 
about the meaning of particular values. Furthermore, while categorizations, classifications and 
rankings might bring order to the multitude of values, she argues that they tell us little about 
their actual foundation (Ibid., 35-36), about the relationship between public values, decisions 
and actions or about the actual function of a value in a specific context or situation (Ibid., 40). 
From a more historical point of view we can, thirdly, add to this that classifications and/or 
categorizations can only (potentially) tell us something about the relative importance of public 
values in a particular time and place. They are, therefore, unable or unsuitable to express or 
explain public value change over longer periods of time.  
 
Shifting notions of ‘publicness’ 
 
Distinctions between something public and something private have always been a major 
element of almost any culture (Rutgers, 2004: 138). In public administration literature it has, in 
any case, been a fundamental empirical and normative distinction. If we want to understand 
public administration and its underlying morality – both in past and present – we need to know 
what ‘publicness’ means, not least because publicness is directly linked to public values and 
perceptions of political (i.e., public) corruption. Shifting or changing notions of publicness are, 
in other words, connected to changing notions of community, society and/or citizenship and 
therefore to changing public values and perceptions of political corruption. When ‘the public’ 
becomes increasingly separated from ‘the private’ we might, for instance, begin to find reasons 
why behaviour is judged differently in the two spheres. Expectations, assumptions and value 
judgments concerning the acts of public officials tend to vary as they are tied to varying 
notions of ‘publicness’ or ‘privateness’.  
However, determining a public-private divide for times past is difficult. For most of 
history ‘modern’ notions of public and private – such as those based on organizational 
dimensions (cf. Rainey, et al., 1976) such as legal status and legal and regulatory power (cf. 
Dijkstra & Van der Meer, 2003) or funding and ownership (cf. Wamsley & Zald, 1973) – did 
not exist. A public office could often not be separated from a private person and his (women 
were rarely if ever involved in politics or administration) personal finances and the execution 
of what we would now call public tasks was often in the hands of ‘private’ actors such as the 
church or well-off individuals without formal legal status and regulatory power even being an 
issue. While a purely organizational perspective on the public – private divide is therefore too 
narrow for the question and aims of this study, the rise and/or increasing importance of legal 
criteria in particular will prove to be important. We will see how notions of publicness did 
indeed shift with their increased importance.  
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In addition, taking a somewhat broader perspective on the divide (or rather dichotomy, see 
Rutgers 2004), allows us to distinguish different notions of ‘publicness’ that have emerged 
throughout history. Weintraub (1997: 7) provides an overview of traditions that have affected 
the notion of publicness in history. Two of them especially help us determine publicness in the 
period between 1748 and 1813. The first is the so-called republican-virtue (or ‘classical’) model 
that sees the public realm in terms of a political community and citizenship, analytically distinct 
from both market and administrative state. Private, here, pertains to one’s household, the 
home and family. In general this classic model was a combination of attention for public duties 
and common good on the one hand and private interests and benefits on the other but in 
which the former was morally superior to latter (cf. Pesch, 2005: 39; Rutgers, 2003a: 20). 
According to Weintraub this general classical model was replaced in more recent times by a 
second, liberal-economic, model in which a clearer separation was made between state 
administration and market economy. In this tradition scholars such as John Locke (1632 – 
1704) and Adam Smith (1723 – 1790) created the idea of a private sphere of ‘natural’ individu-
als guided by self-interest and the market. It meant, according to Weintraub, the complete 
reversal of the classical republican virtue model in which cooperation and collaboration 
between equal individuals was supposed to lead to a public collective (the political community).  
A similar and related shift supposedly occurred with regard to the meaning of ‘the 
common good’ and the ‘public interest’ as opposed to the ‘private good’ or ‘commercial 
interest’. According to Münkler & Fischer, the early modern period – roughly from the 
Reformation onwards – reflected a paradigm shift “in which the old European ideal of political 
virtue, in the sense of the citizen’s voluntary orientation toward the public good” was replaced 
(2001: 12527). Now, rational self-interest emerged as a core concept “in the context of a 
market society in the course of self-differentiation, with the state now simply expected to set 
the conditions for maximized economic well-being of the citizenry in a civil society” (cf. 
Hirschman, 1977: 32-33; Münkler & Fischer, 2001: 12527). It remains to be seen, however, 
whether the shifts described by Weintraub and, to a lesser extent, by Münkler & Fischer also 
occurred in the Dutch eighteenth century context. For instance, while various early-modern 
authors did in fact start to discuss economic self-interest, they often found this – or wanted 
this to be – fully reconcilable with attending to the common good. Examples of this can be 
found in Bernard Mandeville (1670 – 1733) (cf. Van Erp & Van Gils, 1987: 110; Münkler & 
Fischer, 2001: 12527), in Montesquieu (1698 – 1755) (cf. Hirschman, 1977; xxii, 10) or Adam 
Smith (1723 – 1790). The latter famously argued that citizens generally do not promote the 
public interest and only intend their own gain but also said that people (should) realize that a 
common good is essential to protect any self-interest (Münkler & Fischer, 2001: 12527).  
It is not unimaginable that Dutch authors between 1748 and 1813 also favoured similar 
combinations of ‘classical’ and ‘modern’ value systems. This would shed more light on public 
value change and I will return to this question in chapters five and nine. For now, however, it 
remains to be specified that the link between private and public interest (and common good) 
on the one hand and public values and perceptions of political corruption on the other hand is 
very important for the purposes of this study. To Blitz “public interests are what several of us 
happen to desire, or means to satisfaction that we generally want” (2001: 12547). In this way 
the scope of public interests becomes very broad to signify “anything that is not private, so 
that regard for the public interests means any regard for interests or groups that are not strictly 
or exclusively one’s own” (Lewin, 1991). Adding to the confusion about how to define public 
interests (and common goods) is the fact that there often exist different publics or groups who 
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all have their own interests (cf. Rutgers, 2004: 140). This leads to important realizations: first, 
there are as many public interests and common goods as there are publics. Second, we 
therefore need to accept there is no single public interest or common good and third, we need 
to realize that public interests and common goods are always contextual and open to debate 
and discussion. This has led Witteveen to call the public interest a “useful fiction” (op cit. 
Becker, 2007: 31). Becker (Ibid., 29) equally wrote that the concept “does not represent an 
actual existing value system but rather a point of orientation for everyone in society […] it is an 
imaginary, overarching moral focal point positioned away from all sorts of societal forces”.  
While public interest and public good are thus notoriously difficult to define we still 
need to do so because they are invariably connected to what are considered public values and 
what is perceived as political corruption. One approach to the public interest is that of political 
philosopher Brian Berry who noted that “the only really satisfactory way of approaching ‘the 
public interest’ is to take a great number of examples of actual uses – and see what could be 
made of them” (op cit. in Bozeman, 2007: 84). According to Bozeman few have answered this 
call but in this present study I attempt to provide at least a sample. In order to do so I use 
Bozeman’s definition of the public interest as a guideline. This reads: “in a particular context, 
the public interest refers to the outcomes best serving the long-run survival and well-being of a 
social collective construed as a ‘public’” (Ibid., 12). It is a workable definition because it is 
changeable, adaptable, context-sensitive and situation-dependent. Finally, it helps us define 
what public values are. Bozeman again provides a definition – which is adopted in this study – 
of public values as “those providing normative consensus about (a) the rights, benefits, and 
prerogatives to which citizens should (and should not) be entitled; (b) the obligations of 
citizens to society, the state, and one another; and (c) the principles on which governments and 
policies should be based” (Ibid., 17). 
 
1.3 Concepts, theories and definitions of political corruption 
 
Any society needs a social moral code if people are to live together. Social codes consist of 
public values and serve as standards by which we judge our actions and those of others in 
society (cf. Copp, 1995: 19). However, these codes or moral standards are made by people with 
different and often conflicting agenda’s, priorities and ideas on right and wrong. This means 
there are often various different moral standards that are derived from different sources in any 
given society (what is corrupt, as mentioned, depends on the questions who, when and where). If 
we are to define political corruption as the deviation from certain standards in society this 
means that whether something is corrupt or not is continuously open for debate. Precisely for 
this reason Caiden wrote how “theorizing about corruption, like theorizing about most things, 
is a hazardous venture but probably even more so. It requires speculation and conjecture, 
concluding proof based on evidence, and universal acceptance. Speculation can be wide of the 
mark. Accumulated facts can be quite deceptive and misleading. Universal acceptance can be 
impossible to achieve given the variety of belief systems that exist at any one time” (2010: 9). 
In the following, the issue of delineating, defining and studying political corruption is discussed 
in more detail. I will deal with the concept of political corruption, with academic corruption 
discourses (concerning the way in which political corruption can best be investigated and 
understood) and with different associated definitions of political corruption. Benefits and 
downsides of the various approaches and definitions lead me to discuss a specific ‘neo-
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classical’ approach. This approach will be one of the theoretical and methodological founda-
tions of this present study because it is capable of tackling the contextual, contingent and 
changing nature of public values and perceptions of political corruption, also in historical 
context (see chapter three). 
 
The concept of political corruption 
 
Inherent difficulties to define political corruption have led Robert Williams to write that “it is a 
curious state of affairs when an academic mini-industry and the policy agendas of development 
professionals are dominated by a concept which most participants in the debate are reluctant 
or unable to define” (1999: 503). A single uncontested definition of political corruption seems 
nowhere in sight and it remains, in the words of Anechiarico and Jacobs, “a social, legal, and 
political concept laden with ambiguity and bristling with controversy” (1996: 16). The truth of 
this statement quickly becomes apparent from a brief look at dictionaries or encyclopaedias. 
Contrary to the common modern-day negative connotation of corruption the first encyclopae-
dia of Diderot and d’Alembert, for instance, provided the philosophical view of corruption as a 
generating or creating (i.e., a positive) force. D’Alembert discussed the view that “corruption is 
the state by which one thing ceases to be what it once was. One can say that wood is corrupted 
when it is no longer in existence; and that instead of wood, we find fire. Similarly, an egg is 
corrupted when it ceases to be an egg and we find a chicken in its place for corruption is not 
taken here in the usual sense. Hence the philosophical axiom, that the corruption of one thing 
is the creation of another” (d'Alembert, 1754: 278).  
However, corruption is more often regarded as something negative and/or detrimental. 
The Oxford English Dictionary provides a number of interesting and common definitions. 
Corruption means dishonest or fraudulent conduct by those in power, typically involving 
bribery or the action or effect of making someone or something morally depraved; the process 
by which a word or expression is changed from its original state to one regarded as erroneous 
or debased or the process of decay; putrefaction. The term stems from the Latin corruptus, past 
particle of corrumpere, which is to ‘mar, bribe, destroy’ and is built from cor (‘altogether’) and 
rumpere (‘to break’). Many dictionaries define corruption similarly, for instance as the use of or 
participation in decay, bribery, and forgery. Sometimes it is equalled to the sale of offices 
(venality) or is described more broadly as degeneration, deterioration, adulteration, bastardiza-
tion, malversation, falsification, irregularities, shady dealings, being diluted or watered-down, 
depravation, perversity, turpitude or vice. The context and use of the word is – naturally in the 
case of language – decisive. Corruption in the sense of decay or degeneration can for instance 
equally be linked to food (a corrupt apple), language (the corruption of a text), honour (the 
corruption of blood) or behaviour (a corrupt official). In fact Heidenheimer (1989a: 7-8) once 
noted how only one of nine commonly accepted definitions for the term corruption in the 
Oxford English Dictionary is applicable to political contexts.  
We are dealing with two important and related difficulties here. First, there is the issue 
of (seeming) anachronism. The use of the term political corruption for times when the term 
might not have existed or might not have been used can, in other words, be dangerous. The 
same goes, for instance, for terms such as civil servant or bureaucrat. At the same time, 
however, the historian of ideas and concepts needs such terms to be able to observe and make 
sense of things in times past. Also, it need not be anachronistic (or deterministic) as long as the 
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term is defined in a broad enough way. As I will explain later on in this section (on old and 
new definitions of political corruption and on the proposed neo-classical approach of this 
study) a broad definition of political corruption leaves room to use a single term for reasons of 
clarity without in any way fixing its meaning in advance. 
The second issue concerns assessing continuity and change in language and meaning. 
This is an essential part of historians’ attempts to understand developments in political and 
social thought, intellectual history and history of ideas and can be vital to understand origins 
and past uses of concepts that are still central today (Richter, 1995: 5) but it remains a difficult 
task. Continuities in political language may, for instance, persist despite changes in political 
circumstances; shifts may also occur in the words or expressions designating a concept in the 
same or different periods; a concept may remain fixed while the terms regarded as its anto-
nyms may alter (a term such as despotism may change meaning when opposite is thought 
liberty and another when opposite is anarchy). Furthermore, change in meaning can of course 
occur but then we have to ask ourselves how periods of crisis, of accelerated, radical, or 
revolutionary change produce fundamental disagreements about the languages of politics and 
society? (Ibid., 9-10).  
I cannot here discuss all the problems associated with the conceptual history of corrup-
tion in detail. However, I do wish to mention two fundamental elements. The first has been 
noted by Richter, among others, who wrote that “the presence or absence of conceptual 
distinctions in the language of politics reveals much about the government of a society as well 
as about the conceptual resources available to those participating in discussions of its arrange-
ments” (Ibid., 9). Such attempts to link changing language to descriptions of politics and 
political change have, most notably, been made by Reichardt and others (1985) in the case of 
France and by Brunner, Conze & Koselleck (1972; 1982; 1985) in the case of Germany. The 
latter’s Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe proposed their famous – and of particular relevance for this 
study, see chapters three and five – Sattelzeit hypothesis with which they marked the period 
1750 – 1850 in German history as one of major transition in political and administrative 
development (cf. Van Sas, 2005: 18). Koselleck and others linked transitions in political, social 
and economic structures to changes in the meaning and function of key political and social 
concepts. They investigated not just the concepts but the wider history as well and connected 
conceptual and social history in which they related thought to changes in the structures of 
government and society (Richter, 1995: 19-20). For the German situation they found four 
crucial elements contributing to changing concepts: Demokratisierung (a broader public of 
readers and the emergence of new genres of communication), Verzeitlichung (concepts became 
more dynamic because of democratization and came to refer to an as yet unrealized future), 
Ideologisierbarkeit (the content of concepts shifted from being concrete and specific to being 
abstract, allowing them to be used for general ideologies) and finally Politisierung (concepts were 
connected to current political conflict). As we will see such things also happened in the Dutch 
context. 
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Discourses and theories on political corruption 
 
Political corruption is a phenomenon studied in a variety of disciplines, such as economics, 
political science, law or anthropology. This has resulted in several academic discourses trying to 
theorize about the concept and explaining what political corruption is and why it occurs. 
Recently a useful overview of eight theoretical approaches has been provided (cf. De Graaf, et 
al., 2010a: 17-19). I will briefly discuss four of these that are most relevant for the conclusions 
of this study, i.e., the case studies that follow are meant to put these four in perspective and to 
assess them critically.  
A first approach takes the institutional design of political systems as a core focus. Here, in-
stitutions are believed “to shape behaviour which makes some political systems (presidential, 
federal) more prone to political corruption than others (parliamentary, unitary)” (De Graaf, et 
al., 2010a: 18-19). Closely related to this approach are (neo-) institutional theories (Hall & 
Taylor, 1996; March & Olsen, 1989; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991) that emphasize the influence 
of institutions (such as rules, symbols, routines, norms or scripts) on individual preferences 
and action in collective social settings. “To act appropriately”, as De Graaf et al. write, then 
“simply means to act in accordance with institutionalized practices of a collective. Corruption 
or deviance from accepted norms and standards occurs when institutions do not fulfil this 
‘sense making’ function and therefore create uncertainty and disorder” (2010: 18). This 
“normative version of institutionalism”, according to Peters, “has direct relevance for 
understanding corruption” as it “stresses the central role of ‘appropriateness’ within organiza-
tions and institutions and assumes that individual behaviours can be shaped by institutional 
values, symbols, myths and routines” (2010: 83; cf. Tavits, 2007). Peters  relates the institu-
tional design of political systems to the quality of government and addresses the question “how 
to design the interaction between state and society in ways that facilitate the quality of 
governance, defined broadly as well, as to minimize the probability of corrupt practices”. An 
institutional design approach therefore makes sense to explain political corruption although we 
should be careful to directly link structure to levels of corruption (cf. Peters, 2010: 95-96). 
Second there is a structural functionalist approach to political corruption. This approach 
views society as a collection of coherent systems in which all societal phenomena have a 
function. Scholars with this approach ask which function corruption fulfils in a specific society 
(Hoetjes, 1977: 55-57; 1982: 67-69; Riggs, 1964; De Zwart, 2010). Corruption can for instance 
provide protection and influence for groups in society that possess material wealth but lack 
political influence (Waquet & McCall, 1991: 62). Similarly, brokerage (according to some a 
form of political corruption) can serve to facilitate action between central and local levels 
(Blockmans, 1985; Huiskamp, 1995). A structural-functionalist approach raises many interest-
ing issues. Could it be, for instance, that specific forms of political corruption, when the 
context allows them to exist, actually initiate and stimulate political processes that might 
otherwise never have been possible? (cf. Welskopp, 2010: 222). Can political corruption also be 
a good thing? Without it, some things might simply not get done or continue to be done ‘the 
wrong way’. Such a perspective might also lead one to take a more relativist stance. If what 
some call political corruption simply works and/or is accepted in a specific context who is 
anyone to decide this is wrong? A closer look at the actual function of corruption can provide, 
as Wellskopp says, some distance between “real political scenario’s” and “moral-philosophical 
fiction” (2010: 221).  
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A third approach that is often used to understand and explain political corruption is the 
institutional economics (or rationality and economy) approach. It has, arguably, been the most 
dominant in recent decades (Lambsdorff, 2002, 2007; Rose Ackerman, 2010). Rose-
Ackerman’s landmark study of 1978 was a first systematic application of economics to the 
study of corruption. In this view corrupt officials are rational utility maximizers who simply 
take the most profitable course of action in every situation (Rose Ackerman, 1978: 4) or, 
“corruption occurs where private wealth and public power overlap, it represents the illicit use 
of willingness-to-pay as a decision-making criterion. A private individual or firm makes a 
payment to a public official in return for a benefit or to avoid cost” (Rose Ackerman, 2010: 
47). There are different sub-theories that belong to this approach as well. A notable one is 
principal agent theory (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose Ackerman, 1978) which sees “pathologies in the 
agency/principal relation”, Rose-Ackerman writes, as “at the heart of the corrupt transaction” 
(2010: 48). The core of the principal-agent problem according to Bozeman (2007: 57) is “how 
to ensure that the agent (a contractor or employee) will act in the best interest of the employ-
ing principal, given differences in motive, information, and preference”. It concerns difficulties 
that arise because of asymmetric relationships between principal (subordinate) and agent 
(superior), many of which are inherent in the delegation of legislative authority to bureaucratic 
agencies. Political corruption according to this approach can be explained as civil servants 
(agents) violating their official duties (imposed by principals) by favouring certain persons 
(clients) for material rewards (cf. Klitgaard, 1988: 24). However, both the institutional 
economics and principal agent approaches have attracted their share of criticism (cf. Rothstein, 
2010; Williams, 1999). Most notable is the limitation to strictly economic motives and rational 
behaviour of individuals. Emotionally motivated political corruption employed for non-
economic purposes seems to largely fall outside its scope. As we will see in the following case 
studies, this criticism can be verified. 
The fourth approach is Weberian ideal-typical. The theoretical work on bureaucratization 
of Max Weber (1864 – 1920) has been of crucial relevance to the study of political corruption 
even though it seems not to have been a major (or rather: explicit) topic for Weber himself. 
His approach is often used to view political corruption as the deficient rationalization of the 
public service. Corruption is a phase on the route from patrimonial to rational legal authority 
(Hoetjes, 1977: 53-55; cf. Rubinstein, 1983). In short: the more bureaucratic a society becomes 
the less political corruption will occur because of the growing amount of and adherence to 
bureaucratic rules and regulations and (possibly) because of coinciding evolving ideas on 
neutrality, common good and public versus private interest. In many ways the Weberian ideal-
typical approach is able to better incorporate and use elements that are problematic in some of 
the other approaches mentioned earlier. The bureaucratic ideal-type for instance enables us to 
analyze any shift from private to public or vice versa and is able to provide – at least in an 
ideal-typical way – solid standards (i.e., legal-rational rules) for a better use of more public 
office centred approaches. From a historical point of view it also helps to chart and understand 
important topics for the study of political corruption and public values such as state-formation 
or the link between state and society. Furthermore, it is able to tell us a lot about ‘old and new’ 
political corruption and the long term influence of new institutions and organizational reform 
on changing public morality (cf. Kerkhoff, 2011). I will discuss this in more detail in chapters 
two, six and nine. 
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Old and new definitions of political corruption 
 
Since the concept of corruption is so difficult to delineate, problems of definition inevitably 
arise. These problems usually start with scope. In the introduction I mentioned that corruption 
in its ‘classical’ use (by Plato, Thucydides, Cicero and, partly, Machiavelli) was often under-
stood in a general or broad way. It referred to the overall moral and political health or decay of 
whole societies (Friedrich, 1989: 18; Heidenheimer, 1989a: 4-5; Johnston, 1996: 322) and was 
often used to speak of “the corruption of the body politic” or “the decay of a political order” 
(Dobel, 1978: 959). Plato wrote of corrupted constitutions that were guided not by law but by 
the interests of the ruling elite. Cicero saw political corruption as one of the chief causes of the 
decay of the Roman Republic; Montesquieu (partially, see below) saw political corruption as 
the decay of an essentially good political system (i.e., monarchy) into despotism (Friedrich, 
1989: 17-18). For Montesquieu, corruzione meant deterioration in the quality of government, no 
matter for what reasons it occurs (Hirschman, 1977: 40). Based on such views, Dobel defines 
this classical notion of political corruption as “the moral incapacity of citizens to make 
reasonably disinterested commitments to actions, symbols and institutions which benefit the 
substantive common welfare” (Dobel, 1978: 960). The essence of political corruption remains 
“the decline in the ability and willingness of the citizens to act spontaneous or disinteresting to 
support other citizens or communal institutions” (Ibid., 963). This understanding revolves 
around key concepts of loyalty and civic virtue and thus encompasses or needs an idea of 
community or communal welfare (see earlier in this chapter on public interest and common 
good) and is about selfishness as opposed to altruism. Johnston notes how in its classical 
(Republican?) meaning “politics was meant to transcend any clash of specific individual 
interests” (1996: 322).  
Although political corruption in its classical sense was often linked to the general health 
of the body politic, it could also often refer to economically motivated behaviour and actions 
of individuals. Aristotle viewed political corruption as the embezzlement of common money 
and Cicero viewed it as self-interest of civil servants (Tiihonen, 2003: 8). Machiavelli is a good 
example of how both classical (broad) and modern (narrow) understandings could go hand in 
hand. For him it “refers to a fall from general standards of honesty, fairness, and impartiality 
which essentially are bureaucratic standards” and “says nothing about the quality of our 
political leadership or the viability of our political values or style” (cf. Shumer, 1979: 6-7). 
According to Shumer, Machiavelli “stands in this older tradition of political discourse. For him 
as for previous political theorists, the concepts of political corruption and health were tools for 
critical understanding, for understanding the personality of whole political systems, thereby 
illuminating the significance of specific actions within the polity”. Shumer believes how 
political corruption to Machiavelli was the mirror image of the healthy Republic but that 
Machiavelli at the same time deduced from this general view several characteristics of the good 
individual official or ruler. Healthy politics supposedly created actors who “subordinate all of 
their own advantage to the common good” and who “with the greatest diligence cared for and 
preserved things private and public” who were “prudent and just” and “conducted themselves 
according to the laws”. Political corruption was consequently described by Machiavelli as abuse 
of liberty, licentiousness, lust, lavishness, avarice, ambition, violence, and acting without having 
any regard to any civil rights (Shumer, 1979: 8-9). 
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Some authors (cf. Hirschman, 1977: 40) have suggested that the ‘classical’ component of a 
definition of political corruption has vanished in recent decades to make way for entirely 
narrow and legally and/or economically based definitions. Shumer (1979: 6-8), for instance, 
wrote how “the sense that the polity itself may be corrupt is [at present, TK] lost from an older 
usage”. Political corruption has become “a form of personal dishonesty. Acts of corruption are 
the misdeeds of some politicians, or of some citizens […]. Corruption refers to the use of 
bribes, to gain political ends or positions”. In order to “break the bonds of contemporary 
concepts with their claims of neutrality,” Shumer continued, “we must recall an older vocabu-
lary designed for understanding and judging the fundamental bases of political life”. More 
recently Johnston wrote how “as the scope of politics broadened, our conception of corrup-
tion has however narrowed. Societies have become secularized and fragmented; many are seen 
more as arenas for contention among groups and interests than as embodying any coherent 
system of values; and ethical issues in politics now seems to revolve more around maintaining 
the fairness of this competition than around the pursuit of fundamental moral goals” 
(Johnston, 1996: 322; 2005: 62-63).  
The ‘narrowing’ of the definition can be seen in various studies over the past few dec-
ades that seem to have taken wider moral issues out of the equation (cf. Williams, 1999: 504). 
Significant in a move from a ‘wide classic’ to a ‘modern narrow’ definition, as noted by 
Tiihonen (2003: 9), was James Bryce’s late nineteenth century definition of political corruption. 
This was (1) cash payment to civil servants, (2) another kind of payment to civil servants, (3) 
speculation on agreements, and (4) favour in nominations. In hindsight, Bryce was an early 
example of Rose-Ackerman’s institutional economy approach. Much like Rose-Ackerman the 
crucial elements were bribery and personal gain. With the narrowing of definitions of political 
corruption (and perhaps of politics itself?) many have taken the same route as Bryce in 
attempts to find some kind of (single) objective standard to define political corruption and/or 
improper individual conduct. As Rose-Ackerman wrote: “normative statements about 
corruption require a point of view, a standard of ‘goodness’, and a model of how corruption 
works in particular instances” (1978: 9).  
Well-known in this respect is Heidenheimer’s distinction (cf. 1970; 1989a) between 
definitions centred on public office, market and public interest. First, a typical public office 
centred definition has been provided by Joseph Nye as “behaviour which deviates from the 
formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding (close family, personal, private 
clique) pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of 
private-regarding influence” (Nye, 1967: 417). Similarly, Scott found the standard of corruption 
in legal codes and rules that apply to the holder of a public office. To him political corruption 
was “the violation of formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding wealth or 
status gains” (Scott, 1972: 4). Of course legal rules and regulations seem solid enough stan-
dards by which to measure political corruption. This makes this kind of definition relatively 
easy to operationalize. However, the obvious downside is that it does not take into account the 
normative element of political corruption. For this legal rules of public office are too rigid and 
formal because legal acts can still be morally reprehensible. It also presupposes formal rules, 
regulations, and clearly defined public roles that do not always exist or have not always existed 
in times past (cf. Johnston, 1996: 323; Williams, 1999: 504-505).  
As a result of the problems inherent in the legal public office definition some tried to 
break away from it early on. Leff, for instance, viewed political corruption as an ‘extra-legal 
institution’ (1970: 510). Second, a typical market-centred definition is found in the work of Van 
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Klaveren who wrote that “a corrupt civil servant regards his public office as a business, the 
income of which he will […] seek to maximize. The office then becomes a ‘maximizing unit’. 
The size of his income depends […] upon the market situation and the talents for finding the 
point of maximal gain on the public’s demand curve” (Heidenheimer, 1989a: 9; Van Klaveren, 
1989: 26). This definition is able to take into account the crucial element of maximizing gain 
but raises much criticism at the same time. Johnston noted it is difficult to say which market 
one should refer to and the definition also “overlooks the intangible benefits (prestige, 
promises of political support etc.) that can flow from the abuse of authority” (1996: 323-324). 
Third, a public-interest definition has been provided by Carl Friedrich who wrote that “the 
pattern of corruption can be said to exist whenever a power holder who is charged with doing 
certain things, i.e., who is a responsible functionary or officeholder, is by monetary or other 
rewards not legally provided for, induced to take actions which favour whoever provides the 
rewards and thereby does damage to the public and its interests” (1966: 74). This kind of 
definition is plausible, for instance, when Scott’s formal legal standards are difficult to find. It 
also takes into account an important moral aspect of political corruption: the harming of public 
interests (Johnston, 1996: 324). It becomes less plausible when we notice that it presupposes a 
distinction between public and private and a fairly clear idea of what constitutes public 
interests. As we have seen, these two issues are highly contested especially in historical context 
(cf. Rutgers, 2003a; Wagenaar, 2003).  
 
Between Scylla & Scarybdis 
 
The downsides of the various academic discourses, narrow definitions and single standards 
make it seem unlikely we will ever be able to present one definition of political corruption. 
Furthermore, as Kurer notes: the “discussion of the definition of corruption has progressed 
little since Heidenheimer’s groundbreaking distinction” (2005: 222). While such a statement is 
somewhat too gloomy it does point to a fundamental problem of common approaches and 
definitions: they are often too narrow to encompass the broad contextual meaning political 
corruption often acquires. Some therefore argue for a broader approach. Tiihonen (2003: 9) 
for instance noted a shift from broad to narrow definitions and in a critique of the use of too 
narrow definitions by international organizations (such as the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development) he attributed this to the fact that “broader definitions are difficult to 
handle in comparative studies”. However, to him a broad definition of political corruption is 
necessary “as a deep feature of political culture. It is not just a question of individuals, but also 
a question of the political system” (2003: 10). At the same time it is true that while a broad 
approach might be sensitive to context and is able to provide much detail it is also likely to be 
unclear, inconsistent and difficult to operationalize. There have been several scholars who 
“cast their net as widely as possible” (Heidenheimer, 1989a: 7) to come up with a broad 
definition. Berg et al. (1976: 3) for instance wrote how political corruption refers to any 
behaviour which “violates and undermines the norms of the system of public order which is 
deemed indispensible for the maintenance of political democracy”. Such a broad definition 
essentially prevents people, in the words of Mény & De Souza “from establishing empirically 
what standards defined political corruption”, which led them to “sacrifice clarity to brevity, in 
so far as it leaves too implicit how or why behaviour is deviant from which norms” (2001: 
2828).  
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Thus we find ourselves between Scylla and Charybdis. This is described by Williams (1999: 
504) who wrote that “if they are to serve a useful role in the subsequent analysis, definitions of 
social phenomena need to be capacious yet discriminating. If they are too narrowly drawn, they 
will not be comprehensive. If they are too broad, they may be seen as vague and imprecise”. 
Both narrow and wide approaches and definitions have benefits and downsides. Each 
approach and definition discussed so far offers interesting elements that can (at least partly) 
explain the occurrence of political corruption and its underlying values and assumptions. For 
example, while Nye’s public office definition or Rose-Ackerman’s institutional economics have 
their downsides it would be unwise to discard them entirely. On the other hand the downsides 
of each individual approach and/or definition are such that we have to move beyond their 
limitations and look for an alternative. Therefore I argue in this study (see also chapter three) 
that we should return to the classic notion of political corruption in our discussions on the 
topic while not forgetting more narrow standards. We should adopt a ‘neo-classical’ approach 
and definition. When we relate political corruption not just to such individual acts but also to 
wider notions such as (harming) the common good or the public interest it becomes clear why 
the ‘classical’ idea should be revisited and why the ‘modern’ idea should be revised. 
 
A neo-classical approach 
 
There have been various attempts to overcome the limitations inherent in all too narrow or too 
wide approaches and definitions of political corruption. Most of them are to be found in a 
family of approaches labelled ‘neo-classical’, ‘post-positivist’, ‘cultural’ or ‘constructivist’. The 
various labels point to different common characteristics that are particularly advantageous for 
investigating changing public values and perceptions of political corruption, especially in 
historical context. The core of these approaches is a focus on the contextual and contingent 
nature of political corruption and its various definitions (De Graaf, et al., 2010b: 99). Tänzler 
(2007) advocates a cultural approach as he investigates the social realities of how political 
corruption is perceived. Sissener (2001) advocates an ‘anthropological’ perspective and 
discusses how cultural or anthropological differences (between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ 
societies for instance) have different opinions on what is corrupt. Foremost in theorizing about 
a neo-classical approach (I will stick to this term for reasons of clarity) is the American political 
scientist Michael Johnston who also coined the phrase. Johnston (1996: 329) believes that 
definitions that classify (individual) behaviour are often too rigid to apply to all times and 
places. Adapting them to specific historical contexts is likely “to yield categories vague in 
content and soft at their boundaries”. This should be changed. 
Johnston’s approach encompasses all major ‘standards of goodness’ as presented ear-
lier. First it is ‘neo-classical’ as he aims to combine classical notions of the corruption of the 
body politic with modern notions of individual political corruption (legal, office-centred, 
economic, public interest etc.). Johnston sees political corruption and improper official 
conduct as a political and moral issue and not solely as individual acts of public officials. He 
has a view that is broad enough to encompass wrongful individual behaviour as well as the 
political and social processes that define it as such. Any definition of political corruption 
should, according to Johnston, therefore not just look at specific individual actions but at the 
broader contextual processes of consent, influence, and authority as well (1996: 329-331). 
Second, his approach is ‘post-positivist’ and ‘cultural’ in that it is not after one truth or out to 
Chapter 1 | Public Values and Political Corruption 
 
| 31 
find and agree on one correct definition or meaning of a concept (De Graaf, et al., 2010b: 98). 
Johnston states that “corruption cannot be defined exclusively by legal, market or public 
opinion criteria” and adds that “a concept of corruption has to be flexible enough to include 
all these sets of norms” (1996: 333). His definition of political corruption (which is adopted in 
this study) then becomes “the abuse, according to the legal or social standards constituting a 
society’s system of public order, of a public role or resource for private benefit” (Ibid.). As 
such Johnston combines the commonly separated standards such as public office, market, 
public interest, public opinion into one. Third, the approach is ‘social constructivist’ because it 
is based on the idea that political corruption is defined through the contestation of aforemen-
tioned concepts in specific places and periods. ‘Corrupt’ is what is considered corrupt at a certain 
place and time and there is no universal or specific definition we can or should all agree upon. 
In this social constructivist view political corruption is understood as having a social meaning 
that must be understood in relation to its social setting. This means that its content differs 
between societies, and groups and individuals within societies and throughout history. Various 
political and social forces construct the public order of any society. Law, general interest, 
public opinion and economical motivation are all factors that influence the public domain and 
each other in one way or another. The neo-classical approach invites us to “consider not only 
how laws affect behaviour, but also how they might come to fit established customs” 
(Johnston, 1996: 331). We are invited to investigate how the content of notions such as (but 
not limited to) ‘abuse’, ‘public role’ and ‘private benefit’ are contested in specific places and 
periods.  
According to Johnston concepts such as political corruption therefore acquire their true 
meaning in clashes between different views on what is right or wrong. Political corruption is 
socially constructed because of disagreements between fundamentally different notions of 
what government or administration should or should not be about. Johnston’s combination of 
broad and narrow allows for a kind of flexibility that is needed if we are ever to trace changing 
public values and perceptions of political corruption. It is precisely the contextual nature of 
political corruption that rules out any universal understanding or specific definition of political 
corruption. In a way only value judgments that change in time, place and setting, determine 
what constitutes political corruption in any practical historical sense. A neo-classical approach 
does not try and find any single meaning, standard or definition over time but focuses instead 
on how political corruption is actually constructed and how it acquires meaning in social-
political context and contest. As such, as I aim to show in this study, the main characteristics 
of the neo-classical approach make it very suitable for historical research on changing public 
values and political corruption. 
 
1.4 Existing work, voids and opportunities 
 
The need for a renewed and different (i.e., historical and neo-classical) focus on changing 
public values and political corruption becomes even clearer when we contrast the research 
presented in this study with existing historical work. Such a comparison is provided below and 
essentially pertains to relevance. It serves to situate this research in its wider historiographic 
context and demonstrates that while we can build on and learn much from what has already 
been uncovered, there undoubtedly is a need for the (new) questions, research and approach 
presented in this study.  
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Existing historical research on political corruption and morality of Dutch public administration 
can roughly be divided in three categories. First, there is a small category of single descriptive 
historical case studies on Dutch political corruption (cf. Al & Van Cruyningen, 1992; Boels, 
1988; Japikse, 1907; Van Maanen, 1997). A second category involves studies of political 
corruption as part of wider explorations and different questions and contexts. This makes 
sense because political corruption is a phenomenon that pervades society and can accordingly 
be studied in the context of a wide variety of disciplines, topics and questions. It often appears 
in historical research on crime, punishment and the legal system of the Low Countries, most 
notably in the work of Blockmans (1995), Diederiks (1976, 1988, 1989, 1992), Huussen (1976) 
and Egmont and Faber (2001; 1989). Historical perspectives on political corruption have also 
appeared in the context of studies on state formation. Blockmans (1985) famously discussed 
how the weak Burgundian state needed informal and personal (i.e., ‘corrupt’) systems to relieve 
strain and tension between highly autonomous layers of administration.  
At the same time the resulting patronage kept that state weak and also enabled different 
rival parties to access or disrupt each other’s powerbase. De Wit (1965) discussed political 
corruption in his description of the ‘state formation struggle’ between aristocracy and democ-
racy (see also chapters five and seven below) and Witte van Citters (1873) and Schutte (1978) 
did the same in discussions of the forming of oligarchies in the Dutch cities. Huiskamp (1995) 
investigated gift giving and patronage as essential parts of establishing a relationship between 
centre and periphery in the early modern Netherlands. A similar perspective was taken by 
Gabriëls (1989) who shows how elaborate structures of patronage in the second half of the 
eighteenth century were increasingly used in competition between different opposing factions 
in the Dutch Republic. His descriptions of ‘Lieutenant-Stadholders’ (see also chapter seven 
below) offer many interesting perspectives of Dutch political corruption. A third category of 
historical research on Dutch political corruption consists of overviews. First and foremost 
(essentially one of its kind) is work by Raadschelders and Van der Meer (2003) who traced 
academic attention for political corruption in the Netherlands in the post-Napoleonic era, 
provided a literature review and categorized types of political corruption that occurred in the 
Netherlands from 1800 onwards. Other works provide an overview of political-administrative 
culture of the Netherlands in which sometimes played a recurring role (cf. Hendriks & 
Toonen, 1998; Randeraad & Wolffram, 1998). Others have provided overviews of ‘political 
culture’ in specific periods in which corruption sometimes plays a part as well. Klein (1995) 
discusses the Patriot era and Lok (2009) discusses the period of the Restoration in the 
Netherlands (1813 – 1820). Van Zanten (2004) provides a view on the period 1813 – 1840. 
Recently Van den Heuvel (2010) also published an impression of corruption and morality in 
the Netherlands for the seventeenth and eighteenth century. For an overview of corruption in 
the Netherlands in most recent times, the work of Huberts and Nelen (2005) has to be 
mentioned. 
The final context for historical research into Dutch political corruption is that of bu-
reaucracy, bureaucratization and Dutch political culture. Numerous studies on these topics pay 
attention to political corruption and moral behaviour of public officials. In the nineteenth 
century Fruin (1885: 389ff; 1904: 189) investigated and condemned the corrupt practices of 
city regent elites. In the first half of the twentieth century, Elias studied the Amsterdam regents 
to the same effect (1923; see also Van Sas, 1992). More recent explorations have been made by 
Diederiks (1977), Schama (1977: 48ff), Van Deursen (2004a: 277), Van Bockel (2009) or De 
Jong (1987: 56). A continuous line in these studies is the importance of obtaining office in the 
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political culture of the early modern Dutch Republic (see chapters four and five) that meant 
that administrators of all sorts attempted to abuse their powers and offices. They could for 
instance hand them out to friends or family (nepotism), sell them (venality) or occupy multiple 
offices at the same time using so-called substitutes (cf. De Jong, 1987: 52-53). Corruption in the 
context of bureaucracy, bureaucratization, collegial administrative structures and the ‘game’ of 
obtaining offices is also discussed by Raadschelders (1992: 28-31), De Vries (1977), Van IJsselmui-
den (1988), Boels (1993) and Knevel (2001). Dekker (1986) provided a rare and early historical 
contribution to our understanding of political corruption. 
The aforementioned body of existing historical work is of course highly valuable. It 
provides crucial in-depth images of political corruption and morality in times past. However, 
the brief overview presented in the above also exposes some problems. This especially goes for 
the older literature that provided rather one-sided and occasionally subjective moralizing or 
judgmental images of the supposed immorality of early modern Dutch public administration. 
Te Velde (2005) noticed how ‘the early historians’ (mainly Fruin and Elias) were quick to 
present an image of a closed, pedantic, hypocritical clique of regent administrators who simply 
served their own needs. This image remained dominant well into the 1970s through writings of 
Rogier (1954: 292-311), Blok (2002: II: 267, 423-427; III, 376-378, 431-437), Geyl (1938: 105) 
and Jan and Annie Romein (1973: 247, 260ff). For all the good these studies have brought us, 
they also present some difficulties. Most importantly, as noted by Te Velde (2005: 4-5), this 
concerns the fact that critique of early modern public administrative morality has been 
anachronistic at times since it has as much to say about present as past conceptions of what is 
right or wrong behaviour. Many of these studies found that public administrators were 
‘corrupt’ according to the authors’ own standards and ideas (Rogier’s Catholicism and Jan 
Romein’s Marxism must have affected their view on political corruption). Given the somewhat 
biased nature of many of these studies we have to wonder whether the image they provided is 
correct. Furthermore, these images still often persist until this very day. 
In recent decades various scholars have dealt with this problem by taking a prosopog-
raphic approach that is, in part, also taken in the following. Among others, Roorda (1979), 
Kooijmans (1985, 1987), De Jong (1985, 1987), Prak (1985) and Gabriëls (1986, 1989) 
attempted to understand the world of the regent administrators (see chapters four and five) 
according to past standards instead of condemning it outright according to their own. Rather 
than providing the ‘old’ stereotypical image of the corrupt regent, they tried to understand 
administration in its own historical context. Roorda, for instance, showed how the regents in 
the Dutch Republic saw plans of civic reform and increased influence of wider parts of the 
population in administration as detrimental to the health of the Republic. Administration was 
meant for insiders who had the necessary connections and know-how. According to existing 
beliefs at the time it was morally fully acceptable to keep offices within families in order to 
avoid ‘unnecessary’ conflict that would only slow things down (Roorda, 1979: 25). This change 
in historical attitude in recent years (i.e., a stronger focus on existing practical attitudes to 
public administration in their original context) is related to what Van Eijnatten and Wagenaar 
(2007) have called the ‘cultural turn’ and is exemplified by authors such as Kooijmans (2000), 
Panhuysen (2005) and Janssen (2005) who have taken a ‘micro-perspective’ on the history of 
ideas and administrative practice and focused on such things as values inherent in education of 
administrators or the practical (structural-functionalist) workings of patronage. They thereby 
provided a more authentic, explicit and detailed view of public values and political corruption 
in the past. This ‘cultural turn’ obviously opens up promising ways to examine changing public 
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values and perceptions of political corruption. Taking a historical ‘micro-perspective’ (as is 
done in the case studies of this book as well) allows us to view morality as it was actually 
perceived and advocated at the time. 
A second and perhaps more obvious problem with existing work on Dutch political 
corruption that needs to be dealt with is that there has been relatively little of it (cf. Van der 
Meer & Raadschelders, 2003: 182). Also, apart from a very limited number of case studies (see 
earlier), most authors seem to have treated corruption and public values merely as a side event 
in the context of other topics and/or did not consider it worthwhile to systematically, 
comparatively or theoretically study changing public values. Little existing research is system-
atic in nature or regards political corruption (or public values for that matter) as a topic worthy 
of independent study. Historical or social-scientific research that is specifically and/or 
exclusively focused on and designed for investigating changing values and perceptions of 
Dutch political corruption is virtually non-existent, with the obvious exception of my col-
leagues in our shared wider research project. This has resulted in fragmentation and one 
struggles to find more than isolated impressions of past assumptions and interpretations of 
corrupt behaviour and public morality. While some (cf. Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001) provide 
discussions on public and/or political morality this largely remains descriptive and non-
comparative.  
Other ‘big’ works on the history of Netherlands in the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, for instance by Israel (1998), Schama (1977) or Van Sas (2005) also seem to deal with 
public values, political corruption and morality as side issues instead of topics in their own 
right. Hardly ever are these impressions in some way connected to each other, either by means 
of direct comparison or through the use of shared theoretical and/or methodological frame-
works. Comparisons over time are almost never made and when overviews are given (cf. Van 
den Heuvel, 2010) they often – purposefully, it has to be said – lack systematic, comparative or 
explanatory frameworks. This is a problem noticed elsewhere as well. According to De Haan 
and Van den Heuvel (2003: 27) a lack of systematic historical-administrative research, for 
instance, has to do with the fact that political corruption is difficult to trace, is often out of 
view and things we would now consider to be corrupt were not always regarded as such in 
times past. As a result they seem (too) pessimistic about future opportunities to rectify the 
situation. A solution to the problem of a lack of systematic, comparative or theoretical analysis 
can however be found and was already present in early theoretically inclined social scientific 
work on the subject in the 1970s (cf. Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 2003: 184-185). Scholars 
such as Brasz and Hoetjes discussed political corruption from systematic perspectives of, 
respectively, sociology and anthropology. From the 1990s onwards, Huberts and Van den 
Heuvel took a more public administration and integrity-oriented perspective (cf. Van den 
Heuvel & Huberts, 1994; Van den Heuvel, et al., 2002; Huberts, 1994). 
Apart from these efforts more recent years have seen a rekindling of systematic, theo-
retically inspired work on political corruption from a combined historical and social-scientific 
perspective (cf., among others, Hoenderboom & Kerkhoff, 2008; Kerkhoff, et al., 2010; 
Kroeze, 2008; Nützenadel, 2009; Schattenberg, 2009; Von Thiessen, 2009; Wagenaar, 2003, 
2008, 2010; Wagenaar & Van der Meij, 2005). This present study takes further steps in a similar 
direction and, finally, aims to add to attempts that use Dutch history to explain and understand 
changing public values and political corruption in a wider European or global context. In 
Palmer’s seminal work on the Atlantic revolutions he exclaimed that “it is unfortunate that the 
affairs of the smaller European peoples do not enter more fully into our general histories, for 
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their experience has been illuminating” (1974: 323). Similar sentiments have been conveyed by 
Leeb who wrote how “those ill-assorted, ever-quarrelling, often disunited United Provinces 
stand as a special model to which the course of history and politics elsewhere can frequently 
and fruitfully be compared” (1973: 247). The a-typical nature of the Dutch Republic (see 
chapter four) seems to be a main reason for this (Davids & Lucassen, 1995; Van Sas, 2005: 
272-273; Schama, 1977: 15-23). Dutch history can be and has often been an interesting 
background from which various phenomena can be viewed that occurred outside its borders. 
Ample evidence for this can be found in a recent special issue of the Low Countries Historical 
Review (Van Berkel, et al., 2010). Strangely enough changing public values and perceptions of 
political corruption have not been among topics believed to be suitable for international 
comparison (unlike, for instance, water management, emerging capitalism and colonialism or 
tolerance and secularity, cf. Frijhoff, 2010: 7). This seems to be in line with a general trend in 
which discussions on developing public morality and changing public values in the early 
modern and modern age tend to focus on Germany/Prussia (cf. Rosenberg, 1958; Wagner, 
2005), France (cf. Ford, 1953; Simon, 2001) or England (cf. Rivers, 1991; Wilson, 2007). 
Cameralism (the early modern science of administration with distinctly normative elements) is 
for instance hardly ever associated with the Netherlands. This research seeks to remedy this 
situation. While it does not compare Dutch morality of the period with other countries, a first 
necessary step in that promising direction does require more knowledge of Dutch morality 
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In the previous chapter I discussed the two main intertwined objects of research of this study: 
public values and political corruption. I also discussed the advantages of Johnston’s ‘neo-
classical’ approach and pointed towards some gaps in existing Dutch historiography. One 
remaining problem or gap is that Johnston’s approach is essentially without theory. In fact this 
is both its strength and its weakness. While the approach allows for contextual and contingent 
interpretations of changing public values and perceptions of political corruption in different 
times and places it (purposefully) does not provide explanations for potential change. How-
ever, since it is imperative to go beyond description and to also explain public value dynamics 
(see for more on this matter chapter three, section five) theory (as well as a heuristic device, see 
chapter three) is needed to fill what I call the ‘Johnstonian hollow’. In this second chapter I 
first argue that this requires a better understanding of the meaning and use of administrative 
history in general and use of a combination of historical investigation and social-scientific 
explanation in particular. Second, I argue how two specific instances of such a combination 
(offered by Weber’s ideal type of bureaucratization and by historical institutionalism) are 
particularly relevant for investigating public value dynamics. 
 
2.2 History and public value dynamics 
 
The previous chapter showed how past notions of a public-private divide were often blurred 
or vague, depending on changing notions of ‘publicness’ and/or ‘community’. Such unclear 
and ever shifting notions of ‘publicness’ are inevitably derived from unclear notions of 
‘government’, ‘state’ or ‘public administration’. In the past (much like today) these were highly 
abstract terms (Lok, 2009: 23). Of course we should not conclude from this that public 
administration did not exist in history. Rather, there was already public administration before 
there was any public-private divide or any notion of government or state as we know them 
today. Essentially, public administration has been around for as long as humans have lived 
together (cf. Finer, 1997; Lynn, 2006: 43; White, 1955: 1). The existence of past Dutch public 
administration is evident in a complex network of institutions, organizations and public 
officials, from kings and parliaments to water boards and tax collectors. It encompassed a wide 
range of activities, and operated on multiple horizontal and vertical levels. To define past 
public administration one should consider the fact that it has always been shaped according to 
what people believed belonged to it. White argued that public administration always reflects 
the political and cultural values of its environment (cf. Moynihan, 2009: 813). This meant that 
public administration has always been the outcome of implicit and explicit value choices, 
binding people to and with policy amidst rather fluid boundaries of public and private, state 
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and society and politics and administration. When studying past public administration one 
should therefore pay attention to all those organizations and actors that have been experienced 
or perceived as ‘government’, who provided a ‘public service’. Public administration should 
accordingly be defined as the complex set of institutions and activities in society which 
attributes value and provides binding direction to society (Wagenaar, et al., 2011b: 16). The 
scope of past and present public administration is therefore best understood in terms of the 
reach (or binding power) of its decisions and in terms of the value it attributes to specific acts 
and processes. 
Such a wide definition of (past) public administration requires a broad but inclusive 
definition of administrative history. The one adopted in this study is coined by Raadschelders. 
It is based on the same structural and normative elements that define public administration 
itself (cf. Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 1992: 328). It is defined as “the study of structures 
and processes in and ideas about government as they have existed or have been wanted in the 
past and the actual and ideal place of public functionaries therein” (Raadschelders, 2000: 7). 
Such a definition enables us to ask descriptive as well as explanatory questions about structure, 
functioning and functionaries of public administration in the past and why and how admini-
stration in its various forms developed. It also asks normative questions about ideas regarding 
government and administration. It is, furthermore, precisely the combination of description 
and explanation that makes this approach to the study of administrative history suitable for the 
purposes of this study. Others already convincingly argued the case how historical research 
benefits the study of public administration (cf. among many others Caldwell, 1955; 
Raadschelders, 1994, 2010; Raadschelders, et al., 2000; Tilly, 2009; Vaughn, 1985) and I do not 
need to repeat this here. Instead, I wish to focus on those arguments that underscore the use 
and benefits of social-scientifically inspired historical research for the specific purpose of 
studying public value dynamics. Crucial in those arguments is the sometimes understated if not 
ignored worth of a combination of historical ‘descriptive’ and social-scientific ‘explanatory’ 
study in research on public value dynamics (see chapter three paragraph five on the related and 
more specific issues of explanation and causality). 
 
2.3 A combined approach 
 
Paul Pierson once stated that “to assert that history matters is insufficient; social scientists want 
to know why, where and how” (2000a, 72). In line with this view we can say that one of the 
most important advantages of systematic comparative administrative-historical research is 
theoretical in nature; it helps us reach ever higher (though never complete) levels of generaliza-
tion (cf. Caldwell, 1955: 454; Raadschelders, et al., 2000: 781). Understanding and explaining 
long term social processes such as value dynamics thus requires comparative historical work 
and to falsify, build and test theories one needs explicit use of theory and models (cf. Laslett, 
1980: 225). This, at least, is one of the fundamental assumptions of this study (see earlier) and 
is visible in the work of various scholars such as Luton (1999: 206), Raadschelders (1994, 2000; 
2000), Skocpol (2003; 1980), Pierson (2003, 2004; 2002), Thelen (1999, 2002, 2003) or 
Mahoney and Rüschemeyer (2003a). In various ways such authors all venture across ‘the 
dividing line’ between history and the social sciences in their efforts to combine historical 
inquiry with social-scientific methods and theories of interpretation, understanding and 
explanation.  
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In this study I underscore the basic idea that conscientious use of history and explicit use of 
theory can lead to improvements in our knowledge of social, political-administrative processes 
and developments (such as value dynamics) in historical context. A combination of administra-
tive-historical inquiry and the social-scientific study of public administration is, however, not 
entirely uncontested. In fact, depictions of the stereotypical historian and social scientist 
sometimes lead to unfortunate and unnecessary misunderstandings and distrust between the 
disciplines (cf. Laslett, 1980: 214-215; Lynn, 2006: 21-22). Essentially this boils down to the 
supposed distinction between historical fact-finding, description and ‘story-telling’ on the one 
hand and social scientific theorizing, explanation and deductive reasoning on the other. It is 
the stereotypical (i.e., not factual) opposition between Leopold von Ranke’s (1795 – 1886) “wie 
es eigentlich gewesen” (cf. Vierhaus, 1977) and Max Weber’s “warum es eigentlich passiert ist” 
(cf. Raadschelders, 2000: 37). In such a way, the historian who refuses to generalize by means 
of theory is juxtaposed to the social scientist who aims at understanding, explaining and 
providing – at least – law-like generalizations. The stereotypical historian accuses the stereo-
typical social scientist of oversimplifying, not paying attention to unique detail, and bending 
historical reality to suit the theory. The social scientist is accused of providing ‘Procrustean 
solutions’ (after the Greek myth of Theseus and Procrustes), i.e., tailoring data to fit the 
container. Reversely, the social scientist accuses the historian of being too descriptive and of 
not generalizing and theorizing enough. The debate is about finding harmony between 
generalization on the one hand while preserving historical detail on the other, or, as Laslett 
(1980: 219) has put it: “administrative historical research faces problems of the seeming 
contradiction between uniqueness of place and time and efforts to develop generalizations”.  
Distinctions between these two extremes are however often not as clear-cut and usually 
stem from misunderstanding and subsequent unfortunate animosity. This has led authors such 
as Laslett (1980: 214) and Murphey (1973: 148) to lament that theory and models are often 
rejected where they could be useful. To them, explicit theoretical formulations can help yield 
possible answers when historical source material – as is so often the case – is lacking. Similarly, 
historian David Fischer argued how all historians in fact do and should operate with the aid of 
preconceived questions, hypotheses, ideas and assumptions. Why, he asked, “should a historian 
be supposed to go a-wandering in the dark forest of the past, gathering facts like nuts and 
berries, until he has enough to make a general truth?” (1970: 4). Of course many have taken 
such questions at heart; investigating the many shades of grey and situations of overlap. Not all 
historians shun away from working with causality, theory and explanations (Ranke himself for 
instance believed in the intervening hand of God in history) and not all social scientists are 
averse to empirical and/or descriptive historical study (this was the basis of much of Weber’s 
work too). Historical-administrative research, as it is carried out in this study as well, needs a 
little of both: social-scientific study of public administration needs historical methods, skills 
and knowledge and historical investigation needs models and theory (cf. Laslett, 1980; Van der 
Meer & Raadschelders, 1992; Raadschelders, et al., 2000; Stinchcombe, 1978: 13). In this way I 
follow Charles Tilly (1950) who showed early on that explanatory political science can hardly 
get anywhere without relying on careful historical analysis. I also follow Raadschelders’ 
argumentation when he writes that administrative history “teaches the administrative scientist 
to be cautious and realistic with what is prescribed, and it teaches the historian that individual 
and unique phenomena acquire meaning in a more interpretative and, perhaps, pattern-seeking 
framework” (2000: xii). 
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Taking a combined historical and social-scientific approach to study value dynamics provides 
essential knowledge of the context of human action, conduct and experience. According to 
Raadschelders (2000: 9) it “enhances insight in the meaning of human behaviour in relation the 
contextuality of human action to circumstances of space and time”, meaning that “for a proper 
understanding of contemporary structures and relations in public administration a geographical 
and historical setting is of great importance. Such a context does not only provide identity to 
individuals but also to institutions […]. Without knowledge of the geographical and historical 
context, we are not able to assess the uniqueness nor the comparability of societal phenomena” 
(Ibid., 9). Similarly, Mahoney and Rüschemeyer (2003b: 9) state that comparative historical 
analysis is able “to derive lessons from past experiences that speak to the concern of the 
present”. Another, final, reason is that it provides a long-term perspective which is essential to 
“see through political and administrative fads and fashions of the day and enables us to get a 
perspective on more fundamental differences and similarities between present and obsolete 
structures, operations and policies” (Raadschelders, 2000: 13). Lynn uses administrative history 
in precisely this way when he argues how “history can reveal the fundamental dynamics of 
state building” (2006: 22).  
A long-term historical perspective on public value change enables us, in other words, to 
see the more fundamental how’s and why’s of evolving public value systems. In addition, a 
combined historical and social scientific approach that looks for mechanisms and processes 
has much to offer because assessing value dynamics means judging motives, intentions and 
context at certain moments in time (cf. Moodie, 1989: 875-876). This is explained well by 
Moynihan who notes how there has always been vigorous debate about the relevance, 
meaning, and application of administrative values at any given point in time. Because of this, 
Moynihan says, “we need better historical accounts of the debate over administrative values, 
capable of linking these debates to the broader environment […]” (2009: 820). Beck-Jørgensen 
and Bozeman likewise notice the disadvantage of quoting values out of (historical) context 
because this leads to the removal of values “from the message or argument of which they form 
a part, thus robbing them of specific meaning” (2007: 357-358). Such arguments indicate that 
values, expectations, norms and rules are by definition relative and contextually and temporally 
determined and therefore need historical contextual analysis. The buying and selling of public 
offices among family or professional relations through patronage and nepotism were, for 
instance, standard and acceptable practices for long periods of Dutch history (see chapter four 
and De Jong, 1987: 53). This indicates, finally, that one should have an emphasis on change, 
continuity and diversity in historical processes (cf. Raadschelders, 2000: 88; Tholfsen, 1967: 6-
7) which often coincide and influence each other. 
From the previous discussion on the meaning and use of administrative history in gen-
eral and a combination of historical investigation and social-scientific explanation in particular, 
I now turn to the second part of this chapter. In the following I argue how two specific 
instances of such a combination are particularly relevant to investigating public value dynamics, 
which are therefore adopted in this study. The first consists of theory offered by Weber’s ideal 
type of bureaucratization. The second consists of insights taken from historical institutional-
ism. Together they complete the theoretical framework of this study (and thereby fill the 
‘Johnstonian hollow’, see earlier) that is applied to the cases of political corruption. It should, 
importantly, already be kept in mind that different theoretical models can be applied depending 
on the case study at hand. Every theory or model has its own application and every case 
therefore has its own model that is best suitable to provide explanation. 
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2.4 Ideal type and bureaucratization 
 
History, as Raadschelders and others noted (2000: 785), “has no explanatory theories of its 
own. It is a discipline that borrows its theories from others and then applies them to historical 
data”. One such explanatory theory involves the use of an ideal type, introduced by Weber, to 
explain and assess the rise and growth of bureaucracy (as administrative apparatus as well as a 
specific form of organization). Weber’s theoretical model will be used in this study (most 
explicitly in chapter six) because of its explanatory value when investigating changing public 
values in the context of increasing bureaucratization between 1748 and 1813. As a tool to help 
establish meaningful relations, Weber used an ideal-typical construct to “move between 
sociological generalization and historical differentiation” (Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1989: 26). 
While not real itself, or even a description of reality, an ideal type is an abstraction partly based 
on empirical observations which is used as a means to interpret (historical) reality. It can be 
used as a way of generalization, to look for regularities between events in different contexts of 
time and place. It can also be used as way to organize or structure the qualitative elements that 
are always a part of social-scientific explanation (reasons, assumptions, intentions, meanings 
etc.). Third, it can be used as a measure or benchmark for historical reality. Comparing 
historical reality with the ideal type can help explain the why, how and when of events and 
processes (Van Braam, 1989: 38; Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1989: 26). 
Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy is, for the three reasons mentioned above, among the 
most often used theoretical and methodological tools in the historical study of public admini-
stration. It is especially useful when studying bureaucratic organization in the past as contem-
porary organization theories do not provide enough possibilities for this (Raadschelders, 1990: 
123). To Weber, history showed a gradual development towards bureaucratic authority and 
administration because bureaucracy was the most efficient and rational of all forms of 
organization. He converted the consequences of legal-rational authority into a ‘list’ of charac-
teristics of bureaucracy. The characteristics are ideal-typical: they might not ever have existed 
in their purest form and also need not have occurred simultaneously. Weber’s idea of bureauc-
racy has been explained and operationalized by various scholars (cf. Albrow, 1970; Mayntz, 
1965, 1971), but in this study I choose the operationalisation of Van Braam (1977) because he 
extended Weber’s list to twenty characteristics and also made a clear distinction and schematic 
division (see figure 1 below) between bureaucracy as a type of organization and as civil service, 
i.e., the totality of civil servants. In addition, Van Braam’s operationalization offers, arguably, 
the most extensive operationalization of Weber’s ideal type. Furthermore, it is an operationali-
zation that has proven its worth in various studies on bureaucracy and bureaucratization in the 
Netherlands (cf. Van Braam, 1957, 1977; Van der Goot & De Jong, 1982; Raadschelders, 1990; 
Wagenaar, 1997). In line with the general use of an ideal type, the list of characteristics 
compiled by Weber and Van Braam allows us to generalize, organize and compare in order to 
analyze past and present bureaucracy and bureaucratization. Most important for the purposes 
of this study (see especially chapter six) is that the ideal type allows us to better understand 
changing public values and perceptions of political corruption. Before explaining why this is 
the case I first briefly outline each characteristic as shown in figure 1.  
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Figure 1. Weber on characteristics of bureaucratic organization (with the additions by Van 
Braam (1977: 459) and Raadschelders and Rutgers (1996: 97). 
 
Characteristics of functioning  
(legale Herrschaft) 
 
Characteristics of officials 
(Bürokratische Verwaltungsstab) 
i. continuous administrative activity, 
ii. formal rules and procedures, 
iii. clear and specialized offices, 
iv. hierarchical organization, 
v. use of written documents, 
vi. adequate supply of means, 
vii. non-ownership of office, 
viii. procedures of rational discipline and 
control. 
 
ix. office held by individual officials, 
x. who are subordinate, and 
xi. appointed, and 
xii. are knowledgeable, have expertise, 
xiii. assigned by contractual agreement, 
xiv. in a tenured (secure) position, 
xv. who fulfil their office as their main or only job, 
and 
xvi. work in a career system, 
xvii. are rewarded with a regular salary and pension in 
money, 
xviii. are rewarded according to rank, 
xix. are promoted according to seniority, and 
xx. work under formal protection of their office. 
 
The first group – the characteristics of functioning – consists of eight characteristics. Continuous 
administrative activity (i)† denotes the formal presence of functionaries and the regularity of their 
work. Formal rules and procedures (ii) denote (a) rules to control certain social-economic relations 
(ordinances, statutes etc.) and (b) instructions for officials (job descriptions). The characteristic 
of clear and specialized offices (iii) is meant to assess the temporary or permanent nature of the 
office. All sorts of offices are imaginable, from ad-hoc to permanent ones (cf. Van Braam, 
1977), and qualifications and desired competences vary accordingly. Hierarchical organization (iv) 
is the formal structure of the organization as it is expressed in chain of command and different 
positions of authority. Various hierarchical levels of functionaries can be seen throughout 
history and across organizations. The use of written documents (v) pertains to the matter whether 
decisions are written down or not. Adequate supply of means (vi) relates to the question whether 
the means of office (pen, paper, ink, a desk, an office etc.) were provided for by the authorities 
or by the officials themselves. This characteristic is, of course, also useful to assess the public 
(means are provided by authorities) or private (means are purchased by official himself) nature 
of an office. The non-ownership of office (vii) is a related characteristic. Was an office the property 
of an individual, who could then sell it or hand it out as he pleased or was the office owned by 
the authorities so they were the one hiring and firing? The final characteristic of functioning is 
the existence of procedures of rational discipline and control (viii). We should think of (a) direct, non-
systematic and personal control and (b) systematic or periodical, bureaucratic control and 
supervision.  
The second group – the characteristics of officials working in a bureaucracy – is made 
up of a further twelve characteristics. Whether the office is held by individual officials or not (ix) is 
important to assess the mono- or polycratic nature of administration. The question of being 
subordinate (x) is important to assess the relationship between an official and his superiors and 
                                                 
† Numbers in between brackets refer to the Roman numerals in Figure 1. 
Chapter 2 | Administrative History and Public Value Dynamics 
 
| 43 
subordinates. Being appointed (xi) means whether someone has been appointed or whether he 
has, for instance, paid to acquire the office. Being knowledgeable and having expertise (xii) is another 
vital characteristic. In what way, for instance, are experience and ability important to acquire an 
office and how was this measured or enforced? Also: what did it mean for an official to be 
knowledgeable? What was expected of him? To be assigned by contractual agreement (xiii) is 
important when assessing the voluntary or forced nature of someone’s activities. Having a 
tenured (secure) position (xiv) denotes whether someone was, for instance, appointed for life or 
only a few months. This, obviously, has important consequences (among others) for the power 
and influence attached to office and official. The same could be said for fulfilling your office as your 
main or only job (xv) and whether you work in a career system (xvi) with possibilities of promotion. 
Being rewarded with a regular salary and pension in money (xvii) is also important for assessing the 
public/private nature of an office. Many early modern ‘law-enforcement’ officials were, for 
instance, paid from fines they collected themselves rather than from salaries they received from 
the authorities. Needless to say (see also below) this caused an often unhealthy mix of public 
office and private money, increasingly a key ingredient in the occurrence of political corrup-
tion. Being rewarded according to rank (xviii), promoted according to seniority (xix) and (xx) being able to 
work under the formal protection of your office are more or less self-explanatory.  
Weber’s ideal-typical characteristics are often used to understand changes in the way 
organizations function. They serve to help understand processes of bureaucratization. Ideally, 
the more reality correlates with the various ideal-typical characteristics, the more bureaucratic 
an organization becomes. In this way bureaucratization is a useful tool to investigate many 
processes, such as rationalization, professionalization, specialization, structural reform in 
organizations or the growth of government. However, while previous research using Weberian 
ideal-type characteristics of bureaucratization has proven useful to determine and analyze the 
nature of such changes in early modern Dutch public administration (Raadschelders, 1990; 
Wagenaar, 1997), morality was (deliberately) never a specific topic in these studies. It seems 
strange, however, that the moral dimension of bureaucratization is often forgotten 
(Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1989: 28) if only because bureaucratization is so closely related to 
changes in ethics, morality and individual behaviour. The various characteristics of bureaucrati-
zation can be employed to investigate changes in morality. Bureaucratization often comes 
about precisely because of ethical reasons. It often reflects, fosters and furthers (renewed) 
emphasis on morality in public administration, as we will see in the later case studies. Many 
institutional and organizational changes and rearrangements either directly focus on imple-
menting moral guidelines or indirectly reflect conceptions of correct public official behaviour. 
The design and introduction of new administrative and/or organizational layers and the 
introduction of new rules and regulations are almost always meant to ensure a better operating 
system for any public organization; also, I argue in this study, in a moral sense. A separation of 
public office and private money, for instance, serves to curb and counter corruption by public 
officials. The use of instructions and oaths of office is, similarly, often meant to ensure the 
proper behaviour of civil servants towards their superiors and their adherence to the law. A 
stricter sense of hierarchy should help improve and clarify accountability and responsibility. A 
ban on members of the same family holding office in a two council shows the importance of 
being loyal towards the authorities instead of one’s friends and family.  
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Bureaucratization and attention for improving morality in public administration are, therefore, 
often two sides of the same coin: they can feed off each other and be mutually strengthening 
(cf. Kerkhoff, 2011: 14-17). Furthermore, the employment of characteristics of bureaucratiza-
tion in political corruption scandals provides a ‘before and after’ view on cases of political 
corruption that allows us to assess changing public values and perceptions. Typically a process 
of value change might start with the realization by a certain group or individual that a certain 
act is corrupt followed by bureaucratic changes to the system. We must then ask ourselves 
what exactly changed and what were explicitly articulated reasons or motivations for this 
change? Interpreting the motives behind such changes and reforms allows us to see which 
(often implicit rather than explicit) public values and perceptions of political corruption 
actually existed in the past and how (if at all) they acquired new meaning in the process. A 
closer look at new or improved ‘requirements of office’ following scandals helps us to 
investigate new perceptions of proper public official conduct and the interaction between 
bureaucratization and public value change.  
 
2.5 Historical institutionalism 
 
A second and final element to aid our understanding of public value dynamics is offered by 
historical institutionalism. This present study is ultimately focused on assessing change or, as 
Laslett (1980: 220) wrote, to link “historically specific phenomena with general historical 
processes”. It is largely about when, why and how processes of moral or public value change 
evolve over time and is concerned, to quote Skocpol and Somers, “with an understanding of 
societal dynamics and epochal transformations of cultures and social structures” (1980: 174). 
Often – and increasingly in the last few decades (cf. Raadschelders, 1998: 566) – efforts to 
explain social change have included a comparative-historical approach and the use of middle-
range theories (see also below in chapter three, paragraph five). Crucial in this development, 
especially since the 1980s, have been studies based on historical institutional analysis. Likewise, 
this present study uses historical institutionalism in its aim to better understand change of 
public values over a longer period of time. The approach offers, I argue, plausible avenues to 
at least partly explain the intricate relationship between changing institutions (being understood 
here as values as well as organizations and individuals, see below) and changing public values in 
Dutch administration between 1748 and 1813.  
Hall and Taylor provided an overview of three kinds of institutionalism commonly used 
to assess and explain social change. First is rational choice institutionalism that emphasizes the 
role of strategic interaction by individuals driven by rational calculus in which they “canvass all 
possible options before selecting those that bring most benefit” (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 938). 
Second there is sociological (or cultural) institutionalism that is, contrary to the rational choice 
approach, based on the assumption that institutional forms and procedures are often not 
adopted because they are more efficient or because they are “in line with some transcendent 
‘rationality’” (Ibid., 946-947). In this view, people are culture-driven rather than rational ‘utility 
maximizers’ and institutional practices originate and change not because of rational calculus of 
means-ends efficiency but because they enhance social legitimacy of the organization or its 
participants. This is what March and Olsen (2004) called the logic of social appropriateness. 
The third kind distinguished by Hall and Taylor is historical institutionalism in which a broad 
conceptualization of the relationship between institutions, individual behaviour and social 
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change is taken. Contrary to the other two it is more eclectic because it uses elements from 
both rational choice and sociological institutionalism. It also defines institutions in a broader 
way as “the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in the 
organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall & Taylor, 1996: 938). In this 
way the definition is able to include organizational structures, individual persons and groups as 
well as norms, values, or perceptions. For these reasons historical institutionalism has much to 
offer. Its aim and ability to combine calculus and culture in determining the relation between 
institutions and social change is well equipped to deal with complex institutional origins and 
change, based on the idea that institutional origins are dependent on an existing institutional 
world that partly circumscribes the range of options. Also, historical institutionalism empha-
sizes the importance of asymmetries of power and holds that individuals do not always interact 
freely, rational and/or strategic, nor are they always bounded by established routines, culture or 
environment. Instead, historical institutionalism argues, “institutions give some groups or 
interests disproportionate access to the decision making process” (Ibid., 940).  
A historical institutional approach enables asking and answering important questions 
such as “why something has or has not happened or why certain structures or patterns take 
shape in some times and places but not in others” (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002: 696). In addition, 
it is able to explain “variation in important or surprising patters, events, or arrangements rather 
than accounting for human behaviour without regard to context or modelling very general 
processes presumed to apply at al times and places (Ibid., 696-697). With historical institution-
alism “deeper understanding of causal relationships can often be achieved through a more 
intense and focused examination of a number of carefully selected cases” (Thelen, 2002: 94). 
Pierson (2003: 187) for instance notes how causal chains are often not straightforward, in a 
direct line from x to y. Rather it is often that “x triggers sequence a, b, c which yields y”. To 
him, therefore, a causal chain “is about a sequence of key developments over extended periods 
of time since it might take a while to get from x to y through a, b, and c”. This is an appealing 
approach to investigating public value change as it comes close to the way in which social 
reality works. Social processes take a long time to unfold, are often cumulative and take place 
at different speeds and/or levels. Because it is unwise to focus only on the immediate and the 
present, the main strength of historical institutionalism lies in its contextual, long-term and 
comparative approach (cf. Thelen, 1999). According to Pierson and Skocpol (2002: 693, 703) it 
“makes visible and understandable the overarching contexts and interacting processes that 
shape and reshape states, politics and public policymaking” and allows one to “look at 
organizational and institutional configurations where others only look at settings in isolation”. 
It “draws attention to large-scale, lengthy but slow moving processes”.  
Most importantly, the aforementioned means that historical institutionalism pays  
serious attention to time and long-term processes where other approaches often look at “slices 
of time or short-term manoeuvres” (Pierson & Skocpol, 2002: 703). Because of this it is able to 
offer crucial perspectives on diversity, continuity and change. Sometimes past and present are 
linked by looking for ‘pre-determined paths’ that vary from society to society (Raadschelders, 
1998: 569-570). This makes path dependence an essential and highly useful notion within 
historical institutionalism and within the context of this study. Path dependence is useful in 
either of two (or both) ways. First it relates to the important realization that decisions and 
actions in the present have at least partly been shaped and are determined by decisions and 
actions in the past. Douglas North (1990: 98) expressed this idea when he wrote that “at every 
step along the way there [are] choices – political and economic – that [provide] real alterna-
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tives. Path dependence is a way to narrow conceptually the choice set and link decision making 
through time”. As Lynn (2006: 3) writes: “public management’s historical and contemporary 
structures, practices and institutions are so intimately interrelated that answers to the foregoing 
questions require understanding of paths and patterns of national institutional development 
[…]. Reform, change and adaptation follow centuries of national historical developments”. 
Second, path dependence – together with the notion of ‘critical junctures’ – offers useful 
perspectives on the ‘interplay’ between continuity (slow moving) and radical (fast and sudden) 
changes in social processes. According to Pierson (2003: 181-184) change is continuous and 
gradual in social processes in which, sometimes, incremental or cumulative forces have only 
modest or negligible impact until they reach some critical level which triggers major change. 
Such major changes have been called critical junctures.  
The ‘interplay’ between path dependence and critical junctures has some explanatory 
power for understanding change and continuity of processes of public value change. Lynn 
(2006: 162) explains this when he discusses two distinct narratives of path (continuity) and/or 
punctuation (change). The first stresses the durability and continuity of administrative 
institutions (i.e., including values) and the way these institutions have been framed in processes 
of evolution and change. This narrative focuses on the evolutionary and long-term emergence 
of (national) administrative values such as legality, representation, participation, accountability 
or merit. The second stresses often dramatic and occasionally revolutionary changes as 
institutions evolve. Its focus is on discontinuity and change that transform structures, practices 
and cultures. Constitutional principles, for example, may endure, but their reflection in public 
management institutions, values and practices can take different forms.  
When we understand institutions primarily as norms, values, perceptions, attitudes 
and/or assumptions, then historical institutional analysis includes the analysis of value 
dynamics. When not taken in any deterministic way, path dependence is an useful idea because 
‘paths’ provide us with a better understanding of where we come from, how we are bound or 
restrained by the past and how historical and social processes evolve. Its combination of 
calculus and cultural factors is crucial to understand complex historical processes of social 
change. Also, its focus on the importance of power relations, its emphasis on the fact that 
existing circumstances in part circumscribe the range of options for institutional creation and 
its emphasis on induction (looking for evidence in historical archives to find out why actors 
behaved as they did) are promising. The same can be said for its emphasis on time and 
sequencing and large-scale, lengthy but slow moving processes, sometimes interrupted by 
critical changing events. In the history of Dutch politics and public administration these can 
for instance clearly be distinguished as we will see in chapter four. Before turning to this 
chapter, however, I will outline the research design and methodological framework of the 
research presented here in chapter three. 
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In the previous two chapters I discussed the theoretical and conceptual framework of this 
study. In this third chapter theory and concepts are tied together in a research design and 
methodology. In the following I discuss the analytical framework of this study and provide a 
discussion of the case-study set-up (such as reasons for case selection) and some of the 
necessary parameters of the research. I also elaborate on the strengths and possibilities of 
historical case study research and focus explicitly on the issues of explanation and causality. 
Finally, before elaborating on current and future possibilities for research, I provide a brief 
discussion on some of the linguistic, practical and theoretical problems inherent in a study such 
as this. 
 
3.2 A framework for analysis 
 
In the introduction I briefly stated how the research of this book is first and foremost about 
changing public values between 1748 and 1813 in the Netherlands. Second, I stated how it is 
about political corruption which serves a double purpose. It is used as a tool to study changing 
public values but is also a topic (or rather: a negative public value) in its own right. This resulted 
in the central research question: which changes in public values and public value systems become apparent 
from scandals of political corruption in the Netherlands between 1748 and 1813? In the following I 
discuss the analytical and methodological framework that is used to answer this question. 
 
Hidden morals, explicit scandals 
 
Public values and political corruption are intangible by their very nature. Personal moral 
choices and deliberations often remain sealed off from public view, and political corruption – 
for obvious reasons – usually remains hidden. In all times and places ideas on what is right and 
wrong tend to be implicitly understood rather than explicitly stated. It is therefore difficult to 
find out what is right or wrong in specific historical contexts. In study I argue that the problem 
is solved when we look for explicit views that inevitably occur when things go wrong. After all, 
what is wrong does often become the explicit subject of debate and discussion. When 
behaviour of public officials becomes regarded as unacceptable, public values and perceptions 
of political corruption that until then had remained largely hidden are discussed out in the 
open. For this reason, this study focuses on scandals that caused a significant amount of 
debate, i.e., political corruption that is discussed by a number of sources of public values (see 
below). 
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Of course, a focus on scandal and debate has its downsides. For one, the political corruption in 
scandals is potentially different from what we might call ‘normal’ political corruption or 
‘regular’ crime. This concerns political corruption that was not accompanied by scandal and/or 
debate because there was no normative ambiguity. It was often solved outside of public court 
and/or pamphlet wars and never went beyond a small circle of people on the shop floor. It 
was political corruption in which the only question was whether someone was guilty or not. 
Since it is of course possible that only a fraction of the political corruption in the province of 
Holland between 1748 and 1813 turned into a scandal we might therefore miss crucial 
information as attention is almost inevitably focused on high-profile actors and far reaching 
affairs instead of low key officials and their ‘petty’, normal or fully ‘institutionalized’ and 
therefore ‘invisible’ political corruption. An exclusive focus on extraordinary or abnormal 
instances in scandal and debate might then offer a somewhat distorted view. Related to this is a 
second possible objection that an explicit focus on scandals inevitably leads to some sort of 
bias because many scandals occur for political reasons. This potentially causes allegations of 
political corruption to be either exaggerated or simply made up as they are used as instruments 
in political debate. This can make it difficult to separate truth from fiction.  
Such objections are important. They signal that much political corruption will not and 
cannot (at least in this study) be taken into account and that allegations can also be fabricated 
for political ends. At the same time I argue that the benefits of a focus on scandals outweigh 
such objections and that the objections can, in part, be refuted. First and foremost, as 
mentioned, a focus on scandals has the benefit of bringing often hidden and implicit public 
values out into the open. It is precisely because the unacceptable rather than the acceptable is 
often subject to explicit public debate that the focus of this study has to be on scandals. Public 
values and explicit perceptions of right and wrong behaviour become apparent in moments of 
crisis and condemnation. Scandals and the explicit debates and discussions they fuel serve to 
articulate and show the unacceptable, the unwanted and the intolerable. This, in turn, provides 
a view of what was accepted, or as Brooks wrote: “the existence of political corruption implies 
the existence of positive political values” (1970: 61).  
Secondly, large scandals – while often focused on high profile actors or events – can 
and often do reveal ‘normal’ political corruption by different actors on different levels. 
Examples of this can be found in the large scandals discussed in chapters six and seven, which 
provide much insight into systematic and highly institutionalized ‘normal’ political corruption. 
Third, although political motives are indeed often at play this does not have to be the case and, 
more importantly from a methodological point of view, does not make the public values that 
are expressed any less noteworthy. Why something is said is not as important as the fact that it 
is being said at all. In a case investigated by Hoenderboom and Kerkhoff (2008), for example, 
two rival factions in the Dutch town council of Gorinchem, seem to have accused each other 
of being guilty of the same wrong behaviour. Both sides argued from or adhered to the same 
set of values and accused each other of committing the same type of offences. We will see 
examples of this in the case studies presented here as well (for instance clearly in chapter eight) 
where accusations of political corruption are obviously hypocritical, ambiguous and politically 
motivated but this is outweighed by the fact that certain ‘new’ values were in fact mentioned. If 
we want to look at which public values are mentioned and what perceptions of political 
corruption can be found then all statements to that effect are valuable, whether or not they 
were true. Admittedly the question why something is being said does become of crucial 
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importance when assessing the when, how and/or why of changing public values. For this 
reason the case studies will not ignore the possible impact of political motives. 
A focus on scandals has more advantages when investigating the contextual meaning of 
public values and perceptions of political corruption and fits well with approaches discussed 
earlier. In chapter one I put forward Johnston’s definition of political corruption as “the abuse, 
according to the legal or social standards constituting a society’s system of public order, of a 
public role or resource for private benefit” (1996: 333). I discussed how this broad and flexible 
definition was able to catch the contextual and contingent nature of public values. In doing so 
the definition not only does more justice to the concept of political corruption but also makes 
it suitable for historical research into changing public values. Crucially, Johnston’s definition 
urges us to look at the interaction between individual abuse of office and legal and social 
standards of a society’s system of public order. It invites us to investigate how the content of 
notions such as ‘abuse’, ‘public role’ and ‘private benefit’ are contested and thereby acquire 
meaning in specific times and places.  
It is, according to Johnston, precisely in the clash over boundaries that concepts like 
political corruption acquire their meaning. Johnston wants us to put conflicts over standards at 
centre stage as “contention over the basic outlines of corruption may be the most important 
facts to understand, and indeed conflicting conceptions of corruption may be both key 
weapons in those conflicts and useful diagnostic tools for making sense of political and social 
change” (2005: 72). He therefore adds: “disputes over the meaning of (such) basic ideas are 
substantial issues worth careful study in their own right” (Ibid.). Disagreement and contesta-
tion over key issues such as the behaviour of public officials demonstrates a lack of consensus 
but also offers opportunities for change. Scandal, debate and contestation are the result of 
‘interaction gone wrong’ which makes the implicit visible and explicit. Scandals involving 
public official misconduct become instruments to trace changing public values to try and get a 
grip on contextual perceptions of political corruption over time. They help to explain why and 
when certain things are not acceptable anymore. Why and when, for instance, did it become 
unacceptable for tax officials to have some people pay more taxes than they legally should (see 
chapter six), for magistrates to only serve their patron and/or oligarchy (see chapter seven) or 
for public officials to only serve their personal interests (see chapter eight)?  
Since public values are only defined as such in some kind of historical context, scandals 
are a good way of investigating this context (see also Moodie, 1989: 873). Lawrence Sherman’s 
definition of scandal is used in this study. To Sherman a scandal is “a social reaction to the 
violation of socially invested trust in an institutional role” (1989: 888-889). Sherman explains 
how a scandalous act is usually not a part of the assumptions to which people are accustomed. 
In addition, it is often a matter of betrayal of trust that explains the public outrage often 
witnessed in scandals. When a public official betrays trust it means that a particular part of 
society deviates from what is considered appropriate and what are ‘agreed upon’ standards of 
conduct. This triggers debate that at specific junctures in time (in moments of ‘crisis’) becomes 
explicit about which values are regarded as relevant to the behaviour of public officials. In 
public debates explicit statements are provided on what is the ‘public good’ or ‘proper’ 
behaviour. Since public values are essentially contested (see chapter one) the idea of ‘clashes 
over boundaries’ is central to the question what, if anything, occurs when different views on 
correct or incorrect behaviour collide or come together and how this affects the changing 
meaning of public values and perceptions of political corruption over time.  
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3.3 Sources of public values 
 
From scandals it becomes apparent that some sort of boundary between groups or individuals 
in society is crossed. Scandals generate public debate concerning the unacceptable and the 
acceptable. However, difficulties immediately arise. There are often many different ‘publics’ 
(see chapter one) consisting of various actors or groups on different levels and there are as a 
result many different standards of what is acceptable and what is not. In chapter one I 
discussed how attempts to define political corruption often centre on taking single standards 
(law, public opinion etc.) and how a ‘neo-classical’ approach urges us to combine those 
different standards instead. The same logic applies here: public values are potentially (i.e., not 
necessarily) linked to a wide and sometimes conflicting variety of perceptions, assumptions and 
interpretations. To follow the useful terminology of Hoetjes (1977: 12-17; 1982: 27-31) they 
are derived from or uttered by different sources of public values. In this study I follow Hoetjes 
in distinguishing four2 such sources: best-opinion, public rectitude or the ‘morality of the time’ 
(1), legal rules of public office (2), public opinion (3) and the functioning codes of the ‘shop 
floor’ (4).  
In the following (chapters five, six, seven and eight) these four sources of public values 
each (in theory) provide a potentially different view on one and the same act. Sometimes these 
sources value the same behaviour differently. Consider perfectly legal behaviour that is still 
considered immoral or ‘corrupt’ by members of wider public. Consider, also, conduct that is 
acceptable on the ‘shop floor’ among colleagues but condemned by either law or public 
opinion. When multiple sources of values surrounding a single scandal are taken together 
(compare Johnson’s use of disagreement and contestation through debate) this provides a 
detailed and varied view on what is considered abnormal and normal, right and wrong or 
unacceptable and acceptable in a given context. Finally – as a cautionary note – Hoetjes’ 
typology of sources of values must not be confused with any of the categorizations or 
classifications of public values mentioned earlier in chapter one (paragraph two). Instead, it 
serves a different function. Rather than creating a classification or categorization of public 
values, it offers a heuristic device to uncover and investigate public values. In addition, it also 
goes a long way in explaining the contingency and contextuality of public values because it 
shows what is considered politically corrupt in different social spheres or rather: according to 
different sources of public values. Finally, it is able to explain public value change when these 
different spheres are compared and juxtaposed. 
 
Best-opinion and morality of the time 
 
Of the four sources of public values as provided by Hoetjes, the one called best-opinion and 
the morality of the time (hereafter best-opinion) is perhaps most difficult to delineate. The 
term seems to have been first used by Senturia who wrote that “where the best-opinion and 
morality of the time, examining the intent and setting of an act, judge it to represent a sacrifice 
of public for private benefit, then it must be held to be corrupt” (1935: 449). As such he 
seemed to argue how the normative judgments of an elite should be used as criteria. Heiden-
                                                 
2 Hoetjes in fact outlined only three sources (law, public opinion and best-opinion). To him, the codes of the shop 
floor belonged to best-opinion. In the project “Under Construction” we have opted to treat the shop floor as a 
separate source due to a different interpretation of the source of best-opinion. 
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heimer was doubtful of this and argued how Senturia’s “particularistic emphasis” on the elite 
as a source of best-opinion, “would require that this fairly large body serve as a jury for each 
particular case” (1989a: 10). He could have added that it is also problematic – to say the least – 
to determine who actually belongs to such an elite. While Heidenheimer himself avoids such 
terms as elite, his own division of ‘shades of corruption’ ranked the level or seriousness of 
political corruption as grey, white or black, depending on congruence between elite and mass 
public opinion on an act of political corruption. Therefore, argues Johnston (2005: 67), it is 
built on a similar idea as Senturia’s. In either case both Senturia (best-opinion based on elite) 
and Heidenheimer (public opinion of elite and/or masses) are rather vague. Hoetjes’ definition 
of best-opinion seems no less so. He refers to Aikin (1964: 142), who speaks of  the “highest 
ethical standards that exist in a community at a certain moment in time, with regard to integrity 
and corruption” (Hoetjes, 1982: 30) and seems to conclude that what matters most is the social 
rank of the person uttering the opinion.  
More specifically, Hoetjes mentions government leaders, ministers, official spokesmen 
and judges but his definition of best-opinion (just like the one proposed by Heidenheimer) still 
lacks precision. This is especially true as soon as one wishes to use it in a more concise way for 
empirical research. Johnston (2005: 66) discusses how cultural standards can be unclear or 
contradictory at the best of times and are likely to vary among segments of society. Whose 
best-opinion should we be looking at and is it possible (as the ‘best’ implies) to rank the 
opinion of one person or group over that of another? If so, we have to ask ourselves how this 
is to be done. Clarification is provided by Rezsohazy who has written that values are partly 
‘produced’ by “historically situated outstanding figures or institutions” (2001: 16155). These he 
calls ‘value producers’, ‘standard setters’ and ‘sense makers’. They are “great moral personali-
ties, prophets, philosophers, ideologists, intellectuals, scientists, artists, novelists, film directors 
and institutions such as churches, clubs, learned societies, research centres, universities etc”. 
To Rezsohazy the task of these individuals and groups is “to answer society’s existential 
questions, in giving meaning to events, in elaborating systems of thought, in proposing new 
horizons. They supply society and the actors with ideas, objectives, programs, ethical princi-
ples, critical judgments etc” (2001: 16155).  
Best-opinion can be further specified by comparing it to similar concepts. First, it often 
takes the form of meta-ethics in the sense that the opinions expressed by ‘value producers’ are 
often (heterogeneous) reflections on vague, implicit and sometimes conflicting morality. Much 
like ethics best-opinion often constitutes explicit articulations and explanations of morality and 
tends to offer more or less coherent visions on what is right and wrong. Second, best-opinion 
can be better understood when comparing it to ideology. Then it becomes obvious that many 
elements generally associated with ideology are true for best-opinion as well. Heywood 
provides a useful definition of ideology (2007: 11) as “a more or less coherent set of ideas that 
provides the basis for organized political action, whether this is intended to preserve, modify 
or overthrow the existing system of power”. All ideologies, to Heywood, share three basic 
elements: they offer an account of the existing order, usually in the form of a ‘world view’ (a), 
they advance a model of a desired future, a vision of the ‘good society’ (b), and they explain 
how political change can and should be brought about (c), or, in other words, how to get from 
(a) to (b).  
The links between these three elements offer a view on how ideology (and/or best-
opinion) potentially shapes public morality. First, world view and desired future are, for 
instance linked because ‘facts’ in ideologies tend to merge into and become confused with 
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‘values’ (Heywood, 2007: 12-13). In such a way, best-opinion has the ability to cross the gap 
between what ‘is’ and what ‘ought to be’. Best-opinion, when compared to Heywood’s notion 
of ideology, provides groups and individuals with “intellectual maps” of their societies, which 
are deeply embedded within a set of normative and prescriptive beliefs (or rather: values). 
Second, the link between desired future and change can, according to Heywood, be made in 
many ways. It can be ‘fundamental’ as a political philosophy, dealing with abstract ideas and 
theories in a ‘dispassionate’ way but it can also be ‘operative’ as a broad, practical and passion-
ate movement engaged in popular mobilization. Not every ideology (or best-opinion) is as 
strong on each of the two levels. As a source of public values, best-opinion, like ideology, can 
have an important part to play in actively shaping political action and change. “Ideas”, writes 
Heywood, “are not merely a passive reflection of vested interests or personal ambition, but 
have the capacity to inspire and guide political action” (idem 2007: 2-3). Change, in this view, is 
guided by pragmatism and struggles for power but also by beliefs, passions, values and 
convictions about what to do. One of the main purposes of best-opinion is, we could say, to 
either offer change in or adherence to (as in adding legitimacy) a set of ideals where conformity 
already exists. The ‘value producers’ Reszohazy speaks of can pave the way for reforms and/or 
consolidate and legitimize (new) morality. They contribute to new institutions (including public 
values) by questioning and rejecting the philosophical and/or theoretical foundations of old 
institutions and initiating or legitimizing new ones. 
We are able to distinguish between several sources of best-opinion in the Netherlands 
between 1748 and 1813. A first source includes religious sources such as catechisms (cf. Van 
Deursen, 2004b) or sermons. Especially public sermons were, according to Van Eijnatten, 
often inherently political. Van Eijnatten writes how towards the end of the eighteenth century 
sermons were focused on “improving the moral condition of the congregation. They conse-
quently took into account various spheres of life, civilian, social and private; clergymen could 
now sermonize on philosophy, nature or the realms of politics, and economics” (2008: 137-
138). Sermons often came to reflect presuppositions concerning the relations between religion, 
the public sphere, and political power. Popular religiously inspired texts also commented on 
the morality in or of politics and administration. Such works included, for instance, those by 
IJsbrand van Hamelsveld, an eighteenth century Dutch ‘political minister’ (cf. Van Sas, 2005: 
255-263) or Hieronymus Bosch who, in 1785, published a work called Selfishness; a powerful 
indictment of contemporary politics and the immoral behaviour of its members.  
Similar were handbooks on morality such as those by the Patriot reformer Johan Hen-
drik Swildens (cf. Swildens, 1781, 1790; Hake, 2004). These books and pamphlets often 
reflected or claimed to reflect an ‘enlightened’ anthropology and ethics. Another clergymen 
with a political pen was Johan Bareuth, an Orangist preacher in the second half of the 
eighteenth century (see chapter seven). Public values and ideas on political corruption from 
religious sources did not, however, seem to have played an important role in the cases 
investigated in this study. I will return to this in chapters five and nine. A third source of best-
opinion between 1748 and 1813 was a tradition of political-philosophical writing, present in 
the Republic at least since the early seventeenth century. Hugo Grotius (1583 – 1645), Marcus 
Zuerius Boxhorn (1612 – 1653) and Simon van Slingelandt (1664 – 1735) were among the 
early authors but in the eighteenth century the number of political writers would increase 
rapidly. Among the latter we find Jean Rousset de Missy (1688 – 1762), Joan Derk van der 
Capellen (1741 – 1784), Laurens van den Spiegel (1737 – 1800), Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck 
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(1761 – 1825), Isaac Gogel (1765 – 1821) or Willem Ockerse (1760 – 1826), to name but a few 
(see also chapter five).  
Of course, best-opinion writings on administrative reform are not necessarily writings 
on moral reform. Therefore one of the main issues is whether and what kind of attention was 
given by early modern Dutch administrative reform movements to the reform of actual 
(practical?) morality of individual administrators in particular or the system in general. Until 
now, surprisingly little attention has been paid to these issues. Rather, historians have often 
chosen to describe general patterns of institutional reform and state formation. At most they 
dealt with general moral principles and values of public administration in the process. Often 
these are inherently vague notions such as equality, representation, popular sovereignty or 
liberty. More articulated and explicitly stated implications and consequences of these general 
principles and values have hardly been investigated. A first attempt to rectify the situation is 
made in chapter five of this study. The best-opinion writers which are discussed there are what 
I would like to call working on a ‘meso-level’ of ethics. For the most part they do not seem to 
produce practical handbooks or explicit codes of administrative conduct (such as, for instance 
Swildens or, arguably, Van de Spiegel). They also do not philosophize about fundamental 
underlying principles (a la Rousseau or Locke). Instead, they are better understood as ‘small-
time’ ethicists who tried to explain and articulate current morality on a middle level of best-
opinion. This – incidentally – might explain why texts of classic and contemporary foreign 
(English, French, American and German) authors on politics and administration were indeed 
widely read during the eighteenth century (cf. Van Eijnatten, 2000: 16-17; Leeb, 1973) but that 
none of these really featured in any of the scandals I have investigated.  
From a research design perspective it is important to finally note that best-opinion as a 
source of public values will be discussed in a separate chapter while the other three sources are 
used within each case study chapter. There are three reasons for this. First, the sources in the 
cases in chapters six, seven and eight hardly ever refer to best-opinion. Only very occasionally 
can one find a reference to the likes of Cicero, Montesquieu or Locke or quotes from the bible. 
This means that public opinion, shop floor and legal codes do not appear to have been directly 
linked to best-opinion authors and/or their ideas and these will for this reason be treated 
separately. While this presents us with an empirical problem (in part due to case selection, see 
below) it does not mean that best-opinion sources did not have a role to play in changing 
public values and perceptions of political corruption or that it can not be compared (admittedly 
in a very interpretative way) to the other sources. The second reason for having a separate 
chapter on best-opinion has to do with the belief that despite some obvious differences the 
various authors on (moral) administrative reform as discussed in chapter five were part and 
parcel of three reform movements with a high degree of continuity between them. Discussing 
the three movements and some of their respective authors after one another in one single 
chapter serves best to underscore this belief. A third and final reason has to do with time and a 
different pace of moving compared to the other sources of values (compare chapter one on 
public value dynamics). By its very nature best-opinion seems to contain ‘slow moving’ 
elements (ideas, ideology and ethics) that are best to treat as a separate entity because direct 
impact is difficult if not impossible to assess. Often ideas are already around before they are 
put into practice which signals a difference in pace. 
 





At first glance public opinion, or rather: “an opinion on matters of public concern” (Palmer, 
1974, part I: 325), seems similar to best-opinion because both were often expressed through 
public media. For this reason authors like Senturia or Heidenheimer (see chapter one) 
connected the two. Yet although they are linked they are obviously not identical or, as 
Rezsohazy says: “public opinion generally lags behind with regard to the value producers and 
the opinion leaders” (2001: 16155). Furthermore, not all opinions expressed in public media 
can be called best-opinion. Not everyone is a ‘value producer’ or is perceived as such. As a 
source of values, public opinion is crucial to understanding changing public values and 
perceptions of political corruption. Scandals often simply exist by the grace of public media as 
‘public’ or ‘private’ interests are presumably violated. Much like the other sources it is not easy 
to get a grip on public opinion. Investigating this source of values leads to all the usual 
problems of interpretation because it is often unclear who says what for which reason. Authors 
often remained anonymous and what they wrote is, largely, a matter of interpretation. 
Different styles and genres served different purposes and it is not easy to identify irony and 
sarcasm or distinguish sincerity from joking in a world that is not your own. The latter is 
problematic since fear of legal persecution or other potential (social, economic) repercussions 
caused writers to widely use satire and cloaked criticism. Why something is said is also not 
often as clear as one would like it to be. Especially with regard to political corruption it seems 
that public opinion was often formulated for personal political reasons.  
Nevertheless, in the end the historian has to work within the limits set by the available 
source material. This means that all problems of hermeneutics aside (see also below) specific 
public opinion on public values and political corruption can be traced. A focus on scandals 
again provides a way out as they entail public indignation. Many often felt the need to write 
down or otherwise express their opinion which provides the researcher with a view on public 
values. Public opinion is voiced as a means of providing or applying formal or informal 
pressure and control on moral behaviour and this also applies to the past. De Boer and ‘t Hart 
write how in this way public opinion can be viewed as a more or less “collective product 
influencing behaviour and opinions, aimed at social approval or disapproval” (2007: 29). It 
often provides values and norms and increases their visibility and tangibility (Ibid., 33). Scandal 
and controversy are therefore a good point of departure to investigate public opinion and with 
it changing public values and perceptions of political corruption (cf. Bloemendal & Van 
Dixhoorn, 2010). Historical research should therefore also be concerned with the effect of 
public opinion on big changes such as changing public morality. We are best able to investigate 
public opinion in its written form (newspapers, pamphlets or books). Much has been written 
on complex related topics such as printing and literary culture, and different media and their 
reception and distribution as well as the general importance of a growing public opinion 
(Hartog, 1872; Broersma, 2005; Buijnsters, 1984, 1991; Harline, 1987; De Kruif, et al., 2006; 
Pollmann & Spicer, 2007).  
It is beyond the scope of this study to deal with such topics in detail. However, some 
categories of media and public opinion in the period between 1748 and 1813 need to be briefly 
discussed since they will play an important role in the debates in the later case studies. 
Broersma (2005) divided Dutch eighteenth century written media into newspapers, periodical 
press and pamphlets. The newspapers hardly paid attention to local and/or internal politics. 
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According to Broersma (2005: 219) they were instead focused on international news. The latter 
two categories, however, are of special importance for the purposes of this study. The 
periodical press consisted of so-called spectatorial journals and political journals. The specta-
tors were highly popular in many European states such as Germany (Martens, 1971) or 
England (Buijnsters, 1991: 15). In the Dutch Republic (Hartog, 1872; Buijnsters, 1984, 1991) 
the mostly anonymous authors of these journals were also popular as they often argued for a 
revival of commerce, religion and civic morals (cf. Kerkhoff, 2007). However, they hardly 
contained explicit information about political corruption and public values as such. This view 
is supported by Broersma (2005: 221) who noted how current affairs are seldom to be found in 
these spectators since publishers did not want to risk discontinuation of their journals by the 
authorities. The political journals, on the other hand, flourished in the second half of the 
eighteenth century. Broersma writes this was especially the case as politics had by the 1780s 
definitely entered the public sphere in the form of a new public political discourse (2005: 235). 
Lok (cf. chapter seven of this present study) similarly noted how by 1800 public opinion had 
become a separate and independent source of political authority, next to ‘king and church’ 
(2009: 29-30). As a consequence of growing public opinion, Lok says, maladministration was 
more often discussed and condemned and this led to a diminishing of the authority of 
‘administrators’. In the cases that follow (especially chapters seven and eight) such journals had 
an important part to play. Unlike the spectators (which for this reason do not feature much in 
the scandals) they often contained explicit information on changing public values and 
perceptions of political corruption. 
A final and most crucial media category for public opinion is that of pamphlets (cf. 
Broersma, 2005: 224). In the Dutch Republic between 1748 and 1813 public opinion on 
political corruption and public values was first and foremost visible in a surge in pamphlet 
literature; usually anonymous and once-only publications. Pamphlets would be used to convey 
many types of messages and would consequently take on many forms, for instance depicting 
imaginary actors (such as a regent, a farmer and a merchant) in a conversation on current 
affairs on barges, coffee houses or dinner parties. In such conversations (essentially role-plays) 
personified values often provided the views of which the author thought ‘belonged’ to each 
particular value. A character called ‘truth’ would for instance speak to one called ‘betrayal’ or 
‘justice’ as they discussed social and/or political events of the day. Of course current events 
often included scandals of political corruption (although often hidden and very indirect) since 
this would sell copies. Pamphlets were also often used to spread court rulings in important 
cases, official proclamations of authorities or personal statements by individual citizens on a 
variety of matters. In either case, pamphlets in this way provided an outlet for public values 
and perceptions of political corruption (cf. Van Sas, 2005: 195-222). This will also become 
apparent from the case studies of this study. 
 
Legal rules of public office 
 
Legal rules are, at least at first glance, the most tangible source to investigate changing public 
values. In the brief overview of scholarly work on Dutch political corruption in chapter one I 
already noted how it is often a subject in historical research on crime, punishment and the legal 
system of the Netherlands. For this reason legal perspectives on scandals allow us to see what 
the law considered to be acceptable or proper behaviour for public officials. Legal rules are 
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found in a wide variety of shapes and forms. They can be found in scholarly legal arguments, 
in court proceedings against corrupt officials, in jurisprudence and in official legal proclama-
tions and decrees of authorities. An instruction for a tax collector, an eighteenth century oath 
of office, a proclamation by the States-General or reports of an ongoing investigation (such as 
interrogations of suspects in a case) are all legal documents stating the legal rules of public 
office and legal assumptions of right or wrong behaviour. As such, the source of legal rules 
provides us with a varied view on desired and actual public morality. 
While this source is relatively easy to locate there are a number of difficulties to its use 
as well. For one, legal codes seem notoriously and often purposefully ambiguous because of 
strategic interests (cf. Moynihan, 2009: 815-818). Also, law was immensely fragmented in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century Dutch Republic, characterized in part by its particularism. 
In short (see chapter four for a detailed discussion) this meant that cities, provincial states and 
the union of all provinces often had their own legal rules and regulations and legal institutions 
that resulted in a patchwork of different legal proceedings, fines, punishments, and rules. Not 
until the early nineteenth century with the introduction of French legal codes did legal 
uniformity become a reality which makes it difficult to deduce any general perceptions on 
political corruption from legal rules alone. Another problem is that administration and law (or 
any other powers) were not separated in the early modern Dutch Republic until the introduc-
tion of the French legal system in the early nineteenth century. For much of the period under 
investigation in this study different public officials could therefore have executive, legislative 
and judiciary powers at the same time (Groenveld & Wagenaar, 2011: 98). A typical mayor 
would for instance be head of the daily administration of a city, appoint important city 
officials, and control the city’s finances but would also make legislation together with several 
aldermen in the form of local ordinances. This presents problems because it means that ‘the 
law’ was not as objective, neutral or ‘universal’ as it is (or is thought to be) now. It follows 
from this that the same can be said for the rules and regulations regarding public office and 
their behaviour. In addition, as is shown in the case studies that follow, public officials could 
also be above the law, which meant that even when judged ‘corrupt’ they would not always be 
tried. This means that sometimes legal codes might have been there in theory but were 
irrelevant in the practice of a political corruption scandal. This is corroborated by the cases that 
follow – in part there is a case selection bias here! – which show that legal standards were by 
no means the most important standard for the period between 1750 – 1813 (see chapter nine). 
 
The functioning codes of the shop floor 
 
A final source of public values delineated by Hoetjes and used in this study consists of the 
functioning codes of the shop floor. This source includes personal views and statements from 
people who were directly or indirectly involved. The codes of the shop floor involve the 
everyday rules or standards by which public administration was expected to be conducted by 
the actual practitioners. These codes are difficult to access but can be found in personal 
documents such as letters or diaries. They can also be found in pamphlets that were often 
written by key actors in scandals – in which they offered reflections on court cases – in 
personal deliberations on what ‘really’ happened, in public apologies or in publicized responses 
to interrogations. While such personal views are therefore often expressed in the form of some 
of the other sources they still have to be treated separately because the codes of the shop floor 
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(i.e., personal values and perceptions of political corruption) can often be different from those 
found in other sources. Tax farmers amongst themselves (see chapter six) could believe it was 
acceptable to fix prices, even though other sources disagreed. Sometimes (consider chapter 
seven) the codes of the shop floor were even all that really mattered (cf. Hoenderboom & 
Kerkhoff, 2008) especially when legal rules were vague or absent or when public opinion 
and/or best-opinion were not strong enough to make an impression (see chapter seven). 
Furthermore, when the actors in a scandal were also the ones making the rules (as was often 
the case) their personal convictions become crucial. On the shop floor, finally, we are perhaps 
best able to see values, opinions and assumptions for what they really were. We might be able 
to assume how notes in a letter to a friend or in a diary for one’s private use are written 
without ulterior motives; stripped from political or strategic interest. This makes them, when 
written down in such forms, somewhat less ambiguous than values and interpretations in other 
sources.  
 
Combining and comparing sources of values 
 
What has been said for standards of political corruption (see chapter one) applies equally to 
sources of public values. Each source on its own merely provides a particular view on an 
instance of political corruption. Therefore: only when we take multiple sources in account at 
the same time does a more detailed and precise picture of changing public values appear. 
Objections can be raised to each source of values and combinations can also be problematic. 
We have to keep in mind there is considerable potential overlap between them. As we have 
seen pamphlets can be personal documents as well as expressions of public opinion and legal 
codes are often presented as public proclamations – sometimes in pamphlet form – of court 
sentences or in the form of personal writings and deliberations on the application of law and 
jurisprudence. A political journal belongs to public- and potentially best-opinion at the same 
time. Similarly, a major problem is that the historian is dependent on the availability of source 
material (see below). This means that not every instance (or even every case-study in this book) 
of political corruption will have every source of values available for examination in an equal 
measure. A major difficulty and limitation of taking a methodological approach based on 
examining, juxtaposing and comparing multiple sources of values is therefore that cases often 
lack one or more sources and that some sources might prove to be less salient than others. 
Hardly ever do we find all sources represented in an equal fashion in a single case at the same 
time. 
Despite problems with individual sources and possible overlap between them each 
source still provides a particular view. Each also offers unique possibilities for research. 
Furthermore, the benefits of combining them also outweigh the downsides. A combination of 
various sources of values surrounding cases of political corruption is, first and foremost, likely 
to provide a historical view on how value dynamics work. Perhaps public values from legal 
codes conflict with those on the shop floor or best-opinion and public opinion show signifi-
cantly different debates. Perhaps we see that excessive attention by administrators to any 
particular public value or set of public values is the result of the displacement of others (cf. 
Moynihan, 2009: 818). Perhaps a combined view on different sources of values helps to 
explain possible transitions from ‘old’ to ‘new’ public value systems due to specific sources of 
public values. The rise of public opinion as a source of new or reemphasized public values 
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might for instance have been key in displacing shop floor views (cf. Dekker, 1986: 117-118) 
and long-since established ways of doing things. When opinions differ – as they invariably do – 
and clashes between them occur, impetus is usually provided for change of public values and 
public value systems. When some sources start to outweigh others in importance this offers 
possibilities for change. One other added benefit of combining multiple sources of values is 
that it allows one to decrease the ambiguity of particular public values. 
 
3.4 Case study design: selection and parameters  
 
The case study design of this research consists of three cases in Holland between 1748 and 
1813. This design is based on the heuristic devices of political corruption scandals and sources 
of public values. The cases all revolve around scandals that generated explicit debate. Each case 
assesses political corruption from the widest possible range of four sources of values. Since 
each source potentially provides a different view on similar acts, the context is reconstructed in 
which meaning is attributed. In this way the cases offer in-depth and detailed information 
about what was deemed appropriate public official behaviour according to different sources. 
When these sources of values are combined, in addition to the use of the bureaucratic ideal 
type and notions derived from historical institutionalism (see chapter two) this helps us better 
understand changing public values in early modern Dutch public administration. In the 
following paragraph I first discuss the case selection and will also delineate some essential 
parameters of this study. Scandal and the availability of a variety of four sources of public 
values (see earlier) are only two of the parameters applied to the case selection. There are also 
(necessary) chronological, geographical and topical limits to this research. These parameters are 
there in part because of practical constraints. At the same time they also increase the validity of 




Drawing chronological lines between periods is a delicate business. When a period begins or 
ends is a subjective matter and often only necessary to artificially cut up large chunks of time. 
We should, for instance, ask ourselves what events are actually crucial moments of change or 
watersheds between periods and whether we can distinguish these at all. Stefan Zweig for 
instance once spoke of “die Weltminute von Waterloo” but to this Dutch historian Jan 
Romein replied that “this battle did not end anything that had not been ended already and did 
not start anything that had not already begun” (op cit. in Harmsen, 1998: 101-102). This points 
to the problem of determining continuity and change in any given period and to the problem 
how to determine periods of tranquillity and ‘slow moving processes’ interrupted by ‘critical 
junctures’ (see chapter two). It is a problem of determining what changes occur when and of 
‘old’ versus ‘new’. While we should therefore be cautious when attaching explanatory meaning 
to specific sequences of periods or moments in time or with trying to pinpoint moments or 
even periods of radical change, these can still sometimes be seen. To follow historian Ido de 
Haan (2004) there are always moments of transition: radical changes in the political system due 
to such things as war or internal struggle, when the legitimacy of the state is questioned and 
there is room for something new. Obviously, when investigating changing public value systems 
such moments of transition become extremely important.  
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With this in mind we can say that Dutch administrative history has seen some periods and 
events that were certainly more important turning points than others. Commonly accepted 
Dutch historiography usually identifies three watershed moments of transition and books on 
Dutch (administrative) history are consequently usually divided in four basic periods (cf. Blom 
& Lamberts, 1993; Israel, 1998; Wagenaar, et al., 2011a). First is the period until 1588 with the 
beginning of the Revolt against Spain. Second there is the period of the Dutch Republic until 
the United Kingdom of the Netherlands between 1588 and 1813. Sometimes a break in the 
latter period is made in which 1795 is seen as the start of a separate so-called French-Batavian 
period. Third, there is the period of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands to the formation 
of the constitutional monarchy from 1813 to 1848. Fourth is the period from 1848 onwards 
with the establishment of the Dutch constitutional monarchy. This standard segmentation of 
periods is useful for reasons of clarity and can be based on good arguments. However, it is not 
entirely without problems. Some critics have, for instance, argued how it usually coincides with 
a systematic (and normative?) undervaluation of ‘normal’ – as opposed to ‘abnormal’ –  
periods whereby the ‘abnormal’ times of Dutch Republic and French-Batavian period are also 
usually juxtaposed to the ‘normal’ periods before and after (Van Sas, 2005: 17). 
Likewise, Schutte (1978) already argued how the period 1702 – 1780 was often mis-
taken for a period of tranquillity, stagnation and lethargy in between the ‘golden’ seventeenth 
century and the age of revolution after 1795. Schutte argued instead that severe clashes already 
occurred in this earlier (or ‘intermediate’) period which enabled the later transition from ancien 
regime to modern nation state after 1795. Important for the purposes of this present study is 
that Schutte also considered this period to have witnessed “a profound and encompassing 
process of mental change” (1978: 270). Equally important for the purposes of this study is that 
most common periodical divisions do not take into account the importance of the specific 
timeframe between 1750 and 1850. To Van Sas (2005: 17) chronological divisions of Dutch 
history should take this period into account as one of continuous change and thus of funda-
mental importance. Van Sas (2005: 20-21) is the most recent and, arguably, most outspoken 
advocate of attributing special attention to the timeframe 1750 – 1850. In a nutshell, the period 
1750 – 1850 is sometimes considered a Dutch Sattelzeit (see earlier in chapter one) in which 
changes in social-political vocabulary coincided with processes of democratization, ideological 
and/or mental change and politicization (Van Sas, 1999; 2005: 18; Velema, 1999a: ix-x). While 
the term is controversial for use in the Dutch context (cf.  Frijhoff, 2000) it is still used in this 
study to denote the link between fundamental institutional changes of the period and changing 
public values and perceptions of political corruption.  
In this study I follow historians such as Van Sas and Velema in their appreciation for 
the specific period between 1750 and 1850 but I limit my focus to the years between 1748 and 
1813, thus leaving out the period 1813 – 1850. This limitation has been partly due to practical 
constraints of time and space and because of the difficulty in finding suitable case material. 
However, there have also been substantive reasons for this choice. Firstly, the period between 
1813 and 1850 constituted a different period than before because of the introduction of the 
(later constitutional) monarchy in 1813. In that year a fundamentally new political-
administrative era began which warrants a separation as to not compare apples and oranges. A 
second reason is that, as will become clear from this study, contrary to common perceptions 
the foundations for the new era after 1813 were for a large part already built in the period 
leading up to it. An emphasis on the period 1747 – 1813 therefore serves to counter the 
common but misguided idea that the Dutch Republic witnessed relatively little change in 
Hidden Morals, Explicit Scandals 
 
60 | 
public values and value systems, bureaucratization and the foundations and structure of the 
Dutch state. Instead, I argue that some of the most fundamental changes in Dutch politics and 
administration – and of course especially those concerning public morality – had already 
occurred before 1813. Of course, this argument ought also to be tested by means of a 
comparison with a case study from the period 1813 – 1848. This, however, will have to be 
done on a later date. Finally, the choice to consider the period between 1748 and 1813 as a 
time-frame on its own is supported by the existence of three important major moral reform 
movements in this period in which public values and political corruption were a top priority 
(see below and chapter five).  
The period 1748 – 1813 is in this study further divided in three parts based on impor-
tant watersheds in Dutch political-administrative history (see also chapter four). Each of these 
parts will be covered by a case study in the following chapters. The first part runs from 1748 to 
1755. The year 1748 was marked by large-scale tax riots and calls for administrative reforms in 
several Holland cities in part exemplified by a reform movement of so-called Doelists (see 
chapter five). The first case study is situated in this period and discusses problems with 
taxation and subsequent bureaucratic measures to combat political corruption and to strive for 
moral reform. It serves to illustrate the fact that new thinking on public morality was indeed on 
the rise and found its way in bureaucratic measures. It was a kind of new thinking, further-
more, that would become more powerful in the decades to come. The second part runs from 
the late 1770s to the late 1780s. This so-called Patriot period showed a rekindling of older 
demands for reform and a true – but failed – attempt at administrative and political reform by 
means of an armed revolution in 1787. This sub-period is often considered as exhibiting the 
highest degrees of political corruption in Dutch history and involved many instances, mostly 
dealing with the incorrect execution of office and extensive use of patronage and nepotism. 
Now, harming the ‘public good’ became a key notion that acquired new meaning as a result of 
American Revolution and Enlightenment ideas such as civic freedom and popular sovereignty.  
As such the period proved of pivotal importance in the evolution of thinking about 
‘proper’ public administration. The corresponding case study deals with the acts of two high 
ranking city officials in two Dutch cities who were accused of abuse of office for a variety of 
reasons, many of which were ‘new’ in the context of the time’s political debates. The third and 
final part to be distinguished and discussed in this study runs from 1795 to 1813. With the aid 
of French revolutionary troops, so-called Batavians managed to create the Batavian Republic in 
1795. The events in this relatively short period can arguably be seen as the most crucial 
turnings point in modern Dutch political-administrative history (cf. Jourdan, 2009; Palmer, 
1954; Rosendaal, 2005a; Van Sas, 1989; Schama, 1977). The Batavian revolution secured many 
decisive shifts as the new foundations of a ‘Napoleonic’ system were laid (cf. Lok, 2009; Van 
der Meer & Raadschelders, 1995; Peters, 2008; Wunder, 1995) and new public institutions were 
installed (such as a parliament and a constitution). A case study on a parliamentary investiga-
tion into the behaviour of some leading politicians in the Batavian Republic serves to show just 
what debates were about and what the consequences of this might have been with regard to 
changing public morality. 
Consequently, a division in periods directly affects the case selection in this study. The 
three cases of this study are, first, selected because they represent an important and/or highly 
typical instance of political corruption and surrounding debates in each of the three sub-
periods between 1748 and 1813. They each represent a moment of crisis, a watershed, or a 
‘plane of fracture’. Since three cases is a somewhat limited number, more research and case-
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studies might provide different results. Yet, other cases with multiple sources of values are 
difficult to find and, more importantly, the cases presented in this study are highly representa-
tive of their time. They show fundamental debates, crucial values and value statements and 
current and dominant perceptions of political corruption. Second, the cases and sub-periods 
are selected based on the existence of the three subsequent ‘administrative reform movements’ 
that were also consequential to each other in the period 1748 – 1813: Doelists in the 1740s and 
1750s, Patriots in the 1770’s and 1780’s and Batavians from the 1790s onwards. In chapter five 
I will deal with these movements more thoroughly but for now it should already be said that 
the existence of these reform movements is crucial to better understand the development of 
public values and perceptions of political corruption. Each new movement, for instance, had 
similar core demands but would be more successful then the previous (Israel, 1998: 1105-




Geographical location is another important parameter of this research as I focus on the 
province of Holland within the larger framework of Dutch provinces (see chapter four). The 
choice for a focus on Holland is based on two reasons. First, it is due to the immensely 
fragmented nature of the Dutch Republic. As will be explained in chapter four, the various 
provinces and even cities therein would often differ greatly from each other; also in matters of 
administration. A comparative focus on multiple provinces is therefore highly problematic and 
a choice was made to focus on one. Second, Holland was in many ways the most important of 
the provinces. This too is explained in chapter four but for now one can say that Holland’s 
cities were the economic and therefore political powerhouses of the Republic. Because they 
contributed most to the Republic in terms of finances, economic growth and army and fleet 
augmentation for the Republic’s many wars, the province was dominant. In addition, the main 
administrative bodies of the Republic were situated in Holland and the majority of administra-
tors came mostly from the all-important Holland town councils. Holland was in fact so 
powerful that it usually dominated all the other provinces. This does not mean that Holland is 
taken here as either measure or mirror for the entire Dutch Republic. That would be too 
simplistic and provide false accounts. However, it does mean that with a focus on public values 
and political corruption in Holland we are investigating the most influential part of the 




The case-studies are also restricted to certain ‘typical’ areas or policy domains of public 
administration of the time. The first case (chapter six) involves political corruption in the core 
business of taxation and the link between bureaucratic changes in the tax system and changes 
in public values. The second case (chapter seven) deals with political corruption surrounding 
obtaining and executing public office and patronage and nepotism. While debates had often 
focused on the proper or improper execution of public office before 1750 as well (see 
Hoenderboom, forthcoming, on the period 1650 – 1750) these issues, I argue, were more 
fundamentally discussed and brought to the fore in the period between 1748 and 1813 in 
general and in the 1770s and 1780s in particular. These discussions were crucial to an evolving 
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public morality. The third case (chapter eight) examines yet another crucial domain of public 
administration. The case from 1798 serves to exemplify the emergence of a budding political 
system with political factions (though not yet political parties) which opposed each other on 
various fundamental issues of a distinctly political as well as moral nature. Such issues included 
notions of representation and accountability but also the organization of the state, the content 
of a new constitution, the general role of politicians in the execution of their duties and 
discussions on a public-private divide. 
 
3.5 Explanation and causality 
 
Throughout the introduction and especially in the discussion in chapter two, the twin issues of 
explanation and causality already appeared in between the lines. This is, of course, due to the 
fact that research of this study is part explanatory: to provide insight in possible causal relations 
between a changing institutional environment on the one hand and changing public values on 
the other. Explanation and causality are, however, neither straightforward nor self-evident in 
the type of research presented here (i.e., historical case studies) because of the contingency and 
contextuality of public values in the ever changing and highly complex institutional environ-
ment of the Dutch Republic. Both concepts therefore warrant brief separate and explicit 
discussion in order to temper potential expectations as well as increase the clarity of – and to 
be honest about – this study’s aims and conclusions. After all, good comparative historical 
analysis, as Laslett (1980: 219) tells us, requires a good understanding of causality, explanation 
and generalization. 
In short, explanation in the social sciences rests upon the interpretation of facts and 
presuppositions concerning any possible coherence among them. Historians of public 
administration for instance often speak of stages, patterns and mechanisms rather than 
universal or general laws. Explanation in this sense (and it is used in this way in this study) 
means establishing “meaningful relation(s) between observed (new, so far unknown) facts and 
known facts” (Raadschelders, 2000: 40) and the only way to do this is to abstract from reality 
and to select and interpret ‘facts’. Max Weber called this die Erfassung des Sinnzusammenhangs (cf. 
Raadschelders & Rutgers, 1989: 23). It is an approach that is for instance illustrated by 
Mahoney and Rüschemeyer who argue that good comparative historical analysis “is defined by 
a concern with causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic 
and contextualized comparison” (2003a: 6-9; see also Thelen, 2002: 94). To Raadschelders 
(2000: 36-39) models and the use of theory likewise help interpret historical facts, help simplify 
complex past reality and bring us closer to why questions. They also help generate new 
questions and enable systematic comparison. At best, then, a cautious and more realistic 
understanding of explanation, generalization and causality in the social sciences (and history) 
leads to ‘middle-range theories’. These are “more modest and restrictive but intensely studied 
segments of reality” (Van Braam, 1989: 36; Raadschelders, 2000: 44).  
Because of this more cautious and realistic approach to explanation and causality, this 
study does not aim to provide a general theory on public value change. Nor does it delineate a 
(fixed or general) set of factors that lead to public value change. This, in fact, would be 
impossible if only because there is still much uncertainty and disagreement on what public 
values actually are (see chapter one) and because the range of potential explanations seems 
endless. Rather, the study provides a range of potentially explanatory factors and/or mecha-
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nisms of public value change that can be observed in the province of Holland between 1748 
and 1813. Because they are inductively generated by means of empirical case studies, this range 
of explanatory factors will necessarily be somewhat eclectic. Furthermore, the direction of any 
causal relationship (whether theoretically or in practice) will often necessarily remain unclear. It 
is impossible, in my opinion, to answer the question whether bureaucratization leads to public 
value change or whether it was the other way around. I argue that such a ‘chicken and the egg’ 
problem is best solved by leaving the answer somewhere in the middle. Furthermore, the two 
are not separated variables. Instead, as I will show in the later case studies they coincide and 
often go hand in hand. However, this does not diminish the importance of the causal link 
itself. In the end, furthermore, an eclectic range with uncertain causal directions still provides 
material that substantiates, complements and/or corrects existing abstract and general theories 
of public value dynamics (cf. Beck Jørgensen & Vrangbæk, 2011) and political corruption (see 
chapter one). It helps us to observe meaningful relations as to how and why new public values 
are potentially added or how and why the content, meaning and interpretation of existing 
values potentially changed. 
A final related question is whether and, if so how, isolated incidents and cases can also 
function as some sort of structural and/or diachronic representations for longer periods of 
time. Parts of this question were answered in chapter two (the focus on the explanatory power 
of administrative-historical work in general) and earlier in this chapter (on case selection and 
parameters). In addition, focusing on the validity provides a further answer and shows the 
explanatory power of a specific historical case study design such as provided in previous 
sections. Essentially I aim to draw evidence from single cases in order to illuminate features of 
a (potential?) broader set of cases (Gerring, 2007: 29). Such a method serves to gain under-
standing of the whole by focusing on key parts and rests on in-depth knowledge of key cases 
through which general points are elucidated and evaluated. Furthermore, a focus on in-depth 
cases is able to preserve the texture and detail of individual cases. Mahoney and Rüschemeyer 
(2003a: 9) argue how “viewing cases and processes at a less abstract level enables us to derive 
lessons from past experiences that speak to the concern of the present. It yields more mean-
ingful advice concerning contemporary choices and possibilities than studies that aim for the 
universal truths but cannot grasp critical historical details”. The somewhat low academic status 
of historical case studies (cf. Yin, 2009: 14-16; Gerring, 2007: 5-8) usually has to do with the 
view that single or a few case studies can not yield explanatory evidence. They are often not 
thought to be able to generate valid knowledge because cases are not randomly selected and 
there may not be enough statistical degrees of freedom to test all conceivable hypotheses 
critically.  
However, much of the lack of appreciation for the case study method stems from it be-
ing poorly understood and can easily be rebutted (cf. Gerring, 2007: 8; Reuschemeyer, 2003; 
Yin, 2009). Most importantly, a case study research design “exhibits characteristic strengths 
and weaknesses relative to its large-N cross-case cousin” (Gerring, 2007: 37) and is able to 
generate rather than test hypotheses. Case study designs are consequently often identified as 
‘plausibility probes’ or ‘theory-building exercises’ and are thought to provide more internal 
rather than external validity. This means they are generally not highly representative (unless 
potentially on a theoretical level, see Yin, 2009: 41) because they include only a limited number 
of cases of some more general phenomenon. On the other hand high internal validity makes it 
easier “to establish the veracity of a causal relationship pertaining to a single case (or a small 
number of cases) than for a larger set of cases” (Gerring, 2007: 43). Case study designs also 
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provide causal insights into mechanisms (or pathways from x to y, see earlier in chapter two) 
rather than effects and, finally, have a deep rather than a broad scope of proposition. These 
(and other) benefits of a case study design mentioned in the above makes it relatively easy to 
see why this method is especially useful for the research presented in this study. It best suits a 
look at causal mechanisms related to public value change and taking a deep or ‘thick’ contex-
tual perspective rather than a broad and ‘thin’ one. Since I am interested in broader societal 
processes that affect public value change a thick description is needed. This is, in other words, 
in line with Johnstonian as well as a historical institutional point of view. The benefits of a case 
study design for the present study become more apparent when we take into account Gerrings 
statement that “the significant feature of most case studies is that they look at periods of 
change, and these periods of change produce (or are regarded as producing) distinct observa-
tions – classically “before” or “after” observations” (2007: 32). Similarly, the three case studies 
of this research are, as mentioned, cases on ‘planes of fracture’ in Dutch political-
administrative history which allows a view on the ‘before and after’ or the ‘old and new’. Even 
more benefits of a historical case study design for the purposes of this study become visible 
when we consider specific writings on the use of case studies to explain historical dynamics in 
social or political structures. Raadschelders and Rutgers (1989: 26-29) state how a case study 
approach is useful to provide context and detail in (ideal typical) explanations. Similarly, 
Reuschemeyer (2003: 310-312) tresses how much can be learned from single ‘in-depth’ 
historical case studies because they are not just suitable to inspire new hypotheses and insights 
but can also test, reflect, modify and falsify them as long as one “makes an explicit link 
between theoretical imagination and empirical evidence”.  
 
3.6 Limitations and solutions 
 
The most important methodological difficulties, most notably the explanatory power of a 
historical case study design and problems of explanation and causality in general, have so far 
been discussed. Yet, it is essential to also briefly discuss some other limitations inherent in the 
methodology of this study. First, sources can either be impossible to find or simply do not 
exist at all, of course without the historian knowing this in advance. A general lack of indexes 
and overviews of material make the work of a historian who relies (in part) on primary sources 
difficult. Secondly, this means that the practical possibility of combining the different sources 
of public values creates challenges and that it is often difficult to incorporate all sources of 
public values in one single case-study (see earlier on sources of public values). A third difficulty 
has to do with language and interpretation. The problem is defined by the fact that the source 
material offered in the cases is in eighteenth century Dutch – and sometimes French and 
German – while this book is written in modern English. The book is in English because I 
believe that research on Dutch historical cases of political corruption and public value change 
has international relevance (see earlier in chapter one). The inherent problem, however, is that 
we run the risk of losing vital context and specific information when translating eighteenth-
century Dutch into modern English. This is a particularly pressing concern for the research 
presented here since much of the language used to describe political corruption is indirect. 
Straightforward attacks on people’s behaviour were rare. Instead, attacks or discussions were 
often riddled with sarcasm, irony, wordplay and hidden meaning. 
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In Anglophone research translating all citations and giving a reference to the original in a 
footnote usually solves such problems. In Dutch works, on the other hand, citations are 
usually incorporated in a wide variety of languages into the main body of the text. I have opted 
for something of a compromise. To increase the readability of the English text I have 
translated all citations from eighteenth-century Dutch into modern English. At the same time I 
have put the Dutch originals in endnotes – combined in a separate appendix – in order to 
preserve the original language and meaning. The reader who wishes to follow the main line and 
arguments of the book and does not read Dutch may simply ignore the citations in the 
endnotes. However, those who wish to read the eighteenth century Dutch originals can still do 
so. Interpretation likewise presents us with difficulties that one has at least to be aware of. Of 
course translations are really interpretations with which one hopes to do justice to the original 
phrases. It has to be mentioned however that this brings to the fore the crucial problem of 
distinguishing between fact and interpretation in historical research. In a nutshell, perceptions 
of political corruption are contextual and subjective interpretations of events. The historian 
thus needs to distinguish between such different interpretations and has to deal with double 
hermeneutics because, as Lorenz (1987: 29) writes: “language is not a mirror of reality but 
embodies a certain viewpoint or framework with which we perceive reality”.  
It is important to further note two things in the context of this research. First, values 
and value statements can never be separated from their context which remains vital to increase 
our understanding of the changing meaning of actual thought and practice. This is reminiscent 
of Skinner’s well-known critique of studying ideas as ‘isolated’ units of analysis or as ‘forms of 
words’ (cf. Skinner, 1969: 35; Tully, 1988: 29-67). Instead, Skinner argues, “we should study 
not the meanings of words, but their use” and “the meaning of the idea must be its uses to 
refer in various ways” (1969: 36-37). It is, as Velema writes, precisely “the contemporary 
linguistic context within which a term or phrase is imbedded which makes the use of the term 
or phrase understandable and which allows one to make meaningful statements regarding their 
meaning and function” (1999b: xviii-xiv). To Skinner, this does not mean that “a study of 
social context can not help to understand a text”. Rather, it means that “the assumption to 
study an idea in terms of its social context, can be shown to be mistaken” (1969: 42-43. Italics in 
original, TK). It also means, according to Skinner that “classic texts, especially in social, ethical, 
and political thought, help to reveal – if we let them – not the essential sameness, but rather 
the essential variety of viable moral assumptions and political commitments” (1969: 52). Such 
an approach to the historical study of the history of ideas (such as the idea of political 
corruption) in which the historical context of ideas and terms is taken into account, finally also 
helps us to better understand the evolution of new politics (cf. Raadschelders, 1994; Tilly, 
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“The entire world, my dear Aristian, only shows  
the most elaborate portrayal of the aberrations of politics” 
 
Abbé de Mably (1709 – 1785),  
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4 Political History and Political Culture  





It is necessary to understand the wider social and political context of early-modern Dutch 
administrators (in the province of Holland) in order to understand how their actions were 
perceived, what was considered corrupt, which public values we can distinguish and how and 
why they changed. In this chapter I therefore first provide an elementary (due to limited space) 
historical overview of the main political and administrative actors, organizations and levels of 
administration. This is followed by an equally brief overview of events in Dutch political 
history between 1748 and 1813. Third, I provide a short discussion of some of the main 
characteristic elements of Dutch political culture in the period under investigation.  
 
4.2 Administrative levels 
 
The Dutch Republic as an anomaly? 
 
The year 1648 marked a fundamental shift in Dutch political history. With the end of the 
Dutch Revolt against the Spanish empire an independent Republic of Seven United Provinces 
emerged. After nearly a hundred years of revolt and uprising, the Spanish crown – weakened 
by the size of its empire and crippled by war debts – finally recognized the independence of 
the Northern Low Countries with the Peace of Münster in 1648. Coincidence, luck and the 
fact that its main enemies were often too busy fighting each other, were the main reasons why 
this Dutch Republic was able to exist against all odds until 1795. Some have called this Dutch 
Republic an anomaly in early modern Europe (Davids & Lucassen, 1995; Davids, et al., 1988; 
Dekker, 1982; Schöffer, 1978: 184; 't Hart, 1993; Velema, 1999b: xvi). Even though others 
dispute this (De Bruin, 1999) it did indeed have some exceptional institutional characteristics, 
especially when compared to other neighbouring European states at the time. It lacked, for 
instance, a monarch and corresponding court life, a powerful nobility or strong central or ‘top-
down’ state administration (De Jong, 1987: 32-33). In 1673, Sir William Temple, the English 
ambassador to the Dutch Republic, noticed how it: “cannot properly be styled a common-
wealth, but is rather a confederacy of seven sovereign provinces united together for their 
common and mutual defence, without any dependence one upon the other. But to discover the 
nature of their government from the first springs and motions, it must be taken into yet 
smaller pieces, by which it will appear, that each of these provinces is likewise composed of 
many little states or cities, which have several marks of sovereign power within themselves, and 
are not subject to the sovereignty of their province” (1687/1972: 52). The Dutch 
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Republic of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries resembled a federation of sovereign 
provinces more than anything else (Boogman, 1979: 390-391; Van Deursen, 2004a: 138; Fruin 
& Colenbrander, 1922: 179). As a kind of federal Republic it was small and free on the inside 
and able to fight off any internal ‘tyrant’ (such as – according to some at the time – a strong 
Stadholder). At the same time it would be large and united enough to fight off any external 
threat (such as Spain, France or England) (Klein, 1995: 25).  
 
Unity, centralization and local autonomy 
 
At the most central level of the Republic there was the Estates General. Initially this had been 
an advisory council rooted in medieval feudal structures since the fourteenth century. It had 
served as a means for the Burgundian and Habsburg rulers to summon their local nobles for 
advice and money. Since the Union of Utrecht (1579) in which seven Dutch provinces 
(Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht, Friesland, Groningen, Gelderland, Overijssel and Drente) united 
against the Spanish-Habsburg ruler, the Estates General consisted of delegates from these 
seven. It dealt mainly with war, taxation and foreign affairs (Fockema Andreae, 1961; Israel, 
1998: 276). Apart from the Estates General the Dutch Republic had several supplementary 
‘central’ or Generality institutions such as the Council of State, the Generality Accounting 
Office, the Generality Mint Chamber, and five Admiralty colleges. The Generality essentially 
existed by the grace of the individual provinces. The only real basis for unity among the 
provinces had been and would continue to be an ad-hoc alliance. Even the charter of the 
Union of Utrecht stated that it was the goal of the union to protect and maintain the rights and 
privileges of each province (Van Deursen, 2004a: 139). Unity was, at first, a necessary evil to 
improve cooperation in the revolt against the Spanish (Price, 1994: 221). After the Revolt, 
when the common threat was gone, tendencies to disintegration grew (Tamse, 1980: 91) but 
pragmatism still had the upper hand. The provinces realized that only together did they stand a 
chance in a hostile geo-political environment of potential enemies. 
The practical reality of the Republic’s political institutional design was that arrange-
ments of power and sovereignty were based on local or provincial autonomy. Various authors 
have emphasized how only a small group of people truly believed in the union (cf. Blockmans, 
1985: 242; De Jong, 1987: 31; Wagenaar, 2003: 126). The population at large and certainly the 
all important city administrators or regents (see below) were usually loyal to their city first, their 
province next and hardly ever to the generality at large. Despite the institution of the Estates 
General the Dutch Republic would therefore retain its federal and fragmented character 
throughout the eighteenth century. In principle all provinces had an equal share in power by 
means of veto in the Estates General and decisions could only be made unanimously. 
However, in practice some provinces were more powerful than others, mainly caused by 
differences in payment to the union. Because Holland contributed more than half of the entire 
budget it dominated the Estates General (Israel, 1998: 286; De Jong, 1987: 19; De Vries & Van 
der Woude, 1995: 126).  
Essentially, there was no obvious or natural unity among the provinces. In the few 
common areas such as war, taxation and foreign policy, the other six provinces tried to 
influence the one (i.e., Holland) as much as possible. In all other matters the provinces tried to 
keep control over their own affairs as best they could. They only discussed matters in the 
Estates General that were important to them all while at the same time holding on to as much 
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autonomy as possible (Gabriëls, 1989: 40). Provinces often merely referred to each other as 
‘allies’ in official documents, cities and provinces were often involved in bitter disputes over 
territory or jurisdiction (Dekker, 1982; Wagenaar, 2003: 111) and rules and regulations on 
various ‘policy areas’ often differed much from place to place. Provincial autonomy was 
therefore deeply engrained. Provinces each had their own Provincial Estates made up of 
representatives of cities and the nobility. The Provincial Estates also had daily standing 
committees called Gecommitteerde Raden that consisted of local city administrator delegates 
(Kooijmans 1985: 32). Gecommitteerde Raden were responsible for the day to day administra-
tion of their province and also chose the provincial delegate to the Estates General (Israel, 
1998: 279). As a separate institution every province (at least in theory) also had a so-called 
Stadholder (see below) although multiple provinces would usually share one. 
In the political-institutional constellation of the Dutch Republic before 1795 the local 
level of the cities was the most important. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
Dutch cities got bigger and more complex. The Republic ranked among the most urbanized 
regions of early modern Europe. An increase in wealth led to explosive urban growth espe-
cially in the maritime province of Holland (Israel, 1998: 328). As a result, local government 
became more responsible for the welfare of larger numbers of citizens and ‘public policy’ was 
increasingly executed by public bodies instead of church and/or ‘private’ organizations (cf. 
Van der Heijden, 2009). This had a significant effect on bureaucratization and professionaliza-
tion and in turn on morality underlying public administration because more elaborate rules 
needed to be established (see chapter six). The local level was essentially the only government 
most ordinary citizens ever had to deal with and the city was the most important physical, 
political and legal entity in the Republic (Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001: 149). Both Provincial and 
Generality power were derived from the local city level, which shows how the highly decentral-
ized Republic essentially worked ‘bottom-up’ (Schöffer, 1978: 184). As mentioned, Provincial 
Estates mainly consisted of city delegates or representatives and city interests (although not 
every city was represented equally) thus largely determined a province’s stance in the Estates 
General. With the growing importance of the Gecommitteerde Raden and the large role of city 
administrators in them, the cities got ever more direct power over policy on all levels of 
government (Israel, 1998: 278). Large and wealthy cities could be very powerful. Especially 
Amsterdam was often able to ignore or resist the wishes of the Stadholder (Fruin, 1929: 71-72) 
or the other provinces and at times determined the course of their Provincial Estates (De Jong, 
1987: 31) and thereby of the generality as a whole. Much like the provinces, the individual 
cities also viewed cooperation useful for common issues of war and foreign affairs. In most 
other matters they wanted to remain as independent as possible, for instance in issuing local 
statutes and ordinances and administering law and order (Raadschelders, 1992: 11-12). 
Local sovereignty therefore extended to cities as well. Furthermore, city governments 
across the Dutch Republic displayed much of the fragmentation that was also inherent in the 
other levels. In the Western provinces, the geographical focus of this study, city governments 
usually consisted of two main bodies. First there was the town council: a group of ‘wise men’ who 
advised and selected city officials (Groenveld & Wagenaar, 2011: 49, 98-100, 164). The size of 
the town council differed from city to city but the maximum number of members of a town 
council seems to have been forty. From the seventeenth century onwards the town council would 
not only discuss city politics but would also determine their representatives’ stance or position in 
the Provincial Estates (De Jong, 1987: 37-38). Increasingly they formulated and executed policy 
too. Membership of the town council was for life but every year the city government was changed. 
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The town council would nominate two people for every office to be filled, usually – and later 
exclusively (see below for a discussion on the formation of oligarchies) – from among its own 
ranks. From the nominees the Provincial Estates of Holland or the Stadholder would appoint 
members for the Magistrate, the second main body of city governments in the cities of the 
province of Holland (see also chapter seven). The Magistrate was responsible for the daily 
administration of the city and consisted of a provincial representative called bailiff or sheriff, a few 
mayors and several aldermen (De Jong, 1987: 38-39). Usually members of the town council had to 
wait a long time for positions as these could only be acquired after a long and successful career in 
public office. Also, they usually had to wait for others to pass away and they had to be at least forty 
years of age. In cities with a big town council some would have to wait as long as fifteen years but 
offices were usually worth waiting for (De Jong, 1987: 49). Furthermore, administrative bodies 
were always made up of uneven numbers. This was a fundamental characteristic of collegial 
administration (see below) and served to prevent a deadlock in voting or decision-making. The 
regents in the town council also had numerous offices to hand out and this (see below) would have 
a profound effect on debates on political corruption in the form of nepotism and patronage. In 
turn, changing ways of dealing with political offices would have an effect on what was considered 
politically corrupt. 
 




The Stadholder had traditionally been the most important link between central rule (the 
Burgundian-Habsburg ruler) on the one hand and regional (provincial) and local (city) nobles 
on the other (Damen & Stein, 2011: 53-54). After the revolt against the Spanish Habsburg 
King Philip II (1555 – 1598), the office of Stadholder remained intact but its function changed. 
His powers grew extensively as he became the commanding officer of the Generality army and, 
more importantly in the context of political corruption (compare chapter seven), he had the 
power to appoint high officials, such as Bailiffs or Sheriffs and certain members of town 
councils which would link him to accusations of patronage and nepotism. In a very general 
sense he was also responsible for provincial justice and the keeping of the peace. Although he 
was formally not a member of the Provincial Estates or Gecommitteerde Raden the Stadholder 
could claim the right to speak there and was often called in to resolve conflicts (Israel, 1998: 
300-306; Schöffer, 1978: 190). By the nature of his office the Stadholder thus remained linked 
to the central level (generality), the regional level (provinces) and the local level (cities). Apart 
from any formal powers his prestige and dynastic pretensions further increased his authority 
and political power. The Stadholder was one of the most crucial political figures during the 
entire period of the Republic’s existence. While obviously different from the absolutist rulers 
or Kings in some neighbouring states he would at times be or certainly strive to be the closest 
thing resembling a central authority or ruler in the Dutch Republic. Because of this he was 
loved and loathed by different groups at different times, depending on specific circumstances, 
events and interests. As such, his actions (and that of his circle) could be called corrupt or not 
depending on who was asked (as we shall see in the case studies). 
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The vast majority of people occupying public office – and therefore the single most powerful 
political group in the Republic – were the regents (De Jong, 1987: 31; Kooijmans, 1987), a name 
used for all those who participated in higher level civic government. The economic boom of the 
seventeenth century had caused the emergence of a new group of people, a ‘social middle group’ 
consisting of members of merchant families with the means to devote their time to running their 
cities and protecting their commercial interests. The regents were initially rich merchant burghers 
(cf.  Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001: 147-163) who replaced members of older aristocratic and noble 
oligarchies. There is much debate about what this social mobility (the opening up of the patrician 
regent class to outsiders) looked like, what its consequences were and whether or not it ended 
during the eighteenth century (cf. Van Deursen, 2004a: 145-146; Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001: 147-
149; Kooijmans, 1987: 93-94; Schöffer, 1978: 180-182). There is no doubt, however, that the 
regents of the eighteenth century formed new oligarchies themselves. In either case it was a very 
small group of regents that held office in the Dutch Republic. Schöffer (1978: 181) tells us there 
were approximately two thousand administrative offices for regents in the seventeenth century. 
Apart from city offices, regents would also occupy so-called buitenambten, highly lucrative offices 
in administrative bodies outside the city. These included being city delegate to the Provincial 
Estates, being member of the Gecommitteerde Raden or of the provincial treasuries and courts, 
being the provincial delegate to the Estates General, being a member of an Admiralty or of one of 
the chambers of the Dutch East Indian or West Indian Company. As such regents could 
essentially be found on all institutional levels of the Republic. 
The regents became gradually more influential in seventeenth and eighteenth century 
Dutch politics and administration because they were from good – i.e., old – families and because 
they had money. The first signalled natural authority and the second signalled independence or, 
interestingly, incorruptibility (Van Deursen, 2004a: 144). The original priority of the regent was 
protecting his (they, as all public officials at the time, could not be women) family interests. 
Although this ‘individualism’ remained, the regents also considered themselves part of a 
distinct social group as the eighteenth century progressed. To be sure they were part of a 
specific culture. They had mostly gone to the same Latin schools, had spent some time in 
university and all spoke some French (Van Deursen, 2004a: 279). In some ways the interest of 
the group (compare early modern notions of publicness and common good, see chapter one) 
therefore became as important as the interest of the individual regent and his family because 
cooperation at least preserved power within the group (Van Deursen, 2004a: 145-146). This is 
not to say, of course, that faction strife between families, individual regents and groups of 
regents did not occur (De Jong, 1987; Roorda, 1979). For the regent everything was tied to the 
city and the obtaining of lucrative offices. This was especially the case during and after the 
economic decline in the later eighteenth century. While the regents had initially been merchants 
who were also politically active, their main business increasingly came to be politics and 
administration and acquiring public office became ever more necessary as a means of exis-
tence. With the absence of fixed salaries they also had to find ways to supplement their income 
by using that public office to the fullest. Naturally this caused much political corruption and 
further ‘faction strife’ among them (see chapters five and seven). 
 





The nobility was another actor in the largely bottom-up administration of the Dutch Republic. 
They formally represented the local level of the countryside with one seat in their Provincial 
Estates. As such the nobility did not loose its political status and privileges altogether after the 
Revolt against the Spanish and could be quite powerful especially in the countryside. In fact, 
the elimination of the (Spanish) court and royal bureaucracy meant less rivalry for local Dutch 
nobles (Israel, 1998: 337). In the maritime provinces and its cities the nobility had less 
influence because here they were eclipsed by a wealthy and powerful regent elite. Still even in 
Holland the nobility was not entirely powerless. They owned much land and were influential 
due to their investment in land reclamation. They also and held high offices in the army and 
navy. In addition, being of noble descent still meant a lot despite of the ongoing ‘social 
struggle’ with non-noble burghers who gained wealth and status through commerce, trade and 
offices. The Stadholder (himself of course the highest nobleman in the Dutch Republic) would 
also make use of the nobility in his attempts to increase his power. This would eventually lead 
to ever bigger networks of patronage and (critique of) political corruption by the nobility, 





A fourth important actor in the institutional set-up of the Dutch Republic was the church. In 
the Union of Utrecht the provinces had officially become protestant but the protestant church 
co-existed with other religious groups (Van Deursen, 2004a: 148-150, 153, 303-308; Randeraad 
& Wolffram, 1998: 37). This was mainly because a certain level of religious tolerance was, at 
least until the final quarter of the eighteenth century, a political and economic necessity (Kloek 
& Mijnhardt, 2001: 189). The regents wanted to maintain some sort of economic and political-
religious balance in society and realized that unity (whether inside the cities, in the provinces or 
in the union as a whole) could quickly succumb to religious strife and fanaticism (Randeraad & 
Wolffram, 1998: 37). Still, tolerance (of Catholics for instance) was limited and people of 
reformed faith received all kinds of preferential treatment and were in theory the only ones 
eligible for public office (Van Deursen, 2004a: 181; De Jong, 1987: 123; Schöffer, 1978: 209-
211). While the protestant regents were usually active and supporting members of the 
reformed church and its local councils they did not always have much sympathy for the way 
the church conducted its affairs. According to Van Deursen (2004a: 150) the administrative 
elite “preferred a broad church for the people that didn’t ask too many critical questions on 
teachings and life”. The regents seemed to want a separation of church and state insofar as it 
concerned church influence on politics and administration.  
At the very least, regents – and not preachers – should control the church (Schöffer, 
1978: 245; Zijlstra, 1989: 57-59) and regents rarely tolerated church domination over worldly 
affairs. At the same time the regents exercised much influence on church affairs. Town 
councils, for instance, often demanded the right to appoint preachers and paid their salaries 
(De Jong, 1987: 41). Echoing the political theorist Pieter de la Court (1618 – 1685), religion in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was clearly a public affair (De Jong, 1987: 122-123; 
Price, 1974: 34-35). The final result was that regents were suspicious of church influence over 
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public administration while the church was often disappointed in the lack of political influence 
and cooperation of the authorities. As a consequence, according to Van Deursen (2004a: 299), 
most preachers backed the House of Orange and the Stadholder in the everlasting strife with 
the (Holland) regents (see also below). Where the regents did not need or consider church 
criticism on their morals, the church would usually take the side of the Stadholder in condemn-
ing the regent’s acts anyway. However, as far as I have been able to tell from the case studies 
below they did so only in a limited way. Only very occasionally (see chapter seven) can we find 
preachers who publicly and explicitly criticized abuse of office. Limited church and/or 
preacher involvement or relevance in public debates on administrative morality and political 
corruption might have been caused by the paradoxical relation between church and state in the 
Dutch Republic. 
 
4.4 Political history 
 
The period in Dutch political history between 1748 and 1813 has been one of tremendous 
change and major political and administrative developments. In the following a basic chrono-
logical division of the period (see chapter three) is made to provide a rough overview and 
account of these developments in which the later case studies are situated. I draw general lines 
and focus on important watersheds in Dutch political history. This provides essential context 
for the following case studies and serves to help explain changing public values and percep-
tions of political corruption.  
 
Stadholder and regent oligarchy (1748 – 1770) 
 
The year 1747 presented a watershed in Dutch political history when an economic crisis 
coincided with foreign military threat (Israel, 1998: 1067-1069; Randeraad & Wolffram, 1998: 
37). In April 1747 a small French army entered the Generality province of State Flanders. 
While apparently only intended as a warning to the Estates General, the act was perceived as a 
full-scale invasion just like the one in 1672 and caused widespread unrest and fear (Israel, 1998: 
796-806). To many the ‘invasion’ proved the failure of the ruling elite (the regents in the 
Estates General and the Holland cities) to govern and protect the Republic. Adding to the 
grievances was the old and corrupted system of private tax farming in the Republic. Large-scale 
protest against tax farming became intertwined with calls for administrative (Dekker, 1996; 
Israel, 1998: 1072-1075) and moral reform (see chapter six). The problems led to calls for the 
return to power of a strong leader, meaning the restoration of the Stadholder. The latter had 
been deposed of by the provinces and the Estates General during the so-called second 
Stadholderless period from 1702 to 1747 in which the Holland regents decided not to appoint 
a Stadholder. In 1747, however, strife between the Estates General, Holland and its regents on 
one side and the Stadholder and populace on the other erupted once again. This time the latter 
‘faction’ won and William IV (1747 – 1751) became the hereditary Stadholder for all the 
provinces. 
William immediately tightened his grip on administration. Formally he was now allowed 
to recommend even more people for offices (see chapter seven). This meant he had more 
power then his predecessors ever had. Informally, his now hereditary title also increased his 
standing and power. The advent of William IV and his Orangist followers also went hand in 
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hand with popular calls by the so-called Doelisten for administrative reform of the regent 
system, such as ending corrupt practices of office rotation and allowing wider participation in 
politics. In chapters five and six I will discuss this reform movement more elaborately. For 
now, however, it remains to be said that in reality none of the demands for reform of 1747 – 
1751 were realized. It quickly became obvious to most contemporary observers that the 
promised reforms would not be pushed through (Israel, 1998: 1076-1078; Rogier, 1980: 203-
205; De Voogd, 1914: 79-80). Instead, the ‘Revolution’ of 1747 proved to be a ‘conservative’ 
victory for the Stadholder and his moderate Orangist followers (Schutte, 1978: 300) since it 
succeeded in concentrating power at the centre in the hands of the Stadholder. Some, like 
Willem Bentinck van Rhoon (1704 – 1774), the trusted advisor of the Prince (cf. Gabriëls, 
1989: 137-145), had wanted reform but this did not include actually transferring power to 
citizens, ‘the people’ or regents outside the oligarchies, contracts of correspondence or existing 
patronage networks (see chapters five and eight). Bentinck could see that all the necessary 
ingredients for ‘unity of command’ under a single leader were now present. For one, the city 
regents were intimidated by the populace and the Stadholder got more powers to appoint 
people and was as close to becoming a monarch as he would ever be. Bentinck’s attempts to 
create ‘ministries’ (defence, navy, trade, finances, internal and foreign affairs) led by a few 
capable and reliable persons and headed by the Prince, however, failed (Israel, 1998: 1077-
1080; Schama, 1977: 55; Schutte, 1978: 301-302). William IV thought the proposal was too 
revolutionary and his influential wife, Princess Anna of Hanover, did not trust Bentinck. As a 
result, only a limited number of regents were indeed deposed since William urged the Estates 
General only to get rid of regents when it was absolutely necessary to restore order in the 
cities.  
Any chance of alternative actions by William IV disappeared when he died unexpect-
edly in October 1751. Furthermore, opposition from a still powerful regent elite continued to 
frustrate any attempts at reform (Rogier, 1980: 203-205; De Voogd, 1914: 79-80; Wagenaar, 
2004: 551-553). The Doelist Ockers, for instance, already lamented: “how are we better off 
now that the Prince is Stadholder? […] He has changed the government to his liking and 
everything else is wrong; his highness has not reinstated the burgher in his right” (De Voogd, 
1914: 209). Such popular disillusionment and frustration – aggravated by economic decay – did 
not make much difference, at least in the  short term. The death of William IV led to yet 
another shift in power relations in the Dutch Republic. On the one hand, the lack of a strong 
Stadholder led to the partial restoration of anti-Orangist regent dominance in the Republic’s 
cities and provinces. On the other hand Anna of Hanover, who had assumed much of the 
responsibility of the Stadholderate after her husband’s death, attempted to hold on to as much 
power as possible until her son, the heir to the Stadholderate, was old enough to assume 
power. Anna received help from Bentinck and, above all, from the infamous Duke of 
Brunswick (1718 – 1788). These men relied heavily on a culture of patronage and brokerage 
(see below and chapter seven) to keep as much control over offices, and thus power, as 
possible (Gabriëls, 1989: 68-69). This continued in the period between 1759 (the death of 
Anna) and 1766 (the coming of age of Stadholder William V). Still, the period following the 
death of William IV was a temporary return to the way things were before 1747 (Gabriëls, 
1989: 71-72). As Orangists were still holding on to as much power as they could, the regents 
again rose to power. The period after the death of Anna can even be considered another 
Stadholderless period (Schutte, 1978: 313), or as a contemporary observer noted: “then we 
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could see the resurrection of the old regents. Once again they handed out offices and commis-
sions among themselves, just like before” (Te Lintum, 1910: 118). 
 
The Patriot revolt and its aftermath (1770 – 1795) 
 
When William V (1766 – 1795) came of age he assumed full responsibilities as Stadholder over 
all the provinces. This considerably strengthened his position and that of his court. Still, 
economic and military decay and the inability and/or reluctance of the Stadholder and his 
‘clique’ to do anything about it, combined with growing concerns and protests against abuse of 
office such as patronage and nepotism put rival factions in the Republic in a deadlock towards 
the late 1770s. Tensions were especially rising as the inactive Orangist regime continued to 
alienate large parts of the population. Furthermore, patrons and clients still managed to divide 
up large parts of the Dutch political pie and many city regents simply reclaimed the power of 
‘true liberty’ (see below on political culture and also Rogier, 1954; Schama, 1977: 46) to 
continue their ‘corrupt’ practices of office rotation, sale of offices and other forms of abuse of 
power. The Republic was, as Israel (1998: 1095) put it, “in a malaise which extended into every 
dimension of national life. The sense of the Republic being in steep decline became pervasive 
[…]. The combination of economic, political and imperial crisis facing the Republic created the 
necessary conditions for a revolution”. 
A revolution was exactly what happened, spurred on in part by events in North Amer-
ica (Palmer, 1974, part I: 325-326; Schutte, 1978: 314-315). Dutch historian Rogier (1980: 208) 
once wrote how the 1780s witnessed the formation of a “monster-coalition” mainly consisting 
of bourgeoisie, common populace, purged anti-Orangist regents and disillusioned Doelists 
from the 1740s who were all fighting for reforms in (civic) government. Together the groups 
making up this particular ad-hoc coalition were labelled Patriots who, according to Palmer 
(1974: 326) were “for the most part well-to-do burghers, many of them bankers, merchants, 
owners of manufacturing establishments, printers and publishers, or professors at Utrecht or 
Leiden. They were upper middle-class, but so were most people of any consequence in the 
country”. As eclectic as their background and motives sometimes were, on international affairs 
the Patriots (in line with many of the ideas of the earlier Doelists) were against England and 
pro-France. In domestic politics this meant they were against the Stadholder’s pro-French 
politics (Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 221). They were not, as is often supposed, against the 
Stadholder as such. They did not want to abolish the Stadholderate but ‘merely’ wanted to 
reduce him to being the ‘first servant’ of the state (Lok, 2009: 30-31). The Patriot’s class 
standing, according to Palmer (1974: 326), “could not be defined economically. It was more 
readily defined by the permanent exclusion from state affairs of persons like themselves, 
including their fathers and presumably their children”. They did not, in other words, belong to 
the right families nor were they always members of the Dutch reformed church and could 
therefore not become part of the regent elite. Their aim was to end the closed-off regent 
practices and the networks and structures of patronage (see below and chapter seven) set-up 
by the Stadholders William III (1672 – 1702), William IV (1747 – 1751), William V (1751 – 
1795), their ‘advisors’ such as Bentinck or the Duke of Brunswick and many other local 
officials (Van Eijnatten & Wagenaar, 2007: 13; Gabriëls, 1989: 146-163; Israel, 1998: 1092-
1093). 
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The Patriot protest and calls for administrative reform were exacerbated and fuelled by the 
Fourth Anglo-Dutch war (1780 – 1784) that had disastrous consequences for Dutch trade and 
shipping and added economic misery to the pile of Patriot complaints. The war, in any case, was a 
tipping point in the success of the Patriot revolt (Lok, 2009: 30; Schama, 1977: 58). Once again the 
ruling administration – this time including the Prince of Orange and some of his close advisors – 
was blamed for the crisis. To the Patriots it seemed that both Orangists and their dynastic ties and 
regents with their commercial ties were prepared to subvert the national interest (i.e., protection 
from England and alliance with France) to protect their personal dividend and commercial 
connections (Elias, 1923: 238; Palmer, 1974, part I: 327, 329; Schama, 1977: 35-36). A pamphlet of 
1782 (Brief van Batavus, 1782: 20-22) summed things up nicely as it remarked how many were 
following the Stadholders’ court like machines or tools only to further their own interests, i.e., 
getting offices for themselves or their kin. At the same time, those among the regents who had 
always opposed the Stadholder and wished to break English economic and naval power, were 
fighting the Stadholder because of his choice to support England in the American war of 
independence (Palmer, 1974, part I: 326-327). Ironically, then, parts of the regent oligarchies were 
in this way aiding the cause of their Patriot ‘enemies’ who wanted to change the role of the 
Stadholder as well as the system of government in the Dutch towns and provinces. It is a sign of 
how complicated politics actually was. 
Patriot agitation rapidly gained momentum mainly due to the emergence of a strong Patriot 
press and public opinion (cf. Broersma, 2005; Harline, 1987; Israel, 1998: 1100; Klein, 1995: 91-
127; Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001: 81-102; Pollmann & Spicer, 2007; Van Sas, 1992: 99-104; 
Schama, 1977: 79-80). Events followed each other in quick succession from 1784 onwards as the 
Patriot movement grew into a revolutionary movement, according to Israel (1998: 1100): “welling 
up from below […] to wrest control of civic and provincial life from the hands of the Stadholder’s 
favourites, and the regent oligarchies, and transfer power to those who regarded themselves as the 
spokesmen and representatives of the people”. Crucial in the beginning of the revolt were 
attempts to practically alter practices of recommendations and Stadholderly patronage (see 
chapter seven). In towns like Schoonhoven (May 1782), Dordrecht (August 1782), Deventer 
(January 1783), Utrecht (August 1783) or Groningen (1784), Stadholderly recommendations 
were duly banished (Klein, 1995: 152; Van Sas, 1988b: 20-22). Several Dutch towns saw the 
beginnings of Free Corps in the early 1780s. These were armed burger-led and occupied militia’s 
(consider the Patriot demand for military as well as moral rearmament, see chapter five) that 
served to topple city administrations and protect the Republic from foreign and Stadholder troops. 
The first Free Corps, of Dordrecht, was set up in 1783 and soon consisted of over one thousand 
men (Israel, 1998: 1102). In various Holland towns (most notably The Hague, Rotterdam, 
Haarlem and Leiden) Patriot Free Corps clashed with Orangist crowds. The Republic became 
divided in pro- and anti- Patriot zones (Israel, 1998: 1107). By the time a National Assembly of 
Free Corps of around 13,500 men assembled in Utrecht in 1785, the Patriots were triumphant in 
most of Utrecht, Holland and Overijssel and had significant support in the other provinces as well. 
As a result, the Republic was in chaos and practical civil war loomed between Patriot militia’s and 
regular troops (Israel, 1998: 1106-1107). 
The revolt of the Patriot movement was fragmented and would only last a few years. Frie-
drich Wilhelm II (1786 – 1797) had ascended to the throne in Prussia. Not only was Friedrich 
“a disciplinarian and enemy of democratic ideas”, such as those espoused by the Patriots 
(Israel, 1998: 1113), he was also the brother of Princess Wilhelmina, the wife of Stadholder 
William V. In a well-known instance of bad judgment and bad timing, Wilhelmina was arrested 
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by the Patriot Free Corps of Gouda. In response her brother sent an army of 26,000 men into 
the Republic and the result was a quickly disintegrating Patriot movement. Their demise was 
due to external pressure but also, writes Schama (1977: 102, 129), to their “unheeding attachment 
to the letter and the spirits of their ideas, which diluted the concentration of their strength and 
compromised the effectiveness of their organization”. Despite all the training and revolutionary 
zeal of the Patriot militia’s there was thus a triumphant return to The Hague of William V. 
Following in Williams’ wake was Laurens Pieter van de Spiegel (1787 – 1795), the new Grand 
Pensionary of Holland. With William back in the saddle the ‘old ways of doing things’ soon 
returned as Van de Spiegel led the restoration of the Orangist regime. Van de Spiegel was an able 
politician and a reformer and theoretician of public administration in his own right (Rutgers, 2005). 
His efforts to change things (within the limits set by William V) were however thwarted by still 
powerful vested interests. The failure or unwillingness of the restored Orangist regime to make 
drastic changes and reforms in their institutional and political structures meant a continuation of 
old practices. Orangist regent oligarchies took over and the prince tried to increase his grip on 
Dutch society and politics. Thousands of Patriots decided to lay low or flee their city, province or 
even the Republic, many going into exile in France. The initial failure of the Patriot Revolt should 
not obscure its monumental importance in the long run. The restoration of Orange after 1787 
marked the beginning of Patriot ‘oppression’ by the Orangists. In short, it planted a vital seed of 
discontent and resentment that grew into a major movement in the Batavian Revolution of 1795. 
 
The Batavian Revolution (1795) 
 
In January 1795 a French army crossed the frozen rivers in the South of the Dutch Republic to 
free their ‘revolutionary brothers’ in the south. The French had been anxiously awaited by 
Dutch Patriots whose anti-Orangist and pro-republican sentiments had already been rekindled 
by French revolutionary zeal. It should come as no surprise that the Dutch Patriots – either in 
exile or in hiding – were likely to join forces with the French Revolution already in the early 
1790s. The similarities and continuity of the revolutionary movements of 1787 and 1795 were 
striking (Israel, 1998: 1119-1121). The Orangist regime after 1787 had only been able to exist 
because of foreign help of England and Prussia. Internally the patriotism of the 1780s continued to 
live on (Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 224; Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 1995: 199-201) and in 
1795, the Batavians (essentially a new name for the former Patriots, in reference to a West-
Germanic tribe who in 69AD successfully rebelled against the Romans) established a Batavian 
Republic using French military revolutionary support (for extensive discussions see Geyl & 
Godard, 1971; Israel, 1998: 1119-1130; Palmer, 1954; Schama, 1977).  
The French ‘invasion’ was, certainly in the beginning, seen by the Dutch Patriots as a 
liberation from (Stadholder-) tyranny and taken as a pretext to return to ‘civic government’. 
Colenbrander wrote that “whether the Orangists had won in 1787 without the Prussians is 
doubtful; that the Patriots in 1795 would never have been there without the French is certain” 
(1905-1922, part II: xxii). Stadholder William V, who had according to popular opinion (see 
chapters seven and eight) become the symbol of the widespread nepotism and abuse of office 
of his time (Kossmann, 1995, 123-124; Schama, 1977, 77), was forced into exile, despite efforts 
of Van de Spiegel to get him to stay. Van de Spiegel’s own office of Grand Pensionary was 
abolished in January 1795 and together with other Orangists he was placed under arrest (Kloek 
& Mijnhardt, 2001: 551). The Batavians purged many city, provincial and generality councils of 
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Orangists, replacing them with people from their own ranks. The government in Paris decided, 
in return for land and money, see chapter eight) to acknowledge the Batavian Republic as a 
separate and independent political entity.  
The events following the Batavian Revolution have been crucial in Dutch political and 
administrative history. Inspired and guided in part by French ideology (and a French army) the 
Batavians managed to forge the basis of a unitary state out of an existing federation of 
provinces. They also introduced new legislative institutions, a separation of powers and a new 
constitution. The French-Batavian period (from 1795 to 1813) has arguably been crucial to 
understand wider Western-European political history as a whole or, as Palmer put it, “it was a 
typical revolution of the era […], it reveals on a small and well-lit stage, a great many phenom-
ena then common to western Europe and in some degree the Western world” (1954: 35). For 
Dutch history, at least, it was surely another watershed moment. Before, the Republic had been 
a fragmented and decentralized collection of largely sovereign provinces, cities and institutions 
with administration running ‘bottom-up’ from the city level and horizontally through collegial 
systems, rather than ‘top-down’ and vertically from the Generality level. Power was fragmented 
and unevenly distributed, which resulted in highly complex political and social power struc-
tures, both formally and informally. In many ways, the revolution of 1795 marked the end of 
this ancien regime administration and politics. The Batavian Republic (1795 – 1806) and 
subsequent forms of state after 1806 had a fundamentally different appearance. Developments 
from 1795 onwards marked the beginning of feverish political experimentation and secured a 
decisive shift towards the Dutch state as it exists today as old institutions were torn down 
because of revolutionary ideas such as popular sovereignty and the separation of powers. But 
all this, of course, did not happen overnight. 
 
A laboratory for constitutional experiments (1795 – 1798) 
 
The Revolution of 1795 caused much internal strife over how to shape the new Republic and 
its constitution. The main questions were whether it should remain a federation of largely 
autonomous provinces or a unitary state with stronger central command and how ‘democratic’ 
this new state should be. Various political groups consisting of federalists, unitarians and 
moderates – admittedly a very rough categorization (cf. Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 225-226; 
Schama, 1977: 249) – strongly disagreed about these issues. The result was a period in which 
the Netherlands was essentially a laboratory for constitutional experiments (Palmer, 1954; Van 
Sas, 1989; Schama, 1977). The main task of the Batavians, drafting and adopting a new 
constitution, proved to be difficult. After lengthy negotiations in the First National Assembly 
(1 March 1796 – 31 August 1797), a constitution was presented but rejected in a referendum in 
August 1797. Continuous political strife in the following months in the Second National 
Assembly (1 September 1797 – 22 January 1798) over the content of the new constitution, and 
the question of ‘union’ or ‘federation’, ultimately resulted in a first coup d’état led by radical 
unitarians (see chapter eight). Encouraged and spurred on by developments in France, radical 
Batavians like Wybo Fijnje (1750 – 1809), Pieter Vreede (1750 – 1837) and Stephen Jacobus 
van Langen (1758 – 1847) were among the leaders of the coup. The coup was furthermore 
supported by general Daendels and could count on the full backing of the French Directoire 
that was, as discussed earlier, in a hurry to sort out the Dutch political organization once and 
for all. This ‘Batavian Terror’ was, in comparison to the one in France, bloodless but funda-
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mental all the same. To Van Sas (2005: 19) the ‘Batavian Terror’ was even the true core of the 
Revolution. A total of twenty eight ‘federalists’ and ‘aristocrats’ from the Second National 
Assembly were placed under arrest and the remainder of its members had to take an ‘oath of 
hatred’ declaring their “unwavering aversion to the Stadholder, federalism and the [supposed, 
TK] general anarchy or failed administration” of previous decades (Colenbrander, 1905-1922: 
lxv-lxvi, see document number [doc.] 527 for the full original text; Schama, 1977: 291). 
Drafting and adopting a democratic constitution for a future unitary state became much 
easier after both National Assembly and Primary Assemblies had been purged of federalist 
opponents. Also, a Provisional Executive Directorate (25 January 1798 – 12 June 1798) was set 
up, consisting of radical democrats (most notably Vreede, Fijnje and Van Langen) to assume 
temporary executive power. In this way a new constitution could duly be accepted in a 
referendum on 23 April 1798. It was put into effect on 1 May of that year. The constitution 
was based on the principle of unitarism. It provided unity of law, a separation of church and 
state, abolished the guilds and reformed education. The radicals from the Provisional Execu-
tive Directorate would, however, only be in power for a period of roughly six months. On 12 
June 1798 a second coup d’état (see chapter eight) was staged in order to safeguard the 
constitution, democracy and the basic unitary structure of the Republic. For the time being, a 
thinned out National Assembly became an Interim Legislative Assembly (12 June 1798 – 31 
July 1798) and a new temporary Interim Executive Directorate (consisting of the moderate 
unitarians Gerrit Jan Pijman, Jacobus Spoors, Isaac Gogel, Reinier Tadema and Abraham la 
Pierre) took charge to pave the way for new elections. The already accepted constitution 
remained in place. In a matter of months the two coups had thereby ended the deadlock which 
had more or less “cast the Republic into a kind of Polish chaos” ever since 1795 (Schama, 
1977, 271). 
 
New foundations for a Dutch nation state (1798 – 1813) 
 
The result, from July 1798 onwards, was a unitary state with a central government in the form 
of a Representative Assembly (31 July 1798 – 17 October 1801) – replacing the former Estates 
General – and an Executive Directorate (17 August 1798 – 17 October 1801) of five Directors, 
aided by eight ministers (also called agents) for various policy areas. One of the most notable 
changes was the dissolution of the provincialism and particularism that had so characterized 
the old Republic. Increased pressure from the French for further reorganization led to even 
more centralization. Napoleon Bonaparte was not impressed with the Batavian directorate and 
wished to strengthen his authority in the Republic (Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 227-229; Schama, 
1977: 410-411). Ultimately, in 1801, the French installed a Council of State (1801 – 1805), 
consisting of twelve members. The National Assembly was further reduced to thirty five 
members. They were only allowed to approve or disapprove legislation given to them by the 
Council of State.  This council was less democratic but also less centralistic than previous 
governments, even though the new constitution clearly ranked provinces and municipalities 
below the central level. Authority was supposed to be developed from the centre to the 
periphery. In practice, however, changing the old relationships between provincial, city and 
central levels proved difficult. This was, as Schama writes (1977: 363), partly because the 
“bureaucratically contrived cartography paid little attention to social or regional topography 
and the new shape of the Republic was designed, and taken, to be a deliberate insult to the 
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facts of Dutch history”. It was also because there was still much resistance to reducing the 
autonomy and inherent particularism of Dutch local government. This is shown, for example, 
by the fact that the Council of State after 1801 abolished the new division in departments and 
quickly reverted to the old provincial boundaries, enabling old elites of patricians and nobles to 
regain control on lower provincial and city levels (Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 227). It is also 
shown by the fact that town councils would still be largely in control of their own affairs, such 
as taxation, justice and citizen’s militias (Israel, 1998: 1124-1125).  
Squabbling and indecisiveness among the Dutch, the apparent return to local autonomy 
instead of central command and the inability of the Council of State to bring about desired 
reforms made the French intervene again in Dutch politics. Napoleon Bonaparte simply did 
not feel the indecisive Council of State contributed enough to his newly created Empire (Lok, 
2009: 40). The French, as a result, started to behave more as occupiers than liberators (Blom & 
Lamberts, 1993: 227), leading in part to the emergence of a new Dutch nationalism (including 
new ideas on common good and common interest?) in the years between roughly 1800 and 
1813 (Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 227; Van Sas, 2005: 161). From 1805 to 1806, Napoleon put 
Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck –  former ambassador to France for the Batavian Republic – in 
place as Grand Pensionary, or rather: as ‘president’ of a highly centralized system of govern-
ment. More negatively phrased, he was nothing other than a “six-month Doge” (Schama, 1977: 
466), instated by Napoleon to do the latter’s bidding. The constitution of 1805 reduced the 
Representative Assembly even further, to 19 members. They were only allowed to approve or 
disapprove legislation made by Schimmelpenninck. Political participation of citizens was 
curtailed, the executive was centralized under a single person, government finances were 
centralized by Isaac Gogel (1765 – 1821) and a system of general taxation was introduced (for 
more on Gogel and tax reform see Schama, 1977: 382-389, 494-524). The single year under 
Schimmelpenninck was therefore brief but important (Blom & Lamberts, 1993: 228; Lok, 
2009: 40; Schama, 1977: 466). 
Although Napoleon later admitted he should have continued Schimmelpenninck’s rule 
for more than just a single year (Lok, 2009: 40) the Emperor, still not satisfied with the speed 
of reforms and meaning to increase his influence, used Schimmelpenninck’s illness (he had 
become blind) as a pretext to appoint his brother Louis Napoleon as King of Holland from 
1806 to 1810. Although the new constitution of 1806 meant a doubling of the amount of 
representatives, the power of the Assembly became even more insignificant. Centralization, 
now in the form of a monarchy, increased. King Louis, however, identified with the Dutch a 
little too much, at least to his brother’s taste. The Emperor saw his brother as a ‘simple’ 
prefect, the executive of imperial orders. Louis, on the other hand, took his job as King 
seriously and increasingly chose the side of the Dutch in conflicts with France (Lok, 2009: 40-
41). As a result, between 1810 and 1813, Emperor Napoleon dismissed his brother and turned 
the former Kingdom into a part of the Empire, which was now directly ruled from Paris by 
French institutions. This final episode in the long succession of regimes and changes of state 
was very important for the Netherlands. The annexation meant that French laws and regula-
tions were firmly implemented, that functional and geographical unity were ensured and that a 
new legislative organization with true separation of powers and a coherent legal system were 
set up (cf. Lok, 2009: 13-17; Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 1995; Peters, 2008; Rugge, 2003).  
The annexation to the Empire led to crucial shifts and new foundations for govern-
ment and administration in the Netherlands (cf. Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 1995: 220; 
Van Sas, 1992, 2005; Van Sas & Te Velde, 1998). Standardization and the introduction of 
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uniform administrative and legal organization of the state (Lok, 2009: 41-42) was in many ways 
the true beginning of the so-called Napoleonic model of government in the Netherlands. The 
model is that of an omnipresent government based on a uniform division of territory and a 
uniform organization of the civil service through hierarchy and unity of command. In the 
model administration and politics were separated as much as possible. Chosen representatives 
had limited (constitutional) power and a depoliticized civil service was there for execution of 
policy only. The model was centred around a civil service grounded in law and selected on the 
basis of expertise (Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 1995: 201).  
Compared to the ancien regime of the Republic, the introduction of the Napoleonic 
Model meant a fundamental shift. It brought more vertical and centralized rather than 
horizontal and decentralized coordination and organization. This, in turn, led to top-down 
rather than bottom-up administration to which the Dutch Republic had grown accustomed. 
Government increasingly consisted of strong institutions on the national level (such as a King, 
a cabinet and a parliament) and weaker institutions on the provincial and local levels. Bureauc-
ratization and professionalization were ‘natural’ consequences of such a shift. The ever 
stronger reliance on more central government from 1795 onwards also meant that public 
service delivery by the state grew (cf.  Boels, 2011; Schama, 1977: 370-374). The later nine-
teenth century witnessed the rise of ‘big government’ with a multitude of ‘public’ tasks. More 
government on a wider variety of policy fields, in turn, increased bureaucratization and 
professionalization of the civil service and also included more emphasis on the moral elements 
of public administration. Some have pointed to the emergence of so-called Napoleonic model, 
which is important in the context of this study. It is supposed to be a system of organization as 
well as the embodiment of new ideas on ‘good government’ (Van der Meer & Raadschelders, 
1995: 201). It stressed, for instance, the importance of centralized rule, hierarchy, and legal 
frameworks. This is important to assess public value change at the time (see also chapter eight). 
 
4.5 Political culture 
 
Following the previous overviews of main institutions and Dutch political history a final 
overview to help describe and understand changing public values and perceptions of political 
corruption deals with Dutch political culture. While a notoriously difficult concept, a useful 
definition is provided by Baker (1987, part I; xii; 1990: 4) who wrote that “if politics, broadly 
construed, is the activity through which individuals and groups in society articulate, negotiate, 
implement, and enforce the competing claims they make upon another and upon the whole 
[then] political culture is the set of discourses or political practices by which these claims are 
made”. According to Klein (1995: 2) such a definition sees political culture as “the constant 
battle in any society between arguments and counter arguments, between depictions and 
alternative imaginations and between individual and collective actions and counter-actions”. 
This makes political culture a mental and a social phenomenon. It is dynamic and always 
subject to change in wide networks of communication. Despite inherent contingency one can 
point to several main elements of Dutch political culture between 1748 and 1813. In the 
following these will be discussed. This is not, it has to be remembered, an exhaustive overview 
but serves as essential explanatory context for changing public values.  
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Enduring political struggles: true liberty and political corruption 
 
The history of the Dutch Republic between 1748 and 1813 (as well as earlier periods) can be 
characterized by a few central political disputes and political alignments that served as core 
themes in the communication and strife between its various groups and institutional levels. 
Sometimes coalitions were formed between different actors. Some, such as the one between 
the House of Orange and the reformed church, lasted for a long time. Others, such as the one 
between populace and the Stadholder or the populace and the regents, would prove more 
shaky as the popularity of both amongst the populace waxed and waned depending on 
political, military and economic circumstances. The populace at large would for instance often 
call upon the Stadholder in times of great need (compare in the ‘year of disaster’ in 1672 but 
also in 1747, see chapter six) but would denounce him as soon as he proved incapable. A more 
fundamental and long-lasting dispute was that between Holland and many of its regents on one 
side and the Stadholder on the other. In a nutshell, the regent oligarchies in Holland’s cities 
were fearful of anyone with dynastic pretensions (i.e., the Stadholder) who could potentially 
curb their power. In their eyes, a free Republic ruled by free regents could not suffer such 
tyranny. At the same time those who opposed the dominance of Holland and its regents (for 
instance other provinces that envied Holland, noblemen who frowned upon non-nobles in 
public office, regents who were excluded from offices or preachers who wanted to diminish 
regent influence over church affairs) would often gather around the banner of the Stadholder. 
They did so because, as mentioned earlier, although technically nothing more than a provincial 
official the prestige of the Stadholder and his powers of appointment (see chapter seven) could 
carry a long way. The Stadholder of course welcomed any backing to boost his power and 
prestige. 
The enduring political struggle between Holland and many of its regents and aforemen-
tioned other groups – or rather: the basic antagonism between the House of Orange (i.e., the 
Orangist faction) and the Holland regents (i.e., The States faction) – would sometimes lead to 
radical changes in the institutional set-up and political culture of the Republic such as the first 
(1650 – 1672) and second (1702 – 1747) Stadholderless periods. In these periods the regency 
gained what has been called ‘True Liberty’; a fundamental element in Dutch early modern 
political culture that is of vital importance to understand changing public values. It entailed the 
freedom of the relatively small group of regents to decide what was best for all. It meant they 
could govern without being hindered by the Stadholder or any other political entity, such as 
the Generality (Van Deursen, 2004a: 276-280; Rogier, 1954; Schama, 1977: 46). It meant the 
Holland regents could essentially rule their cities and province without consultation. The 
regent elites essentially did not have to answer to anyone but themselves. In the two Stadhold-
erless periods (the latter of which is important for this present study) the regents – who, 
incidentally, could also be fighting among themselves (cf. Schutte, 1978: 270-273) – gained 
almost full control of the Republic. True liberty obviously worked well for the regents 
themselves and for a long time nobody really seems to have questioned the idea that these 
people were actually in the best position to govern based on their own ideas and values. Yet, 
true liberty would increasingly lead to the criticism that the regents were corrupt. This will 
especially become clear from chapters seven and eight. Then, such things as a lack of consulta-
tion, a lack of legitimacy and accountability, ruling with impunity and regents distributing 
offices as the saw fit would be fundamentally challenged. 
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Particularism and compromise 
 
Van Deursen (2004a: 224-225) has written how the Republic did not have many constitutional 
rules and that even if they were there, it was largely unsure whether they were actually 
followed. “Formal constraints”, he wrote, “do not mean much when they are not confirmed in 
practice” (cf. De Jong, 1987: 51-52). This goes to the heart of much of the Dutch political 
culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and can be translated into two basic 
elements. First, there is the element of particularism which meant that in the fragmented and 
bottom-up system of administration (see earlier in this chapter) a large variety of autonomous 
actors all tried to hold on to as much independence as possible (De Jong, 1987: 34). The 
concept has extensively been explored by Fruin (1922), Van Braam (1986: 349-350) and, more 
recently, by Price (1994) who have shown how the Republic’s system of government was 
designed to reflect an enormous variety of particular (religious, commercial or political) 
interests. Second, there was an element of persuasion, consensus, deliberation, compromise 
and/or ‘giving and taking’ (Van Deursen, 2004a: 140; Hendriks & Toonen, 1998; Kickert & 
Hakvoort, 2000: 229; Randeraad & Wolffram, 1998). Particularism and the lack of formal rules 
and regulations created a system in which no single actor or level could really determine the 
course of the others. Even Holland often had to rely on the other provinces and had to work 
within the system. Unity among the provinces, according to Van Deursen (2004a: 140), really 
only served to maintain as much diversity as possible, and statesmanship “required finding a 
middle way between inherently opposite ideals […]. Neither force nor violence helped because 
the provinces were free to do as they pleased”.  
The art of politics in the Dutch Republic was, therefore, to keep an eye on all relevant 
actors and levels and find a balance between often diverging and conflicting interests. In the 
practice of everyday Dutch politics, as Kloek and Mijnhardt have written, the vast majority of 
politically active individuals managed quite well to prevent polarization and the formation of 
cabals. This was mainly due to the essential mechanism of compromise due to pragmatism 
“which prevented the formation of a serious gap between administrators and administered” 
(Kloek & Mijnhardt, 2001: 158-160). This means that the elements of particularism and 
compromise were structural-functional parts of political life in the Dutch Republic. This has 
obvious consequences when one wants to assess and understand changing public values. As 
long as particularism and compromise were basic foundations of the Dutch political system, 
practices that were essentially derived from it were not considered corrupt. I will discuss this in 
more detail in a later section of this chapter on brokerage, patronage, venality and nepotism as 
elements of Dutch political culture. 
 
Obtaining office, collegial administration and oligarchy 
 
From the previous it has become apparent how the centre of political and administrative power 
was to be found in the cities. From this level the influence of the regents extended to all other 
levels of provincial and generality government. Obtaining office was the most important goal of 
regents, especially as commerce and trade, their traditional lifeline, began to wane from the second 
half of the eighteenth century. Since, however, income from public office was still often not 
anything like a (fixed) salary, these officials tried to get as much out of their office as they could. 
This meant that the public and private were closely intertwined and that private gain from public 
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office was neither uncommon nor abnormal. The economic decay of the late eighteenth century 
thus actively promoted the hunt for offices that would become one of the core complaints of the 
various reform movements from Doelists to Batavians (see chapter five). Partly to avoid problems 
of faction strife, internal competition and abuse of office, government institutions on all levels 
were organized according to the principle of collegial administration. In essence this meant that 
organizations were run by cooperative agreement among those directly involved. It should come 
as no surprise that collegial administration was the most appropriate form of decision-making and 
organization given the Republic’s political structure and its emphasis on particularism and 
consensus. It allowed making decisions based on mutual agreement between more or less equal 
actors who could correct each other and keep balance in decision-making. Collegial administration 
was also often able to prevent open abuse of office as it prevented any one party from becoming 
too powerful (Van Braam & Bemelmans-Videc, 1986: 349, 383-385, 387-388; Raadschelders, 1992: 
28). Regents could simply not afford to alienate themselves from the bigger group because they 
relied on each other to get offices. Instability within collegial bodies, such as the all-important town 
councils, would be bad for everyone involved. For this reason, intricate systems of maintaining 
‘harmony’ among the regents in collegial bodies were devised in the course of the early modern 
period.  
The core of these systems consisted of office rotation based on seniority. Members of 
town councils, for instance, would acquire various offices within and outside of the cities in yearly 
rounds of allocation based on whoever was first in line. Since membership of a town council was 
for life, all regents would eventually share in the spoils of administration (Gabriëls, 1989: 276; 
Schöffer, 1978: 245). Maintaining this ‘harmony’ in day to day politics (on the shop floor, see 
chapter seven) among a collegial group of ruling regents became all-important (cf. Hoenderboom 
& Kerkhoff, 2008). Paradoxically, as De Jong (1987: 52) writes, self-interest of the regents 
prevented any obvious or outright abuse of power because group harmony was a prerequisite for 
individual well-being. Sometimes such informal arrangements would be semi-formalized in 
documents called contracts of correspondence. These provided detailed accounts of which 
members of the town council were to get office and which were not (Van Deursen, 2004a: 277; 
De Jong, 1987: 56; De Witte van Citters, 1873). To the regents the contracts of correspondence 
were accepted practice because they prevented faction strife in order to further their shared 
interest which was, in turn, a prerequisite for their personal interest (Kooijmans, 1987: 94-95). 
Needless to say the system did not always work. For one, while administrators increasingly became 
professionals, their jobs often still did not provide (regular or fixed) salaries. These professionals 
thus had to supplement their income from public office by alternative means and once an office 
came in someone’s possession it became necessary to make the most of it. Also, the number of 
available offices was fewer than the number of regents because reigning regent families began to 
restrict the number of available and profitable offices in the course of the eighteenth century. A 
smaller group of regents wanted to have a bigger share in the spoils. This, naturally, led to the 
exclusion of others from office (Van Deursen, 2004a: 277; De Jong, 1987: 56; Kooijmans, 1987-
95; Roorda, 1979). Life-long membership of a town council, sticking to the earlier example, was 
now no longer automatically translated into power or any chance of obtaining a substantial 
income.  
Such circumstances created exclusion and faction strife that were increasingly perceived as 
being politically corrupt (see chapter seven).  The intense competition among regents over offices 
was a dominant theme throughout the period between 1748 and 1813. It could sometimes tear 
town councils apart and lead to a scramble for positions in which regents handed out offices to 
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friends or family (patronage and nepotism), sold them (venality) or occupied multiple offices at the 
same time via so-called substitute offices (De Jong, 1987: 52-53). This, in turn, would in the end 
divide and weaken the regent bodies of the Republic, marking the beginning of the end of collegial 
administration. Once the collective body of regents was weakened, other parties (such as the 
Stadholder) gained influence (De Jong, 1987: 54). During several crucial episodes in Dutch history 
(such as 1672, 1748 and 1788) the Stadholder and his ‘court’ used internal divisions among the 
regents in various cities to overthrow reigning factions of regents hostile to the Stadholder and 
replace them with friendly ones (De Jong, 1987: 60-61). 
To those outside of government, one of the most characteristic results of the way the 
town councils and other collegial bodies functioned was the formation of oligarchies. Accord-
ing to De Wit (1965, 1974), the existence of an unbridgeable gap between aristocrats and 
democrats in the eighteenth century (see also chapter seven) pointed to the emergence of a 
true oligarchy in the Dutch Republic. Continued ‘aristocratisation’ of society in which the 
regents kept the most important offices to themselves (using contract of correspondence and 
nepotism) meant, to him, that it became increasingly difficult for non-aristocrats (i.e., non-
regents) to enter the political realm. Although, as Kooijmans suggested (1987: 94) it had not 
been uncommon to appoint friends and family in office ever since the seventeenth century, it 
became part of an “oligarchic ideology” in the eighteenth century.  
 
Brokerage, patronage, venality and nepotism 
 
Brokerage is a term that is often heard when early modern Dutch political culture is discussed. 
As a general term it was used by Charles Tilly (1990: 28-29) for his second phase of state 
formation (roughly 1400 – 1700). In that phase “mercenary forces recruited contractors, 
predominantly in military activity, and rulers relied heavily on formally independent capitalists 
for loans, for management of revenue-producing enterprises, and for installation and collection 
of taxes”. Administration and politics, in this view, were indirect. Put in modern terms, things 
that we now consider to be public (defence, education, health care or taxation – see case study 
one) were left to private third parties as much as possible simply because the authorities did 
not have the capacity or feel the desire to do it themselves. Brokerage is inherently linked to 
patronage, a situation in which personal power relationships between unequal persons (a 
superior or patron and a subordinate or client) are primarily meant to yield mutual advantage 
(Breman, 1971: 31; Ellemers, 1969: 433; Gabriëls, 1989: 147-148; Landé & Graziano, 1983: xx). 
Brokerage is patronage with the use of middle-men, a special form of patron-client relations 
where the patron needs the client to exert his powers everywhere (Gabriëls, 1989: 148). 
Similarly, Blockmans (1985: 231-236) described brokerage as a situation in which clients 
become middle men or ‘powerbrokers’ who use their access to patrons to make others 
dependent on them and create their own clients.  
Patronage and brokerage were – not surprisingly considering the aforementioned – an-
other elementary characteristic of Dutch political culture in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. The Dutch Republic, with its particularism and compromise and its lack of central-
ized authority, small bureaucratic system and vague lines between public and private interests, 
provided the ideal circumstances in which these practices could flourish. The weak Dutch state 
needed informal and personal systems to relieve strain and tension between highly autono-
mous layers of administration. Patronage and brokerage were often – much like other elements 
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I discussed in the above – structural-functionalist practices without which society and politics 
could hardly have functioned. We should therefore wonder whether and, if so why, how and 
when this kind of behaviour actually came to be perceived as corrupt. Some, like Schöffer (1978: 
168) have argued that the sale of public office was not considered fraudulent at the time. Similarly, 
Schutte (1978: 280) has said that to profit from the system was acceptable according to the political 
norms of the eighteenth century. Schama, finally, noted that by eighteenth century standards the 
conduct of the Dutch regents was not considered outrageously scandalous. “Offices”, Schama 
writes, “had always been bought, sold and inherited as commodity rather than bestowed as duty” 
(1977: 48). The traffic of offices was often considered necessary by the Estates General and the 
Council of State and, as Schama (1977: 48) notes, was even taxed to the benefit of the public 
treasury until as late as 1800. Answers to the question whether, when and why such conduct did 
eventually become unacceptable will be discussed in chapters seven, eight and nine. From 
these chapters it will become clear that as soon as consensus among the closed group of 
regents and the idea of particularism were fundamentally questioned, people did begin to voice 
fundamentally different opinions on formerly more or less accepted practices such as broker-
age, patronage, venality and nepotism.  
 
Popular sovereignty, representation and participation 
 
Some final important elements of Dutch political culture in the period are the ideas of popular 
sovereignty, representation and political participation that emerged from the second half of the 
eighteenth century amidst major changes in the political-administrative set-up of the Dutch 
Republic. While the Doelists of the 1740s emphasized the importance of greater ‘popular 
participation’ in and ‘representation’ of government, in reality things were not so bad. As 
Kloek and Mijnhardt (2001: 158-159) have for instance discussed in detail, the practical level of 
political participation in (roughly) the second half of the eighteenth century, was relatively high 
when compared to surrounding countries because of the decentralized and ‘bottom-up’ way of 
governing. Roughly two thousand Dutch regents decided, in various ways, on the fate of about 
two million inhabitants. That was, for instance, roughly fifteen times as much as in England. 
Kloek and Mijnhardt (Ibid.) also noted how in Dutch local administration, levels of participa-
tion were even higher, both formal and informal and direct and indirect. Still participation and 
representation became big issues from the Patriot period onwards, in part because of emerging 
ideas and concepts such as popular sovereignty, constitution and liberty which, however – 
according to Klein (1995: 199) – really meant something different to the various participants in 
the political debates of the 1770s and 1780s. As a rough indication, however, the Patriots did 
seem to have had a more inclusive perspective than most of their Orangist adversaries (see 
chapter five).  
With the emergence of the Batavian Republic, the political culture changed quite dra-
matically. It is clear that from 1795 onwards, fundamental debates occurred over the meaning 
of such key concepts as participation and representation because of the creation of a new 
political order and a new ‘democratic’ political culture. Just how the meaning of such concepts 
changed and what various parties thought these were is beyond the scope of this study and 
requires independent research. Still, here (or rather in chapter eight), I do wish to answer a 
fraction of this question as it is directly related to changing public values. It is, I believe, safe to 
hypothesize – admittedly in a very general sense – that the radical changes between 1795 and 
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1813 and the creation of new political institutions (such as parliaments and constitutions), 
questions of participation, representation and accountability (indeed a new kind of democracy 
in general) became the centre of public and/or political debate. We can easily imagine, after all, 
that questions arose as to just how ‘representative’ the new members of the National Assembly 
were actually supposed to be or just how much representatives were to be answerable to 
voters? As the ancien regime seemed well and truly over after 1795, its ‘old’ political culture of 
particularism, compromise, collegial administration, the formation of oligarchies, patronage 
and nepotism might also have started to give way to a new political culture based on funda-
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5 Best-Opinion and Morality of  the Time  





In chapters one and three I discussed the idea that the period between 1750 and 1850 (a Dutch 
Sattelzeit?) brought major political and administrative transitions that are likely to have affected 
changing social-political vocabulary. This change of vocabulary, I argue in this fifth chapter, 
included public values and perceptions of political corruption as many new institutions – being 
structures as well as values (cf.  Hall & Taylor, 1996: 838) – replaced or altered older ones. In 
chapter three I also discussed the use of different sources of public values (following Hoetjes) 
to assess changing public values and why the source of best-opinion and morality of the time is 
presented in a separate chapter instead of being spread out over the case studies like the others. 
In the following I therefore assess changing public values and perceptions on political 
corruption between 1748 and 1813 by looking at a variety of best-opinion authors from three 
successive (moral, political, ideological) reform movements of Doelists, Patriots and Batavians. 
Best-opinion writings will be examined on the discussion, condemnation or advocacy of 
specific public values and their critique of political corruption. In this way I assess whether, 
and if so how, public values and perceptions of political corruption were actually a part of any 
discussion by a selection of best-opinion authors. What, in other words, did some of the 
eighteenth century ‘value producers’ (a term borrowed from Reszohazy, see chapter one) 
consider to be right or wrong public official behaviour? In doing so I assess whether this 
provides us with any sense of change and/or continuity of public values between 1748 and 
1813 from a best-opinion perspective by explicitly focusing on the link between the three 
reform movements and some of their representatives and changing public values.  
To temper expectations and counter potential critique, some cautionary notes have to 
be made. The first is that the following can only be an interpretation of a limited number of 
writings due to space and time constraints of this study. The best-opinion authors presented in 
the following only represent a part of the total amount. In the busy and varied intellectual 
world of the Dutch eighteenth-century other views existed, some of which were different from 
and conflicting with the views provided here. Although this inherently leads to some bias, 
some counter arguments can be made. First, it is not required here to provide a full account of 
best-opinion on public morality. Second, my emphasis on these particular authors stems from 
the idea that I wish to investigate progressive thinking and critique on existing practices and 
wish to focus on reform-minded opponents to established practices rather than on the 
orthodoxy of ‘conservative’ authors who protected vested interests. In addition, I argue how a 
focus on critique and negative public values (much like a focus on scandal and debate) allows 
for a better understanding of the fundamental elements in social and political discussion 
between opposing sides. A focus on the ‘negative’ (by critics opposing the status quo) provides 
a good view on the ‘positive’ (by supporters of the status quo). This approach allows for easier 
access to espoused public values. If one does not focus on scandal and critics, one is forced to
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investigate an almost endless stream of regular sources (such as, for instance, sermons or all 
pamphlet literature).  
A second cautionary note is that other reform-minded authors could have been dis-
cussed as well. Such a task would however have been impossible within the confines of this 
present study and the problem is alleviated by the fact that the selected authors were in many 
ways representatives of their time (though not of the entire population of the Dutch Republic). 
They were all part of and important spokesmen for the main administrative reform movements 
between 1748 and 1813 and provide us with an important cross-section of authors and ideas. 
They were all read, they had (sometimes temporary) political influence and a following. A third 
and final cautionary note is that much of the importance and/or relevance of the chosen 
authors obviously depended on the actual reception, perception and diffusion or dissemination 
of their work and ideas (see chapter three on public opinion). This too, however, has to fall 
outside the scope of this study. What concerns us here, and what therefore limits the following 
discussion, are the public values and perceptions of political corruption of a selection of 
authors between 1748 and 1813. Especially when linked to the other sources of values in 
Hoetjes’ typology (see below) this has much to offer. 
 
5.2 Best-opinion and Dutch (moral) reform movements 
 
According to some, early modern Dutch writing on (moral) reform of public administration 
has been few and far apart (Van Eijnatten & Wagenaar, 2007: 272). This seems especially true 
when one compares the Dutch Republic to its neighbours such as the German lands or France 
where Cameralism was, for instance, a blossoming field of study. Rutgers has shown, however, 
how there have been at least a few early modern Dutch writers on administration and 
administrative (moral) reform. He has shown that although the actual amount of ‘administra-
tive science’ work coming out of the Dutch Republic has been quite limited, it certainly 
received attention (2004: 75-78). From the following discussion on best-opinion authors and 
works a similar conclusion can be drawn. These authors and works featured in what have been 
three (ideological) reform movements in public administration between 1748 and 1813 (Van 
Sas, 2005: 9-12).  
First, Doelists in the 1740s and 1750s argued for increased influence of citizens in ad-
ministration and more opportunities for a larger group of people to acquire public office. They 
demanded an end to the oligarchic rule of the city regent elites and all the abuses that were 
inherent in the system (Israel, 1998: 1073-1076; Schama, 1977: 52-58; De Voogd, 1914). 
Second, Patriots from the 1780s onwards had similar demands, calling for an end to (princely) 
patronage, nepotism and abuse of office that, according to many, prevailed in the Dutch 
Republic at the time (Schama, 1977: 64-79). Third, Batavians between 1795 and 1813 de-
manded a new state as well as a new kind of public administration and politics. Influenced 
mainly by French revolutionary thought and political philosophy new public institutions (such 
as a parliament and a constitution) were designed (Van Sas, 2005: 275-292; Schama, 1977: 311-
321). As a result, I argue, the position, functioning and proper moral behaviour of public 
officials therein had to be reassessed and redefined as well.  
A more elaborate discussion of the three movements will follow below. For now, how-
ever, it is important to already realize that Doelists, Patriots and Batavians have been regarded 
as three consecutive movements and, more importantly, can be regarded as content-related. 
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Also, despite some apparent differences due to context and time, the three movements and 
subsequent ‘revolutions’ all proved to be watersheds in Dutch administrative history, providing 
important moments or periods of transition in thinking on public values and political corrup-
tion. All three movements increasingly rejected and condemned certain types of behaviour, 
such as the buying and selling of public offices, gaining privately from a public office or using 
patronage and nepotism to maintain power and wealth. Changing public morality, it seems, was 
at the heart of each of the movements. In questioning and changing (some of) the moral 
foundations of early modern Dutch public administration, each movement, furthermore, 





In chapter four I briefly discussed the rise of (popular) discontent in the years between 1748 
and 1751. The advent of Stadholder William IV had raised expectations and hopes of adminis-
trative reform to a high level. Already from 1747 onwards, an ad-hoc coalition of populace, 
burghers and excluded regents wanted to get rid of the corrupt oligarchies who ruled the cities 
in the Republic (Israel, 1998: 1069). At least for a while these popular demands aligned with 
those of disenfranchised Orangist regents and noblemen who wanted to break the oligarchies 
that excluded them. All sides, for instance, made references to John Locke’s Two Treatises on 
Government (1689) (compare Rousset de Missy below) which seemed to provide an ideal 
ideological justification for enlisting the people on one’s side (Israel, 1998: 1074-5). Locke’s 
insistence on popular sovereignty made his book an important tool and symbol in exploits to 
gain support for both Orangist and Doelist cause. After all, as Schama (1987: 600-601) 
explains, to Orangists Locke’s ideas showed how a strong Stadholder with majority backing 
from the populace, instead of narrow cliques of oligarchic regents, was a more legitimate and 
preferable form of power. To others, popular sovereignty widened the scope of political 
participation. Political participation – or rather: exclusion from it – was among the main issues 
that caused discontent. Serious questions were raised regarding the delegation of sovereignty to 
an oligarchy and the obedience to patrician authority. 
The reformers, often called Doelists (named after members of citizen committees in 
Amsterdam but consisting of people from various Holland towns), fuelled the discontent, 
criticizing the oligarchy and advocating an end to the abuses associated with the bestowal of 
office (Schutte, 1978: 297-298). Wealthy citizens excluded from participation in government by 
the oligarchy’s correspondences demanded political influence. Radical representatives of the 
movement even advocated the removal of the entire old clique of magistrates (De Jongste, 
1980: 82-83). The periodical political press (cf. Broersma, 2005; Harline, 1987; Kloek & 
Mijnhardt, 2001: 81-102; Pollmann & Spicer, 2007) created an image of continuous abuse 
within oligarchies and accused the magistrates of nepotism and venality, all detrimental to the 
‘welfare and order’ of the country. The discharge of an office should be directed towards the 
interests of the people, not to self-interests such as increase of personal wealth, or power and 
advancement of family relations (Schama, 1977: 47-48).  
For a while the political alignment between Orangists and Doelists created a common 
front against the regent oligarchies. However, the new Stadholder and his aides were reluctant 
and/or too weak to instigate reform. It quickly became obvious to most contemporary 
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observers that the promised changes failed to materialize (Israel, 1998: 1076-1078; Rogier, 
1980: 203-205; De Voogd, 1914: 79-80). William failed to use his powers of appointment to 
curb and punish regent corruption and he hardly purged the city governments. This led to 
increasing popular protest and friction between two camps and a ‘split’ among the Doelists. 
On the one hand there were moderate reformers who continued to adhere to the wishes of the 
Stadholder. They wanted a strong Stadholder with popular support but did not see the need 
for more popular engagement in politics and administration. The (radical) democratic reform-
ers, on the other hand, were increasingly drawn into conflict with the Stadholder and their 
moderate Doelist colleagues. They wanted a Stadholder but only because they wanted him to 
deliver them from (corrupt) regent oligarchic rule. As the Stadholder persisted in his refusal to 
act the radical democrat Doelists started to organize agitation against both ineffective Stad-
holder and his followers and the regent oligarchies. Increasingly they called for administrative 
reforms and radical changes in local government. Adding to their grievances was the old and 
corrupted system of private tax farming in the Republic (see chapter six) and the obvious 
wealth of the regents which was thought to be intolerable, especially considering the steep 
decline in trade, industry and general economic prosperity (cf. De Voogd, 1914: 60).  
A look at Doelist demands from an ensuing stream of pamphlets provides much in-
formation of best-opinion on public morality. A booklet entitled Het ontroerd Holland from 1750 
described the unrest of the period and voices some of the Doelist demands. It contained a 
discussion of a request made by burghers to the mayors of Rotterdam and the subsequent 
Doelist riots in that city and other towns such as Leiden and Delft. In its preface we read a call 
for unity and just administration by the regents and love and subservience of the peoplei ♠. Its 
main target, typically, is the sale of public offices by the regents and the friction between the 
magistrates and their citizens. In Rotterdam, the booklet reads, the burghers had been angry 
about the many burdens put upon them by the Holland Estates and how they wanted to be 
relieved of taxes, imposts and excises (Het ontroerd Holland, 1750: 379). As a solution to ease 
their financial burdens, the request had called for the public sale (or auction) of offices 
whenever they became available (Ibid., 381).ii The wealthy and powerful could, in this way, buy 
as many offices as they liked and get interest on them as they pleased. The only requirement – 
apart from the buyers having to be Protestant –  was that the money to be made with this sale 
would benefit the nation’s treasury, i.e., that of the city.iii  
It is interesting to note how capability of public officials was not an issue for debate. 
The only thing that seemed to matter was the money ‘the community’ would get. When the 
Rotterdam town council proved tardy in its response, another request was submitted on 6 
October 1750. This time, the magistrates were asked in a much more demanding tone to reach 
a favourable decision without any further delay. It also restated that the regents had to sell their 
offices for the common benefit, not just because of “resolve” and “generosity” but also 
because not doing so was in violation of their “character and decency, yes, to the greatest 
disrespect of honour, glory and esteem of our great city of Rotterdam” (Ibid., 385).iv In 
essence, public authorities were told they were the representatives of their city and community. 
Any bad conduct reflected badly on them and their city. Personal interests should, in other 
words, not trump public ones.  
                                                 
♠ As explained in chapter three, Roman numerals in the text refer to the endnotes in the appendix of this study in 
which the reader can find the Dutch originals of the quotes. 
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The Rotterdam town council initially conceded to popular demand (Ibid., 386) and agreed with 
the public auction of offices to the benefit of city and province.v However, William IV was not 
pleased, arguably because of the insolent tone of request. He also had other reservations. 
Unlike the Doelist request, William in fact argued that merit and capability would be hard to 
find once offices were sold to the highest bidder. To him, this would lead to “extortions and 
objections of the citizens”.vi Considering his later reluctance to meet the demands of the 
Doelists, we could say that he did not really believe this. He might just have wanted to 
persuade the Doelists to give up their demands. In the end, however, he would be largely right. 
As the case study in chapter six will show, the public auctioning of (tax) offices, for instance, 
did indeed lead to political corruption and more popular protest. For now William IV, for 
aforementioned reasons, decided to overrule the Rotterdam town council’s initial decision.  
The populace, partly gathered in front of the town hall to hear the final proclamation, 
was shocked. According to the booklet Het Ontroerd Holland (1750: 393), they removed their 
orange ribbons and trampled their rosettes under their feet. In Rotterdam, the town council 
tried to appease the crowd. They promised that all the benefits from the Postal Offices (these 
were highly lucrative offices) would still go to the town (Het ontroerd Holland, 1750: 411).vii 
However, the complete public auction of all offices apparently went too far. Interestingly, the 
town council used the Stadholder’s argument that this would only lead to corruption. It was 
not right, they said, that people should acquire offices by paying for them. This, they added, 
was also clear from their oath of office (or more specifically the oath of purification) in which 
people were meant to swear they had not received or promised anything in return for their 
office.viii Another argument of the town council (Ibid., 413) against the public sale of offices 
was that they thought it was wrong for offices to be available only to those with money. 
Interestingly, then, the Rotterdam town council raised worries of corruption to counter worries 
of corruption. Also, their arguments are interesting in light of their later initial reluctance to 
change the system of private tax farming in which tax farmers did have to pay to acquire an 
office (see chapter six). 
These were the main issues raised by the Doelists. In Amsterdam similar events oc-
curred when the town hall was actually stormed by an angry mob when it became apparent 
that their demands were not met (Het ontroerd Holland, 1750: 402-403; De Voogd, 1914). 
Among the more radical members of the disillusioned Doelists were men like Jean Rousset de 
Missy and Hendrik van Gimnig. Their pamphlets denounced the city regents as corrupt, selfish 
and only interested in monopolizing lucrative offices and lining their own pockets. While the 
likes of Rousset de Missy and Van Gimnig have been labelled as “skilful coffee-house 
demagogues” (Israel, 1998: 1070), they were, I argue, much more than mere populists. Instead, 
their writings and ideas provide a unique best-opinion insight into the Doelist communis opinio 
on appropriate moral public behaviour. 
 
Jean Rousset de Missy 
 
When Amsterdam expressed reservations about making the Stadholderate hereditary in 1747 a 
wave of unrest swept through the province of Holland. Protest was orchestrated among others 
by the journalist Jean Rousset de Missy (1686 – 1762). De Missy, a French Huguenot exile in 
the Dutch Republic since 1719, was “a fierce critic of regents and regent corruption and 
became the foremost populariser of John Locke’s radical political ideas in the Republic” 
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(Israel, 1998: 1048-1049). He was also one of the foremost leaders of the Doelist revolt and 
submitted, together with others (most notably another Doelist leader, Daniel Raap) a petition 
to the Amsterdam town council in October 1747. The demands (similar to those made by 
Laurens van der Meer and other burghers in Rotterdam) ranged from auctioning offices for the 
civic treasury chest to the restoration of the privileges of the guilds. Although the entire 
Doelist cause (see chapter four) would soon die out, the movements and these petitions were 
important first steps in the advocacy of moral administrative reform in the Republic. 
Apart from the petition to the Amsterdam town council, De Missy also published his 
account of the events that had led to the advent of William IV. In a work entitled Relation 
historique de la grande revolution arriveé dans la République des Provinces-Unites (1747), De Missy (1747: 
preface) describes how in 1747 “the dispositions and sentiments of the magistrates […] came 
to change, as it were, from black to white, in an instant; for we behold how suddenly their 
aversion to a Stadholderate, chang’d into an eager desire of it, and a haste to complete it, to 
which no obstacles could put a stop”. De Missy is sceptical and clearly convinced of the 
hypocrisy of these magistrates. He writes how fear for the populace is more likely to be the 
cause for their change of heart than “any sincere regard to the publick good”. After all, he 
continues (1747: preface), “the individuals who compose the several bodies of the magistracy 
are men (and subsequently subject to passions) who from the authority and the Post occupied 
by the individual drew that force by which they have triumph’d over all; from hence sometimes 
arise irreparable mischief’s to the interests of particulars”.  
De Missy’s hundred-and-four page long tract describes, among other things, the advent 
and installation of William IV. In a telling passage De Missy recounts the commission by the 
Estates General of William IV as Stadholder and Captain-General of the army, on 13 May 
1747. De Missy  (1747: 90) writes how the Prince had been elevated to Stadholder due to his 
“steadfastness”, courage and zeal for the prosperity of the Republic”. In a conversation 
between Prince and Princess (supposedly told to De Missy by an eye witness) upon hearing the 
news of the former’s election to Stadholder, William was supposedly to have said to his wife: 
“what unsuspected tidings! […] God, who has called me to it, will support me in it. All that we 
possess, (continued he, embracing his royal spouse) is the gift of the people, who, by this 
signify the great confidence they have in us; I hope I shall be found to deserve it, by the 
uprightness of my intentions, as well as the honourable name I bear; my friends will assist me 
with their councils, and all good men with their prayers” (Rousset de Missy, 1747: 96-97). All 
this, of course, was meant by De Missy to show how much change and improvement he (and 
many other Doelists) had initially expected of the Stadholder and how little had actually 
happened. De Missy hammers the point home that the Stadholder had, in fact, not done 
anything. De Missy then denounces the corrupt and wasteful regents at the same time and tells 
us of a so-called conversation between a magistrate and a burger. When confronted with the 
news of William’s rise to power, the magistrate says this will be costly, about three million 
florins a year, to which the burger replies: “so much the better. We have been forty five years 
without a Stadholder, and of course must have sav’d 135 millions. This fund will well support a 
war of three years with France, which cannot at present abound very much in money […] and 
[…] to draw off the most powerful of the neighbouring princes […]”. The reader, De Missy 
(1747: 99) continues, “may easily suppose that no reply was made to this reflection”. As if, De 
Missy seems to say, the regents have been so careful in spending the nation’s money. No 135 
million had, of course, been saved by the regents.  
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Hendrik Van Gimnig 
 
Hendrik van Gimnig, a mid eighteenth century Haarlem textile worker, was, like De Missy, one 
of the leaders of the radical Doelists. Like De Missy, he too was critical of the Stadholder and 
oligarchic regents and published a few short pamphlets in 1748 and 1749 advocating and 
outlining the Doelist cause. In September 1748 Van Gimnig published his Address to His 
Highness Prince William (1748a). At this point Van Gimnig still seems to be hopeful that the 
Stadholder is indeed going to change things (or he is already disillusioned with the Prince’s 
efforts, which might explain the somewhat sarcastic tone of the pamphlet). Van Gimnig 
(1748a: 4) writes how the previous forty years without a Stadholder had only led to negligence, 
greed, incompetence, faction strife, domination and the general neglect of various administra-
tors and rulers (Van Gimnig seemingly made no distinction between the two) to safeguard our 
freedom.ix Of course, now that there was a “strong, loving and protective” Stadholder (1748a: 
6), these things would surely be relegated to the past! William is called upon to introduce civil 
reforms and to curb the immoral behaviour of the regents. 
Whether he was being sarcastic or still hopeful, Van Gimnig attributed achievements to 
the Stadholder that, as we have seen in chapter four, would never materialize. William – or the 
city regents in Amsterdam for that matter – did not do the things expected of him by the 
population or Doelists. Despite or because of the Stadholder’s reluctance, Van Gimnig 
published a Request on behalf of the Amsterdam Burgers (1748b) that following October. Here Van 
Gimnig demanded the Stadholder to concede to all eleven demands submitted to the Amster-
dam town council in July 1748 (Israel, 1998: 1075-1076). One of these demands was the sale 
(compare the demands of the Rotterdam burghers above) of the lucrative postal offices on 
behalf of the treasury instead of regents’ wallets (Van Gimnig, 1748b: article [art.] 8; see also 
Knuttel, 1978: Pamphlet 18169, 1748, p. 29ff; De Voogd, 1914: 48-52). Another demand by 
the Doelists was the removal of the thirty-six members of the Amsterdam town council. There 
was, according to Van Gimnig, no need to prosecute them. Still they had to return the money 
they had unjustly taken.x Also, the citizenry should elect the burgomasters from among the 
town council, instead of the common practice where members of the council elected the 
Burgomasters themselves. This, according to contemporary as well as later observers, often led 
to political corruption in the form of pre-arranged rotation of offices and contracts of 
correspondence (cf. Schimmelpenninck, 1785; Schama, 1977: 50-51; De Witte van Citters, 
1873). Also, a wider range of citizens other than the small circle of powerful regents should 
elect militia officers and select the directors of the Amsterdam chamber of the Dutch East and 
West Indian Companies from amongst experienced merchants (Van Gimnig, 1748b, art. 4, 7; 
Israel, 1998: 1075).  
The demands issued by Van Gimnig on behalf of the radical Amsterdam Doelists met a 
wall of resistance. The Amsterdam government, backed by the Prince, by and large refused to 
meet any of their demands (Israel, 1998: 1076) and issued a warning to the protesters 
(Waarschouwinge, 1748) that this kind of civil disobedience would not be tolerated. Indeed, to 
the regents and Burgomasters the demands and actions by the Doelists were tantamount to 
anarchy. Probably as a result of the continued refusal of Prince and local authorities to change 
things, Van Gimnig wrote a one page piece which was printed in the Groninger Courant of 3 
September 1749 (Van Gimnig, 1749). The piece is an almost desperate call directed at regents 
and tells us more about the values Van Gimnig thinks are important for administrators. Once 
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again calling for civic reform and an end to oligarchic rule, Van Gimnig (1749: 1) writes: 
“burghers who are in power, if you want to rule our hearts, you must get rid of haughtiness 
and despotism. All your deliberations must be guided by justice and fairness, do not give in to 
self-interest, be kind-hearted and sign all your decisions with the seal of kindness and friendli-




On the surface (see also chapter four), most if not all changes resulting from the revolt of 1748 
– 1751 were gains for the Stadholder and his moderate Orangist followers since it had 
succeeded in concentrating power at the centre in his hands. Some, like Bentinck (cf.  Gabriëls, 
1989: 137-145), expected in vain that the Prince would open up to serious reform after all 
(Israel, 1998: 1077-1078) but very little power was transferred to citizens, ‘the people’ or 
regents outside the oligarchies and their contracts of correspondence (compare case study 
two). The refusal of William IV to act as well as his untimely death, Bentinck’s inability to 
persuade William to do something (despite serious attempts, see Israel 1998: 1080) and strong 
opposition from a still powerful regent elite (cf.  Rogier, 1980: 205) frustrated attempts of 
reformers like Missy de Rousset or Van Gimnig. Still, best-opinion authors such as De Missy 
and Van Gimnig explicitly articulated values and behaviour that were needed to improve public 
administration. Seeds of change and reform of administrative morality had, in short, been 
sown. De Missy indirectly had several things to say about proper moral behaviour and values 
of public administration. Amidst the rhetoric, he denounced the serving of personal interests 
and the hypocrisy of men claiming to serve the people (and then only out of fear instead of 
noble motives) while at the same time abusing their office for personal gain and wasting 
(public) money, either through mismanagement or fraud. Van Gimnig provides new moral 
guidelines or values for appropriate administrative behaviour as well, albeit more implicitly. 
The demands and arguments launched by Van Gimnig had a clear moral purpose. This leading 
opponent and member of the Doelists had clear ideas about correct and incorrect behaviour. 
He lists several values as detrimental or important to the welfare of the state such as participa-
tion, honesty, justice and taking care of the common good. Other values, such as pride or 
haughtiness, despotism and self-interest, should be avoided at all cost. Crucially, and finally, De 
Missy and Van Gimnig (exemplifying the larger Doelist movement) argued for including 
broader segments of the population in the social and/or political community. In that sense, 





From the previous it has become apparent that the decades following 1748 were bleak times 
for anyone arguing for administrative or moral reform. The reforms promised by or expected 
from William IV did not materialize and there was in many ways a return to the pre-1748 
situation. This, at least according to Israel (1998: 1084), led to the 1750s and 1760s being 
relatively calm, stable and ‘conservative’. On the whole, reformers seemed to withdraw from 
direct involvement in politics (in part of course also because they were forced) and demands 
for civic reform were no longer heard as often or as loud. Still, while the reforms of civic 
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government argued for by Doelists had not materialized, not everything was lost. In fact, the 
failure of 1748/1751 made it almost inevitable that old issues reappeared with more force in 
the 1770s and 1780s. Geyl already explained how this worked when he wrote how 1748 led to 
an extremely powerful regime of the Stadholder, a regime that to Geyl was in its own way “as 
corrupt as the previous had ever been” (1948-1959: 31-32). The decades following 1748 had, 
according to Geyl, witnessed the continued “crumbling of democratic institutions” where old 
practices of (city) regents and (provincial) aristocracy were in full force again or, as Schama 
wrote: “the notion that it would be harder for a regent to enter the kingdom of Godly 
democracy than for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle found a ready response” (1977: 
651). While the disappointment of 1748 had discredited reform-mindedness for the time being, 
in due time, wrote Geyl, “the annoyance over all of this had to be directed against the patron 
of the system, Orange”. This is exactly what happened from the 1770s onwards. While earlier 
movements and reform attempts (such as those of 1672 and 1702/1703, see chapter four) had 
failed on the surface, much dissatisfaction had always kept simmering. This made the Patriot 
revolt essentially a further development of old tendencies (Israel, 1998: 1105). Some of the 
circumstances leading to the Patriot Revolt of the 1770s and 1780s (military threat, economic 
misery, a widespread feeling of corruption of the body politic, see Klein 1995) were, in any 
case, similar to previous ones.  
Palmer has noted that “the Patriot movement was characterized by its lack of a  
developed ideology; it did not formulate its demands in terms of any universal ethical affirma-
tions or any theory of world history” (1974, part I: 339 footnote 22). This, I argue, has to be 
nuanced. Once we follow our chosen concept of ideology from chapter three, the Patriots 
certainly had an explicit (although somewhat heterogeneous) ideology. They offered an 
account of the existing order, they advanced a model of a desired future (a vision of the ‘good 
society’), and they explained how political change can and should be achieved. What united the 
Patriots in an ideological or best-opinion sense was, in the first place, a strong sense of 
nationalism propagated and made possible by political periodicals (such as the Post van den 
Neder-Rhijn). Such national media transformed Patriots of all kinds into what Van Sas (1988b: 
27) called a Gefühlsgemeinschaft. Secondly, they had a striking ideological and programmatic 
coherence in their shared desire to attack “social and moral decadence” (see also Van Berkel, et 
al., 2010: 25; Schama, 1977: 71) and to achieve “moral rearmament” (Van Sas, 1988b: 18) with 
the express purpose to secure the economic and administrative ‘regeneration’ of the Republic. 
These issues were closely related and, incidentally, made Patriot ideology “a mélange of old and 
new attitudes towards the Dutch constitution” as the Patriots wanted the old Republic “to be 
rescued from its infirmity and rejuvenated in the image of its heroic beginnings” (Schama, 
1977: 68). Above all, writes Schama, the manners of the regent classes, and especially their 
“opulence in the midst of public squalor”, the loss of thrift and “excessive conspicuous 
consumption” were attacked (1977: 71-72). 
Crucially, as Schama noted, the “attack on manners [or morals, TK] became linked with 
the authorization for government […]. the Patriot burgher leaders were convinced that they 
were the true custodians of a national virtue which had been debased by those to whom office 
had been granted on trust and who had abused that mandate over the generations” (1977: 73). 
They, instead of the selfish regents should therefore be in power. The Patriot’s complete 
isolation and exclusion from political affairs had to be ended. To them political participation was 
a key element to achieve their goals (Van Sas, 1988b: 18). As such, they argued against the way 
in which the regent oligarchies governed the political institutions of the Republic. They wanted, in 
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the words of Palmer, “a reconstitution of the old constituted bodies, so that these bodies 
would become representative in a new kind of way, either by actual choice at the hands of 
voters outside their own ranks, or through a broadening of membership to reflect wider 
segments of the population” (1974, part I: 323). Such sentiments were expressed in the 
emerging political press of the period. Writers of Patriot periodicals such as Pieter ‘t Hoen and 
his Post van den neder-Rhijn (1781 – 1787) and J.C. Hespe and his De Politieke Kruyer and De 
Constitutionele Vlieg (see also chapter eight) made an important mark. Also, the reverend 
IJsbrand van Hamelsveld (1743 – 1812) and Rutger Jan Schimmelpenninck (1761 – 1825) were 
well known Patriot ideologists on these issues. Van Hamelsveld (cf.  Van Sas, 2005: 255-264) 
published a characteristic blend of religion, politics and ethics, he perceived the totally rotten 
moral foundation of the Republic to be the root cause of the economic, military and political 
decay of the time (Van Sas, 2005: 259). A stable Republic should have high public morals 
which is, in turn, impossible without high personal morals and a high personal moral is, finally, 
dependent on firm religious beliefs (Israel, 1998: 1111). Schimmelpenninck’s Verhandeling over 
eene wel ingerichte volksregeering (1785) was a similar democratically inspired plea to serve citizens’ 
interests (cf.  Van Sas, 2005: 293-302). 
 
Joan Dirk van der Capellen tot den Pol 
 
Joan Dirk van der Capellen tot den Pol (1741 – 1784), a provincial nobleman and member of 
the States of Overijssel since 1772, was arguably the foremost advocate of Patriot ideology. 
Since Van der Capellen was not originally from Overijssel he failed to meet the prerequisite for 
membership of the Provincial Estates. Still he got in, apparently due to William V who put in a 
good word for him (Zwitzer, 1987: 6). The fact that he got in because of William’s help is 
interesting because the patronage dispensed by William V was later so severely criticized by 
Van der Capellen and other Patriots. Perhaps, then, old and new were not so clearly demar-
cated even by the ‘leader’ of the Patriot movement. For the most part Van der Capellen did 
have unorthodox views on administration and foreign policy (in turn closely related to internal 
power struggles in the Republic, see chapter four). Foremost among them was his repudiation 
of near feudal services having to be rendered by farmers in Overijssel to their local lords, the 
so-called Drostendiensten (Van der Capellen tot den Pol & Van der Marck, 1782) and his 
disapproval of helping the English King George III fight the American rebels with the use of 
Dutch troops. 
Van der Capellen’s views soon led to his suspension from the Provincial Estates be-
tween 1778 and 1782. It was during this time that he wrote his manifesto Aan het volk van 
Nederland of 1781. It became the ideological foundation of the Patriot revolution and was 
heavily influenced by ideas coming from the American Revolution, which in part explains his 
sympathy for the American rebels and his ideas on popular sovereignty (Van der Capellen tot 
den Pol, 1781: 24; Kossmann, 1987; Zwitzer, 1987: 6, 9-10, 13). Indeed, social movements 
criticizing royal policy in England and its North American colonies from the 1760s onwards 
closely resembled and influenced the Dutch Patriot complaints and action (Geyl, 1947: 430; 
Israel, 1998: 1095-1096). Van der Capellen was also attracted to the classic Republican idea (of 
course present in the American Revolution as well) that greater and freer involvement of the 
people – both in military and political matters – was the way to safeguard the Republican 
political community. It was, according to Van der Capellen (cf.  Zwitzer, 1987: 10-13), every 
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citizen’s duty to participate in political life. If citizens were barred from participation and if 
popular sovereignty was not granted, armed struggle by means of citizen militias and revolt 
became a justifiable option. 
While in his manifesto Van der Capellen proclaimed the suppression of Dutch freedom 
to be the work of Stadholders who had usurped power, he was not against a Stadholder or 
even a monarch as such. Instead he was against any large concentration of power in the hands 
of a single person and the abuse of power that was often the result of it. Van der Capellen 
advocated more participation in civic government and called on people to start a ‘bottom-up’ 
revolutionary process of democratization. Government, to Van der Capellen and many of his 
fellow Patriots, was to be made answerable to the people, if need be by force. In the manifesto 
Van der Capellen (of course a former provincial official himself) introduces himself as 
someone who is “completely without interests and not out to gain personal wealth”. To him 
these are, obviously, important values for a proper public office holder. For centuries, he 
writes, “the people of the Low Countries have been at the mercy of power-hungry rulers”. No 
longer should they be led by people who only serve their own interests and fortune, who serve 
to feed themselves”. In the past the people of the low countries were ruled by “the bravest, 
most wise and most virtuous people […] they refused to be ruled by those who did not 
account for their actions to the people”. In a direct attack on the system of patronage 
employed by the Stadholder and his clique, Van de Capellen sneers how “in the past, princes 
and rulers were not able to distribute profitable and unnecessary offices like our princes today. 
They were not able to so easily use so many hungry, proud and bald noblemen and other 
despicable high and mighty men for their cause, having them vote as they please even if it goes 
against the prosperity of the nation”xii (Van der Capellen tot den Pol, 1781: 3-5). Thus, from 
the very beginning of the pamphlet, Van der Capellen gets to the heart of the matter. He 
condemns nepotism, patronage and serving one’s own interests instead of those of the nation 
as a whole. The latter (compare De Missy and Van Gimnig) suggests he actively argued for the 
need to have a broader sense of community and common good and linked it directly to 
political corruption. 
In his pamphlet, Van der Capellen continuously uses Dutch history to argue his case 
for civic reform. His discussion of the characteristics of previous Stadholders is a part of this 
and partly tells us what to him constituted a morally good administrator or ruler. William of 
Orange (1533 – 1583) had been “the most sensible, good, kind-hearted and good-natured 
prince” (Van der Capellen tot den Pol, 1781: 9). His son and successor, Maurice (1584 – 1625), 
“would have been a good ruler if only he had had as much virtue and patriotism as he had lust 
to rule” (Ibid., 13). Maurice, instead, had been “a man of the worst morals: a cruel, wicked and 
lewd man who was accustomed to seduce every woman he could, whether they were virgins, 
married or widows” (Ibid., 11-13).xiii Van der Capellen was also critical of the regents. Interest-
ingly, he denounced their dependence on the Stadholder and their breaking of oaths as he 
warned his fellow citizens “against the high and mighty […] the Prince has got them all on his 
leash. To obtain offices or even a meal at court they will do everything. Oath and duty to the 
benefit of the fatherland are irrelevant to them” (Ibid., 17). These people, Van der Capellen 
continued, “treat you as their hereditary property, as their oxen and sheep, which they can 
slaughter or shear as they see fit” (Ibid., 21).xiv  
Van der Capellen, I already noted, was quick to point to ideas of popular sovereignty. 
The regents and other officials of the Republic were only, as he put it, the “directors-
custodians of society, all their authority is derived from you. They [Prince, regents, and 
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magistrates, TK] should be obedient to the majority. They are only accountable to you and 
should submit themselves to your wishes” (Ibid., 21-22).xv With a display of early-modern 
utilitarianism, Van der Capellen argues how “God, our common father, has created man to be 
happy. He has obligated us to make each other happy as much as we can”. For this reason, 
“we are all equal. No man should be governed by another” (Ibid., 22-23).xvi Reality, according 
to Van der Capellen, sadly did not reflect these ideals. In order to obtain a public office, he 
wrote, it is not necessary to “be polite, friendly and obliging to one’s fellow citizens or to be an 
advocate of the nations’ freedom, privileges and prosperity, to be a true Patriot”. Such traits, in 
fact, only diminish the possibility of obtaining an office. For this “one only needs to win the 
favour of the Prince which, as we all know, requires no virtuous, polite or obliging behaviour 
at all” (Ibid., 36-37).xvii  
To Van der Capellen, nothing had changed with the advent of William IV in 1747 or 
that of William V in 1766. While William IV had promised “mountains of gold”, i.e., the end 
of abuses and the restoration of privileges (Ibid., 40), no such things had in fact been achieved. 
Indeed, “what have you won other than simply another master on your back who is even more 
difficult [because of the now hereditary Stadholderate, TK] to unhorse than your previous 
rider?” (Ibid., 40). To Van der Capellen, William V (1751 – 1795) was exactly the same. He 
abused military power and indiscreetly bestowed positions and made recommendations (see 
chapters four and seven). Clearly, William V was as selfish as other Princes had been before 
him and equally incapable of serving general (public) interests. Van der Capellen’s symbolism 
gets the message across even better. What to think, he writes, of the deer that have been put 
out so the Prince (and only the Prince at that) could hunt for game? These animals now eat the 
crops of the poor farmers who, “instead of getting their well-deserved rest are now obligated 
to guard their fields at night as well as work them during the day”. William V also surrounded 
himself with the wrong people, “honouring those with his trust who we already know are or 
will be scoundrels […]” (Ibid., 52-54). Once again Van der Capellen addresses William V 
directly: “are not most of your favourites the most evil and immoral creatures, fornicators, 
adulterers, dice-players, who wallow in luxury […] These are the people you choose for high 
office, people who sell their votes or are too incompetent or too afraid to resist your will. No! 
You consider the honest, able, bold Patriot, the man who dares and is able to speak up, to be 
your enemy. You view him with loathing and fear” (Ibid., 52-55).xviii Interestingly, surrounding 
yourself with bad people and ignoring those who are true and loyal would at least be linked to 
a lack of capability (see also chapter eight in which a similar notion of political corruption 
appears). 
 
The Grondwettige Herstelling 
 
Another crucial Patriot plea for moral and administrative reform was the two-volume Grondwet-
tige Herstelling van Nederlands Staatswezen of 1785. It was, essentially, a summary of the main 
arguments that had until then been voiced in various Patriot pamphlets and periodicals. This 
“catechism of political purity” (Van Sas, 2005: 213) was compiled by various leading Patriots. 
Chief among the authors were the Patriot intellectual Johan Hendrik Swildens (1745 – 1809) 
(cf.  Hake, 2004), Joan Van der Capellen (again) and the latter’s nephew Robert Jasper van der 
Capellen van de Marsch (1743 – 1814) (Israel, 1998: 1102; Van Sas, 2005: 106). The Herstelling 
addressed most of the standard Patriot causes such as the usurpation of power by the 
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Stadholder. Invoking Grotius (1583 – 1645), the document showed (1785: 82-86) where things 
had gone wrong: “for he [the Stadholder, TK] is not a sovereign, he is not a party to a contract, 
he is a servant”. Other noteworthy elements from the document were the decay of society 
(especially in comparison with the seventeenth century), the increasing wealth and luxury of 
the regents as the cause of the Republic’s problems, and returning ‘rights’ to the people (Van 
Sas, 2005: 212). Morality, therefore, was explicitly put at the heart of the document. In the 
Herstelling (1785: viii-ix) it was stated that “with this constitution we also have to improve our 
morals […]. Then our great building of the union that is built on sand and is now sinking, will 
get a steady foundation […]. From general virtue will arise courage, industry and patriotism, 
and with these also the old honour and power of the Republic”.xix  
The Herstelling lashed out against the contracts of correspondence as well as the distri-
bution of offices by the Stadholder. These were, after all, the reasons for keeping all important 
offices among a small clique of regents and/or loyalists to the Stadholder who were, often, 
incompetent, ‘corrupt’ and self-serving. The election of regents depended not on “reason, 
ability or justice” but rather on “wealth, luck and finding a girl [i.e., with connections and 
money, TK] gullible enough to marry you”xx (Swildens, et al., 1785: II, 238; cf. Van Sas, 2005: 
213). The Stadholder was, according to the Herstelling, in no position to recommend anyone for 
public office. Pointing to an ideal of merit-based appointments, they wrote how “no matter 
how clever, virtuous, tireless, benevolent a Stadholder might be, it is impossible for him to 
know those persons eligible for election well enough to make an informed decision” (Swildens, 
et al., 1785: 98, 179).xxi Of course, such characteristics did not apply to William V. The 
Stadholder should therefore “either not interfere or get to know those he wishes to instate well 
enough” (Ibid., 98).xxii The Herstelling was aiming at Stadholder William V’s use of ‘Lieutenant-
Stadholders’ (friends and confidants put in office by the Stadholder to protect and further the 
Stadholders’ interests on a local level (see chapter seven for a detailed explanation). It is 
impossible, “that these Lieutenant Stadholders are safe and loyal leaders […]. In Friesland, this 
system has changed a people’s government into some kind of absolutism”. It is harmful that 
the “entire civil government and the distribution of offices depends on one single regent”xxiii 
(Ibid., 98-99). The Herstelling reminds the reader of the brothers Pesters. These lieutenant 
Stadholders in the province of Utrecht became renowned for their abuse of office, selfishness 
and opportunistic behaviour (cf.  Gabriëls, 1989: 202). Indeed, it says (1785: 99-100), “the 
more regents are dependent of the Stadholder, the less they depend on and serve their fellow 
citizens”.xxiv  
In order to show how administration should and should not be executed and what was 
or was not considered corrupt, three types of regents are described in the Herstelling: the 
Stadholder’s regent, the Aristocrat’s regent and the People’s regent. The first kind was 
appointed by the Stadholder. “Not seldom”, the Herstelling tells us, have offices been given to 
“little troublemakers, scallywags and deceitful men. The few competencies they might have are 
enough to acquire distinguished offices from the Princely court […]. Masculine and Republi-
can virtues are despised and suspect in the unwholesome [poisonous? TK] air of a Princely 
court. Independence of the soul and noble views are often enough to be excluded from all 
offices” (1785: 188). Instead, it is clear from the Herstelling that one can only get promoted “by 
means of cunning, cowardly flattery and a criminal eager to please or to compromise, which 
can only stem from depraved [corrupted? TK] hearts and narrow-minded spirits”.xxv The 
second kind of regent was the Aristocratic kind. Although not as low as the Stadholder-kind, 
they are not less haughty and much more dangerous. According to the Herstelling (Ibid., 188-
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189), “in the eyes of the Aristocrat, the people are nothing more than a group only fit to 
endure their haughtiness, to obey their demands and to be a tool to further their personal 
interests. These Aristocrats do not, however, live without fear. All the time, they are forced to 
fight each other for spoils. In order to balance the different parties/factions, their behaviour is 
governed by trifling and fainthearted caution. They are forced to live in constant jealousy of 
each other, they are always sizing each other up, secretly opposing each other and covering 
their actions in secrecy”.xxvi  
Needless to say, only the People’s regent (the third kind) was truly capable of the  
behaviour suitable for a public official. However, the Herstelling seems realistic about the 
opportunities for ‘true democracy’ and ‘proper representation’. The authors are also pragmatic 
and seem to be wrestling with ‘the problem of dirty hands’, “that painful process which forces 
a man to weigh the wrong he is willing to do in order to do right” (Walzer, 1973: 174). When 
circumstances call for it, and as long as one’s intentions are pure and good, it is alright to 
obtain an office by grovelling, i.e.,  by means of patronage and/or nepotism. “In a non perfect 
system of electing public officials”, the Herstelling says (Ibid., 189), “citizens wishing to hold 
office, will have to endure some sort of humiliation to achieve their purpose. These men will, 
however, let themselves be known as magnanimous, charitable and humane”.xxvii In brief, it 
seems to say that the ends justify the means. We read that “even though their motives might 
not be fully free of self interest, this means is not degrading or humiliating because we can not 
take offence if a great man seeks the favour of the people”.xxviii “In a government of the 
people, it is possible for a man of merit to expect to climb higher. One can see a lofty bearing 
which seems to show that he is indeed a representative of the people because of merit”. In 
such a great man, “pride [which can after all easily turn into haughtiness, TK] is, however, 
tempered by an affable appearance while he knows he is to take responsibility for even the 
least of citizens. He knows he bears the burden of the interests of the entire nation and he 
defends these with perseverance  because he can show that these are not his own, personal, 
interests but the general interests of the people”xxix (Ibid., 189-190). Perhaps we hear Van der 
Capellen here? He was one of the authors and seems, as we have seen, to have gotten his place 
in the States of Overijssel due to a personal favour of William V. Perhaps this is his apology? It 
might well explain why Van der Capellen was so opposed to patronage and nepotism while 
this, at the same time, had gotten him (in part) where he needed to be. In any case it shows an 
important practical moral stance. In order to do good it is sometimes necessary to do bad. In 
addition, we again see the wider notion of common good and community that good (i.e., not 
corrupt) administrators were to have. 
From the Herstelling (Ibid., 191) certain ‘democratic’ values furthermore become  
apparent. The authors feel, for instance, that ‘the people’ should get to decide who are to get 
public offices and what characteristics are important to do a good job. It is written, for 
instance, that “the root of all discontent, schism and the evil that results from it will [by letting 
the people decide, TK] be eradicated. The people will be satisfied once the election of officials 
is no longer dependent on scheming or machinations. From that moment on the trust between 
regent and people will be restored forever […]”.xxx Indeed (Ibid., 192), “there are many who 
obtain offices through relatives or friends, who use common spoils and profitable offices to 
enrich themselves. It is in the interest of all citizens to make sure all matters of state are 
properly governed. It is therefore necessary to elect able men for this task”.xxxi Quoting from 
Montesquieu and referring to ancient Athens and Rome (Ibid., 192), the authors of the 
Herstelling argue their case for popular sovereignty and the need for the population to take 
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matters in their own hand. This is exactly the same kind of Republican ideology, mixed with 
democratic elements such as electing officials that we saw earlier.xxxii  
In the Herstelling, talk of lofty ideals as popular sovereignty or representation was often 
mixed with how to practically organize proper government by means of bureaucratization and 
what administrators should or should not do to ensure ‘good government’. Should public 
offices, for instance, be “perpetual or temporary” (Ibid., 193)? How long should officials be 
allowed to remain in power? When and why should officials be removed or be permitted to 
stay in office? The authors are, again, pragmatic as they list all kinds of pros and cons of 
various characteristics of bureaucratization (see chapter two). Offices in colleges of State 
should, for instance, be temporary as every man should have the possibility to obtain one 
(Ibid., 192). Still, when an official is doing his job well, why remove him? Giving people time 
to settle in and get to know their work is important as well. Why “rob the state of able men 
before they get a chance to properly know their jobs and give offices to incompetent people” 
(Ibid., 194)?xxxiii  Most legal offices (mayors, judges, aldermen) should, according to the 
document (Ibid.,  193-194), still be temporary to provide equal opportunity. Failure to 
occasionally remove such officials undermines diligent behaviour, Patriotism and only causes 
sluggishness and haughtiness that are detrimental to the public wellbeing and general free-
dom.xxxiv Indeed, the Herstelling (Ibid., 193-194) says, “those government officials who are never 
forced to return to the status of citizens are likely to believe they are the masters instead of the 
servants of the law. Bribery, impunity, arbitrariness and bad management of public affairs stem 
from protracted authority”.xxxv High legal offices, on the other hand, should be more  
permanent as it would be “a disadvantage to citizens when courts are subject to dismissals and 
continuous change. In these important offices “proper consideration” is necessary. There, even 
the practice of a lifetime would not be enough to properly serve the state”xxxvi (Ibid., 195).  
The Herstelling constantly hovers between general principles, lofty ideals and practical 
prescriptions. Its thirteenth chapter actually discusses the requirements for being a public 
official. First and foremost is a law degree (denoting attention for merit). Before, “when times 
were not as complicated/tricky administrators could rely on common sense and sincerity 
[however], different times and virtues require different capabilities”xxxvii (Ibid., 207). “No one 
should be allowed to become alderman without having proof of his abilities in law and at least 
having won some cases”.xxxviii Regents should all have knowledge of international law, public 
law, politics, negotiations, business, agriculture etc. by means of an academic education (Ibid., 
207).xxxix Regents also had to be wealthy to some extent. This requirement for public officials 
was not new. Having money of your own seemed a good ‘natural’ way to avoid abuse of office 
for personal financial gain. However, the argument in the Herstelling is more intricate than that 
since the commitment one has to the nation was directly linked to the possessions one had in 
that nation. Therefore, “all those with possessions in foreign lands must be excluded from 
national colleges or assemblies, since one’s heart is always where one’s possessions are” (Ibid., 
208),.xl Still – and this can be considered quite an innovative thought – ability and merit were 
just as important. Not having money should not prevent able men to become public officials. 
In that case, the people should grant these men a yearly income to properly execute their 
duties. “Instead of a salary”, the authors add, “he could also obtain an extra office which could 
yield some profit” (Ibid., 208).xli Again the authors display their pragmatism since holding more 
than one office was, even at the time, often considered to lead to conflicts of interests. Other 
requirements were being a citizen of the Republic for a certain number of years and being able 
to speak the language (Ibid., 208-209). Those with a tarnished reputation or who had debts and 
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no credit left should be excluded until paying off their creditors (Ibid., 209). Service in a militia 
or the army was also a prerequisite for a good public official, “as it was already customary 
among the ancients to excel in art of war and politics” (Ibid., 209).xlii Good public officials 
should also either be married or living with their parents and should not be related to anyone 




Much like the Doelists and ‘democratic’ Orangists of 1747 – 1751 the basic purpose of the 
Patriots had been to wrest control of civic and provincial life from the hands of the Stadholder 
and his favourites and the regent oligarchies, and transfer power to ‘the people’. The basic 
continuity between the movements was, as we have seen, not lost on writers like Van der 
Capellen or Swildens when we take into account their use of history (cf.  Leeb, 1973) but there 
was change as well. While earlier movements had by and large failed, the Patriots were not so 
easily thwarted. The Patriot Revolution in the Dutch Republic in the 1780s had been a social 
movement of substantial proportions that had been unimaginable until then. It was, as Israel 
(1998: 1103) has put it, “a product of the Enlightenment […]. Its assumptions and outlook 
show many affinities with the thought-world of men throughout the Western world eager for 
fundamental reform, and the sovereignty of the people”. The revolution, spurred on by 
ideologists like Van der Capellen and Swildens, surpassed the Doelist movement of 1748 – 
1751 in many ways. Not only did the revolutionaries manage, this time, to gain ground in both 
the east and west of the Republic, they actually succeeded, however briefly it would turn out to 
be, in purging local authorities and restoring rights of the citizenry (see chapters four and 
seven).  
Clearly, the Patriot ideologists discussed in this chapter, condemned some of the main 
existing administrative practices of their time and put new ideas forward. Closer inspection of 
the writings of Van der Capellen and the Herstelling reveals explicit public values. There was 
apparently interest in discussing practical morality for public officials next to discussing the 
general principles of ‘maladministration’ of the Stadholder, provincial elite and city regents. 
Van der Capellen, for instance, discussed various public values and aired clear ideas of proper 
moral behaviour. To him (and to the Patriots in general) proper administration was based on 
popular sovereignty, serving common interests and not abusing one’s power. His vision of 
proper public official conduct (at least) entailed being selfless, not having without lust for 
power and being accountable for one’s actions. Apart from that, one had to be a kind and 
benevolent patriot and be a custodian of interests staying clear of patronage, nepotism or 
luxury. Most crucially, perhaps, was Van der Capellen’s idea of administrators (and even the 
Stadholder) as servants and custodians of the people, responsible for but most of all account-
able to the people. The Herstelling was even more explicit than Van der Capellen in prescribing 
new or reemphasized public values. The document argued for replacing regents with a new 
elite whose appointment would be more often based on ability and conscientiousness (cf. 
Leeb, 1973: 189-192). A good administrator had to serve the people’s interests instead of his 
own, should be bound by popular sovereignty and had to meet various kinds of explicitly 
stated bureaucratic requirements. Sometimes a more pragmatic stance was needed. The 
aforementioned Patriot authors were practically inclined moralists who seized the moment to 
(morally) improve administration and government. This becomes apparent from the Herstelling 
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(1785: 11) in which Swildens, Van der Capellen and Capellen tot den Marsch wrote how 
“certain times sometimes provide moments which, more than any other times, enable us to 
rebuild the nation on steady ground, to improve a people. When these moments, so brief, so 
delicate, are over, they do not come again. They either serve to confirm slavery or to revive 
freedom […] This is the deciding moment, to determine and fix the rights of the people or to 




As described in chapter four, the Patriot revolution of the early 1780s was followed by an 
Orangist counter revolution between 1787 and 1795 brought about by Prussian intervention. 
However, the spirit of Patriot opposition and revolutionary agitation over oligarchic rule and 
corrupt regents, the Stadholder’s abuse of power, and a lack of opportunities for civic 
engagement in (local) government remained alive despite (or perhaps because of) the Orangist 
crackdown of 1787. The Patriots merely went into exile or hid in the Republic awaiting more 
opportune times. These came with the arrival of the French troops in 1795. The degree of 
ideological continuity between the Patriot revolutionary movement of the 1780s and the 
Batavian Revolution in 1795 is, as a result, striking (Israel, 1998: 1120-1121). As has been well 
documented elsewhere (cf.  Boels, 2011; Leeb, 1973; Schama, 1977) the drafting and adopting 
of a new constitution and the formation of new institutions led to continuous ideological strife 
over the content of the constitution and the shape and (unitary or federal) structure of the new 
Dutch state. Since the general reforms proposed by the Batavians have been discussed in detail 
before (Grijzenhout, et al., 1987; Rosendaal, 2005a; Van Sas & Te Velde, 1998; Schama, 1977), 
there is little need to thoroughly restate them here. What follows, however, is a brief overview 
of views on specific Batavian best-opinion morality of public administration. 
The basic foundation of Batavian morality is to be can be found in the pages of the new 
constitution (De Gou, 1983; Rosendaal, 2005b; Van Sas & Te Velde, 1998) and in the writings 
of some of its ‘value producers’, such as Isaac Gogel and Willem Anthonie Ockerse (to be 
discussed below). Generally speaking, the suggested reforms of the Batavians were (at least in 
theory) based on the basic revolutionary sentiments of the era: ideas of freedom, equality, a 
separation of powers and popular sovereignty. In line with the general sense of decay and 
doom still hanging over the eighteenth-century Dutch Republic, the Batavians were also deeply 
concerned with the supposed deterioration of morals. As in other European countries 
(Kossmann, 1995, 119-120), and as had been the case for many Patriots, moral decay was often 
considered the root cause of decay in other areas as well, such as politics, economy and culture. 
The Batavians believed that if the Dutch were ever able to return to their ‘golden’ seventeenth 
century, the first step was to revitalize the nation through moral moral rejuvenation, by means 
of ‘new’ politics and new administration. To the Batavians, popular elections rather than 
political appointments were, for instance, meant to end a system of extensive patronage with 
which the Stadholder and/or an oligarchy of officials had wielded enormous influence for 
decades (see chapter seven). This meant that hereditary offices and mechanisms of office 
rotation within the oligarchic town and provincial councils should also be abolished. Public 
offices should instead be opened up to a wider group of people. Indeed, as Palmer (1954: 25) 
put it, “neither family, nor church, nor estate, nor town council, nor provincial assembly 
possessed [any longer] any public power in its own right”.  
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An important attempt at ‘national’ moral and political rejuvenation and reform – in part by 
means of education – was provided by the political journal De Democraten (Jourdan, 2009: 9; De 
Lange, 1971: 506; Van Sas, 2005: 289). It was edited by Gogel and Ockerse, two influential 
Batavian ideologists and politicians. The journal was a prime example of using the press to 
further both men’s Batavian ideology, spelled out for a wider audience. Among its main topics, 
listed by De Lange (1971: 507), we find popular sovereignty, the equality of all burghers and 
decisive – because unitary – administration. The journal, for instance, insisted that free 
elections were to guarantee honest representation, responsibility and accountability by 
administrators. To men like Gogel the bond between people and its representatives in political 
institutions had long since been broken and needed to be restored by means of centralization, 
unity and ‘true’ representation. They were not, as De Lange (1971: 509) tells us, arguing for an 
aristocracy eligible for election. Rather, they were arguing for a participatory democracy in 
which the people actually had a say. In true Batavian fashion Gogel and Ockerse furthermore 
combined calls for a moral ‘revolution’ with nation-building, centralization and state formation 
(Van Sas, 2005: 289-290). Constitutional revolution (see chapters four and eight) was only 
believed to be able to succeed if it went together with a moral revolution. It is because of the 
importance of the journal and both men as ideologists of the Batavian period that I briefly 
elaborate on Gogel and Ockerse and provide some further insight into their best-opinion 
concerning public morality. As we will see, both exemplify many of the core Batavian ideas on 
morality and reform that have been discussed in the above and will reappear in case study 
three. 
 
Isaac J.A. Gogel 
 
Isaac Jan Alexander Gogel (1765 – 1821) played an important role in establishing the Batavian 
Republic’s main institutions, most notably as first minister of finance of the Batavian Republic, 
a function he continued to hold under King Louis Bonaparte between 1806 and 1809 and after 
1810 as part of the imperial government that was devoted to the Dutch departments of the 
French Empire (Schama, 1977: 617, 619-620). When, after the defeat of Napoleon, the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands was proclaimed at the Congress of Vienna in 1814, Gogel 
however refused to take office under the new regime. To him, according to Schama (1977: 
630-645), this was only a restoration of the pre-1795 Orangist clique he so despised. Gogel’s 
aversion to the Orangist camp (despite his pragmatic calls for reconciliation, see Van Sas, 2005: 
289) was deeply influenced by that same republican tradition which, as we have seen, had 
inspired several Patriot best-opinion ideologists before him. Gogel addressed similar issues. In 
a public lecture delivered in 1796 at a meeting of like-minded Patriots in Amsterdam,3 Gogel 
discussed the idea that the Republic was in moral decay. To him this was not necessarily a bad 
thing. Instead, it offered a way forward as he stressed how good morals and good laws all stem 
from striving towards the happiness of the entire society instead of individual happiness. 
Similar to the later Batavian constitution (cf. Roosendaal, 2005: General Principles, art. vi), 
Gogel said a virtuous public official was to live according to the golden rule “do unto others as 
you would have others do unto you […]. The desire to make profit and ever increasing wealth 
has brought immorality, disloyalty and extortion”. “Civil servants”, according to Gogel, “no 
                                                 
3 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag [NL-HaNA], Collectie 039 Gogel, 1752-1820, accessnumber 2.21.005.39, inventory 
number [inv.nr.] 2, page [p.] 10-13. 
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longer saw the need to behave better than the people or their so-called masters. Stealing from 
the nation was no longer condemned in a harsh manner and ceased to be wrong – each 
pillaged and looted at will and the nations’ finances were ruined”.xliv A similar message was 
conveyed by Gogel in De Democraten in which he stated how “only virtue and capability could 
be reasons to occupy a public office”. National unity, based on national loyalty and l’esprit 
publique would lead to thrift in (public) administration and finances”.4 As one might suspect, 
the opposite of this was the ‘Aristocratic system’, based on self interest and the lust to rule, the 
cherished system of those wishing to promote provincial interests and their own wellbeing 
over that of the nation”xlv.5 
While Gogel had largely similar arguments as many Patriot ‘moral’ reformers before 
him, he also – in typical Batavian style – added something relatively new to the mix in a lecture 
to his (unitarian) fraternity – of which men like Wybo Fijnje (see chapter eight) and Ockerse 
were also members – on 18 January 1798 and in several issues of De Democraten. There, he 
made the (unitary Batavian) argument that a strong central state was the solution to overcome 
many of the problems that had paralyzed the pre-1795 Dutch Republic and would paralyze any 
federal state in the future. Among them were moral decay and corruption. From Colen-
brander’s reproduction of the lecture (1905-1922, part II: cxxvni), this much at least becomes 
clear. Gogel, in his lecture, blames the faction strife among various groups in the Republic, the 
political inconsistency and the continuing changing of governments on the “dependence on 
internal quarrels, the mercy of external commonwealths, trifles and chimera’s”.xlvi Lack of 
central authority and regulation had meant that the Dutch people were unable to curb vice and 
passions. The downfall of the Dutch people, according to Gogel, would be a sure thing unless 
they reached unanimity and unity to overcome strife. In order to do this there was a need for 
powerful administration that would earn the trust of the people and could thereby force all to 
do their duty for the well-being of the common good. If this does not happen, says Gogel, 
“then self interest, lust to rule and violent passions would suppress and smother the soft voice 
of reason […], then ability, honesty and good virtues will be passed over.xlvii 
 
Willem Anthonie Ockerse 
 
Willem Anthonie Ockerse (1760 – 1826) – a former theology student and preacher – also 
argued for a new republican, democratic and national political system and in doing so presents 
us with clear views on moral rejuvenation and the ending of the political corruption of the old 
‘Aristocratic system’. Van Sas’ essay (2005: 303-313) and Stouten’s biography (1982) have 
already provided much information of this important but largely forgotten Batavian and his 
political writings. His specific best-opinion thoughts on public values and political corruption 
have, however, remained relatively underexplored. In a work entitled Batavians! Eischt eene 
nationale conventie from 1795, Ockerse argued for a popularly elected National Assembly that 
was to provide a new constitution. Interestingly enough, as Van Sas (2005: 305-306) explains, 
Ockerse was critical of the events of 1787 and what he called the ‘Aristocratic system’ built by 
the once victorious Patriots. The patriots of the 1770s and 1780s (see before) had argued for 
moral reforms and the end of Patronage and oligarchy. According to Ockerse, many were now 
in power and had turned into a new Aristocracy. They no longer had any interest in true 
                                                 
4 NL-HaNA, Collectie 039 Gogel, 1752-1820, 2.21.005.39, inv.nr. 173, issue 1. 
5 Ibid., issue 20. 
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reform. To Ockerse, a truly representative National Assembly of a unitary state would reduce 
the number of public offices. Centralization and a national convention would guarantee 
simplicity and retrenchment and end the distribution and multiplication of offices so common 
in the old Republic. It would also end the eternal and harmful bickering among the various 
autonomous bodies in the Republic. In his quest for centralization and strong central admini-
stration as the cure for the Republic’s illnesses, Ockerse was much like Gogel. The latter had, 
after all, argued for the same in the mentioned lecture to their fraternity. True popular 
sovereignty, according to Ockerse, entailed that the people (i.e., the elected representatives) 
would have to make the laws. It was Ockerse’s ideal that every delegate would represent the 
nation as a whole instead of particularistic provincial or local city interests.  
Van Sas (2005: 307-309) describes how Ockerse continuously returns to the themes of 
unity, democracy, popular sovereignty and anti-aristocracy in various public lectures held 
before the Amsterdam Patriot society Doctrina et Amicitia in 1796 and 1797. His ‘Aristocrat 
bashing’ is interesting to us as it shows a continuing line of argument between the Batavian 
Ockerse and Patriots such as Van der Capellen. Contemplating the current situation, Ockerse 
complains that he sees nobles instead of burghers and wealthy gentlemen instead of true 
representatives occupying the seats of government. Instead of gatherings of the people he sees 
sovereign meetings (Tydeman, 1831, part 2: 174) and denounces the aristocracy which is, to 
him, only a representative of itself instead of the people. To Ockerse, the ‘aristocracy’ had 
already usurped power after the revolt against the Spanish. To him, as I noticed before, the 
Patriots of 1787 had been more of the same and it was precisely for this reason that the new 
political system of 1795 should be fundamentally different. A new, unitary and democratic, 
constitution would, according to Ockerse, “end all abuses and will fit our nature, our virtues, 
our interests, our needs”. It would also ensure that “the administrator is only a short-lived 
representative, that administration is responsible to the nation and that the voter is not a selfish 
intermediate regent but a  popular body through consultation”. Such a constitution would 
prevent anarchistic chaos as well as aristocratic subversion and despotic abuse (Tydeman, 
1831, part 2: 185-186).  
Clearly Ockerse saw institutional unity, representation and popular sovereignty as being 
directly related to ending the general corruption of the body politic by ensuring ‘new’ public 
values of public responsibility, accountability, representation and consultation. A similar 
message was conveyed in another main work of Ockerse devoted to describing the ‘national 
character of the Dutch’ (Ockerse, 1788-1797). It provides an interesting view on Ockerse’s 
best-opinion regarding public morality and political corruption. Van Sas (2005: 309-312), again, 
explains how Ockerse uses his description of ‘the Dutch character’ as a political instrument to 
argue for institutional unity. According to Van Sas, Ockerse purposefully uses the discourse of 
decay to argue his case. Dutch society had to return to the morals and virtues of the past that 
had once made the Dutch Republic into a great nation. Politics and the message of unity, 
representation and popular sovereignty were to bring about the re-civilization and moral 
rejuvenation of a corrupted political society. Aristocracy, federalism and the hunt for offices 
(also among the Patriots of 1787) would all impede this cause. 
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Ockerse belonged to the small circle of radicals who staged the coup of 22 January 1798 (see 
chapters four and eight). His desire for a unitary constitution that would end all problems 
prompted him to take such forceful measures. To Ockerse, the coup of 22 January was simply 
necessary to break the political deadlock and in this he clearly resembled other radicals, like 
Van Langen, Vreede and Fijnje (see chapter eight for more on these individuals). Ockerse did 
not, however, become a member of the Interim Executive. Instead, he chose to keep working 
on the new constitution as he became chairman of the third (and final) drafting committee (cf.  
Van Sas, 2005: 312; Schama, 1977: 303-307). His involvement in the radical coup had, 
however, alienated him from some of his former, more moderate, friends who were worried 
about the radical turn of events and the ‘lust for offices’, combined with political purging, 
displayed by some of the radicals. In a letter to Gogel on 3 February 1798 (see Colenbrander, 
1905-1922, II: 715), he addresses this problem and justified his actions from which his views 
on correct (and incorrect) public behaviour become clear. He describes himself as “an honest 
and selfless advocate for the good cause of the fatherland and wishes not to be equated with 
hot-headed and immoral fortune hunters who are only out for personal gain and are motivated 
by lowly urges”.xlviii Ockerse then goes on to defend the coup of 22 January. He writes how he 
“despises those who hunt for offices, the hot-headed ultra-revolutionaries, but in order to 
restrain them one should stop the destruction of the fatherland and the trampling of the 
people by evil despots who would have brought disaster on all of us”. Ockerse in fact blamed 
the current divisions, indecisiveness and long-windedness on the personal political corruption 
of people in government who only wanted to acquire offices and serve their own interests. The 
‘despots’ he spoke of were the ‘federalist-minded’ politicians in the first and second National 
Assembly as well as ‘Aristocrats’ and the city oligarchies. The current state of affairs, Ockerse 
writes to Gogel, is one of “phlegm, weakness, lack of energy, a deviation from principles and 
an inclination towards aristocracy and urban federalism. This poison has infected near all 
bodies, even our own fraternity. We need purification to provide health to this phlegmatic and 
languishing body”.xlix  
In what Jonhston might call a ‘classical’ sense, Ockerse thus quite literally speaks of  
corruption as the general degeneration or indeed sickness of the body politic. A healthy, united 
political body is being invaded by the poison of corruption (i.e., division, federalism, indeci-
siveness, hunting for offices and serving personal interests). Ockerse (like Gogel) seems to 
have been a typical example of the unitary Batavian who, at the same time, did not shun from 
using strong measures to get what he wanted. In this he also closely resembled ‘radicals’ like 
Vreede, Fijnje and Van Langen (see chapter eight). To Ockerse, the coup of 22 January had 
been a choice between two evils; necessary to speed up the process of constitution building 
and to steer the Republic in the right direction. The end justified the means. This is  
exemplified by the reasons given by the radicals to stage their 22 January coup. A proclamation 
by the new Constituent Assembly on that very day, in which we can clearly recognize Ock-
erse’s views, stated how: “it is time to close the gap between an orderly state of affairs and the 
deformed administration and its ruinous consequences which have so often befallen our nation 
[…] to end the confusion and uncertainty which has paralyzed our prosperity and has brought 
us [this] cesspit […], “to end the lust to rule and the lack of administration”. It is time, the 
Assembly continued, to “end the plans of those suffering from megalomania”.l The proclama-
tion continued by stating that “state funds have been abused to force a constitution on the 
people who had already rejected it in favour of people’s own personal goals”. It was time to 
end the use of public money, “the fruits of such hard work”, for foul personal interest. The 
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coup was necessary as a means to achieve popular elections rather than political appointments 
that were, in turn, to end a system of extensive patronage by Stadholder and oligarchic town 
councils alike. Privileged interests, hereditary offices and mechanisms of office rotation within 
the oligarchic town and provincial councils should be abolished (Staatsregeling, GP, Art. xv, 
xxv; Palmer, 1954, 25). In order to achieve this, a coup and a certain degree of self interest and 
acquiring of offices could be condoned. This line of reasoning will reoccur in chapter eight, 




From the previous it has become apparent that the French-Batavian period had a great impact 
on Dutch political and administrative history despite its relatively short life span. The various 
institutional breakthroughs and developments brought, among other things, institutional 
centralization and the beginnings of the ‘modern’ Dutch nation state. In the midst of these 
fundamental changes we are also able to discover the beginnings of a new kind of public 
morality. A substantial portion of Batavian best-opinion (exemplified by Gogel and Ockerse) 
was about moral reform and/or rejuvenation. A part of the new foundations of the state was 
made up of (new) morality of public administration. Attempts to end an old and corrupted 
administrative system were at the top of the Batavians’ list of priorities as they vehemently 
argued for a new kind of public administration. These Batavian best-opinion authors took the 
earlier Patriot line of argument a decisive step further. With their aim to end federalism (and 
with it particularism, patronage, oligarchy and privilege) through unity and centralization, they 
provided a new moral foundation based on ‘new’ or at least re-emphasized public values, 
which were in turn based on a different view of the common good. With their ideas of nation 
(in the more modern sense of the word), men like Gogel and Ockerse clearly had a much more 
inclusive notion of the public or common good and the public values they espoused – most 
notably representation, accountability, responsibility, participation and consultation – were tied 
to it. Good (i.e., not corrupt) administrators and/or politicians had to be accountable to the 
people; had to be responsible because they acted for an entire nation and (ideally) had to 
represent more interests in that nation than only those of a small and powerful elite. With a 
wider and more inclusive notion of common good, a whole new way of looking at public 
morality and political corruption seemed to have started. In chapter eight I will discuss just 
how much of this ‘new’ best-opinion can be found in relation to actual cases.  
 
Towards part three 
 
In the previous chapters of part two I discussed the general historical background and context 
for the scandals discussed in this book and provided a view on best-opinion thinking on public 
values and political corruption. In the following third part I turn to the case studies as I offer a 
detailed and in-depth empirical view on explicit scandals to reveal the open otherwise hidden 
morals. The cases are spread out over the entire period coinciding with the three reform 
movements in Dutch political-administrative history as described earlier. The cases combine a 
Johnstonian approach with Hoetjes’ heuristics and theoretical insights taken from Weber and 
historical institutionalism. Chapter six offers a case study on political corruption, bureaucratiza-
tion and moral reform in the context of Holland’s changing system of taxation around 1750. 
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Chapter seven offers a case study of political corruption in the years of Patriot agitation and 
revolt during the 1770s and 1780s. Chapter eight offers a case study on political corruption in 






























“Clio, properly respected, is the least straightforward of the muses. Her beauty lies in the 
complexity, not the simplicity, of her truth. Which is why her votaries, attentive to the 
sometimes difficult and winding path they must follow, are sworn to tell stories in order to 
make the journey easier” 
 
Simon Schama,  
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6 Taxes, Political Corruption and Moral  





In this chapter I present the first case study in the sphere of tax collecting in Holland between 
(roughly) 1748 and 1756. In 1748 demands for change from an angry population and desires 
and assumptions from disgruntled administrators aligned to strive for a new and improved 
system of taxation. With the implementation of bureaucratic elements (such as fixed office 
hours, supplying means or separating person from office) the Provincial Estates of Holland 
slowly but steadily turned the ‘private’ system of tax farming into a more or less ‘public’ one. 
This was meant to eradicate political corruption, immoral behaviour and abuse of office that, 
according to many, had become endemic in the system of taxation. This chapter therefore 
explores the link between bureaucratic changes in the system of taxation and changing public 
values in the province of Holland. While the link between taxation and public values has been 
explored in the past – for instance by Jean Bodin (1530 – 1596) (cf. Wolfe, 1968: 269), Pietro 
Verdi (1728 – 1797) (cf. 1771/1993: 93), Adam Smith (1723 – 1790) (cf. 1981: 902) and, of 
course Max Weber (cf. Gerth, et al., 1991) – it has hardly been explicitly and/or empirically 
investigated in more recent times and is non-existent for the Dutch case.  
In the following I therefore first provide a general overview of events in 1748 and em-
pirical evidence that outlines the reasons for the changes in the system of taxation. This is 
followed by an empirical analysis of the bureaucratic regulations regarding tax collecting before 
and (mostly) after 1748 to assess public value change. I adopt an approach similar to the one 
taken by Van Braam (1977), Raadschelders (1990) and Wagenaar (1997) who used Weber’s 
ideal-type characteristics of bureaucratization to historically analyze reform in public admini-
stration. Unlike these authors, however, I apply Weber’s characteristics to specifically analyze 
and assess not only organizational reform in taxation before and after 1748 but also the link 
between bureaucratic tax reform and changing public values. These findings will then be 
connected to scandals in the area of taxation. 
 
6.2 Taxes, political corruption and reform 
 
Taxes, political corruption and protest 
 
The province of Holland had a high number and large variety of taxes, something that was 
recognized by contemporary authors as well. In his Fable of the Bees (1705) Bernard Mandeville 
(1714/1988: 187) noted how Holland was “loaden with greater taxes than any other nation”. 
                                                 
6 Parts of this chapter have been published by Oxford University Press as: Kerkhoff, A.D.N. (2011). Organizational 
Reform and Changing Ethics in Public Administration: A Case Study on 18th Century Dutch Tax Collecting. Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, 21(1), 117-135. 
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similarly, Adam Smith (1981: 906) noted how “the singular countries of Holland and Zealand 
require a considerable expense even to preserve their existence, or to prevent their being 
swallowed up by the sea”. Taxes in the Dutch Republic mostly consisted of indirect excises on 
popular consumer items such as bread, wine, butter, peat, beer or meat (Diederiks, 1977: 485-
490; De Vrankrijker & Elias, 2005: 32-42). The collection of these excises in Holland (officially 
since 1583) was largely arranged by means of tax farming by ‘private’ tax farmers in collabora-
tion with public authorities. Tax farmers were private businessmen who could buy the right to 
collect taxes, usually for a year, during annual auctions organized by the authorities. In order to 
acquire the farm, tax farmers had to pay a deposit. They were also obligated to hand over a 
part of their proceeds to the authorities every month. The amount to be paid was determined 
in advance of the auction and was based on expected returns. The system was devised in such 
a way that it encouraged aggressive levying. Tax farmers had to collect enough to pay their 
monthly dues and had to recover their deposit. They were, however, allowed to keep the 
difference between the estimated amount (the money they paid to the authorities every month) 
and the money they actually collected (Dekker, 1982: 134; Heringa, 1983: 83). 
Tax farming systems had been around since antiquity (cf. Kiser, 2007; Webber & 
Wildavsky, 1986; Weber, 1978: 557) and were common in other early modern European states 
such as France (Matthews, 1958; E. White, 2004), Prussia (Kiser & Schneider, 1994) and 
Britain (Kiser & Kane, 2001). Tax farming ensured the authorities of a steady flow of revenue 
without having to establish or operate an elaborate and expensive organization for collection 
(Ma, 2003: 441; Scholten, 1999: 308). Public authorities simply benefitted from entrepreneurs 
who were willing and able to acquire the know-how. In addition, tax collecting on consumer 
items was risky business. Harvests, live stock or trade routes could easily be affected by bad 
weather, plague or war and tax farming ensured that such risks – along with tax evasion and/or 
fraud – were for the tax farmers and not the authorities (Dekker, 1996: 9; Heringa, 1983: 83). 
The system also ensured that revenues were received partly in advance. This was obviously 
important for planning or making policy.  
A final crucial idea behind the system was, as we have seen, that tax collecting should 
be left to private entrepreneurs. Since they were allowed to keep all the revenues other than the 
amount they had agreed to pay to the authorities, aggressive levying was beneficial for tax 
farmers and authorities alike. Self-interest of tax farmers was believed to make levying efficient 
and reliable. Of course, the disadvantage to the province was at the same time that part of the 
proceeds would disappear in the pockets of the tax farmers (Dekker, 1982: 134). If tax farmers 
were indeed able to collect more than the estimated amount, the province, in a way, lost out 
but this was apparently not enough to outweigh the benefits. This is no to say that the system 
of tax farming was indeed able to generate much revenue for the Dutch treasury. Gosse and 
Japikse (1947: 639) already noted that the eighteenth century United Provinces were a rich 
country with a poor government, meaning that the Dutch were largely unable to tax the 
wealthy (obviously because the wealthy were also those in charge), much like France or any 
other major European state apart from England (Palmer, 1974, part I: 78). Still, a public system 
proved (in hindsight) more effective in terms of revenue. Proceeds rose, especially shortly after 
1748 with about 10% (Diederiks, 1977: 501; Heringa, 1983: 83-84, 89, 100-101; Oldewelt, 
1955ff; De Vrankrijker & Elias, 2005: 42-44) presumably as parts of it no longer went to the 
private tax farmers.   
Abuse of the system of tax farming seemed inevitable across Europe (Kiser & 
Schneider, 1994; Ma, 2003: 441-442, 445-448) and the province of Holland – as well as the rest 
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of the Dutch Republic – was no exception. Tax farming was a lucrative business and it was, 
thereby, also susceptible to abuse. While the Holland tax farmers, together with the local 
regent elite and public provincial officials were, at least in theory, tied to excise levels set by 
local or provincial authorities (Dekker, 1982: 132), they often abused their powers to collect 
more than was allowed. Lack of supervision and complexity of rules were part of the problem 
but there were also other – more fundamental – reasons. Abuse seems mostly to have been 
due to the way the system was intended to function. Certain organizational arrangements 
effectively facilitated fraud, abuse of office and highly aggressive methods of levying. Self-
interest as a major catalyst of the system ensured that private tax farmers and public ‘law 
enforcement officials’ (bailiffs, sheriffs, debt collectors and the like) were, for instance, 
awarded parts of people’s fines as part of their income. This in turn led to aggressive levying 
and often meant people were arrested on false charges to collect more pay. The variety of 
offences such as smuggling, bribery or price fixing was also endless. Sometimes deals were 
made between tax farmers, public tax officials and traders to illegally import goods so they 
could sell it for themselves. Tax farmers would often smuggle goods by bribing officials or fix 
prices. People changed the prices of excises, deliberately over- or underestimated expected 
revenues, cheated with or forged tax notes, bribed people who weighed goods at markets or 
hid proceeds and goods from inspectors. Public officials in charge of supervision often turned 
a blind eye to illegal practices in return for rewards and sometimes actively participated (cf.  
Engels, 1862: 39-41). In addition, tax farmers would often pay bailiffs and process servers for 
their assistance in combating fraud or tracking down tax offenders making it interesting for the 
former to apprehend people without cause. 
The high burden of taxation in Holland, but above all the level of fraud and abuse of 
office inherent in the system, led to violent and large-scale popular dissatisfaction concerning 
tax farming in the midst of Doelist agitation (see chapters four and five). Now, the  protest was 
mostly focused against the moral corruption of the system. This, at least, was the case in the 
final days of June 1748. Protest in Holland followed that in Groningen and Friesland. In The 
Hague, Leiden, Haarlem, Rotterdam and Amsterdam, riots erupted that targeted the homes 
and possession of the hated tax farmers (Dekker, 1982: 134; De Vrankrijker & Elias, 2005: 44). 
As Doelist petitions that called for change were presented to local and central authorities 
(consider the complaints of men like Rousset de Missy and Van Gimnig in chapter five) many 
pamphlets simultaneously denounced fraudulent tax farmers. In Leiden, the house of tax 
farmer Van der Kok was pillaged and destroyed. A pamphlet of the time read “see here a crude 
image of Van der Kok, a tax farmer, renowned along the Rhine and Vecht for his extortion, 
the supreme Beelzebub, full of pride and vanity, so proud that even his house looks like the 
palace of some rich Venetian. His secret comforts alone have cost more than I have earned in 
all my life” (Brief van een Zwitsers officier, 1748: 19-20).li Similarly, a short printed play in 1748 
portrays a tax farmer saying “I always got what I want, no amount of complaining would help. 
How great was my power! How distinguished [as in posh, ‘aristocratic’? TK] my authority! It 
was, pay up, and if you did not have it then your wife and even your children would suffer the 
deprivation” (Den bedroefden Pachter, 1748: 7).lii Various poems and other writings around the 
same time reflect similar basic sentiments. Tax farmer Lublink was, for instance, supposedly 
complaining about his lost wealth that he had been able to collect unjustly as one of the 
greatest usurers (Historisch verhaal van het tumult, 1748: 21) and tax farmer Glavink is supposedly 
full of remorse as he says “I have been devilish wise! I was a snitch! Yes the silliest bungler! 
Devoid of reason and spirit, I went and became tax farmer on butter. Oh! The remorse is 
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hardly bearable!” (Ibid., 23)liii Tax collector Heus, as a final example, was depicted as saying 
“what goes around comes around. Now the angry mob is raging because I gnawed at their 
bones and did not know what a conscience was. Now I must suffer my usury and see the 
treasure [the tax revenues, TK] return to its source [the people? TK]” (Ibid., 25).liv  
The rioters of 1748 seem not to have succumbed to blind rage. They knew who the 
culprits were and targeted specific persons rather than laying waste to the entire city or even all 
tax farmers’ houses out of sheer frustration. Retired tax farmers from previous years were left 
alone and adjacent houses to those pillaged also remained untouched (Noordam, 1980). There 
existed a certain amount of order and discipline as becomes apparent from the plunder of the 
house of tax farmer of the wines Jan Staysail on 24 June in Amsterdam. Staysail had upped the 
excise on wine and had, accordingly, put small innkeepers or bartenders in such a stranglehold 
that they invariably went bankrupt (Historisch verhaal van het tumult, 1748: 16). The mob smashed 
his possessions but not until the maid had been allowed to secure her possessions. She was 
also apparently paid her wages by members of the attacking crowd (Historisch verhaal van het 
tumult, 1748: 12; Breen, 1934: 283). Tayspil himself, however, did not get off so easily. A poem 
from 1748 has him lament: “Ai! Poor me! That I have so shrewdly taken from other purses 
when I received my office. I have cheated myself and nobody cares” (Historisch verhaal van het 
tumult, 1748: 14).lv Similar events apparently occurred during the sacking of the house of a 
certain Mr. A. Bundel in Amsterdam. A pamphlet of the time read how “the maid was allowed 
to leave with all her possessions before they went pillaging. Yes, they pillaged so carefully 
everywhere that all spectators had to wonder about the fact that the neighbours were not 
inconvenienced in any way” (Pachters traanen, 1748: 24).  
In addition, a distinction was sometimes made between good and bad tax farmers 
whereby the former stuck to the rules without extorting the population through fraud and 
corruption and who did not flaunt their wealth. The house of the ‘bad’ tax farmer J. van 
Ockhuysen in Leiden was destroyed by the mob because of his harsh methods of levying (Korte 
schets der Leidsche pachters, 1748: 20; Noordam, 1980: 93). The house of another Leiden tax 
farmer, Van Kouwenhoven, was initially ransacked on 17 June but on 18 June several people 
gathered at the spot to retrieve some of his furniture from the canals. They did so, according to 
Noordam  (1980: 90), “not because of the destruction but out of remorse for having targeted 
this specific man”. Van Kouwenhoven had in fact been one of the good tax farmers (Korte 
schets der Leidsche pachters, 1748: 20). The Hague tax farmer David Beekhof was, as a final 
example, also spared because of his fair (i.e., non corrupt) way of levying (Wagenaar, 1997: 90). 
The mob passed by the house of Beekhof “because of his politeness and moderation” (Brief van 
een Zwitsers officier, 1748: 15). The  wrath of the mob therefore seems to have been evoked not 
so much because they were tax farmers in the service of some vicious government but because 
they had exploited the system and abused their position for their own benefit.lvi 
From such characteristics of the tax riots we can deduce how the protest had mainly 
moral motives. They signal that the riots of 1748 were not so much against taxation in general. 
Instead, motives for protest against taxation were essentially moral. The system of tax 
collecting as such was no longer fundamentally rejected (Dekker, 1982: 135; 1996; Ma, 2003: 
448) but was now mostly despised for largely being corrupt. This conclusion can also be 
derived from the fact that widespread discontent with regard to the corrupted system of 
taxation and the behaviour of the tax officials has to be largely understood in the context of 
the general socio-economic and political difficulties in the Republic at the time (Dekker, 1996: 
17; Israel, 1998: 1069-1078; Noordam, 1980: 87; Schama, 1977: 45-58; De Voogd, 1914: 95). In 
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the first place (as I discussed in chapters four and five) this concerned the political failure of 
William IV and the regents to instigate any kind of administrative reform. To many, pillaging 
tax farmers’ homes and urging for the end of the system of taxation seems to have been a way 
to protest against the system of regent oligarchic government in general. Tax farmers were (for 
good reason, given the close ties between regents and tax levying, cf. Dekker, 1982: 134; 
Engels, 1862: 41-42; De Jong, 1987: 43, 51, 65-75; Scholten, 1999: 309; Slothouwer, 1875: 14; 
De Voogd, 1914: 101; De Vrankrijker & Elias, 2005: 44) considered to be in league with regent 
authorities and both were seen as part and parcel of the same corrupt elite. In addition, the 
general economic and social decay of the period made the wealth of the tax farmers more 
visible and intolerable (Israel, 1998: 959-1121; Pfeil, 1998: 44-49). Many apparently considered 
expensive clothing, chariots and horses and big houses proof of the fact that tax officials 
enriched themselves at the expense of others. One pamphleteer denounced people “who were 
able to buy a carriage, a country house and twenty to thirty horses only two years after 
receiving the right to collect excises. This ill-mannered line, stemming from a tribe that knows 
no decency, only wishes to commit usury and to scrape money together for which any 
honourable persons would only be ashamed” (Burgerlyke oplettendheid, 1748, volume 2: 4-5).lvii 
Another pamphleteer remarked that tax farmers who “manage to acquire a carriage and twenty 
to thirty horses in the first two years of their office”, obviously achieved this through “avarice, 
usury, greed, haughtiness and general lack of decency” (Ibid., 5-9). 
 
Reform of the system 
 
Contrary to the more or less failed Doelist movement (see chapters four and five) the tax riots 
of 1748 had immediate consequences for Holland’s administration. After a brief period of 
resistance from William IV (see for variety of official warnings: Groot Placaet Boeck [GPB], 
collection of ordinances and regulations by the Estates General and the Estates of Holland and 
West-Friesland,” 1658 – 1796, Volume [vol.] VII, folio [f.], 830-831, 832, 836) he finally 
travelled to the Estates General on 25 June 1748 – to squash the riots – with a proposal to 
abolish tax farming after all (Propositie van Syne Hoogheid, 1748; De Voogd, 1914: 103). In his 
proposition he stated his desire that the Estates General should start thinking about a new 
system of taxation. William appears to have grasped the root cause of the problem. According 
to him, the citizens are not out to evade taxation in general: “it is”, he wrote, “not their 
purpose or desire to avoid carrying the burdens that support the common cause”.lviii It was 
mostly the way in which levying took place that aroused such emotions.  
The reasons why the Stadholder wanted to abolish the tax farm at this point when he 
had denied any such possibility only a few days earlier are essentially unknown. Still some can 
be deduced from his proposition as he writes, for instance, how the country must not be 
damaged by riots any further. Also, there must have been a sense of political opportunism in 
play as well, as the Prince was always looking to gain favour with the Orangist populace in his 
ongoing struggles against the powerful regents. In either case, on 26 June 1748 the Estates of 
Holland decided to abolish tax farming because of the grave disturbances, i.e., the riots (GPB, 
vol. VII, f. 1204-1205, 26/06/1748). Instead of tax farming, the Estates of Holland came up 
with provisional arrangements on 26 July 1748 (Ibid., f. 1204). The direct excises on consumer 
items were replaced with direct taxes to be paid by the cities, based on the estimated use of 
goods by their citizens. In this way they made fixed quotas out of the formerly farmed excises 
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(Heringa, 1983: 84; Wagenaar, 1997: 93-94). A year later, in July and August of 1749, the 
Estates decided to get rid of the initial band-aid and replaced the measures with a new 
permanent system of tax collecting which remained intact until 1805 (cf. GPB, vol. VII, f. 
1360). The main reason was a lack of cooperation from local functionaries and tax payers 
which had made the revenues from the provisional measures very poor (Heringa, 1983: 84). In 
one of their official proclamations, the Estates wrote how “they could not be more astonished 
and lament more, the enormous sluggishness, if not unwillingness, of so many of our citizens 
to meet their obligations” (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1209).  
In a motivation for introducing indirect excises the Estates of Holland addressed the 
grievances of the populace. On 5 July 1749 they wrote that there “shall be introduced, tax 
levying on an equal footing for the whole of the province and the money collected in this way 
shall go into this countries’ treasury, and our citizens will be freed from the vexations that so 
often occurred during the time of tax farming of the common means. In this way the reasons 
for all the displeasure that we have come to find against tax farming are all taken away and 
have ceased to exist”.lix The Estates of Holland were quite thorough in addressing the previous 
(moral) problems of tax farming. They wrote how those tax farmers who had been inclined to 
do evil had caused much harm to the country [Holland, TK] (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1214 – 1215, 
04/07/1749).lx They promise to act against all those who “willingly and knowingly, deliber-
ately, profit from tax collecting and thereby extract revenues from the country” (GPB, vol. 
VII, f. 1360, art. ix, see also GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005 – 1010, 22/07/1749).lxi In the general 
ordinance of 28 August 1749 the Estates of Holland add that they plan to “deter as much as 
we can all those who are looking for profit through fraud and stealing, and protect the good 
tax payer from being cheated and oppressed by them” (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1119).lxii Of course, 
they had less noble motives as well. They wanted an end to the riots and, perhaps, hoped to get 
more revenue this way although that seems unlikely.  
Many things started to change from 1748 onwards to meet the demands of both rioters 
and reformers. Designing a new public system of tax collecting became the most time 
consuming responsibility of the Gecommitteerde Raden (Fockema Andreae, 1961: 45; Israel, 
1998: 278-280). Among the people appointed to design the new public system of taxation were 
Anthony van Wesele (1701 – 1757) and Jacob Vosmaer (1717 – 1781). On 22 August 1749, 
Van Wesele became fiscal attorney and ‘attorney general’ of the Gecommitteerde Raden (see 
also GPB, vol. VIII, f. 1022, 05/05/1757 and GPB, vol. IX, f. 734, 09/01/1762) and was 
responsible on their behalf (Heringa, 1983: 100). As former fiscal attorney of the Court of 
Holland Van Wesele proved to be highly instrumental in setting up a new system from about 
1750 onwards in which a new administrative structure of command was put in place and the 
private tax farmers were replaced with public tax collectors. The new public functionaries now 
had a legal position as public servants and were part of a much more encompassing chain of 
hierarchy and command. The main tax collector collected taxes in his area with the aid of some 
assistants (clerks, accountants or bookkeepers, process servers and investigators or ‘chergers’ 
who tracked down tax offenders and/or stolen goods). These officials were all appointed and 
officially employed by the Provincial Estates. This was a big difference with the way things had 
been before. In the case of very large excises (such as beer) the main tax collector could receive 
assistance from minor or subordinate tax collectors. Other key differences were a stronger 
emphasis on hierarchy, control and supervision. New supervisors served as a link between the 
main tax collectors and Gecommitteerde Raden (cf. Heringa, 1983: 90) and a new office of the 
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common means, headed by Vosmaer, served to implement and guide the immense reforms 
from 1 January 1750 onwards (cf. Heringa, 1983: 91; Wagenaar, 2004: 558). 
6.3 Bureaucratization and changing public values 
 
As the largely ‘private’ system of tax farming was turned into a public one a highly bureaucratic 
organization was created. Measures that were already there (most notable oaths of office and 
instructions) were revitalized but many new measures were introduced at the same time. The 
activity of Van Wesele, Vosmaer and countless others becomes apparent from a comparison of 
the situation before and after 1748. All sorts of bureaucratic measures can be distinguished 
with which tax officials were now confronted. Crucially, these measures show a change in 
moral stance. Since moral protest against abuse of office by tax officials and regent elite had 
been the main aspect of the tax riots, this abuse was also the main target for the reformers. 
From the new rules it becomes apparent that bureaucratic measures were effectively installed 
to counter political corruption and abuse of office. In the following I discuss several character-
istics of bureaucratization to analyze and assess change in the organization of taxation before 
and after 1748. This includes changing public values and perceptions of political corruption 
with regard to the behaviour of the new, now public, officials. 
Both private tax farmers and public tax officials (i.e., before and after 1748) were bound 
by continuous administrative activity (i).† Before 1748, tax farmers worked the whole year round and 
had to collect on a daily basis selling their tax notes. They also had to pay public collectors 
every week and have their books inspected by the latter on a monthly basis (GPB, vol. VI, 
f.1036-1039, art. xviii-xix). The city or regional public collectors would, in turn, send the 
money to the provincial officials (Engels, 1862: 41) who also worked the whole year round. 
The latter also had to deal with precisely set office hours (the office was in fact their private 
home): from eight to twelve in the morning and from two to five in the afternoon in summer 
and only from two to five in the afternoon in winter (GPB, vol. VI, f. 1036-1039, art. ix).lxiii 
They had to keep their books in proper orderlxiv and if they were not present at said hours they 
would have to pay a fine of twenty-five guilders (GPB, vol. VI, f. 1036-1039, art. vii). If absent 
for a whole day they were, supposedly, to be fired immediately (GPB, vol. VI, f. 1036-1039, 
art. xi; see also GPB, vol. VIII, June 1748, f. 999, art. xiii). 
After 1748, Van Wesele and others came up with more elaborate guidelines regarding 
the regularity and continuity of the work of those involved in levying. The two provincial 
inspectors from the office of the common means were, as mentioned, required to supervise the 
now public collectors in three annual rounds from 1750 onwards and local inspectors were to 
continuously supervise the collectors (Instructie voor de inspecteurs, 1751, art. vi, 23/03/1751; 
Instructie voor de opsienders 1760, art. xxv, 04/04/1760). The collectors themselves would now 
have to deal with stricter regulations regarding their administration. Every year, for instance, 
they received two books. One rough book or daily journal, the other an official ledger. They 
were obligated to update their journals every day and would have to produce a balance sheet in 
their ledgers at the end of each month. For every day not updated in the books, they were 
fined ten guilders (GPB, vol. VIII, art. ix, September 1748; Instructie voor de collecteurs, 1748). 
Lower law enforcement officials in charge of stopping or preventing illegal activities after 1748 
would have to inspect the different tollbooths and weighing houses “at least once a day at 
                                                 
† Numbers in between brackets refer to the Roman numerals in Figure 1 in chapter two. 
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irregular hours, to see or hear whether the people working there did so properly, in a sober 
[not drunk! TK] and capable way” (Instructie voor de hoofdchergers, 1760, art. iv, 17/04/1760).lxv 
‘Policemen’ would have to provide detailed accounts of their daily rounds every month  (Ibid., 
art. iv, art. xiv-xv).  
These examples show how local and provincial authorities were convinced of the im-
portance of continuous administrative activity regarding the collecting of taxes. Apart from the 
fact that running a well-organized tax system demands such institutional arrangements as 
regular office hours and inspection this is also an ethical or moral stance. ‘Good’ public 
officials maintained their books in an orderly and regular fashion, were present at their office at 
least a few hours a day, would regularly supervise and inspect any subordinates and would 
regularly present their books to any superiors. Values such as continuity, systematization and 
uniformity were at play here as were being sober and having an eye for detail. The increase of 
rules and regulations after 1748 tells us that although these values were required prior to 1748 
as well, they certainly gained importance after 1748. 
As already indicated, tax officials were bound to many formal rules and procedures (ii), also 
prior to 1748. One instruction, dated 14 March 1701, obligated collectors to show their books 
to each other (note the desirability of peer supervision) and to provincial officials (GPB, vol. 
V, f. 1036). Non-compliance would result in a hefty fine of six hundred guilders, which could 
amount to as much as half a tax collector’s yearly income (GPB, vol. VI, f. 1036-1039, art.v; 
GPB, vol. VII, f. 1228, art.xiv-xv, 08/10/ 1749). The same instruction from 1701 stated that 
public collectors or private tax farmers should “not connive, pardon or collect less than what 
was rightfully theirs to levy, punishable with a fine of two hundred guilders” (GPB, vol. VI, f. 
1036-1039).lxvi The collectors were, furthermore, obligated to collect taxes from the tax farmers 
themselves. Only collectors of large means like wine or beer in the largest cities in Holland 
could hand over some of their business to other “loyal and capable persons” such as subordi-
nate collectors. Interestingly, family members were explicitly barred from this arrangement 
(GPB, vol. VI, f. 1036-1039, art. x, 17/03/1701). However, after 1748 the number of rules and 
procedures rapidly increased. In part this was, I believe, a direct result of growing ethical 
demands and the need to target political corruption (mainly in the form of fraud) that were 
now a direct and ‘internal’ government affair.  
To solve some of the problems inherent in the old system and to get the new rules and 
regulations out to its officials, the Estates required all new officials to take an oath of office. 
For this they revived an oath of purification in 1748 that had originally been devised in 1656 
and was then revised in 1715. The original oath from 1656 made officials promise to work in a 
“pure and incorruptible manner […] without being corrupted by gifts, presents or any other 
direct or indirect interest” (GPB, vol. III, 24/02/1656, f. 102). In 1715 it was added that 
“those who receive any high or low public office will have to execute their duties with purity 
and integrity, as it suits all pious and resolute regents and officials […] without having been 
corrupted by any gifts […]. All those willing to hold public office will thus have to swear by 
oath that neither they, nor their wives, children or other family or persons, have received or 
given, directly or indirectly, any gifts” (GPB, vol. V, f. 686ff, 10/12/1715. Compare for a later 
version GPB, vol. IX, f. 400, 02/05/1777).lxvii In 1749 it was added that public tax officials 
were to behave “punctual and to act in accordance with instructions and decrees” (GPB, vol. 
VII, f. 1006, art. vi, 22/07/1749; see also GPB, vol. VII, f. 1119, art. i, 28/08 1749).lxviii This 
ensured they could no longer claim (after the fact) not to have understood the rules. To secure 
this even more, ordinances and instructions were publicly dispersed “so that nobody can claim 
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to be ignorant of their contents” GPB, vol. VII, f. 1222, art. x, 28/08/1749). Supervisors of 
the tax collectors after 1748 (like Jacobus Cras in the case below) received all ordinances and 
instructions from Gecommitteerde Raden and had to disperse them over all main and 
subordinate tax collectors (Heringa, 1983: 90). The importance of the oath also becomes clear 
from the fact that when a tax official passed away, his successor was to take the oath within 
eight days upon starting the new job. For every following day one neglected to take the oath 
you were fined ten guilders, to be paid to the poorhouse (GPB, vol. IV, f. 1068-1069, art. xvi).  
There are many examples where higher and lower tax officials were convicted by pro-
vincial authorities for not obeying oath and instruction. Many verdicts handed out by Gecom-
mitteerde Raden to corrupt tax officials start with the simple phrase that upon receiving his 
appointment the official “has received a proper instruction and has sworn on this the required 
oath”.7 lxix Pieter Buijtenweg, process server and cherger of the common means in the town of 
Gouda was for instance convicted for not obeying his oath in 1751 and banished for twelve 
years from the province. While he knew that a certain Wouter Slappendeel was smuggling 
goods into the city, he did nothing about it. Indeed he even asked Slappendeel to provide some 
illegal meat for him and his wife. According to Gecommitteerde Raden, Buijtenweg “displayed 
enormous disloyalty for a sworn official, whose duty by oath it was to be vigilant against 
‘froindes’ and contraventions”.8  
An equally telling example of the importance of oath and instruction (and of not mixing 
public and private affairs!) can be found in the trial and verdict of Laurens van der Meer, main 
collector of excises on land reclamation, peat and coal in the city of Rotterdam. The accused 
admitted during his second interrogation by Gecommitteerde Raden9 that “he had taken the 
land’s money and that he knew this was not his to take for his own personal use or even to mix 
with his personal money”.lxx He had also used his son Roger instead of “the nations’ servants” 
to collect the excises. To Gecommitteerde Raden this was proof of his “excessive disloyalty 
and perjurious nature” and that “all his actions concerning the land’s business were evil and 
contrary to oath and duty […].lxxi As a result Van der Meer was sentenced to “be whipped 
while a noose was around his neck, then branded and confined to a detention centre for 
twenty five years to earn his living with manual labour, after which he will be banished from 
the province for ever”.lxxii The aforementioned tells us that after 1748 increased attention was 
paid to seeing to it that good officials were neutral with regard to their ‘clients’ (i.e., citizens). 
Personal feelings and use of discretion (conniving, pardoning etc.) that had often been 
condoned in the past were now explicitly denounced. Furthermore, a good public official 
should be loyal and capable (whatever that specifically may have meant) and should not 
involve family in their work. Also, a good administrator should remain pure and incorruptible 
by following his instructions and oath and not mix personal finances with public office. 
The characteristic of adequate supply of means (vi) is important as it relates directly to some 
kind of public-private distinction and the different things expected of public and private 
officials. This characteristic is somewhat problematic since tax collecting, both before and after 
1748, was largely a mix of public and private elements. Prior to 1748, offices where taxes were 
collected (apart from small tollbooths at bridges, markets and city-gates) seem, for instance, 
                                                 
7 NL-HaNA, Gecommitteerde Raden van de Staten van Holland en Westfriesland, 1621-1795 [Staten van Holland na 1572 / 
Gecommitteerde Raden], 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4077, folio [f.] 118. 
8 Ibid., inv.nr. 4076, f. 105-106. 
9 Ibid., inv.nr. 4077, f. 114-117. 
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not to have existed. Services provided by ‘policemen’ and subordinate collectors would, 
furthermore, have to be paid by the tax officials themselves. We can also safely assume that at 
least the tax farmers had to buy things like ‘office equipment’ with their own money. However, 
from 1748 onwards we can see a move towards supplying the now public tax officials with 
books and other materials. A decree in 1760, for instance, asked inspectors to provide the 
necessary equipment (Instructie voor de hoofdchergers, 1760, art. iv, art. xiv-xv, 17/04/1760). Since 
the new officials were expected to maintain their administration in an orderly fashion, the 
Estates ordered the use of a specific type of book in 1748 provided by the authorities. On the 
first page a clerk of the Office of the Common Means would write down the exact number of 
pages and sign off with his initials. The thread used to bind the book was then sealed at both 
ends with the coat of arms of the Province of Holland (Instructie voor de collecteurs, 1748, art. viii, 
07/08/1748).lxxiii The Estates thereby hoped to make it more difficult for tax collectors to take 
out pages, insert new ones or otherwise withhold or alter information. This implies an 
important change in the attitude of the Estates that they were serious about control and 
supervision. It also shows they accepted responsibility and regarded tax collecting as a 
provincial instead of a local (city) matter.  
Just how seriously the Estates were about proper bookkeeping and using the official 
books becomes apparent from the conviction of Abraham van der Linden, main collector in 
the town of Heusden.10 Although his oath and instruction (see ii) were clear on these mat-
terslxxiv, Van der Linden had written down his collected taxes on separate sheets of paper 
instead of in the official ledger. This had caused him to be behind in his administration even 
though his supervisor had approached him several times to improve the situation. Van der 
Linden also seems to have tampered with the money as he appears to have borrowed public 
money to pay his personal debts. From the books it appears that he has received money but 
has not noted this down, “making it seem as though the money was never paid”.lxxv Since Van 
der Linden had, however, signed every monthly statement to the supervisor with a “declaration 
to the oath to the land” he was now “forced to admit that he had lied and that these state-
ments were false”.lxxvi His punishment was being fired as main collector. 
Although the private nature of tax collecting was increasingly rejected after 1748, some 
remnants still remained. Public tax collectors would still use private means to pay for certain 
things such as notary costs when accepting their office. Collectors would, as said, still use their 
own house as an office, even though they would now sometimes receive a lump sum of around 
600 guilders for furniture and incidental compensation for peat and candles (i.e., heating and 
light) (Heringa, 1983: 89). However, after 1748 it was no longer needed to pay for services of 
local law enforcement or administrative subordinates. Even though this saved the collectors 
quite some money, it also meant that they were “no longer allowed to use government officials 
for private purposes” (Instructie voor de hoofd- en ondergaarders, 1759, art. xliii).lxxvii Furthermore, all 
tax officials now received some form of salary from the authorities although this still entailed 
many private elements (to be discussed below). As we have seen tax officials were personally 
responsible for taking commercial risks before 1748. These risks were, however, also not 
completely eliminated after 1748. Public law enforcement officers would for example have to 
pay twice the amount of any unnecessary damages resulting from an arrest or property search 
with private money (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1119, art. xii).lxxviii Tax officials would be held financially 
responsible in case of accepting false money, whether doing so knowingly or not (GPB, vol. 
                                                 
10 NL-HaNA, Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4077, f. 48. 
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VII, f. 1119, art. xxi). They were also  still responsible for the “integrity of their cash registers”. 
Deficits at the end of the month, which could just as well be the result of citizens’ refusal to 
pay rather than embezzlement, would still have to be replenished by collectors’ private funds 
(Instructie voor de hoofd- en ondergaarders, 1759, art. xxix. See also GPB, vol. VII, f. 1010, art. xxv-
xxviii; GPB, vol. VIII, f. 995, art. i, 10/02/1748).lxxix 
Even family members would sometimes be held financially accountable for any wrong-
doings or deficits should the tax collector himself have passed away (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005-
1010; cf. Wagenaar, 1997, 209-210). Several ordinances state regulations that wives of tax 
functionaries also had to sign an act of deposit in which they relinquished beforehand any 
inheritance that was (in case of fraud or mismanagement by their husbands) owed to the 
authorities (See GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005 – 1010, art. v, 22/07/1749).lxxx The mix of public and 
private elements even after 1748 also becomes apparent from the fact that several tax collec-
tors still received parts of fines as part of their salary (cf. Heringa, 1983: 86-89; Wagenaar, 
2004: 557). In case of fraud, after public tax collecting was introduced, any plaintiff would 
receive two thirds of the fine. The remaining one third would be divided in two: one half for 
the person who had brought the offence into the open and one half for the poor house (GPB, 
vol. VII, f. 1005 – 1010, art. v, 22/07/1749). Prosecutors, finally, could still choose to 
prosecute cases themselves, reaping either benefits when winning or suffering the risks when 
losing. They could also ask the Estates of Holland for financial backing but were then expected 
to pay a percentage of any winnings to the Estates in return for this ‘service’ (GPB, vol. VII, f. 
1005-1010, art. xxii-xxiii, 07/22/1749). 
Good public officials were, interpreting the aforementioned, expected to work just as 
well at home and to take good care of their books and administration, both before and after 
1748. Although I currently lack the evidence for a more detailed comparison, at least after 1748 
good public officials were expected to make use of official materials supplied by the authori-
ties. Furthermore, public tax officials should no longer pay law enforcement officials them-
selves, although some payment out of their own pockets would still be considered normal. The 
fact that they were still personally responsible for taking commercial risks was not completely 
abolished, showing how the authorities expected to ensure prudence, caution and responsibility 
from their employees. Private gain for public tax officials was only gradually stamped out as a 
motivator. As in the case of already discussed characteristics we do, however, see a gradual 
change in attitude. Although there were still private elements in public tax collecting after 1748 
this did in fact decrease. 
The seventh characteristic, non-ownership of office (vii), is also important in a moral sense. 
In part, it denotes whether a person owes allegiance to a superior or not and whether someone 
treats the office as their own possession or not. It relates directly to issues of accountability 
and responsibility. When looking at this characteristic before 1748 one again finds many 
complications. Before 1748 tax farmers technically did not own the office but only the right to 
collect excises for one year. On the other hand there were tax farmers who did in fact buy the 
office for longer periods of time (Scholten, 1999: 308, 310). Furthermore, no tax farmer was 
allowed to do whatever he wanted even though he had bought the rights attached to the office 
in the auction. They still had to abide by provincial rules, for instance by not employing 
compositie (see also GPB, vol. IV, f. 732, art. xvi, 20/06/1699). This practice entailed the settling 
of disputes among parties outside of court or legal procedures. Usually this was not allowed 
but it occurred quite often. Faber (1988: 255-260) noted how the term originally had a positive 
meaning, denoting reconciliation between parties without having to take recourse to expensive 
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and bothersome legal procedures. However, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it got 
a more negative meaning denoting illegal buy-offs with which the public official would enrich 
himself. After 1748 composition would be punished more frequently but it was never 
abolished outright. In July 1749 the States, for example, ordered that collectors could not do it 
based on general ordinances unless they had permission to do it based on particular ordinances 
(GPB, vol. VII, art. vii, 22/07/1749).lxxxi Similarly, a later instruction stated that collectors 
could not do it unless they had prior permission (Instructie voor de hoofd- en ondergaarders, 1759, art. 
xiii).lxxxii From this it becomes apparent that the relationship between tax farmers and official 
public authorities resembled a rather ambiguous and complicated ‘semi-private outsourcing’. 
Given the fact that after 1748 there were less ‘private’ elements attached to the office of 
tax collector and that officials would now be appointed (see also xi), it becomes easier to assess 
whether office and person had indeed become more separated. Here too we see a mix of old 
and new as well as some confusion. It was still possible, for instance, for a tax collector to have 
a family member replace him in case of illness (Instructie voor de collecteurs, 1748, art. vii, 
07/08/1748).lxxxiii The fact that the authorities still had to adjust to new rules and procedures 
becomes clear from a statement by the Estates from September 1748 that this too was no 
longer allowed. The office now did become more separated from the person. In case of illness 
family members could no longer be employed. The supervisor had to provide a solution (GPB, 
Vol. VIII, f. 991, art. xvi).lxxxiv Ownership of office, or at least a vague separation between the 
two, after 1748 also becomes apparent from the fact that successors sometimes paid a pension 
to their predecessors upon taking over the office. Sometimes, apparently, the office was really 
still considered a personal possession in part because people had invested their own money 
(Diederiks, 1977: 499). 
Procedures of rational discipline and control (viii) also played an important role in attempts at 
reform. Prior to 1748 there appear to have been considerable regulations that prohibited hole-
and-corner arrangements between, for example, tax farmers and officials or between tax 
farmers and taxpayers (GPB, Vol. IV, f. 732, art. xvi). If corrupt officials were caught, 
discipline was tough and could consist of banishment from the province and/or a lifelong ban 
on working as a tax official. Failure to report fraud or misconduct of a colleague to the city or 
regional collector would result in a fine of six hundred guilders (GPB, vol. VI, f. 1036-1039, 
art. xx, 14/03/1701). If you did notify the proper authorities you could however receive 600 
guilders and, had you been accessory to the fact you would even be exempted from any 
punishment (GPB, vol. IV, f. 732-734, art. xvi, 20/06/1699). After 1748, compositie was targeted 
with increased vigour by the authorities although it was still possible in specific circumstances 
(GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005-1010, art. vii, 22/07/1749. See also Instructie voor de hoofd- en ondergaarders, 
1759, art. xiii). The authorities considerably intensified their attempts to reduce fraud and 
abuse of office (at least on paper) after 1748. In several decrees public whipping, jail time, 
confiscation of possessions, banishment and a permanent ban on working in public office were 
again stated as punishment (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1119, art. iv-vi, x, 28/08/1749). The possibility 
to (anonymously) spill the beans on someone in return for money was maintained and 
reemphasized in 1760 and 1797 (GPB, vol. VIII, f. 991, art. iii. See also Instructie voor 's lands 
bedienden, 1797, art. vi). 
Again I briefly restate some of the new, or at least reaffirmed, ethical or moral views 
implicit in these official formal-legal organizational changes. Both before and after 1748, a 
good public official should not make use of compositie, conniving or other kinds of hole-and-
corner arrangements, except in some extraordinary and formally agreed upon instances. A 
Chapter 6 | Taxes, Political Corruption and Moral reofrm (1748 – 1756) 
 
| 129 
good public official was also expected to be loyal to the authorities first. It is also worth 
emphasizing that there were fines for active as well as passive official misconduct. In general it 
became increasingly unacceptable (in theory) after 1748 for tax officials to abuse their money, 
rank, and standing and influence to bully or extort taxpayers. 
There are other Weberian characteristics that we use to determine both bureaucratiza-
tion and new and/or more explicit standards of moral conduct for public tax officials. What 
are left are the characteristics of officials (Weber’s Bürokratische Verwaltungsstab). There is, for 
instance, the characteristic of being appointed (xi). Prior to 1748 tax farmers were appointed 
based on the size of their bid. They bought the right to collect for one year. Public tax officials 
before 1748 were overall appointed by the Provincial authorities although city magistrates 
often had an important say in the matter. After 1748, tax officials were all appointed by the 
Gecommitteerde Raden of Holland. Appointment was based on recommendations from 
supervisors and/or the town council. Either way, local magistrates still had a lot of influence in 
these matters (Heringa, 1983: 85). The Estates made a clear ethical stand in their attempt to 
limit this influence of local magistrates after 1748. The first article of the first decree concern-
ing the new system of collection stated: “magistrates, regents or other persons can not 
denounce [as in appeal, protest, disapprove, TK] decisions regarding the levying of the 
common means”. Furthermore, it stated that regents “can not give their own interpretation or 
hinder [the process, TK] or even interfere in such matters, on penalty of being suspended for a 
year” (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005, art. i, 22/07/1749).lxxxv However, we shall see in the case of 
Reijers and Vaster (see below), that this principle would not always apply. 
Being knowledgeable and/or having expertise (xii) pertains to essential qualities, characteristics, 
background or skills public officials were supposed to possess. Tax officials and tax farmers 
alike should preferably be debt-free and frugal Calvinists (Scholten, 1999: 312- 313; Wagenaar, 
1997: 90). Most tax officials and tax farmers also had to be able to read, write and calculate 
properly and all officials were tacitly assumed to know the different decrees and instructions 
regarding the common means. Collectors should also be “sober and capable men of honest 
behaviour and reputation.”  (GPB, vol. VIII, art. i, 02/10/1748).lxxxvi One instruction comes 
close to actively create a ‘service oriented’ state of mind among tax officials when it stated how 
public inspectors of weights and measures at the weighing-house were to be “decent people, 
over twenty five years old who should treat everyone with kindness, help people as quickly as 
possible and, above all, make sure citizens would not be delayed any longer than strictly 
necessary” (Instructie en eed voor de ykers van de zoutmaten, 1797, art. vii).lxxxvii  
Other expressed values were: being of good disposition; being flexible and amiable, be-
ing vigilant, honest, loyal and cautious (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1119, art. xii, 22/07/1749; Idem f. 
1006, art. iii). Higher officials were often explicitly expected to have legal expertise. In the 
instruction of Vosmaer it was stated, for instance, that “he shall be an able and diligent person, 
of the true reformed religion, a born Dutchman, a legal scholar or skilled user of the law, 
especially experienced with the levying of excises on the common means” (GPB, vol. VIII, f. 
1007, art. i, 11/06/1750).lxxxviii Further requirements both before and after 1748 often dealt 
with reducing possible conflicts of interest and limiting single large concentrations of power. 
Provincial inspectors should, for instance, not be an interested party in any of the common 
means (Instructie voor de inspecteurs, 1751, art. i-ii. See also an earlier ordinance in GPB, vol. VI, f. 
1036, art. I, 14/03/1701). Tax officials were not allowed to occupy the post of bailiff, sheriff 
or mayor. Nor could they be any other kind of legal magistrate (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005, art. iv, 
22/07/1749; GPB, vol. I, f. 1806; GPB, vol. IV, f. 728). At the same time knowledge of the 
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local community was considered a good asset for tax officials (Heringa, 1983: 86). We should 
note the obvious collision between having strong roots in the community and the desire to 
avoid conflicts of interest. This is, I believe, a strong indicator of how old and new ideas 
concerning correct public official behaviour were still very much at odds with each other.  
Fulfilling ones office as a main or only job (xv) – i.e., were offices full-time or part-time? – is 
another bureaucratic characteristic with important moral ramifications. Diederiks (1977: 500) 
has written how most jobs regarding the common means in Amsterdam were full-time. Only 
rarely did it concern part-time jobs. Some subordinate tax collectors in rural areas would often 
have a main job as, for example, surgeon or teacher (Heringa, 1983: 86) but main tax collectors 
were not expected to have any other job on the side (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005, art. iv, 
22/07/1749).lxxxix The same applied to higher offices such as those of Van Wesele (GPB, vol. 
VII, f. 1004, 22/08/1749, art. ii)xc or Vosmaer (GPB, vol. VIII, f. 1007, art. ii-iii, 11/06/1750). 
As lower officials (such as clerks) could apparently have more than one job (Heringa, 1983: 99) 
we might be able to say that it was more allowed to have additional offices the lower one got in 
the hierarchy. 
As the eighteenth century progressed authorities increasingly acknowledged the impor-
tance of being rewarded with a regular salary and pension in money (xvii). Before 1748, tax farmers and 
their staff obviously did not receive any salary. They were paid based on what they collected. 
Before 1748, higher ‘public’ officials such as collectors and inspectors did sometimes get a 
fixed salary but this was almost always supplemented with ad-hoc payments or emoluments 
and salaries depended on the amount of revenue that was brought in (GPB, vol. IV f. 1968, 
30/07/1711). After 1748, a fundamental change was that fixed salaries would now (slowly) 
become the norm, although often still mixed with payments in percentages of proceeds 
(Heringa, 1983: 86) and usually differing from city to city (cf.  Diederiks, 1977: 492; Heringa, 
1983: 86-89). A transition to truly fixed salaries for all tax officials, of course, did not happen 
overnight. Main and minor tax collectors appear to have been in some kind of transition 
period after 1748, since a part of their income was still derived from fines. However, on 
average main collectors would receive somewhere between 1,500 and 2,000 guilders a year and 
supervisors would receive around 1,000 guilders in 1750 but already 1,800 guilders around 
1760 because their work was initially underestimated but soon proved to be a lot harder and 
more time consuming. Inspectors would receive money to cover their travel expenses 
(Heringa, 1983: 86-90). Despite this transition period, the idea of a fixed salary did start to gain 
ground and was a major shift in attitude from roughly 1748 onwards. According to several 
instructions for various officials the idea behind fixed salaries was most of all that it would 
keep officials from accepting gifts or bribes (Instructie voor de opsienders 1760, art. lxv, 
04/04/1760).  
Standard public salaries instead of diverse emoluments or ad-hoc rewards were re-
garded as a means to curb political corruption and bribery and keep officials in check. After 
1748 the Estates of Holland wrote that “now everyone is rewarded based on their qualities in a 
reasonable fashion” and that “because the collectors are, in fact, to be considered receivers of 
money owed to the treasury of the common land […] each shall have to be fairly rewarded 
based on his quality and condition by the common land […] which is of course more natural, 
fair and consistent with the nature of things than using parts of fines to that end” (GPB, vol. 
VII, f. 1020, art xxii-xxiii).xci The Estates argued how a salary (instead of emoluments or 
premiums) was meant to end accepting any gifts (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1020, art. xlv). With regard 
to pensions (as part of a salary) one can be brief. These were rare. Only very high public 
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officials like the Grand Pensionary of the Estates would receive a lump sum when retiring 
(GPB, vol. VII, f. 128, 05/07/1749). Lower officials seem not to have had such benefits and 
should instead rely on savings or family. Still there have been cases in which successors of tax 
officials would have to yield a certain amount of their income to their predecessor (Diederiks, 
1977: 499). Again, aforementioned regulations show a blurred boundary between old and new 
and/or public and private elements. Paying a pension to a predecessor who had apparently 
invested his own money in the office signals how the office was at least partly considered to be 
personal. Also, personal economic gain was not ruled out as a motivator since payment by 
percentage of the proceeds was still common after 1748. However, paying salaries at all does 
tell us that the Estates gradually came to have a different perception of its officials, how they 
should be rewarded and how they should act. Most importantly salaries also became a way on 
controlling the actions of public officials: receiving a salary obligated tax officials to act in a 
non-corrupt way.  
Applying a final bureaucratic characteristic, we can see that after 1748 tax officials in-
creasingly came to work under formal protection of their office (xx). Before 1748, the authorities did 
their best to emphasize the public nature of the work of the (private) tax officials. In protests 
and riots before 1748 the Estates already often explicitly stated that all officials were under the 
formal protection of the Provincial authorities (cf. GPB, vol. VI, f. 879, 14/05/1727. See also 
GPB, vol. I, f. 2250; GPB, vol. IV, f. 723, f. 1169; GPB, vol. VI, f. 606, f. 743, f. 874, f. 875, f. 
877, f. 879 and f. 888).xcii Warnings not to harm tax officials would however become more 
frequent and explicit in 1748 (GPB, vol. VII, f. 825, 21/06/1747; GPB, vol. VII, f. 830, 
12/06/1748; GPB, vol. VII, f. 835, 22/06/1748). The authorities would react more severely to 
violence directed against ‘their’ officials as the riots of 1748 progressed (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1221, 
art. xv; GPB, vol. VIII, f. 575). Some of the main culprits of the violence against tax farmers in 
Amsterdam in the 1748 riots were, for example, executed by hanging them from the beams of 
the Amsterdam weighing-house on Dam Square.  
The tone of the Estates speaks volumes when they announce in August 1749 that any 
violence against tax officials, collectors and their assistants is punishable by death. After all, the 
Estates wrote: “it concerns people who work for the country and support its finances based on 
oath and duty (GPB, vol. VII, f. 1221, art. xv. Compare also Diederiks 1977, footnote 3).xciii 
When a crowd gathered on 13 September 1758 to drive out two tax collectors from the town 
of Aarlanderveen by throwing sand and rocks at them the Estates reacted by stating that “all 
offences and violence committed against the Estates’ servants shall be considered as violence 
against the Estates themselves” (GPB, vol. VIII, f. 575).xciv Such statements show how tax 
collectors were now truly being considered as government employees by the authorities 
(compare Scholten, 1999: 316-317) which was quite a radical change from before. The fact that 
the Estates increasingly considered tax officials as ‘one of their own’ and as true extensions of 
their power was, I believe, essentially a solution to early modern problems of legitimacy of 
public administration. The Estates no longer accepted any conflict between private business-
men making personal profit while their duties were based upon public authority and their 
office fell under the protection of the Estates. Having public officials would place the 
legitimacy of tax collecting beyond any doubt. 
In the previous I provided empirical evidence of the link between changes in the system 
of taxation, bureaucratization and changing public values as it (mainly) becomes apparent from 
new bureaucratic regulations. In the following these findings are connected to scandals 
involving corrupt behaviour of tax officials. I describe what went wrong, how different sources 
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of values judged matters, what public values can be distinguished and what was apparently 
corrupt or reprehensible behaviour for public officials at the time in the context of the 
bureaucratic changes discussed earlier. This essentially serves to assess just how much new 
rules, assumptions and values were enforced and/or discussed in actual practice. It also serves 
to include views from the other sources of values. 
 
6.4 Cases of political corruption 
 
In chapter three I discussed some of the difficulties inherent in taking a methodological 
approach based on examining, juxtaposing and comparing multiple sources of values. One 
major downside was that cases often lack one or more sources. Also, some sources might be 
less salient than others. Hardly ever, in other words, do we find all sources represented in an 
equal fashion in a single case at the same time. For this reason multiple instances of political 
corruption are discussed in the following to allow for a varied view on different sources of 
values. Of course, all instances of political corruption belong to the sphere of taxation. The 
first case provides only a limited view on public values from legal sources. At the same time it 
has much public opinion and can strongly be linked to best-opinion (and wider social-political 
events of the time) too. The second case has more legal (bureaucratic) and shop floor codes, 
taken from official sentencing and interrogations of suspects. Following the cases I will 
consider just how much of the link between discussed bureaucratic characteristics and moral 
reforms we can see in these scandals, which public values can be found and how to assess 
change and continuity. 
 
Pieter Reijers and Frederik Vaster 
 
In June 1751 Pieter Reijers, main tax collector of the wines, and Frederik Vaster, supervisor of 
the tax collecting of the wines in Amsterdam, made a bad decision. Both men knocked on the 
Amsterdam town council’s door to recover losses they had supposedly suffered at the hands of 
a certain aldermen of the local court. The alderman, they claimed, had not handed in a tax note 
provided by Reijers for the purchase of some wine and had, therefore, not paid his taxes. 
While the action of Reijers and Vaster was lawful and indeed fitted well with the new bureau-
cratic regulations regarding taxation (cf. GPB, vol. VII, f. 1005, art. I, 22/07/1749), the 
authorities were not amused with such a brute treatment of regents by (lowly?) tax officials. 
With their complaint Reijers and Vaster seem to have disregarded an unwritten rule that 
regents should be left alone if at all possible. On 26 June 1751 the Amsterdam aldermen-
commissioners wrote a letter to Gecommitteerde Raden11 in which they spoke of the indis-
crete, indecent and disrespectful actions of Reijers and Vaster. They requested Gecommit-
teerde Raden to interrogate both men for their disloyalty and asked for a full account of these 
interrogations.xcv  It followed on 8 July 175112 and states that Reijers and Vaster apologized in 
an elaborate way, vowing to have been unaware of any indecent action and stating never 
having meant to behave in any such way.xcvi Furthermore, they were prepared to state the same 
to the Amsterdam aldermen-commissioners and the specific alderman in question if they were 
                                                 
11 NL-HaNA, Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 3103, f. 1388, 26/06/1751. 
12 Ibid., f. 1447, 08/07/1751. 
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allowed to do so and hoped that would be sufficient.xcvii In a reply to Gecommitteerde Raden 
the aggrieved commissioners stated they believed the response by Vaster and Reijers had been 
credible but at the same time they argued that Vaster and Reijers were too unequal persons to 
be judged in the same way.xcviii As a result they chose to accept the apology of Vaster (the 
higher ranked supervisor) but not that of Reijers (the lower ranked collector) and Gecommit-
teerde Raden agreed. Reijers was subsequently fired while Vaster would be allowed to stay in 
office until 1757.13 Interesting, of course, is that such class justice was the opposite of Weber’s 
equality of administrators. Here, perhaps, we find an example of mixing old and new ways of 
doing things. 
 
More public values from legal sources 
 
Pieter Reijers, undoubtedly distressed by this outcome, then made a bold move. He fled 
Amsterdam with a supposedly large sum of collected tax money. As far as the available sources 
can tell us, Reijers was never caught. He did not show up at his trial and was therefore 
sentenced in absentia and banned for life from the province.14 The verdict does not speak of any 
stolen money (probably because a motivation by the judge(s) of a verdict was not obligated and 
therefore usually not present in the files), but Reijers was ordered to pay the costs of his trial. 
Bicker Raye (1963: 195), an Amsterdam regent who kept a detailed journal of events in 
Amsterdam during his lifetime, furthermore writes that the parents of Reijers were forced to 
pay a certain amount to the Estates of Holland (and were supposedly ruined because of it). 
Perhaps they were made to pay the costs of the trial since Reijers himself had vanished. In any 
case, the fact that the parents were held financially responsible for the actions of their son 
seems to denote some sense of ownership of office or at least personal, individual and family 
responsibility for a public office. 
 
Public values from public opinion sources 
 
Apart from the brief court verdict, there were various other sources at the time that were quick 
to condemn Reijers and, to a lesser degree, Vaster. Authors of several pamphlets uttered their 
dismay at so much disloyalty and thieving, committed by people who were responsible for 
collecting their tax money. Images and short verses appeared in which both men were mocked 
and scolded, for instance calling Reijers a coward and a villain (De Cerberus, 1751: 10).xcix A 
satire directed at Reijers and Vaster (and tax collectors in general) laments that the high and 
mighty always protect each other and always get away with anything by means of bribery and 
use of connections to the detriment of the land and its citizens. The author complains that 
Reijers will probably soon get some high office again (De Cerberus, 1751: appendix)c, perhaps 
even at court. He also marks the obvious futility of the oath taken by Reijers and other tax 
collectors and notes their hypocrisy as they continuously profiteer and line their pockets when 
he writes: “alright gentlemen, now swear your oath, swear you sweat, blood and bile, swear you 
will not steal a dime but all the while fill your skinny bellies”.ci Another pamphlet consisted of 
an imaginary letter from Reijers to his mother, while running from the law. As a new horse is 
                                                 
13 Stadsarchief Amsterdam [NL-AsdSAA], accessnumber 5031: Archief van de Burgemeesters: stukken betreffende ambten en 
officiën, 1413 – 1859, inv. nr. 109, f. 1. 
14 NL-HaNA, Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4074, f. 124, 29/07/1752. 
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supposedly saddled up at some roadside inn, Reyers is made to reflect. “Sometimes”, the letter 
states, “I am overcome with thousands of thoughts due to my lies and false oaths, and then I 
think of the state of mankind which comforts me. While we are all more or less sinners, he 
who is less so is most happy; the secret crimes that I have committed against the heavens, 
press hardest on me”. The imaginary letter then has him continue with saying that “stealing 
from the lands’ cash register is the least of my crimes, it is my bad upbringing that has made 
me incapable to be honest” (Copye van een merkwaardige missive, 1751)cii Then the letter gets to the 
heart of the matter as it reads how Reijers has never been fit to hold such an important office 
in the first place. Whereas everywhere in Europe, state servants are of such virtue and nobility, 
Reijers is – according to the pamphlet – only of low birth and lacks morals as well as educa-
tion. And how could it be otherwise, the letter states, with a mother who (apparently) sold 
cooked eel on the streets.ciii 
Pieter Reijers quickly seems to have become a symbol for the fraudulent, thieving and 
greedy tax official. He is also attributed a distinct role in the political quarrels of the time as he 
appears in an image alongside Daniel Raap, a porcelain salesman and former Doelist leader in 
Amsterdam. Raap had been a confidant of William IV in the hay days of the Doelist revolt of 
1748. However, with the failure of the Doelist movement he had fallen from grace and had 
become the symbol of its failure instead (cf.  Beerinck & De Boer, 1963: 222-226). In the 
image, Reijers and some other (unknown) fraudulent tax collector are already at the gallows 
waiting for Raap to arrive (Breen, 1934: 299). The (imaginary) link in some of the media 
between Reijers (symbol of fraudulent tax collectors) and Raap (symbol of failed Doelist 
reform movement) is interesting. It demonstrates how accusations and ‘discussions’ of political 
corruption by tax officials were explicitly tied to the main social-political events of the time. 
According to popular opinion, corruption by tax officials could still continue precisely because 
of the failed Doelist reforms. Whereas men like Reijers (and Vaster, see below) initially appear 
to have been the victims of a kind of class justice for actually speaking out against a corrupt (or 
at least negligent) alderman they were turned into examples and warnings of what happened as 
a consequence of a failed Doelist reform movement. A pamphlet from 1751 provides a final 
interesting example of this. Now, Vaster and Raap are presented as imposters who pretend to 
serve the common good but only serve their own interests.civ They deceived the people and 
mocked all that is holy, forgot their oath and duty and even dared to claim that it was all the 
fault of William IV, they abused his name for their own profit.cv All their promises were only 
meant to deceive, to provide false hope and to keep up appearances (Advertentie, 1751).cvi  
Other tax functionaries were soon caught up in the public fray surrounding the scandal. 
Henricus Wachloo, main collector of the excises on butter in Amsterdam, was accused of 
having acquired his office from Raap, in return for a handsome sum of money and his support 
for Raap and the Doelist movement. On 2 November 1751, Wachloo is sentenced in absentia to 
banishment for life from the province.15 Although Gecommitteerde Raden (again) do not 
discuss the crimes in detail, there was never a shortage of pamphlets. A letter (Brief van Henricus 
Wachloo, 1751), supposedly written by Wachloo, is circulated in which he admits that while he 
was a wine tradesman “he had always been able to lead a quiet and advantageous existence by 
means of smuggling”. He also (supposedly) describes how Raap had seduced him to take an 
office (as main tax collector of excises on butter) that was in fact too risky (i.e., too costly) for 
Wachloo. According to Wachloo, Raap had told him he would give him an office worth four 
                                                 
15 NL-HaNA, Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4074, f. 112, 02/11/1751. 
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thousand guilders [...] saying “I will protect you, I have enough friends at court and this the 
whole world knows”. Instead, Wachloo had been haunted by debt ever since he took the job 
(perhaps because of a deposit he still had to pay to the Province or because he was bad at tax 
collecting..) and had to take money from the collected taxes to stay in business. Wachloo 
curses himself for having taken Raap’s offer. He declared he had never intended to steal but 
had only borrowed money until one of his old cousins would die. He had then intended to use 
his inheritance to make up for the missing funds!cvii Wachloo then points his anger at Raap and 
curses him for having approached him. “If only the judge would know”, Wachloo writes, “that 
you [Raap, TK] and your accomplices sold offices for money, your fate will surely be worse 
than mine”.cviii Reijers is mentioned too: “Why is my colleague Reijers, a.k.a. pretty Pete 
(known as such by all the whores and strumpets) so forcefully protected, when everyone 
knows how he manages to keep a family, a whole array of whores and a mistress [...] for 
everyone knows that he had lots of debts when he started collecting”.cix 
Andries Mallan, another former Doelist agitator (from Rotterdam) and afterwards main 
tax collector of the excises on peat and coal in The Hague, was also publicly targeted and 
linked to Reijers, Wachloo and others (see below). In one pamphlet Mallan is portrayed as a 
fraud and a thief who used his position in the Doelist movement to acquire a lucrative office as 
main collector in the new tax organization. In a pamphlet dripping with sarcasm, Mallan 
supposedly writes: “I acquired through this and other dashing actions  [as a Doelist, TK] the 
title of Patriot and because of this my sober countenance and dress came to be regarded by 
some as half and by others as three quarters divine. So it was in that time that I finally came to 
acquire the honourable position of collector of peat and coal for The Hague […] in which I 
was so competent that in the first year I managed to borrow two thousand guilders from the 
communal coffers (to somewhat improve my sober appearance). By providing false monthly 
statements I managed to get as far ahead in life that I was publicly sentenced for being 
perjurious, without honour and shameful “ (De Cerberus, 1751).cx The pamphleteers’ accusa-
tions were at least partly true as Mallan has indeed been sentenced by Gecommitteerde Raden 
for breaking his oath and instruction and having stolen 2,024 guilders from the Provincial 
coffers. At his trial – at which Mallan indeed appeared16 – he confessed that he had in fact 
taken an oath and also did not deny having received a clear instruction.cxi As such he acknowl-
edged that he had promised to report all incoming revenues to the supervisor. To Gecommit-
teerde Raden this was enough for a guilty verdict. Since, upon checking his books, Mallan 
proved to be short the 2,024 guilders, Gecommitteerde Raden concluded he must have taken 
this money “for his own use or that of his family”.cxii Mallan did not deny the charges but 
defended himself by saying that “necessity has led me to use some of the nations’ money for 
myself and my family, but I always intended to give it back.cxiii Despite Mallan’s confession 
Gecommitteerde Raden blame him for “severe negligence, together with perjury, falsity and 
thievery which can not be tolerated in a land of justice but should be punished if only to let it 
be an example for others”.cxiv The verdict then read that Mallan was to be banished from the 
province for the rest of his life.cxv  
Other public opinion pamphlets connected various aforementioned actors in the scan-
dal as well. One of them presents Reijers, Wachloo and Mallan as the three heads of Cerberus. 
The author wants “to report on the many sinister, base and villainous acts and foul deceit of 
the collectors of the taxes” and wishes to disclose the “godless behaviour of the three bandits 
                                                 
16 See NL-HaNA, Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4076, f. 102. 
Hidden Morals, Explicit Scandals 
 
136 | 
or refugees [Mallan, Wachloo and Reijers, TK]” to provide a proper account of the Doelisten 
“and other colleagues of these thieves of the country”. This should be enough “to arrange the 
collection of the countries’ common means in a better way” and to do something against “the 
enormously villainous acts committed by these false patriots [the Doelists, TK] to the 
detriment of the common good” (De Cerberus, 1751: 3-4).cxvi In an imagined conversation 
between the three heads of Cerberus, Wachloo and Mallan want Reijers to share the loot. 
Reijers, however, refuses and says he will use the money for himself as soon as his mother 
clears his problems and settles his debts. He will then return to Amsterdam to go to his 
beloved ladies of pleasure, to act once again like a ‘dandy’cxvii, throwing his money (and that of 
his fathers’ pension) about.cxviii The pamphlet’s (anonymous) author wants to sling as much dirt 
as possible. Reijers has supposedly taken six thousand from the provincial coffers to buy 
presents for his girlfriend. He is (like Wachloo and Mallan) also accused of having acquired his 
office as main collector by paying for Raap’s support.  
 
Jacobus Cras and Jacob Nolla 
 
Jacobus Cras was a supervisor of “the countries’ sealed and unsealed tax notes in Leiden” from  
4 December 1749 to 6 August 1756.17 He was one of the new high-ranking public officials 
instated after the changes in the tax system of 1748. As supervisor Cras was responsible for the 
supervision and control of all main and lower tax collectors and local investigators in Leiden 
(at the time the third largest city of Holland). He was also responsible for handing out tax 
notes to the main collectors. The important role officials such as Cras had in the new public 
system of collecting meant they were always in the thick of it once problems occurred and this 
would often be the case in the early days of the new system: the new rules were vague, people 
were unsure what to do or expect and old ways still lingered on. Such elements can all be seen 
in a case leading to a considerable scandal involving Jacobus Cras and other tax officials – 
concerning events that had happened since 1747 – when Cras was convicted in 1756 by 
Gecommitteerde Raden for several offences in the execution of their duties. 
One of the main collectors Cras was supposed to supervise and inspect was Jacob 
Nolla, main collector of the taxes on quite a few common means such as cows, horses, 
servants (a tax based on the number of servants one had) and general wealth (an early form of 
property and income tax), tobacco, coffee, tea and ferry fares in Leiden and some surrounding 
villages. Nolla had been in office since 1747 and was therefore one of those allowed to stay 
after the tax riots. He remained in office until his death in 1756 after which it was soon 
revealed that there were many problems and discrepancies in his administration. Investigations 
by Gecommitteerde Raden into Nolla’s books showed he had taken quite some ‘accountancy 
liberties’. It appeared that by the time of his death Nolla had a deficit of 17,000 guilders. The 
investigations soon led to Cras (who was after all Nolla’s supervisor) and Cras’ books showed 
Nolla only had a deficit of 4,000 guilders. The Estates found that Cras had violated the rules of 
his instructions that obligated him to “accurately supervise whether the main and other 
collectors kept their administration in proper order”.cxix Second, Cras had obviously made 
some grave ‘accounting mistakes’ himself when dealing with Nolla’s books and settling his 
accounts after he had died. How else, after all, did his books reflect a deficit of only 4,000 
instead of 17,000 guilders? 
                                                 
17 NL-HaNA, Collectieve Middelen Zuiderkwartier Holland, 3.01.41, inv. nr. 1226, f. 1. 




Public values from legal sources 
 
Nolla could, due to his death, no longer be punished or prosecuted for his actions (even 
though his widow and children had to sell everything they owned to repay as much of his debt 
to the province as they could).18 However, Cras was accused of bad supervision as well as bad 
accounting which were both regarded as offences against his instruction and oath. In his 
response before Gecommitteerde Raden19 Cras admitted he had not noticed the ‘liberties’ 
taken by Nolla over the years because he had not gone through the latter’s books as he should 
have. He also admitted having written to Gecommitteerde Raden right after Nolla’s death that 
all things were indeed in order (even though they had clearly not been!) and that the office had 
been run properly (which it had not!), also during Nolla’s illness.cxx When Gecommitteerde 
Raden asked Cras during the trial to comment on these false statements and Nolla’s deficit, 
Cras had to admit how “such had not been possible had he obeyed the proper order to prevent 
such disloyal acts”. He also stated that his negligent behaviour as supervisor “is the cause of 
the great loss now suffered by the common land”.cxxi Cras thus takes the blame for bad 
supervision and negligence but denies any criminal intent. This statement might be supported 
by the fact that in their verdict the Estates do not speak of him actually stealing any money for 
himself (cf.  Heringa, 1983: 98).  
During the course of the Estates’ investigations, however, more of Cras’ activities were 
brought to light on top of his bad supervision and bad accounting. It turned out that Cras had 
also been involved in earlier dealings with Nolla. Nolla had been a butcher before becoming a 
tax farmer, together with J. Ockhuysen (one of the tax farmers affected by the 1748 riots, see 
earlier), of the excise on meat in 1747. After becoming tax farmer and, in 1749, main tax 
collector, his son Jan Nolla had taken over the butcher shop. As we have seen, this happened 
because collectors (like tax farmers before them) were not allowed to have any business links 
with the common means for which they collected excises.20 Even though the shop was now 
officially owned by the son, father Jacob still had an (indirect) interest in it. As such he 
provided meat to Cras between 1751 and 1753. Cras seems not to have been too eager or 
quick about paying Nolla for the meat. He told Gecommitteerde Raden, however, that he 
eventually gave Nolla an ‘I owe you’ worth 600 guilders promising to pay this amount in four 
instalments. Nolla died before the debt was paid and the obligation went “to a certain grocer in 
Leiden”. Cras did not know whether the obligation had been transferred to this grocer before 
or after Nolla’s death.21 
In what appears to be a rare case of legal openness, Gecommitteerde Raden provide a 
basis for their verdict as they pointed to a resolution of 1749 (repeated on 31 October 1753) 
which stated that higher public officials are in no way allowed to borrow or provide money or 
credit to lower ranked (subordinate) officials.22 In violating this resolution, Cras was guilty of 
having had a conflict of interest and of abusing his superior position for financial gain. The 
conclusion of the Estates was that “all this is highly damaging and disadvantageous to the 
                                                 
18 Regionaal Archief Leiden [NL-LdnRAL], Schepenbank (Oud Rechterlijk Archief [ORA]), accessnumber 508, inv. nr. 
50jj, f. 156, 15/12/1757. 
19 NL-HaNA, Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4077, f. 33-35, 25/08/1756. 
20 Ibid., inv.nr. 3099, f. 848, 29/11/1749, article [art.] 2. 
21 Ibid., inv.nr. 4077, f. 34, 25/08/1756. 
22 Ibid., inv.nr. 3099, f. 861-867, 01/12/1749. 
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common land and its finances […] such acts should be punished without connivance as an 
example to prevent such things in the future, especially when it concerns a supervisor”.23 
Gecommitteerde Raden were thus determined to make an example out of Cras possibly to 
boost people’s confidence in the new system of public collecting. His job had been, after all, 
precisely to prevent or stop the kind of political corruption he had hidden from view and 
participated in himself. Class justice (as had been the case with Reijers and Vaster, see earlier) 
seems not to have been an option and Cras was declared ‘incompetent’ and sentenced to 
“repay the damages inflicted upon the country”.cxxii If he did not or could not comply he 
would be banished from the province for life. Unfortunately, the records are unclear about the 
actual punishment but it seems likely Cras indeed paid some amount of money. An interesting 
further stipulation by the aldermen-commissioners of Leiden on 8 November 1756 however 
orders Cras to pay his creditors.24 A list of creditors was eventually presented to Cras by the 
aldermen-commissioners on 12 July 1757. From the list it becomes apparent that Cras had a 
total remaining debt of almost two thousand guilders, to be divided over no less than nineteen 
creditors. Among the creditors are also several tax collectors of various common means, the 
Bailiff Van Alkmade and a large number of grocers. Apparently, Cras had purchased more than 
just meat on credit.25 
Even though Cras had been sentenced, the case was far from over. Several lower assis-
tants of Cras (and Nolla) had been directly or indirectly involved in the uncovered mess. Even 
a supervisor and main tax collector were in a way aided and/or checked by such officials as 
bookkeepers, accountants and chergers. These lower public officials were to be scrutinized just 
as well. As such this provides some interesting cases of corruption of some lower officials in 
the new tax system. Among the employees of Nolla we find a certain Jan Andries Pelmeer, 
cherger and process server in Leiden and assistant of Nolla. Pelmeer had been assigned by Cras 
to Nolla’s office from 1754 onwards apparently as a part of emergency measures to alleviate 
some of Nolla’s burdens. Pelmeer, ordered to appear before Gecommitteerde Raden and 
declared that he never signed Nolla’s monthly statements but that he “did know and has also 
seen from the cash register books that every month collector Nolla reported less money than 
he received according to the cash register”.cxxiii Pelmeer was convicted by Gecommitteerde 
Raden26 because of his failure to report the political corruption of Nolla, “all of which are 
affairs with dangerous consequences that can not be tolerated from a servant of the common 
land”.cxxiv Pelmeer was not banished but was fired and was no longer allowed to hold a similar 
office. He also had to pay for the costs of his trial. 
Another employee at Nolla’s office was Pieter Ramak, a higher ranked assistant than 
Pelmeer who also knew things were wrong. Perhaps because of his higher rank, Gecommit-
teerde Raden were tougher on Ramak than they were on Pelmeer. They convicted Ramak27 on 
the basis of having violated his oath of office and his instruction. These had, after all, obligated 
him “to tell Gecommitteerde Raden of any disloyalty or wrongdoing on the part of the 
collector should he find out, and therefore Gecommitteerde Raden can not but conclude that 
since he knew but did not speak of the discovered disloyalty, he had to be seen as an accom-
plice”.cxxv Furthermore, he had failed to always behave with loyalty and diligence.cxxvi From the 
                                                 
23 Ibid., inv.nr. 4077, f. 35, 25/08/1756. 
24 NL-LdnRAL, ORA Leiden, 508, inv. nr. 50jj, f. 148, 08/11/1756. 
25 Ibid., inv. nr. 52+4A, f. 169-172, 02/07/1757. 
26 NL-HaNA, Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4077, f. 37. 
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Chapter 6 | Taxes, Political Corruption and Moral reofrm (1748 – 1756) 
 
| 139 
court proceedings it had indeed become clear that Ramak knew of Nolla’s malversations and 
even of Cras’ negligence. Furthermore, Cras was himself guilty of political corruption accord-
ing to Ramak. Ramak testified28 that he had signed “all the monthly statements since 1751, and 
it is known to him that there was a certain sum of money missing every month, and that he has 
to confess that he did not follow his instruction, and that the collector Nolla ordered him to 
do so and forced him, and that supervisor Cras inspected the books several times but never 
mentioned anything to him [either Nolla or Ramak, TK]”.cxxvii  
Ramak also testified that he had been ignorant of the exact workings of the embezzle-
ment and that although he had seen things he had not understood much of it.cxxviii Ramak 
seems to have been stuck between two ‘corrupt’ bosses, unable to do anything about it and 
was perhaps also ignorant of the reward he could get upon selling both Nolla and Cras out. He 
was also, possibly, hampered by a lack of proper education or knowledge of the workings of 
the new system. This was something many of his colleagues most likely had to deal with as well 
because of the increased technical and organizational complexity of the system and the sheer 
quantity of new rules and regulations combined with inherent problems of starting something 
new. Most collectors simply did not understand the new regulations (Heringa, 1983, 93-99). 
This was even more the case for lower and less educated officials charged with maintaining 
local order. These problems soon became apparent from the rounds of the inspectors of the 
Office of the Common Means from 1750 onwards which forced the Estates of Holland to 
come up with special regulations for “servants charged with countering smuggling and other 
offences with regard to the common means”, restated in 1758 (with extra instructions), in 1760 
and in 1797 (Instructie voor 's lands bedienden, 1797, art. ii).cxxix Despite any such potentially 
mitigating circumstances, Ramak was sentenced to six years banishment from the province, 
was forever barred from having a public office and had to pay the costs of his trial. 
 
6.5 Analysis and concluding remarks 
 
In chapter three I outlined the basic elements and structure of the concluding sections to each 
case study. In the following I will therefore deal with a brief discussion of the public values and 
value statements found in the case and provide a comparison between the various sources of 
values. Finally, I will address questions of change and continuity of public values, mainly in the 
context of bureaucratization. 
 
Public values and value statements in the case 
 
The cases of Reijers, Vaster, Cras and others offer many public values and value statements 
with which public official behaviour was either condemned or supported. This allows us to 
find out what was considered corrupt at the time. Crucial values and value statements mostly 
included those linked to bureaucratization, such as keeping one’s books in good order, being 
neutral towards citizens, keeping one’s oath and instruction and holding regular office hours. 
In fact, as the previous discussion has shown, interest in each characteristic of 
bureaucratization was in itself often an implicit value statement and/or guide for proper 
behaviour. Behind many of the characteristics of bureaucratization we find implicit but 
                                                 
28 NL-HaNA, Staten van Holland na 1572 / Gecommitteerde Raden, 3.01.05, inv.nr. 4077, f. 36. 
Hidden Morals, Explicit Scandals 
 
140 | 
nonetheless fundamental ‘new’ or reemphasized public values such as having expertise 
(knowledge of the new rules), being neutral (avoid conflicts of interest, avoid having multiple 
jobs at the same time), act with legitimacy (with tax collecting now being a public affair), 
accountability (towards the province or city instead of friends and/or family) and honesty (do 
not break oath and instruction). The demand for loyalty toward the authorities instead of one’s 
colleagues was clearly going against the old and widespread collegial and shop floor way of 
doing things. Values such as caution and prudence when performing your public duty were 
reemphasized. The same goes for values such as continuity, regularity, uniformity, adhering to 
formal rules and procedures (oaths and instructions), hierarchical organization (rank is 
important in sentencing), use of written documents (keeping a proper administration) and 
procedures of discipline and control (being vigilant, prosecute offenders). 
 
Comparing sources of values 
 
The cases presented in this chapter have been viewed from a variety of sources of public 
values. A comparison helps to answer some fundamental questions having to do with how any 
value change worked. Differences and similarities between the sources and various ways of 
phrasing helps to decrease the ambiguity of particular values and sources of values. It also 
helps to explain possible transitions from ‘old’ to ‘new’ or value dynamics. Unfortunately, 
formal legal codes are largely absent in the cases surrounding Reijers and Vaster because the 
accused failed to show up in court and because the court was often not inclined to provide any 
elaborate motivation for a verdict or a discussion of what had precisely gone wrong. Still, 
Gecommitteerde Raden had a reasonably clear and certainly interesting view on matters. In 
their verdict they agreed with the views held by the aldermen-commissioners. In doing so they 
adopted the same line of argument, that there had indeed been indecent, indiscrete and 
disrespectful behaviour.cxxx Gecommitteerde Raden seemed to make what are essentially shop 
floor codes of disgruntled or offended aldermen (see shop floor codes later on) into legal 
codes. While they should have commended Reijers and Vaster for their attempts to hold an 
alderman accountable for not paying his taxes on time, they chose to fire Reijers and rebuke 
Vaster. Gecommitteerde Raden argued that Reijers and Vaster were too unequal to be 
punished in the same way. In punishing both men differently, they therefore seemed to have 
also neglected an important bureaucratic characteristic. Similarly they seemed to have 
interpreted the new laws rather interestingly when dealing with Reijers after he had stolen the 
money and fled the city.  
Gecommitteerde Raden could of course do little else than give a guilty verdict in the 
case of Reijers. Not much else needed or could be said since Reijers had already fled the city. 
However, in making his family pay for Reijers’ crimes Gecommitteerde Raden seem to have 
denied any (bureaucratic) separation between office and official. If Reijers was truly considered 
a public official and the risks of his work were indeed thought of a being for the province, it 
seems odd that the parents (his mother at least) were driven to bankruptcy because of the acts 
of the son. The punishment of the lower official Andries Mallan provides some more public 
values as expressed in legal codes. Gecommitteerde Raden convicted Mallan for breaking his 
oath and instruction and blamed him for having taken (public) money for his own (private) 
benefit. They also blame him for neglecting his duties, perjuring himself, being false and 
thieving.  
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The legal codes in the cases of Cras and others are more elaborate and better traceable to 
several bureaucratic characteristics. This is most likely due to the different nature of the case 
but can also be due to the new system having been in place for a little bit longer. In the roughly 
five years between the case of Reijers and Vaster and the case of Cras and others, people are 
likely to have become more accustomed to the new system. In either case, the legal codes in 
these instances are characterized by much attention for detail and bureaucratic regulations. Just 
like in the case of Reijers and others, one need not look for any sweeping statements or pleas 
from the court on how their officials should behave. Still, many public values and assumptions 
of proper public behaviour are mentioned. Judgement, verdict and punishment in Cras’ case 
seem to have been based firmly on legal sources and bureaucratic principles and arguments. 
Instructions, oaths of office and official proclamations regarding tax collecting (i.e., bureau-
cratic characteristics) provide the court with enough ammunition to convict and sentence 
corrupt tax officials.  
Often recurring is also, for instance, the public value of loyalty, sometimes towards 
ones’ superior official but mostly towards the Provincial Estates or the ‘common land’. We 
also see many other legal-bureaucratic (‘Weberian’) values such as upholding promises made in 
oath and instruction. Cras was condemned because he had violated oath and instruction in 
which he had promised to supervise well and keep the books in good order. His corruption 
also consisted of having had improper financial relations (a clear conflict of interest) with a 
subordinate (Nolla) and having therefore abused his office for personal gain. From Cras’ 
conviction it therefore becomes apparent that the Gecommitteerde Raden attributed much 
importance to values of accuracy and precision in maintaining one’s administration or books in 
a proper way. Likewise, lower officials Pelmeer and Ramak were convicted because they failed 
to meet the bureaucratic principles inherent in their oath and instruction. Gecommitteerde 
Raden blamed Pelmeer and Ramak for their failure to report on Cras and/or Nolla. They were 
accused of not being loyal, diligent, resolute or vigilant enough in tracking down offenders. 
What was not mentioned also provides interesting information in the case of Cras and others. It 
becomes apparent from the court files that the legal codes were hardly bothered with harm 
done by corrupt tax officials to individual citizens or even citizens as a group. While the 
reasons for changing the system were moral in nature and directly related to citizens being 
harmed by wrong behaviour (i.e., preventing political corruption and the abuse of office 
harmful to citizens) these reasons can not be found in the court files examined here even 
though damages done to the common land or the country is mentioned quite a lot. This 
usually meant the city or province and seems to denote an important emphasis on some kind 
of common good that is harmed. Stealing common revenues means stealing money that is (in 
theory at least) supposed to be for common things.  
One can find more information on what was corrupt and which public values there 
were in the instances involving Reijers, Vaster and others from public opinion sources. As is to 
be expected from this source of values there is a lot of attention for the broader (political-
social, economic) circumstances. In public opinion we can find long tirades against the 
immoral behaviour of the public officials involved. We also see a mix of fact and fiction. This 
is not surprising as the public must have been largely unaware of the actual course of events 
and legal affairs in general. Pamphleteers were usually out to get their message across as best as 
possible in order to make some money on sales or to prove their point and making things up 
or exaggerating obviously helped. However, more importantly, in order to reach these goals 
their pamphlets had to connect to the values and ideas held by (the majority of) their reading 
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audience. The message that was subsequently broadcasted was that tax officials and the 
corrupted tax system were part and parcel of the wider failure of Doelists, Orangists and 
corrupt regents to bring about (administrative and moral) change. This meant that Reijers, 
Vaster and others seem to have been used mostly as scapegoats and examples regardless of 
what they were actually guilty of. It did not seem to matter, for instance, that Reijers and 
Vaster had initially acted correctly in dealing with the alderman.  
From this point of view it becomes clear why Reijers is automatically accused of using 
his connections to get out of trouble (nepotism was meant but the term itself is not used), of 
getting ahead in the world by means of bribery, of flaunting his wealth and of lining his 
pockets whenever he could. According to public opinion this was simply what people like him 
did. One rhyme from a pamphlet read: “little thieves are hung between heaven and earth, but 
the big thieves ride in carriages and on horses. While those who steal the most are given 
countries and cities to rule” (Historisch verhaal van het tumult, 1748: 41).cxxxi People like Reijers 
were imposters, only out to deceive others and enrich themselves by the taking from the 
common land. It is also why Reijers, Vaster, Wachloo and Mallan were all accused of leading a 
nice and comfortable life (blowing money on whores, mistresses, carriages and horses) while 
others suffered, despite the fact that their cases had very little to do with each other. Hypocrisy 
turns out to be another negative value that often occurs in the pamphlets. Saying one thing but 
doing another seems to have been very much despised in public opinion. Other negative values 
that were mentioned were disloyalty (similar to legal codes but now regarding citizens as well), 
sluykery (used not as a verb for smuggling but as a value, i.e., being a sluyker), thievery, lacking 
nobility (being dishonest, not being of good disposition), or deceit (of people and civic duty). 
Acquiring your office by paying for it (in this case buying it from Raap) was also on the whole 
considered wrong in public opinion. 
The source of values least well represented in the studied cases is that of the shop floor. 
In the case of Reijers and Vaster the only real shop floor document is the letter by the 
aldermen-commissioners to Gecommitteerde Raden. While of course being a legal institution 
their letter and complaint looks more like a shop floor code. This is particularly so because 
Reijers and Vaster seem to have acted within the limits of the law but, apparently, transgressed 
the limits of acceptable shop floor behaviour. They had, in other words, dared to accuse a 
higher ranked regent of tax fraud. Perhaps we can assume they had violated or disturbed the 
fragile, precarious and/or shady link (cemented with unwritten rules?) between regents and tax 
collecting that was still there despite the new rules already being in place. A bureaucracy 
ignorant of class differences is, after all, something that takes time to grow. Although shop 
floor documents are mostly lacking we can find some more interesting shop floor information 
out of the bits and pieces from interrogations (mostly in the case of Cras and others). First, 
Cras and others do not seem to have contested that what they did was wrong. This was the case 
with Andries Mallan who described his malversations as wrong but justified his actions as a 
loan because he badly needed the money for his family. Cras himself also admitted his actions 
had been wrong. An excuse for his actions can not be found in the files. Pelmeer and Ramak 
also agreed that what they had done was wrong, but they both pleaded they were guilty of 
ignorance rather than wilful theft. They both (naturally) seem to have passed the blame to 
Cras. It seems they took the ‘bureaucratic’ stance that if the supervisor was not capable or 
willing to deal with the fraud, why should they be expected to do anything about it?  
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Change and continuity of public values and perceptions of political corruption 
 
From the aforementioned some interesting conclusions can be drawn regarding the interaction 
between bureaucratic reform and changing public values and perceptions of political corrup-
tion. Firstly – bearing in mind the limited sources and instances discussed here – it seems there 
was in fact little disagreement (in public at least) between tax officials on the shop floor, 
Provincial authorities and their legal regulations and even public opinion about what was right 
or wrong moral behaviour for tax officials in the new system of public tax collecting after 
1748. Relatively few people seem to have questioned that tax farming had run its course and I 
have found no evidence (either in public or legal sources) that distinct value systems clashed. 
The examined tax officials did not dispute the basic values underlying the (new) system or 
brand them as nonsense. All parties essentially seemed to agree that the acts described in the 
previous were in fact corrupt or wrong. There was, in other words, little value pluralism.  
Of course, this is not to say that everyone was happy about the new system or able to 
work within it. In fact, local authorities would sometimes obstruct the introduction of public 
tax collecting right after 1748 (cf.  Heringa, 1983: 93-99) and much reprehensible behaviour 
apparently still went on after 1748.29 In the end, knowing something is wrong does not always 
keep people from trying to get away with it anyway. Discontent also did not go away with the 
introduction of the new system. Although William IV and the Estates of Holland had initially 
gained much appreciation for abolishing tax farming (especially among small shopkeepers and 
artisans, see Wagenaar, 2004: 556) this newly acquired respect quickly disappeared with the 
introduction of public tax collecting and the return of the indirect excises (Dekker, 1982: 137; 
Wagenaar, 2004: 551). Proof of the bad reputation tax officials and taxation still had among the 
population after 1748 was that upon introduction of the public collection some small riots 
erupted once more in several parts of Holland. Furthermore, the Estates of Holland had large 
difficulties recruiting public collectors after 1748 (Heringa, 1983: 96, 99).  
However, discontent and continuing fraud were not, I argue, evidence of clashing value 
systems. They were, rather, caused by normal difficulties associated with the implementation of 
a new system. Establishing proper uniformity in rules and changing a system takes time and 
local particularism lasted for a long time especially (perhaps) in people’s minds as the introduc-
tion of a new and highly bureaucratic system requires an equally radical change in mindset as 
well. People simply had to get used to new procedures and its implicit assumptions of political 
corruption and correct behaviour. As such, implementation of the new system did not always 
go smoothly, changes did not occur overnight and old habits died hard (cf. Heringa, 1983: 
101). All things considered, the common citizen was not much better off than before as many 
problems associated with tax collecting were not immediately solved in the new system. There 
were still, for instance, possibilities to form monopolies whereby groups of people acquired the 
exclusive right to trade or produce goods (Scholten, 1999: 309-310). Excises in Holland were 
also often still higher than those in other provinces which kept resulting in smuggling of goods 
and other forms of corruption (Heringa, 1983: 95). Furthermore, a part of the salary of various 
officials was still sometimes based on a percentage of the proceeds and/or fines, encouraging 
                                                 
29 See for instance a large collection of cases in NA 3.01.05, Archives of the Gecommitteerde Raden of the States of Holland 
and West-Friesland, 1621 – 1795, inv.nrs. 4074 – 4075: Sentences in criminal affairs regarding the common means over 
the period 1723 – 1766. See also NA 3.01.05, Archives of the Gecommitteerde Raden of the States of Holland and West-
Friesland, 1621 – 1795, nrs. 4076 – 4080: registers of sentences in criminal affairs regarding the common means in the 
period 1738 – 1807. 
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fraud and aggressive levying (Heringa, 1983: 86). Still, since large tax riots were a thing of the 
past after roughly 1750 (Dekker, 1982: 28-29), some things must indeed have improved. 
Finally, growing pains and slow institutional change are natural and should not be regarded as 
fundamental disagreement about which public values are appropriate or important.  
Institutional or organizational difficulties should also not mask a second conclusion 
that we can discern a change in moral attitude around 1748 from the case. We have seen how a 
great multitude of bureaucratic characteristics was specifically designed to counter political 
corruption and to improve the morals of tax officials in particular and the ‘morality’ of the new 
system as a whole in general. The specific and limited nature of the discussed instances, of 
course, makes it impossible to trace all or even many of these characteristics in practice. Some 
are simply not applicable to any of the committed offences. Still, the aforementioned (espe-
cially the discussion of legal codes) has shown that a number of bureaucratic characteristics 
were indeed functioning in practice and that correct public official moral conduct was clearly 
an important issue for the authorities in 1748. There seems to have been a sense that things 
should change. Reorganizing Holland’s tax system and ‘going public’ provided windows of 
opportunity to tackle important moral issues. The fact that types of political corruption that 
had hitherto been accepted practice were either no longer supported or seem to have been 
more actively prosecuted after 1748 is proof enough that some things did indeed change. So is 
the fact that rules and regulations meant to prevent and combat political corruption became 
more elaborate and were, as it appears from the cases, relatively actively enforced. However, 
again we must realize that this change was neither abrupt nor new. There had been instances 
before 1748 where tax farmers were held accountable to bureaucratic and/or legal rules and 
principles (cf. Wagenaar, 2003).  
A link between bureaucratic reform and changing public values can therefore be seen in 
the above. Next to a wide variety of (mostly bureaucratic) values and value statements it is 
interesting to see that there were also different interpretations or normative connotations of 
values and/or behaviour among various sources of public values. Values such as punctuality 
and accuracy (in bookkeeping for instance) or vigilance (in locating offenders or supervising 
subordinates) were, for instance, very important to the provincial authorities. However, to the 
tax officials the same value would often mean cumbersome paperwork or ‘red-tape’. Similarly a 
value such as efficiency (denoting aggressive levying rather than anything else) was considered 
important by authorities and tax officials alike but thought too rigorous or extortive according 
to taxpayers. Values could also be interpreted or explained differently depending on who was 
asked. Loyalty is a good example. Being loyal to the province or to the citizens of a town 
makes a big difference and partly shows that ideas of popular sovereignty or accountability 
were still far from the (tax) authorities’ minds in the middle of the eighteenth century.  
However, the fact that the Estates did heed some of the rioters’ calls for reform could 
be a sign that this too was about to change. The often invoked common interest (i.e., some-
thing bigger than self interest) shows, in any case, that public officials could no longer serve 
their own interests as before. In quite a general sense political corruption therefore meant not 
serving common interests but only one’s own. With office and person and public and private 
becoming more (although not fully, see below) disentangled, values such as accountability, 
loyalty and responsibility got reemphasized and often acquired a new meaning. The main 
reason for a change in moral attitude adopted by the Estates of Holland therefore seems to 
have been the combination of social-political and economic circumstances of failed reforms 
and economic decline of the times on the one hand and the efforts of a relatively small group 
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of reform minded administrators on the other. Social-political and economic circumstances 
opened the door to achieve reforms in the tax system in 1748 where someone like Simon van 
Slingelandt (1664 – 1736) had failed miserably only a few decades before (Wagenaar, 2004: 550, 
554). It enabled a limited group of reformers like Van Wesele and Vosmaer to devise new or 
reinforce old regulations. It also enabled them to ensure that provincial and local courts based 
their prosecution on (normative) bureaucratic characteristics. As such, popular protest in 1748 
triggered organizational reform and new morals. As new administrative layers were designed, 
new officials were instated and new rules and regulations were announced, reformers tried to 
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7 Princely Patronage and Patriot Cause  





In chapters four and five I discussed how the Patriot period of the 1770s and 1780s witnessed 
major attempts at administrative and moral reform. In this chapter I provide a second case 
study against this backdrop. I focus on the criticism the Patriots had on so-called ‘aristocratic’ 
practices of patronage, nepotism and abuse of office for personal gain in a system of Stadhold-
erly patronage that in many ways dominated the second half of the eighteenth century. In this 
system (discussed in detail below) the patron Stadholder placed clients in important positions 
to protect and further his interests. At the same time this often provided these clients with so 
much power that they themselves became patrons in their own right, often abusing their 
position for personal gain. In this chapter I will look at the acts of two such officials, Jacob van 
der Heim (1727 – 1799) in Rotterdam and Hugo Repelaer (1730 – 1804) in Dordrecht. 
A fair amount of literature exists on the system of Stadholderly patronage in the second 
half of the eighteenth century. First and foremost (although written in Dutch) the topic has 
been explored in great detail by Gabriëls (1989). Despite of this I focus on Stadholderly 
patronage for two main reasons. First, the cases presented in this chapter form an essential link 
with the other cases of this study. In the search for changing public values and perceptions of 
political corruption from 1748 to 1813, the Patriot period is simply not to be missed. Funda-
mental (administrative, bureaucratic and moral) changes occurred which, although also in part 
independent and ‘new’, can and should be linked to the previous struggle of the Doelists and 
to later events in the Batavian period. This does not mean that we are to deny the importance 
of the Patriot period on its own. We should indeed not regard it merely as a prelude to the 
French-Batavian period after 1795 (cf. Klein 1995: 3-4). Instead, I argue that in the Patriot 
period many of the squashed public values of the Doelists regained strength and momentum 
and that the following French-Batavian period was in many ways a final fulfilment or victory of 
those values. Second, Stadholderly patronage and the cases in this chapter serve to get a closer 
and more specific look – from a ‘Johnstonian’ perspective – at the political corruption of the 
time and the public values that were expressed. This is a valuable contribution to our current 
understanding of this important period in Dutch political history since the explicit focus on 
scandals and public values is obviously closely related to, but still different from, existing 
discussions on political culture and/or institutional system of the time (cf. Gabriëls, 1989; 
Gosses & Japikse, 1947; Klein, 1995; Van Sas, 1988a, 2005; Schama, 1977; Vijlbrief, 1955). 
Existing historiography on the Patriot period has, in other words, not spent express, direct or 
specific attention to changing values of public administration and perceptions of political 
corruption. Therefore, it is the purpose of this present chapter to find out in more detail (in 
addition to what I have already discussed in chapter  five) which views, values and perceptions 
were around in the Patriot period and how much change and/or continuity there was in public
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value systems. We should wonder, for example, if the period was about realizing new public 
values (next to reinforcing old ones) and whether there were any fundamental changes in 
assumptions of what government was or should be about.  
In the following I briefly discuss the link between emerging politics of the time and 
conflicting and changing public value systems. Next, I discuss the system of Stadholderly 
patronage in more detail as I focus on the (largely informal) system of recommendations in the 
province of Holland. Then, I turn to the two cases of Van der Heim and Repelaer. The critique 
on their dealings, the response they got from Patriot reformers as well as from their peers 
provide much information on changing public values and perceptions of political corruption at 
the time. I will end with an analysis similar to the other case studies of this book. There I assess 
the various values and value statements found, compare the sources of values and assess 
changing values within a wider (historical) institutional context. 
 
7.2 Emerging politics, clashing value systems and public value change 
 
Much like the other sub-periods distinguished in this study the Patriot period can be consid-
ered an important potential driver of public value change. We can hypothesize how the 
fundamental institutional changes of the time (those proposed and those actually put into 
practice) were not just about realizing, for instance, a new organization of town councils. It 
was also about realizing new ideas and values. Investigating change in public official morality in 
the Patriot period depends in large part on the emerging politics of the period. Baker for 
instance wrote how in eighteenth century France, political opinion became “the articulating 
concept of a new political space with a legitimacy and authority apart from that of the crown” 
(Baker, 1990: 199). For the Dutch situation (despite the fact that there was no ‘crown’) a 
similar conclusion can be drawn. As Van Sas (1988b: 18) stated, ‘modern’ politics were 
invented during the Patriot revolution of 1780-1787. Elsewhere Van Sas (2005: 223) wrote, “to 
many Dutch the Patriot period was a break from the past, despite the failure of the movement 
to gain actual power, that was of lasting importance. In the Patriot period the Dutch citizen 
lost its political innocence. He became ‘politically aware’, whether he wanted or not, regardless 
of his conviction”. In various publications such as the work of Van der Capellen and the 
Herstelling (see chapter five) a multitude of political issues were indeed discussed as people 
spoke of ideas and principles such as popular influence, representation, loyalty to and trust in 
government and the ‘right’ political system. 
I explained in chapter five how Patriot best-opinion offered quite radical new perspec-
tives on how public officials ought to behave and where their allegiance should lie. In many 
ways Patriot best-opinion tried to redefine the ‘political nation’. In this attempt political society 
was basically divided into ‘democrats’ and ‘aristocrats’. Patriot critique of aristocrats was heard 
everywhere and was exclusively used in a pejorative sense. The well-known Patriot activist 
Gerrit Paape (1752 – 1803) remarked how the term was an “iron hand grenade to each’s 
disposal” (Paape, 1798/2003: 46-47; op cit. in Klein, 1995: 228). Much like the term ‘regent’ 
nowadays (cf. Te Velde, 2005), it had become a term of abuse, basically referring to anyone 
who had any power over another and who abused that power in any way. Pieter ‘t Hoen, the 
writer of the important Patriot periodical Post van den Neder-Rhijn, distinguished between 
‘conscious’ (people with honest characters but without much insight and with many prejudices) 
and ‘unconscious’ Aristocrats (those who willingly deceived the people, limited freedom of the 
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press and favoured their own family and friends over others). While one could find both kinds 
in both major political camps of the time (i.e., those against and those in favour of a strong 
Stadholder), the worst ones, according to Patriot ideology, were surely to be found on the 
Stadholder’s side (Klein, 1995: 236). Israel furthermore noted how the Patriot terminology of 
democrats versus aristocrats was closely linked to the idea of freedom (2007: 14). This was 
again represented by Paape who wrote that freedom was always in danger from Aristocrats 
(and clergy) who knew how to manipulate the dependent, indifferent and ignorant burgher 
(1785: 9, 53, 55). Dependency would – incidentally – be a recurring characteristic of ‘bad’ 
government. The term Democrat on the other hand had a much more positive connotation 
and was frequently used by the Patriots to describe themselves. It certainly did not denote any 
actual influence of the real lower classes or populace (Palmer, 1974, part I: 331), but still meant 
more inclusion, participation, freedom and ‘popular sovereignty’ of a wider group of people 
than anything that had previously been proposed.  
The terms democrat and aristocrat were central to the Patriot vocabulary of the 1770s 
and 1780s and pointed, according to De Wit’s central thesis (1965, 1974), to the eighteenth 
century struggle between a powerful anti-Orangist oligarchic regent class of aristocrats on one 
side and pro-Orange democratic burghers, arguing for national unity, on the other. De Wit’s 
thesis of an unbridgeable social-political gap between regents and burghers has since been 
often criticised (cf. Klein, 1995: 227-230; Van Sas, 1980; 2005: 20). It is, in short, considered 
too rigorous and therefore unsatisfactory to describe eighteenth century Dutch social political 
reality since we can find democrats and aristocrats among both regents and burghers. While I 
agree with the criticism that De Wit’s thesis is too rough as a social distinction between groups 
I also believe this does not negate its use in marking the existence of two (almost ideal-typical) 
distinct political ideologies that potentially clashed in their visions of right and wrong, or 
corrupt and not corrupt. In this chapter these ideal-type political ideologies can therefore also 
be seen as two competing and clashing public value systems (cf. Van Sas, 1988b: 27) something 
that is discussed below as well. 
 
7.3 The Stadholders’ patronage as a catalyst for moral reform 
 
In chapter four I discussed how patronage and brokerage were unavoidable and sometimes 
essential ingredients to make Dutch politics work. Especially in the second half of the 
eighteenth century these tactics were increasingly employed in competition between different 
opposing parties in the Republic (Israel, 1998: 1092-1093; Van Eijnatten & Wagenaar, 2007: 
13). In chapter five I then discussed how much of Patriot best-opinion critique centred on the 
system of Stadholderly patronage of the second half of the eighteenth century. Essentially the 
Stadholder was a patron to clients. Sometimes (outside the province of Holland) these were 
called Lieutenant-Stadholders. At other times (inside Holland) they were simply called 
confidants (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: 232 for this distinction). Both kinds of confidant acted as 
extensions of the Stadholder. Notorious examples of Lieutenant-Stadholders were Andries 
Schimmelpenninck van der Oije (1705 – 1776) in Gelderland (cf.  Franken, 1997, 2002; 
Gabriëls, 1989: 185-190, 496, 499), the family of Van Lynden van Hemmen in the same 
province, Anthony Adriaan van Iddekinge in Groningen, Willem Carel Hendrik van Lynden 
van Blitterswijk in Zeeland, and Sigismund van Heiden Hompesch van Ootmarsum in 
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Overijssel (Van der Capellen’s powerful adversary in the latter’s fight against the Drostendien-
sten). Utrecht was in the hands of the infamous brothers Pesters. 
The Stadholder would use his confidants to select and appoint people in important of-
fices in various administrative bodies of the Republic. The clients would protect and further 
the Stadholders’ interests on a local level and did so by taking positions themselves, by handing 
out offices to others and by recommending people for them to the Stadholder (Gabriëls, 1989: 
1). Especially in instances where the Stadholder did not have any direct right (mostly in 
Holland, see below), a system of indirect appointment came into being. The Stadholder would 
in that case appoint people in office from a short-list (usually itself the result of a contract of 
correspondence) provided to him by a town council. However, often it became informal 
custom that the Stadholder was already asked about his preferences before the town council 
would make the short-list. In such a way Stadholderly patronage was dispensed in a system of 
recommendations in which the Stadholder, as Gabriëls noted (1989: 73), could actively prevent 
the recommendation of people he did not like and further that of those he did like. A recom-
mendation by the Stadholder was therefore essentially an appointment. The Stadholder would 
choose people based on the advice of his local representatives who provided him with 
information and made sure that like-minded (i.e., Orangist) regents would get the positions. In 
this system it was often near impossible to get offices without help from the Stadholder or his 
clients (Gabriëls, 1989: 17).  
Many Patriots were appalled at how the Stadholder gave offices to members of the no-
bility or to people from outside towns or provinces which – again – makes it interesting that 
Van der Capellen himself had once been such an outsider (see chapter five). However, to the 
Stadholder the system made perfect sense. Bringing in outsiders would increase their loyalty to 
him and would ensure they could act independent of existing relations or a shared past with 
older ‘native’ members of the local administration. The Stadholder would thus use outsiders to 
develop extensive networks of patronage throughout the Republic in return for which these 
men would gain power and wealth. The confidants were usually expert power brokers who 
were skilled in navigating fluent political lines using all means necessary to attain their goals 
and those of their patron. This meant that high scruples were often not required. To William 
IV and Anna of Hannover, at least, political convictions were hardly important for becoming a 
confidant. Past enemies could just as well get the job as long as they performed well (Gabriëls, 
1989: 235) and personal affection between patron and client seems not to have been much of a 
requirement (see on Van der Heim below). Also, lieutenants had money and power and used 
both to secure loyalty to specific patron interests (Blockmans, 1985: 236) as well as their own 
purses. Of course, as Gabriëls notes (1989: 153), money and/or power were not always the 
reason for helping the Stadholder. Ideological or political views could just as well be reasons 
for them to do what they did.  
Still, many confidants used (or rather abused) their influence in arranging offices for 
personal gain. As such, the system of recommendations often led to intrigue, abuse of office 
and nepotism. What essentially united most, if not all, confidants was that they distributed 
offices to friends and family, increased their wealth using their public offices and ignored or 
circumvented (collegial) principles of office rotation and seniority on the ‘shop floor’. Those 
who did not agree or were in any way critical of the Stadholder or his confidants were purged, 
given bad offices (that is: less influential and/or lucrative) or were otherwise bullied into 
submission (Gabriëls, 1989: 145-149, 152-153; Israel, 1998: 1082-1084). In Patriot opinion the 
confidants of the Stadholder displayed all sorts of ‘corrupt’ behaviour such as being haughty, 
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greedy, wasteful or selfish. For all these reasons the system of Stadholderly patronage and 
recommendations was despised by many in the Patriot period (Geyl, 1948-1959: 125-126). We 
have already seen (in chapter five) how Patriot best-opinion fulminated against it. 
In Holland the Stadholder and his confidants had less influence on local politics than in 
the provinces in the periphery of the Republic (Gabriëls, 1989: 17, 232; Klein, 1995: 141). 
Because of this the Stadholder was forced to mostly recruit his clients via the system of 
recommendations. While the Holland city regents had long been able to retain their ‘true 
liberty’ due to their economic power (cf.  Gabriëls, 1989: 66-67) even they were forced to bow 
to the Stadholder from 1747 onwards as he managed to put confidants in important Holland 
positions. In all eighteen Holland towns with voting rights in the Estates of Holland, the 
Stadholder appointed members of the town council based on short-lists. In the ten most 
prominent cities of Holland, the Stadholder furthermore gained the right to appoint people as 
alderman, mayor or in various other offices. Only some cities, such as Leiden, Haarlem and 
Amsterdam (Gabriëls, 1989: 73), were sometimes able to dodge the Stadholder’s influence in 
these matters. Other towns, such as Rotterdam and Dordrecht were not. In the following I will 
discuss two cases of political corruption of confidants in both latter cities to assess what other 
sources of values than best-opinion had to say on these matters. The two (highly similar) cases 
deal with of abuse of office by Jacob Van der Heim in Rotterdam and Hugo Repelaer in 
Dordrecht. 
 
7.4 Cases of political corruption 
 
The scandal surrounding Jacob Van der Heim and Hugo Repelaer is, as was the case in chapter 
six, affected by the problem that not all sources can always be found at the same time. The 
cases that follow are mostly viewed from public opinion and shop floor sources (and are also 
juxtaposed to the best-opinion sources in chapter five) and, generally, lack a view offered by 
legal codes. This is not surprising given the enormous surge in public pamphlet literature in the 
Dutch 1780s in which accused and accusers all had a share. At the same time legal codes, 
including bureaucratic ones, were difficult to find essentially because of the absence of a 
Rechtsstaat. Furthermore, the offences of the Stadholder’s confidants were only partly illegal as 
their functioning was often regulated by informal instead of formal codes. The complicated 
mix of formal and informal procedures and interpretations of whatever laws there actually 
were make the entire system quite ‘shady’ in a legal sense. In either case, the Stadholder’s legal 
rights to appoint people were not very clearly defined and open to interpretation based on ever 
changing power relations. Despite or perhaps because of this, neither Van der Heim nor 
Repelaer would be summoned to appear before court. Instead, both were booted out of their 
administrative bodies by opposition from Patriots outside and their peers within the town 
councils. While this makes the legal source a somewhat difficult one to take into account, it is 




Dordrecht was one of the Holland cities in which the Stadholder could recommend and in 
practice appoint people for offices. In Dordrecht the local confidant of the Stadholder had 
much power because the rules of seniority were not being obeyed. Instead of seniority, a 
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contract of correspondence (see chapter four) had been in effect since 1702 (Frijhoff, et al., 
1998: 26-27). The contract had divided the forty members of the town council in two classes 
of twenty regents among whom the various offices were distributed. William IV made sure the 
contract was kept intact after 1747 but only in form. In reality he would now confer with the 
ruling mayors (who were not members of the town council but chosen from among its ranks, 
according to the contract of correspondence) about who would be eligible for which office. 
The members of the two classes of the town council did not have any influence over this 
(Gabriëls, 1989, part I: 235; part II (footnotes): 521). As such, the confidant in Dordrecht who 
suggested to the Stadholder which people to appoint, was not bound by any procedures (such 
as the contract of correspondence). This gave him much influence and opportunities for 
personal gain. 
In the second half of the eighteenth century, two men competed for the favours of the 
Stadholder in Dordrecht. The first was Jeronimus Karsseboom (1706 – 1771), a former 
‘Loevesteiner’ who had turned into an Orangist with the events of 1747 (Gabriëls, 1989: 235). 
Despite his original political convictions Karsseboom was given the task of confidant by 
William IV and Anna to keep them in the loop of events in Dordrecht and to advise them on 
who to appoint for various offices. Karsseboom exploited his position for personal gain, at 
least helping out friends and family and acquiring many offices for himself. His actions were 
openly criticised by other Dordrecht regents after Anna died in 1759 (Gabriëls, 1989: 235-236). 
Foremost among Karsseboom’s opponents during the 1760s was Hugo Repelaer, a member of 
one of the leading Dordrecht regent families (Palmen, 1998: 212). He was member of the 
Dordrecht town council since 1756 and holder of various (highly lucrative) offices ever since. 
Repelaer tried to take Karsseboom’s place in the 1760s but did not succeed. For a while, 
therefore, Karsseboom and Repelaer were forced to accept some form of shared power. 
However, when Karsseboom died in 1771, Repelaer became the one and only confidant of 
William V in Dordrecht. He was the all-important broker between Dordrecht and the court in 
The Hague and made sure he acquired all the benefits that came with the job. Repelaer, in the 
words of many contemporaries (see below) was renowned for his lust to rule. He was alderman 
(1757 – 1758), bailiff (1766 – 1771) and three-time mayor of Dordrecht (1778 – 1779, 1782 – 
1783, 1794). Apart from that he was also Receiver of the ‘Convooien’ (the right to levy money 
by the navy from shipping companies for the protection of their merchant ships) and ‘Licen-
ten’ (rights imposed for the transport of goods to enemy territories) (in 1771), Dike warden of 
the Alblasserwaard and member of Gecommitteerde Raden of Holland (between 1775 and 
1777), member of the Court of Audit (in 1782) and Drossaard of Liesveld (1790) (Molhuysen, 
et al., 2008, part 4: 1140). 
In many ways, at least according to the Patriots and his fellow (excluded) regents in the 
town council, Repelaer was the personification of the typical Orangist confidant whose only 
purpose was personal gain and that of his close friends and family in the form of money, office 
and influence. In 1770, compare one of the pamphlets discussed below (Van Putten, 1782: 9), 
Repelaer supposedly appointed a friend as Receiver of the Common Means. In 1772, Repelaer 
has Paulus van der Heim (the son of Rotterdam mayor Jacob van der Heim, see below) 
appointed by the Estates General as second secretary of the Admiralty of Rotterdam.30 Since 
Repelaer and Jacob van der Heim were relatives (their wives were cousins) and both were 
Stadholderly confidants, this was sometimes (see below) considered nepotism (cf.  Gabriëls, 
                                                 
30 National Archives The Hague [NL-HaNA], Family archive Repelaer 1496-1940, 1.10.70, inv.nr. 20, appendix c. 
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1989, part VI: 522, footnote 534). Repelaer also asked the Estates-General for his son Ocker 
Repelaer (1759 – 1832) to be appointed as assistant Receiver of the Convooien and Licenten in 
1779.31 
Repelaer’s actions to recommend his friends and family for offices, his own collection 
of lucrative offices and his apparent complete disregard for such things as seniority and 
‘proper’ office rotation got him many enemies both within and outside the town council. His 
actions, according to Gabriëls (1989: 237), were among the main immediate causes of the early 
Patriot success in Dordrecht to abolish the system of recommendations in August 1782. As 
such, we could even say that Repelaer seems to have almost single-handedly kick-started the 
Patriot revolt. Somewhat surprisingly, Repelaer and his followers were allowed to remain in the 
town council afterwards. They refused however, according to some because the Stadholder 
would reward them handsomely for their continuous support (Missive van den heer L.V.J., 1782: 
4) which was indeed what happened when Repelear was reinstated as the Stadholder’s 
confidant in Dordrecht after 1787. Only with the Batavian Revolution of 1795 would he finally 
lose all his offices, after a career in public office of forty-three years. 
 
Public values from public opinion sources 
 
The actions of Repelaer led to agitation and protest from Patriots who expressed their 
opinions in public pamphlets. The decision by the Dordrecht town council to put an end to 
the recommendations was, for instance, hailed in the Patriot press on many occasions. One 
pamphlet provided two laudatory poems on the Patriot move to sideline both Stadholder and 
Repelaer. The courageous regents (two of which were apparently family members of Repelaer, 
see Missive, 1782: 12-13) valued freedom over treasure, honour over life. They withstood 
tyranny and were praised for their virtue, befitting “the grey-haired old man”, meaning in this 
case Johan van Oldenbarneveltcxxxii (Tweetal lofdichten, 1782: 3). Now, one of the poems 
continued, “bribery has been warded off, the chair of the mayors no longer occupied by 
flatterers. No slave bowing for favour and oppression will any longer approach the honourable 
council chamber”.cxxxiii The poem ends with an appeal to squash all the other ‘Repelaers’ in the 
many towns of the Republic.cxxxiv Clearly, Repelaer was seen as an example of a confidant. 
Interestingly enough this also signals how the Patriot movement was at heart a truly national 
movement in the modern sense of the word as the various towns and provinces were explicitly 
connected through a shared Patriot purpose. This, in turn, denotes quite a wide and relatively 
new idea of common good and public interest. Similar sentiments appear in another pamphlet 
and short poem. It spoke of the past in which lust to rule had affected cowardly souls by 
binding them to own interests with a gilded hand. The oppression that had resulted from this 
could, however, not survive as soon as the Batavian would awake to turn the tide (De herstelde 
vrijheid, 1782: 2).cxxxv Then “one would once again find men in the [town, TK] council, who 
choose wisdom over slavish honour, despite slander, jeer and defamation” (Ibid., 3).cxxxvi Most 
important in the poem is the attack against arbitrariness which is the result of the many 
machinations of patronage and nepotism. People appointed in this way have, according to the 
author, become “alienated from oath and duty”, have been muzzled and will stop at nothing to 
rule in an arbitrary way (Ibid., 3-4).cxxxvii 
                                                 
31 National Archives The Hague [NL-HaNA], Family archive Repelaer 1496-1940, 1.10.70, inv.nr. 20 
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Putting an end to the Stadholderly recommendations in Dordrecht as early as 1782 had 
repercussions for the entire Republic (see chapter four). The Dordrecht town council (for 
whatever partisan reasons) radically changed an ‘old’ practice and directly aimed to break the 
Stadholder’s hold over the city. The public attack on the system boiled down to some 
fundamental debates on representation, self-interest, public interest and ‘appropriate’ behav-
iour. Bad regents were to be replaced with good regents and this led to a discussion what both 
actually meant. In a pamphlet by Johan Bareuth, a Dordrecht preacher, fervent Orangist and 
moral authority of the day, this central issue is very well illustrated. The pamphlet poses a 
crucial question: if the regents of Dordrecht acted only out of self-interest (and the author 
expects they do), what does this say about their morality and principles? To Bareuth the 
motives of the Patriot regents to depose of Stadholder and confidants were not as pure as the 
Patriots claimed. He signals a difference between acting out of public or out of personal 
interest and he concludes that the Patriot regents act according to the latter. They are hypo-
crites who do not act on behalf of burghers or city but only wish to protect their interests or 
play a nasty trick on the Stadholder. Here – incidentally – we also find the idea of the Stad-
holder as a victim of political corruption rather than its cause. Furthermore, the decision to 
end the recommendations is, according to Bareuth, “useful and necessary in every way” (an 
interesting point to make for an Orangist!), to ensure that “offices are obtained through 
rotation and rank [i.e., seniority, TK] without paying heed to the recommendations of the 
Stadholder”. “But”, Bareuth writes, “the grand question is whether this resolution is brought 
forth out of self-interest to get a big piece of the pie since now everything is being taken by 
only a few people, and out of old spite against the house of Orange, or out of true Patriotism” 
(Bareuth, 1783: 3-4).cxxxviii 
Since self-interest, according to Bareuth was indeed the sole motivator of Patriot 
change, Bareuth could easily show the advantages of the present system, although with a few 
small adjustments. True Patriotism, according to Bareuth, was selfless and had to be ‘tested’ or 
measured by the first ‘constitutions’ in which the privileges of Dordrecht’s citizens had been 
written down. He was, of course, speaking of the restoration of the old privileges of the guilds. 
In a ‘conservative’ move, reminiscent of a demand once launched by the Doelisten (see chapter 
five) Bareuth argues how only the guilds have the actual right to appoint people in the town 
council and, thereby, in high offices. Both old and new Dordrecht town council (before and 
after 1782) are thus portrayed as oligarchies and both are rejected by the Orangist preacher. 
The new ‘Patriot’ regents, according to Bareuth, were no better than the old ones as all of them 
failed to protect the privileges of the citizens. They failed, in the words of Bareuth, to “live up 
to the great lesson of the conscience, do not do unto others what you do not want others to do 
unto you” (Bareuth, 1783: 3).cxxxix Has it, asks Bareuth, “been the consideration of duty to 
uphold the privileges of their cities or the self-interest, advantage and the urge one has to clip 
the wings of the Stadholder, to take from him what they themselves once gave to him out of 
lowliness or voluntary will (Bareuth, 1783: 4).cxl If the guilds, he continues, enjoy their rights to 
the fullest then all is right. But if they do not, let then these great Patriots, these champions of 
freedom, first remove the beam from their own eye before they remove the splinter from the 
eye of his Majesty” (Bareuth, 1783: 21).cxli He urges the Patriots to look at themselves first 
before blaming the Stadholder. They should, in other words, return power to the citizens and 
only then “shall they deserve the praise that true Patriots deserve”cxlii (Bareuth, 1783: 23). As 
such, Bareuth voiced a ‘public opinion’ (or is it a best-opinion’?) against regency in general. 
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This must have sounded great; both to an Orangist populace and Patriots. It is another example 
of how meshed arguments and ideas sometimes could sometimes be. 
 
Public values from legal sources 
 
Hugo Repelaer’s political career ended (for the time being) as a result of the 1782 decision to 
stop the recommendations. To assess any formal legal views on the case, it is important to 
restate however that he was not removed from the council but, instead, chose not to submit to 
the new regulations. Even though he was formally bound to the instructions that came with his 
office and could have been judged by a legal standard such as new Patriot town council 
regulations after 1782 (cf. Bedenkingen over het aanstellen van regenten, 1787) or by oaths and 
instructions (cf. Gabriëls, 1989: 269ff), this was not done. Only occasionally can one find any 
reference to the oath as a legal argument in public opinion pamphlets. Had members of town 
councils not, as one pamphlet wrote, “obligated themselves with their oath to uphold and 
protect the rights, privileges, interests of the people and citizens of their city?” (Intressant vertoog, 
1782: 3). The use of such legal arguments was highly limited. In any case, Repelaer was never 
legally charged with any criminal offence or summoned to appear before any court.  
Several reasons for this can be thought of, which on their own might provide at least a 
superficial view on the role and importance of legal codes in the case (and that of Van der 
Heim, see below). First, a court case against Repelaer might simply have been too difficult for 
the contemporary legal system to handle because Repelaer’s actions were not easy to brand as 
illegal. The system of recommendations in Dordrecht (and Rotterdam) was a strange mix of 
formal and informal rules and procedures and practices (see also below). Formally the 
Dordrecht town council had the right to recommend people after which the Stadholder would 
make a choice. In that sense some of Repelaer’s actions (getting offices for friends and family) 
had indeed been illegal because he circumvented those procedures. Yet the town council of 
Dordrecht had long since relinquished any real rights to recommend people to the Stadholder 
and had given the Stadholder (and his confidants) the power to recommend and in effect 
appoint people in its stead. In that sense the actions of Repelaer (and his fellow confidants 
across the Republic, see also on Van der Heim below) were not illegal or, in any case, very 
difficult to regard as such. Second, the fact that the Dordrecht regents had been forced to play 
the game of Repelaer and Stadholder made them, essentially, accessories to the ‘offences’ 
committed, an argument that was, as we have seen, also made by Bareuth. Seeing as the regents 
were essentially trying to regain power from the Stadholder to again hand out offices among 
themselves, any legal action might also be turned against them in the future. Third, not 
formally prosecuting Repelaer must have also been due to his social standing and prestige. 
Some people certainly were above the (fragmented) law. Court cases and criminal indictments 
against powerful officials such as Hugo Repelaer were uncommon in the Dutch Republic, a 
possible sign of both inequality before the law and a lack of ‘bureaucratic’ principles of 
administration. In 1782, Repelaer was still a powerful figure with money, connections and 
offices. Fears for revenge in the case of a possible return of his patron might have kept the 
other Dordrecht regents from formally accusing and prosecuting him. This was, in hindsight, a 
wise decision since Repelaer was indeed reinstated as confidant in Dordrecht after 1787. 
However, the absence of an actual court case, a criminal indictment or any kind of judicial 
review make it impossible to truly assess any public values from legal codes.  
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Public values from shop floor sources 
 
I now turn to the final source of ‘shop floor’ public values. It should be noted here that in the 
case of Repelaer (and the one of Van der Heim below), the line between shop floor and other 
sources of values is particularly difficult to draw. Most pamphlets are either anonymous or 
from an untraceable author, making it hard to label or categorize a source. Still, some sources 
can be called ‘shop floor’ based on interpretation of their content. In the following, pamphlets 
are labelled ‘shop floor’ for various reasons but mostly when authors display detailed and 
accurate knowledge of how things worked and/or constantly argue for reinstating the old 
system of correspondence and rotation (which was a typical comment any regent on the shop 
floor would make) instead of recommendations which they often found arbitrary. Also, 
documents are likely to be ‘shop floor’ when authors complain about the negative sides of 
confidant behaviour from the perspective of an excluded regent (such as harming his commer-
cial interests) rather than from the perspective of a disadvantaged populace. 
One such shop floor pamphlet focused on the convention of 1782 in which the 
Dordrecht town council regents had ended the Stadholderly recommendations. According to 
the anonymous author the town council had simply been forced to do so because of Repelaer’s 
actions. The author asked why the town council never halted the “arbitrary recommendations 
in giving offices”cxliii, since “Repelaer had done nothing else than betray the trust invested in 
him by the Stadholder only to get for himself and his family in the most illegal way the favours 
of government, proven by the number of functions he has gotten out of turn and only because 
of the favour of the Stadholder” (Missive van den heer L.V.J., 1782: 3-4).cxliv The use of the word 
illegal is of course interesting here since explicit legal codes hardly appear in this case. How-
ever, illegal is meant here as not following office rotation, i.e., waiting your proper turn. 
Repelaer’s ploy to get an office for his son Ocker (see before) is also mentioned in the 
pamphlet but now Repelaer’s schemes to try and get his second son, Johan Repelaer (1760 – 
1835) appointed as Raad en Rentmeester Generaal van Zuid-Holland (something in which Repelaer 
seems to have failed) was also mentioned. Repelaer had been so hell-bent on getting offices 
that, according to the pamphlet, “as soon as anyone gets sick this gentleman is ready to take his 
position for himself or his children, which is easy for him since the Stadholder has put his faith 
in him and believes no one loves him [the Stadholder, TK] more and will do more for him in 
the city of Dordrecht” (Missive van den heer L.V.J., 1782: 4).cxlv It is noteworthy that the 
Stadholder does not appear to be considered a guilty party in all this by the author of this 
pamphlet. Instead he is considered as much a victim as anyone else. Repelaer himself and the 
lack of action of the Dordrecht town council were to blame. 
The author of the pamphlet has good insight into the system of Stadholderly patronage 
as he then puts his finger on one of the main weaknesses of the system. As soon as the 
majority of the city regents become unhappy, he writes, the system starts to fail. It might have 
been a way for him to argue for the return of collegialism and rotation. This, after all, had been 
the reason why the original contracts of correspondence were so successful. They kept 
everyone happy in the sure knowledge that the spoils of government would someday be theirs. 
When that security disappeared with the increasing entrenchment of Stadholderly recommen-
dations, the foundations of the system were in danger. Still, the pamphleteer seems to be 
saying that having a Stadholderly confidant does not necessarily have to be a bad thing. It only 
becomes a problem when the confidant overstretches and thereby hurts rather than furthers 
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the Stadholder’s interests (Missive van den heer L.V.J., 1782: 5).cxlvi As an extension of the 
Stadholder’s power the confidant has to tread carefully between local city regent interests and 
Stadholderly demands and actions. They were often in a difficult position, having to maintain 
harmony between a large variety of actors (cf.  Gabriëls, 1989: 150-152) and Repelaer had 
according to the pamphlet failed to do so. He had not “used appropriate means to strengthen 
the harmony between Prince and government”. He had “ignored and thwarted all resolute 
decisions of the government concerning the troubles with England” to please the Stadholder 
but in fact had “treated the Stadholder with contempt”. He had “willingly failed to understand 
that the regents knew well how bad all this [i.e., finding a solution for the crisis with England; 
meaning the restoration of the fleet] would be for their personal [commercial, TK] interests 
but that they did this for the nation’s wellbeing (Missive van den heer L.V.J., 1782: 5).cxlvii  
A number of interesting values and value statements can be found here. Maintaining 
harmony between regents and Stadholder seems highly important, especially when compared 
to many cases of seventeenth century Dutch political corruption in which corruption essen-
tially meant not maintaining harmony on the shop floor (cf.  Hoenderboom, forthcoming; 
Hoenderboom & Kerkhoff, 2008). Also, the criticism that Repelaer acted selfishly and 
disregarded the nation’s interests is interesting. Repelaer’s way of distributing offices was, 
finally, also unbearable to the pamphleteer. “This is”, he wrote, “solely dependent on his 
arbitrary goodness, to get douceurs [gifts in the form of money, TK], instead of being 
dependent on the order of government [rotation and seniority, TK]. His authority is accompa-
nied by an unbearable haughtiness and contempt for his fellow regents, claiming to be a man 
without whom no office in Dordrecht can be acquired (Missive van den heer L.V.J., 1782: 5-
6).cxlviii Again we see critique towards possessing certain ‘bad’ character traits and not following 
proper (though not bureaucratic!) procedures. Regents are simply no longer able to know what 
is going on. All the order and regularity they had been used to (so consistent under the old 
contracts of correspondence) went out the door in the system of Stadholderly recommenda-
tions. 
We have already seen that Repelaer, together with five other regents, declined the town 
council’s offer to stay on as its members after 1782 (of the forty members, twenty-six immedi-
ately voted in favour and eight would sign later). According to this shop floor pamphlet, they 
did so because they “only had their short-term interests at heart, because otherwise they would 
see how the convention [to abolish the recommendations, TK] was good for the citizenry and 
the government because of the free deliberations it enables”cxlix (Missive van den heer L.V.J., 
1782: 7). The author suspects that the seven were only trying to hold out as long as possible to 
see which side (Dordrecht regents or Stadholder) would offer them the best deal.cl The 
recalcitrant regents – among whom was also Pieter Pompejus Repelaer, brother of Hugo –  in 
the end refused because of promises by Repelaer and (presumably) the Stadholder of future 
positions. In a sarcastic note the author writes he hopes that Repelaer “will keep his promise 
instead of keeping for himself a great portion of all these reserved offices” and that he will still 
have the power to dispose of them since the Stadholder must at some point realize that it had 
been Repelaer who destroyed his chances in Dordrecht (Missive van den heer L.V.J., 1782: 10).cli 
Then, the author unfolds his vision of the future government of Dordrecht, consisting of 
“delegates that feel subordinate to the responsibility of their principals, who have freedom 
loving feelings and display enough resolve to govern their city in accordance with the wishes of 
their able Pensionary” (this was Cornelis de Gijselaar, see below) (Missive van den heer L.V.J., 
1782: 14).clii The recommendations had to end to safeguard free deliberations because in that 
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system “even the most able, powerful and selfless regent will find it hard to serve his country 
when he is robbed of offices, that should have been his, by cowardly flatterers and courtiers” 
(Missive van den heer L.V.J., 1782: 15).cliii Interestingly, public values of delegation (of authority) 
and free deliberation had a very particular meaning here. To the shop floor regents this meant 
being free from the influence of Stadholder and his confidants and had seemingly little to do 
with popular representation or accountability. 
Similar sentiments reappeared in other shop floor pamphlets of the time. One pam-
phlet argues how Stadholderly recommendations and patronage had caused political power to 
move away from its original base, i.e., the cities and their regents. The pamphleteer counters 
the attempt at centralization apparent from the acts of the Stadholder and his confidants. In 
short, particularism and ‘bottom-up’ administration were under attack. The language is 
interesting as the pamphlet states that the cities provide the money and thereby form “the 
main nerve of the state […]. When this source is not pure then the entire form of government 
will be affected. When the central nerve is struck by disease, calamity must follow through all 
branches of government and its pernicious influence will be felt everywhere” (Intressant vertoog, 
1782: 4).cliv Here (as elsewhere, see chapter eight) ‘classical’ notions of political corruption – in 
terms of disease, illness or being unwholesome – reappears. It meant moving away (a degen-
eration) from a state of purity. The corruption of the entire body politic was caused by 
Stadholderly recommendations and the acts of his confidants “because”, the pamphlet 
continues, “those regents who obtained office through the Stadholder will not counter him. 
They will use their opportunities to indulge in their main motives of glory, lust to rule power 
and self-interest” (Intressant vertoog, 1782: 5).clv Any beginning to counter this state of affairs has 
to be reform on a city level since the town councils are the spring from which all other 
administrative bodies are formed (Intressant vertoog, 1782: 12). 
Another particularly outspoken shop floor pamphlet was entitled De legende van Hugo 
Repelaer (Van Putten, 1782) written by a man called Gijsbert van Putten. Van Putten does not 
appear as member of the Dordrecht town council or in any other official office within or 
outside Dordrecht at the time. Perhaps, because authors often wished to remain anonymous, 
the name was a pseudonym dedicated to two ‘Patriot’ heroes – incidentally stemming from 
Dordrecht – Cornelis de Gijselaar (Gijsbert?) and Cornelis de Witt, whose manor in South-
Holland had been in the town of Putten. These men would often (see below) be made to serve 
as symbols of good Patriot regents. De Gijselaar (1751 – 1815) was pensionary of Dordrecht 
between 1778 and 1787 and one of the main Patriot leaders and anti-Orangists of the 1780s 
alongside Van der Capellen and others (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 10: 309-310). Cornelis De 
Witt (1623 – 1672) had been a symbol of regent ‘true liberty’ and martyr for this cause ever 
since he had been murdered by the Orangist populace in the ‘year of disaster’ 1672 together 
with his brother, Grand Pensionary Johan de Witt (1625 – 1672).  
Given his criticism and what is supposedly his reverence for men like Gijselaar and De 
Witt, the author was someone close to or at least sympathetic with the regents even though 
Van Putten does cast his net somewhat wider than that. The pamphlet targets Repelaer in 
specific as well as the system of Stadholderly patronage in general as it calls upon the citizens 
to get rid of the Stadholder’s favourites by means of force for the purpose of the common 
good. They are to be replaced by those “not blinded by the glitter of gold, in whose soul no 
ignominy can be found” (Van Putten, 1782: 2).clvi Repelaer was, of course, one of those regents 
to be removed because of “the behaviour and character of this lieutenant Stadholder”, a term 
that was – incidentally – therefore used at the time as well. Several main (bad) characteristics of 
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Repelaer are emphasized in the pamphlet. First, there is his lack of caution, in the sense of the 
classic virtue of prudentia but also, perhaps, in the sense of adhering to shop floor codes of 
office rotation and waiting one’s turn. Second is his lack of courage, something which the 
author is sure Repelaer would never acquire beyond mere external display (Van Putten, 1782: 
3). Ever since his early childhood, the pamphlet continues, Repelaer’s language has been tough 
but his actions cowardly instead of illustrious with the result that his countrymen have had to 
stick up for him on many occasions when they did not want him to become a target of slander 
and contempt (Van Putten, 1782: 4).clvii Possibly, the author of the pamphlet was referring here 
to the fact that Repelaer had failed to overthrow Karsseboom in the 1760s. Repelaer was 
accused of not being able to fend for himself, which was arguably a desirable characteristic for 
a city administrator. Repelaer was also accused of adultery and having loose sexual morals 
when the pamphlet told how, in 1758, he “had married, after several previous love affairs, a 
loveable, virtuous and God-fearing woman”, but that “her piety was a burden to him just like 
his infidelity with two women had been a nail in her coffin” (Van Putten, 1782: 4).clviii Similarly, 
Repelaer’s actions vis-à-vis Karsseboom were a clear sign of the former’s corrupt nature. 
Repelaer, supposedly in a drunk state, once publicly denounced Karsseboom as a villain for 
which insult he was made to publicly apologise to Karsseboom (Van Putten, 1782: 6). This, 
according to the pamphlet, was the reason for Repelaer’s later lust to rule and his meddling in 
every affair. His antagonism with Karsseboom led him to want revenge and use every cunning 
trick or vicious fabrication to this end, “even under the pretext of serving the nation’s interest” 
(Van Putten, 1782: 7).clix 
Repelaer’s lust for offices was another main criticism as the pamphlet states how he is 
“known throughout the city as a true courtier [in the most pejorative sense of that word, TK] 
[…] someone willing to do anything to get what he wants, thereby forsaking oath, honour, 
duty and conscience”.clx The pamphlet makes much of Repelaer’s career and his machinations 
to acquire offices. It tells of how Repelaer in 1759, after having been a member of the town 
council only for three years (i.e., rules of seniority are out the door!) displayed “the greatest lust 
to rule and selfishness after the death of Anna” and “joined several members of the town 
council that were not pleased with the [city] government [i.e., Karsseboom, TK]”. Repelaer, the 
pamphlet states, used all the “scheming, intrigues or cunning ways that he knew of to get what 
he wanted”.clxi While Repelaer was unsuccessful at the time (because Karsseboom was still in 
power, TK) and the vast majority of regents did not submit to his unbearable lust to ruleclxii, his 
early attempts did already show his “seditious mind […] almost nothing could happen without 
him interfering and passing judgment with the greatest conceitedness (Van Putten, 1782: 4-
5).clxiii 
Van Putten continues by saying that with the advent of William V in 1766 the time had 
finally come for Dordrecht to submit to Repelaer’s political domination.clxiv Repelaer, “always 
worshipping the rising sun […] used all his influence to protect and serve the interests of the 
Stadholder for which the latter fattened him and his friends up, as long as there was no villainy 
they would not commit.clxv Repelaer’s political corruption, according to the pamphlet, 
therefore also became apparent from Repelaer being a ‘wind vane’ without backbone and/or 
principles. Furthermore, everything was done by him to get offices “without there being any 
chance left for the old regents” (Van Putten, 1782: 7-8).clxvi Repelaer was in this way being 
criticised for ignoring the old rules of rotation and seniority under the existing contract of 
correspondence. On one occasion (in 1770 according to the pamphlet) Repelaer, for instance, 
supposedly gave the office of Receiver of the Common Means (a lucrative office, see chapter 
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six) to one of his friends while then mayor Van Ouryk (lawyer at the Courts of Justice in the 
Hague and later Dordrecht and alderman and mayor of The Hague and later Dordrecht) had 
‘rightfully’ claimed this office, first for his son and then for himself (Van Putten, 1782: 9). To 
Van Putten, the case of Van Ouryk and the (supposed) dealings of Repelaer provides a typical 
account of machinations in obtaining office in an eighteenth century Holland town. It was 
portrayed as the kind of cunning and intrigue Stadholderly confidants were renowned and 
despised for. 
The pamphlet describes how Repelaer took the offices of Receiver of Convooien en 
Licenten and the Dike wardenship for himself in 1771, as soon as they became vacant (Van 
Putten, 1782: 9). He had done so despite the fact that Karsseboom had already stipulated 
(before his death) that his son would get the office of receiver and that Repelaer would ‘only’ 
get the Dike wardenship. For Repelaer, according to the pamphlet on account of his greed, this 
was not enough (Ibid., 9).clxvii At the same time Repelaer knew he had to tread carefully as “to 
ask openly for both such considerable offices could cause offence”. To avoid problems, he 
publicly declares the office should go to mayor Stoop who was himself a member of a long 
since established Dordrecht regent family (Palmen, 1998: 212) with, incidentally, close ties to 
the family Repelaer (Schotel, 1998: 15). Stoop wanted it for his nephew Van Puttenbroek. At 
the same time the pamphlet states that Repelaer, “against all traditions”, assembles a commit-
tee containing his friends and relatives and sends it to the Stadholder. The committee’s job is 
to ask the Stadholder if he would be willing to give the vacant office of Dike warden (which 
Repelaer already promised to Stoop) “to a capable person”. Apparently the scheme worked. 
When William asked the committee if they had any particular person in mind they suggested 
(of course) Hugo Repelaerclxviii (Van Putten, 1782: 9). Now Repelaer had publicly promised the 
office to Stoop but had secretly arranged for the Stadholder to overrule that decision in his 
own favour. He had shown his devotion to the Stadholder, had seemingly (in public) followed 
informal rules of seniority but had at the same time gotten the office he wanted. 
Van Putten seems to know exactly how things worked as he states that now “the Stad-
holder was confirmed in his belief to have found such an able and beloved man as his 
lieutenant Stadholder” and Repelaer “had the opportunity to show his love for the Stadholder 
to serve him by taking such a demanding task of Dike warden, a job that would only provide a 
few bags of guilders” […] and “this shows the extent of the cunning of a human’s heart, when 
one sacrifices everything to his own interest” (Van Putten, 1782: 10-11).clxix Mayor Stoop (the 
pamphlet reads) felt utterly betrayed in the meantime, especially since he had helped Repelaer 
to acquire an office (of Dike reeve) for one of Repelaer’s friends only two years earlier in 1769. 
At the time, Stoop had helped secure the office for Repelaer’s friend “in an unheard-of, 
unusual, yes to all utterly unknown way, completely going beyond any bounds of honesty”clxx 
(Van Putten, 1782: 11). This provides interesting views on what are essentially shop floor 
codes made public. On the one hand Van Putten writes that Stoop himself had ‘gone beyond 
all bounds of honesty’ in pleasing Repelaer. On the other hand, while Stoop had thus been 
‘corrupt’ himself, Repelaer had committed an even greater sin when not returning the favour. 
To Van Putten (and most likely to Stoop as well) it had been wrong that Repelaer tried to get 
the job in the first place but it was even worse that he had done so by going against all shop 
floor codes of collegialism, ‘regent’ honesty and harmony. Political corruption meant not 
honouring the codes of the shop floor which, simply put, said scratch my back if I scratch 
yours or as the pamphlet stated: one service is worth another (Van Putten, 1782: 12). clxxi 
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Van Putten then goes on to state that after Karsseboom’s death in 1771, Repelaer had 
“reached the top, and the entire city had to worship him and dance to his tune: should anyone 
have the courage to ask for an office without his consent, they would earn his disfavour” (Van 
Putten, 1782: 11).clxxii His lust to rule and meddling knew no bounds. Only his fellow members 
of the Gecommitteerde Raden (he was a member from 1775 to 1777) were, so it seems, able to 
outplay Repelaer and keep him in check. On a Provincial level he was therefore not as ‘capable’ 
as he would have liked to be which apparently made his reign in Dordrecht all the worse (Van 
Putten, 1782: 11-12).clxxiii Repelaer continued to hand out offices as he pleased to people he 
could use. Always, so the pamphlet reads, he ensured himself of future support in return for an 
office which many regents, being the “Judases” they are, happily did (Van Putten, 1782: 12). 
Van Putten also discusses Repelaer’s move to get the Stadholder to appoint his son Ocker (see 
earlier) as assistant Receiver of the Convooien in 1779 even though the latter was apparently 
still in school. Supposedly the Stadholder had in this way wanted to thank Repelaer for 
safeguarding the office of Dike warden (the one promised to Stoop) for the Orangist camp. 
When Repelaer’s credit in Dordrecht started to wane in the 1780s he was, according to 
Van Putten, ever less able to find regents who were willing “to sacrifice honour, oath and duty 
for their own interest” (Van Putten, 1782: 13). He could find ever less “nourishment for his 
dishonourable impertinence” (Van Putten, 1782: 13).clxxiv Among the reasons mentioned by the 
pamphlet were Repelaer’s Anglophilia and a general drop in revenues from commerce. Fellow 
regents were, in other words, less likely to put up with Repelaer’s scheming the more their own 
commercial interests dwindled. His disregard for the codes of the shop floor were also to 
blame, as were his continuous efforts to serve his own interests instead of those of the nation 
(presumably in the fight against the English). And so, essentially due to the hypocrisy and self 
serving nature of his fellow regents, Repelaer was ousted from power by the town council (see 
earlier) “to get rid of the yoke of such a tyrant, to be able to guard with force the wellbeing of 
the fatherland, their city and freedom and to restore their government constitution which had 
been so trampled because of cowardly compliance”. Now, the pamphlet states, “that salutary 
and reasonable objective can be attained that every regent in time is [should be] able to taste 
both the benefits and the burdens of government [in this way] they can prevent cowardly and 
lowly flatterers to keep offices for their own interest in fixed hands who thereby trample on 
their duty and oath” (Van Putten, 1782: 14).clxxv Essentially (compare the author of the 
pamphlet “Missive van den heer L.V.J”. discussed earlier) the author writes how it is in 
principle not wrong to reap the benefits of public office, as long as one deserves them. With 
offices “in fixed hands” the author meant, I believe, that they should be in the hands of the 
regent oligarchies and should be given to regents based on seniority and rotation. They should 
not be in the hands of a single actor. Here we see the shop floor self-interest of an excluded 
regent who wants things to revert back to the stability and security of the old ways.  
At the end of the pamphlet Repelaer is contrasted with ‘good’ Dordrecht regents in 
past and present. First there was De Witt van Jaarsveld (1696 – 1769), grandson of the 
murdered Johan de Witt (see earlier) in whom “composure and caution, bravery and wisdom, 
and honesty and unfeigned fear of God had always gone hand in hand” (Van Putten, 1782: 14-
15).clxxvi Second, there were (again) Cornelis de Gijselaar, Adriaan van Zeebergh and Johan van 
Berckel (two leading Patriot pensionaries of, respectively, Rotterdam and Haarlem). The latter 
is praised for being “a good soul, able, diligent, honest, firm or resolute and impervious to 
temptation”. On Gijselaar, the pamphlet continues, “you can count as on a copper wall. You 
would sooner see him lose his tongue than that he would harm the burdens [duties? TK] [of 
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office, TK] he has received only to please others” (Van Putten, 1782: 15).clxxvii Both De Witt 
and Gijselaar were furthermore praised for their incorruptibility or unimpeachable integrity. If 
only the government of Dordrecht was in the hands of such men. Instead, Repelaer and others 
did everything for their own interest (Van Putten, 1782: 16).clxxviii 
 
Jacob van der Heim 
 
Just like Dordrecht, Rotterdam was in the grip of the Stadholder’s confidants for most of the 
second half of the eighteenth century. In Rotterdam, Jacob van der Heim was the leading local 
representative and confidant of Stadholder William IV, Princess Anna and later Stadholder 
William V. Van der Heim was a typical example of a confidant. He was essentially the Hugo 
Repelaer of Rotterdam (as well as the latter’s relative as we have seen). He was undoubtedly 
selected as confidant because of the old and strong ties between the Van der Heim family and 
the house of Orange. Jacob’s father Anthonie van der Heim (1693 – 1746) had been Grand 
Pensionary of Holland and a staunch Orangist all his life. Jacob van der Heim’s first office of 
any significance was Secretary of the Admiralty of Rotterdam in 1746. This position along with 
his connections and family ties brought him in close contact with both Stadholder and his 
court in the Hague, which Van der Heim indeed frequented. The office brought him close to 
the Stadholder due to the latter’s interest in naval affairs since the Stadholder was General-
Admiral of the Dutch fleet and its highest ranking officer. Van der Heim was also close friends 
to the Duke of Brunswick (Gabriëls, 1989: 237).  
Gabriëls (1989: 237-238) briefly outlines Van der Heim’s career which was truly 
launched when Anna of Hannover disregarded the usual nomination procedures and circum-
vented the short-list of Rotterdam. In 1758 she gave Van der Heim a seat in the Rotterdam 
town council which he would keep until 1795. However, his first term as confidant ended 
quickly. When Anna died in 1759 Van der Heim was without a patron and his fellow town 
council members immediately excluded him from obtaining any offices in a quickly drafted 
new contract of correspondence. Van der Heim would be excluded for the coming seven years 
until William V assumed full responsibilities as Stadholder in 1766. From that year onwards 
Van der Heim would be confidant once again. In typical regent fashion, Van der Heim 
occupied an impressive string of legal, financial, military and ‘charity’ offices in, around and on 
behalf of Rotterdam during the second half of the eighteenth century  (cf. Unger, 1892: 563-
564). Foremost among them (besides his seat on the town council) was his position as mayor 
to which he was appointed by the Stadholder in 1766, an office he would occupy six times. His 
secretariat of the Admiralty also continued until 1795. Finally, but no less important, Van der 
Heim was one of the governors of the Rotterdam chamber of the Dutch East India Company 
from 1759 to 1795. 
Van der Heim must have been a talented confidant as he managed to hold on to power 
for roughly three decades. The fact that his name was apparently mentioned by the Stadholder 
as candidate of Grand Pensionary of Holland and, also, as clerk (or registrar) of the Estates 
General (cf.  Gabriëls, 1989: footnote 540 to part VI) might be proof enough of his talents. On 
the other hand it seems more likely that the Stadholder only threatened to give such a high 
office to Van der Heim because he knew of the opposition towards his confidant. Any 
suggestion that Van der Heim would really get such an office would have startled (which it did) 
the latter’s many opponents which would make it easier for the Stadholder to get what he 
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wanted. This can be deduced from the facetious way in which the Stadholder apparently 
proposed Van der Heim as candidate for Grand pensionary to Philip Jacob van der Goes 
(1728 – 1789). Van der Goes (cf.  Engelbrecht & Poelmans, 1973: 354; Molhuysen, et al., 2008, 
part I: 949) was one of the leading opponents of Van der Heim in the Rotterdam town council 
(Krämer, 1901-1918, I: 98). He had been one of the driving factors in the removal of Van der 
Heim in 1782 and the related decision to end the Princely recommendations in Rotterdam. He 
had also been removed from the town council as a result of his Patriot sympathies in 1788 and 
was, for all these reasons, the perfect man for the Stadholder to startle into submission.  
Van der Heim seems to have served both William and his own interests well and in 
Rotterdam, as had been the case in Dordrecht, his reign led to much (perceived) abuse of 
office (see below). In 1782, loathing towards him was mixed with political momentum when 
the Rotterdam town council, following Dordrecht, decided to end the system of recommenda-
tions. Here too, as suggested by Gabriëls (1989: 238), the behaviour of Van der Heim was a 
major factor in the town council’s radical move. They did not waste any time and immediately 
excluded Van der Heim and six other regents from obtaining offices by means of a new 
contract of correspondence. At the height of the Patriot movement in 1787 he was even 
removed from the town council altogether. Only after the Prussians restored the Orangist 
order and crushed the Patriot revolution (see chapter four) did Van der Heim return to 
Rotterdam to again be William’s confidant. In the end, the Batavian Revolution of 1795 
proved to be the final end to his public career. As French troops marched on Rotterdam he 
fled to Bremen (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part I: 1054) but soon returned to Rotterdam in 1796 
where he died in 1799. 
Much like Repelaer, Van der Heim used his special relation with the Stadholder to ef-
fectively gain control of the Rotterdam town council from 1766 onwards. His privileged 
position and the power, money and influence derived from his various offices enabled him to 
dispense patronage and make use of nepotism to get what he wanted. Van der Heim clearly 
knew how to be both patron (of officials in and around Rotterdam) and client (of William V) 
and was, all things considered, a powerful man. His nepotism and the fact that he disregarded 
proper procedures would be a main line of critique (see below). We have already seen, for 
instance, how his son Paulus had been recommended by his relative and counterpart Hugo 
Repelaer to the Estates-General to become second secretary of the Admiralty of Rotterdam. 
Jacob van der Heim had apparently left nothing to chance in this case. Upon his own ap-
pointment as secretary he already had it stipulated that his son Paulus would succeed him as 
(first) secretary when he died, making the office for Paulus a done deal.32 Repelear’s help to 
already make Paulus second secretary when Jacob was still alive and would obviously further 
such endeavours. 
Apart from critique on nepotism and circumventing proper procedures on the shop 
floor (see below) there was also a persistent, though as yet unsubstantiated rumour that Van 
der Heim had personal gain from his office as secretary of the Admiralty. The five Admiralties 
of the Dutch Republic were highly autonomous ‘semi-private’ organizations. They were 
responsible for equipping the Dutch naval fleet and its maintenance, waged the naval wars of 
the Republic and protected Dutch trade and commerce across the globe. They also adminis-
tered affairs on shore, such as shipyards, warehouses and arms depots (Groenveld & 
Wagenaar, 2011: 111, 122). Because of the importance of the Admiralties for the military and 
                                                 
32 Nationaal Archief [NL-NaHA], Admiraliteitscolleges XXXI Bisdom, 1525-1793, 1.01.47.21, inv.nr 161. 
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economic survival of the Republic, their high officials (which Van der Heim as secretary clearly 
was) were in a position to distribute and control offices, power and large sums of money.  It 
might not come as a surprise that Van der Heim was accused of illegitimately getting his hands 
on money meant for the construction of war ships by the Rotterdam Admiralty in April 1784. 
Gijsbert van Hardenbroek (a nobleman from Utrecht and representative to the Estates-
General who kept detailed notes and records in a personal diary of things going on in the 
Republic between 1747 and 1788) provides some information on the matter on several 
occasions. A first entry on 14 March 1783 (Krämer, 1901-1918, IV: 396-397) tells us how Van 
der Goes, in rather vague terms, told Van Hardenbroek that “money belonging to the 
Admiralty was given by Van der Heim and the master of equipping [R.F. van Staveren, TK] 
and that it had been more than fortunate that matters had not come to a head, because he, Van 
der Goes, hesitated to go and tell the Stadholder about Van der Heim, D’Escury [a much hated 
member of Van der Heim’s cabal in Rotterdam, TK] etc”.clxxix Apparently, Van der Goes had 
discovered something out of the ordinary but was afraid to tell the Stadholder. Perhaps for fear 
of reprisal. 
Unfortunately, it remains unclear who the money was given to by Van der Heim and 
his master of equipping and what “matters” it exactly concerned. However, a second entry on 
the topic in Van Hardenbroek’s diary (1901-1918, V: 218-219) of 7 April 1784 provides clues 
as it speaks more clearly about (possible) transgressions of Van der Heim. This time it is Paulus 
Gilles (1708 – 1792) (cf.  Krämer, 1901-1918, IV: i, v and V: 64, 557), Thesaurier-general of 
the union from 1769 to 1785, who complains to Van Hardenbroek about the quota’s of the 
various Admiralties. Gilles declares he wants purity and sincerity with regard to the finances [of 
the Admiralties, TK]. Van Hardenbroek recounts how Gilles says about Van der Heim: “he 
makes everything so obscure and confused, that it is impossible to make sense of things. I can 
achieve more with Bisdom [Dirk Rudolf Wijckerheld Bisdom (1740 – 1814), TK] in one hour 
as I can in eight days with Van der Heim who as secretary of the Admiralty has drawn 
immense sums of money from the accepted newly built ships, something he is not entitled to. 
From now on nothing should be done by the Admiralties without any prior communication by 
the Council of State, which would keep those bodies in an infinitely better order”.clxxx Gilles 
seems to speak of Van der Heim taking money (contrary to Van der Goes who said he gave 
money).  
Unfortunately Gilles is unclear about where the money went. Perhaps Van der Heim 
simply used too much money for the ships but it seems more likely that he did not use enough 
of the money that was he was given to work on the fleet and, instead, took some for himself. 
Truth is we do not know for sure even though some pamphlets (see below) point in the latter 
direction. What is clear, though, is that Gilles criticised Van der Heim for his behaviour. 
Similar criticism is found elsewhere too when Van der Hoop (cf.  De Smidt, 1996: 132-133), 
Van der Heim’s successor as Thesaurier-General in 1785, complains that he misses Bisdom (as 
Fiscal-Attorney for the Rotterdam Admiralty) because now he has to put up with the procras-
tinations of Van der Heim (Krämer, 1901-1918, V: 556-557) who was still its Secretary. Van 
der Heim therefore seems to have been criticised by Gilles and others mainly for his shop floor 
behaviour but the solution, to Gilles at least, was in part to be found in increased ‘bureaucrati-
zation’, i.e., better order, better communication and clear lines of responsibility and decision-
making.
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Public values from public opinion sources 
 
For his actions as confidant Van der Heim (like Repelaer) received much criticism from both 
Patriots and fellow regents. A short poem (Doornekrans, 1782) is telling for much of the other 
public opinion pamphlet literature on Van der Heim. It denounces him as the “murderer of 
the Batavians’ freedom and robber of their money, blood and honour. It is Jacob van der 
Heim, that fattened beast, who fears neither hell nor heaven, sold our fatherland to England 
out of a lust to flatter that Bacchus Orange”. It calls for an attack on Van der Heim “to break 
his neck and legs, to roll his fat belly through the mud, to feed him to the ravens as a bur-
ial”.clxxxi Another anonymous pamphlet (Aan den welgebooren, 1783) was addressed to Van der 
Heim, who was “of good birth but of bad character”. It denounces the patronage of the 
Stadholder and accuses Van der Heim of following the Stadholder to serve his own interests 
when it says “you risk your life for a drunken Stadholder but you must be senile if you think 
this will gain you the rule of this land”.clxxxii William V was – incidentally often portrayed as 
being drunk or with a bottle of wine in his hands. It was a symbol to accentuate his, supposed, 
inability to rule. In the end the pamphleteer promises that Van der Heim will be punished for 
his actions because that is “the reward for a traitor who dares betray the Netherlands [called as 
such, TK]”.  
The pamphlet continues saying that “to lead a man to the throne for a hand of gold a 
man who mingles with ladies and devious whores, whose wife so often sighs at that thought, is 
truly a villain’s work”.clxxxiii The obviously harsh tone of the pamphlet is testament to a kind of 
critique hitherto deemed unimaginable. To accuse a regent in such a way was daring and tells 
us something about the level of hatred some people obviously felt towards Van der Heim. The 
way it spoke of the Stadholder (implicitly at least) was also daring and for this reason the 
pamphlet itself caused something of a stir. In a reply (Scherpe nagalm, 1783) the critique towards 
Van der Heim was echoed but the (implicit) critique towards the Stadholder was fiercely 
condemned. William V, in the words of this pamphleteer, was only misled and blinded by the 
Duke of Brunswick. The pamphlet is another example of the complexity of the Dutch political 
situation in the 1780s. There were clearly (as we have seen already) those who viewed the 
Stadholder as a victim of corruption. The author states he “hates Van der Heim but loves the 
Stadholder with all his heart”clxxxiv showing how there were those who where pro-Stadholder 
but anti-confidant. 
Another pamphlet – entitled “The short way to authority and offices” from 1782 – 
quickly gets to the heart of the Patriot critique on Stadholderly patronage and Van der Heim’s 
specific role in it. The author provides an account of a dream he had in which he is walking 
along the various roads that lead to offices. The first road is via the court and its doorman the 
Duke of Brunswick, the guardian and later main advisor of Stadholder William V and key 
architect of the system of Princely patronage. On this road capability is not a requirement, only 
flattery and being a friend of the court (Het verkorte gezag, 1782: 7). The second road means hard 
work, honour and virtue. Throughout the pamphlet the author encounters and speaks to 
figures who tell him about the vices and virtues of government. Important virtues are valuing 
the interests of the citizens over one’s own (like a guardian watching over the interests of his 
pupil) and to teach them honour and virtue instead of obstinacy, haughtiness and licentious-
ness. In order to obtain offices, various figures hail the merit and qualities or capabilities that 
administrators should possess. A good regent should serve the nation’s interest, be conscien-
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tious and should not turn a blind eye to things to please the Stadholder. He should also be 
selected based on capability and should choose a clean conscience over the finest gold (Het 
verkorte gezag, 1782: 12-15). The bad regent, on the other hand, displays haughtiness, self-
interest, flattery, servility, toadyism and is bribed. A good regent, the pamphlet states, “is pure 
in his profession in that he is not bribed by gifts, by bags of English guineas to do something 
to the detriment of his neighbour”.clxxxv Van der Heim, D’Escury and Bichon again appear as 
the typical examples of bad regents. The author writes “then I saw three others, of which one 
was a fat man, he was Jacob [Van der Heim, TK]; a second one, that was with Van der Heim, 
wore a big powdered wig comme un pigeon [Bichon, TK] as the French would say; the third had 
on a riding cap or a Calot d’ecury [Collot D’Escury, TK]. This trio aroused my curiosity and I 
asked Fame [one of the allegoric figures the author encounters in his dream, TK] who they 
were. They are, he answered, men of name; they have stalled instead of used ships [i.e., harmed 
the interests of the nation in fighting the English, TK]; they have helped the nation’s enemies 
[England, TK] and ridiculed themselves; they are low souls who would give up a pure 
conscience  to obtain offices for their children (Het verkorte gezag, 1782: 10-11).clxxxvi Here we 
find a hint at possible bad government and political corruption concerning the sailing and 
equipping of war ships (see earlier) was squarely put in the category of pro- versus anti-English 
sentiment. Perhaps that was all there was to the accusation as well. As I said before, political 
corruption to the Patriots could simply mean being pro-English. 
Other public pamphlets address various bad character traits of the likes of Van der 
Heim. One pamphlet criticises Orangist regents, including Van der Heim, who are buddies 
with the Duke of Brunswick and give themselves offices and money. They are called (and we 
will find the term more often, see chapter eight), “chameleons [compare wind vanes, TK], 
changing their colours as often as they please” (Als't uw belieft een aalmoesje, 1782: 16-17).clxxxvii In 
typical fashion the pamphlet urges people not to trust these “men of ‘48”, meaning Orangists 
of 1748, such as Daniel Raap, Laurens van der Meer and Hendrik van Gimnig (see chapters 
four, five and six and note, again, the ideological and historical continuity between Doelist and 
Patriot movements) who are mentioned by name. To many Patriots these men symbolized the 
beginning of the end as their Doelist reforms had failed to bring change and had in effect only 
consolidated the Stadholder’s power (Als't uw belieft een aalmoesje, 1782: 13).clxxxviii Intrigue and 
flattery in order to obtain office are denounced as are bad regents (like Van der Heim) who 
damage commerce because they only serve personal interests and are on the side of the 
English. Perhaps the pamphlet is saying here that if Van der Heim had indeed withheld money 
meant for properly equipping the fleet and thereby protecting the interests of the Stadholder, 
then commerce might not have been damaged. Such a connection between bad government 
and decline in commerce and trade was often made. One pamphlet (Brief van een rechtsgeleerden, 
1784: 13) for instance notes the damage to commerce and trade when “arbitrary rule of a 
monarch, or of a few aristocrats is made to serve the most important interests of society”.clxxxix 
A final public opinion pamphlet launches in at the debauchery of Princess Anna and 
her court including confidants such as Van der Heim. Anna is turned into the Marie Antoinette 
of the Dutch Republic when the pamphlet states “when one surveys the good characteristics of 
virtue and wisdom in her [Anna’s, TK] person, then one sees they only pertain to pageantries, 
galas, lavish dinners and other playfulness, the effect of which will only be the effemination of 
the nation, further immorality and marred royal lustre that would put an unnecessary weight on 
the nation’s treasury” (Missive van een Haagsch Patriot, 1782: 3-4).cxc Such idle waste of money is 
then contrasted with the hardworking citizen when the pamphlet reads how “the good, honest, 
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hardworking and tireless citizen who is burdened with taxes while his freedom, goods and 
possessions are left unprotected” (Missive van een Haagsch Patriot, 1782: 3-4).cxci The confidants, 
called dependents and flatterers, join forces with Orange for their tyranny to work, “their 
boisterous nature and luxury make them look down upon the citizen as slaves and forget their 
equality. The more naughty these confidants are, the more able they are, and the more they 
hound people, chain them, and herd them as a flock of meek sheep” (Missive van een Haagsch 
Patriot, 1782: 4).cxcii  
It is not surprising that the people of Rotterdam are urged by the pamphleteer to follow 
the exemplary lead of cities like Dordrecht in ending the Stadholder’s recommendations. Now 
is the time to “dispose of cowardice and mend the infringements [...] the cause of most decay 
and misfortune has been, the carelessness and neglect of several affairs [...]”(Missive van een 
Haagsch Patriot, 1782: 8).cxciii Just as in the case of Repelaer the pamphlet contrasts ‘bad’ with 
‘good’ regents and here too, ‘bad’ Van der Heim is contrasted with “the masculine bravery, the 
loyalty to the fatherland and the unwavering steadiness of the able pensionary Gijselaar and the 
brothers De Witt who should be an example to others” (Missive van een Haagsch Patriot, 1782: 
3).cxciv In Dordrecht “people cheer and the names of De Gijselaar, the De Witt’s of Jaarsveld 
and other good Patriots are on their tongues. The smallest day labourer praises them, at every 
meal people from all ranks drink to their wellbeing” (Ibid., 6).cxcv Gyzelaar is depicted as “the 
best of good regents, who maintain property, freedom and the rights of the good community 
and their interests so well, so altogether creditable or deserving and so noble, which lets them 
be on such good terms with the community” (Ibid., 6).cxcvi Here, serving personal or commu-
nal interests are again juxtaposed. There is no doubt that this pamphleteer (and the Patriots in 
general) preferred to see the latter. 
The pamphlet is most direct about the ending of the recommendations in Rotterdam 
and especially about the role played by Van der Heim and his clique (cf.  Gabriëls, 1989: 
footnote 541). It states how Rotterdam, as yet, does nothing and “as soon as I mention the 
names of a Van der Heim, a Bichon, a Collot d’Escury, you will know the reason why; these 
cowardly dependents and gilded slaves [of the Stadholder, TK], who sacrifice civic freedom 
and burgher interests to caress their ambition and lust to rule, and especially Van der Heim is 
the disgrace and oppressor of his city”.cxcvii Van der Heim, the pamphlet continues, “this 
courtier, unworthy of the dignity of being mayor and being of low principles, is not bothered 
by the complaints of his merchants and burghers” (Missive van een Haagsch Patriot, 1782: 12).cxcviii 
By Van der Heim and his clique “everything is countered if it’s not according to his aims and 
he knows to overrule the majority of regents” (Ibid., 12-13).cxcix The author writes how there 
are still well intentioned regents in the city but they are overpowered by Van der Heim. If only 
Van der Heim would be gone, things would change. Then the good regents, “these once 
forced slaves”, would again behave like independent regents, protecting the interests, freedom 
and rights of the citizens just like they promised in their oath and duty to God”.cc Then “a 
forced majority [Van der Heim and his cabal, TK] would no longer counter the freedom and 
attempts at recovery from a good minority [those excluded from government, TK].cci Van der 
Heim’s politics of appointing people outside of ‘common’ procedures of the town council has 
to end. As long as Van der Heim is not stopped “Rotterdam and its merchants, burghers 
[referring to a social class, TK], regents and citizens [referring to inhabitants of a city, TK], will 
be disgraced by Anglophilia and dishonoured and humiliated in front of the free countrymen 
of Dordrecht and Schiedam” (Missive van een Haagsch Patriot, 1782: 14).ccii Again – just as in the 
case of Repelaer – being pro-English seemed to equal political corruption. 
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In rapid succession the author raises various interesting points. He has economic arguments to 
get rid of Van der Heim and clearly equates the individual well-being of merchants/regents 
(traditionally the backbone of a Dutch city, see chapter four) with that of the common good. 
On ‘proper’ administration the pamphlet says that it would be infinitely better when the 
citizenry would rule as with one voice, to counter a “lack of spirit, indifference being caused by 
ambition, lust to rule, self-interest, incapability, cowardice, narrow-mindedness, family interests 
and other such despicable motives” (Missive van een Haagsch Patriot, 1782: 15).cciii The fatherland, 
the pamphlet continues, now needs men like Gijselaar and Van der Capellen, “men who are 
true to their country, acknowledge their citizens as free and decent, and protect and serve the 
good community’s rights, privileges and precious interests, against all infractions, neglect and 
indifferent treatment, in a bold way, according to their oath and duty [...]. There are such bold 
regents and heroes who for freedom and citizens’ prosperity are willing to sacrifice everything, 
and will never allow people to be the victim of tyranny.cciv They will counter characteristics of 
bad administration, being (again) lust to rule, boastful and ambiguous behaviour, dependence, 
indifference, narrow-mindedness of judgement and addiction to a few [a cabal? TK]. Instead, 
they will (like Gijselaar) use “wisdom, tact, eloquence, courage and persistence, combining the 
virtues of Brutus and Cicero, comparable to De Wit in virtue, to Barneveld in loyalty” (Missive 
van een Haagsch Patriot, 1782: 30-31).ccv 
 
Public values from legal sources 
 
As far as values from legal sources are concerned, the case of Van der Heim has many 
similarities with that of Repelaer. Here too hardly any values or value statements from legal 
sources can be found. Van der Heim, like Repelaer, was not prosecuted for any specific acts of 
political corruption after he had been pushed out of the town council in 1782. His fellow 
regents simply made a new contract of correspondence and got rid of him based on Patriot 
public opinion and shop floor codes (see below). Van der Heim’s machinations in Rotterdam 
politics and even his alleged malversations with the sale of warships were apparently not 
deemed enough reason for any judicial review, undoubtedly for similar reasons as in the case of 
Repelaer. The fact that Van der Heim had been appointed to the town council by Anna in 
1759 in complete disregard for the usual nomination procedures had made his seat ‘illegal’ in 
the eyes of his fellow regents but this specific argument does not appear in the sources viewed, 
which leaves us without many legal points of view on the case from which we can deduce 
public values or value statements concerning the corruption of Van der Heim. While it was 
brought up in public opinion sources that Van der Heim had violated his oath of office (which 
can be construed as a legal argument) this was not part of any official deliberation. Still, what is 
interesting about the affair concerning alleged personal benefit from the sale of war ships is 
that Gilles (as we have seen) at least argued for improved bureaucratic control by the Raad van 
State. Also, the fact that any malversations by Van der Heim were in the end not investigated 
again points to a possible structural incompetence of the legal system to attack such practices 
from powerful Stadholderly confidants head on. This is, for instance, how we might interpret 
Van der Goes’ unwillingness or inability to notify the Stadholder.  
Eventually Van der Heim would still be targeted immediately after the revolution of 
1795 (see chapters four and eight) but more for ‘party-political’ reasons than anything else. 
Renting (1964: 275-277) tells us how on 6 January 1795 the Rotterdam town council charged 
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three of its citizens to draft a report on the whereabouts of former Orangist regents who were 
now in exile. They were also to execute plans already devised by the Provisional Representa-
tives of Holland in February 1795 to sequester the goods of those former regents. Van der 
Heim was among those targeted and on 6 April 1795 (while he was still in Bremen) the final 
decision was made to indeed confiscate his possessions. Only due to an appeal before the 
Court of Holland by his sons did he manage to avoid this. Instead he was forced to provide a 
sum of money for a new ‘loan’ to the Provisional Representatives. The move to prosecute Van 
der Heim, while legal in the strict sense of the word, was essentially politically motivated and 
did not constitute anything like a formal legal investigation or court case, not least because the 
investigation was, in the end, not even carried out. Van der Heim was simply being targeted for 
being an Orangist and having forsaken to do the right (i.e., Patriot) thing.  
 
Public values from shop floor sources 
 
On the shop floor, finally, there was some interesting direct criticism from Van der Heim’s 
peers – as we have already partly seen in some public opinion sources. One critic was the 
Stadholder himself. I already wrote how the Stadholder essentially used the idea of appointing 
Van der Heim in a high office as political leverage in his power struggle with some opposing 
Rotterdam regents. Apart from any such motives the Stadholder really did not seem to have 
been too charmed by his confidant, at least on a personal level. Van Hardenbroek (1901-1918, 
I: 91, 98; IV: 113, 125) notes, for instance, how on various occasions the Stadholder had told 
people that he did not really want Van der Heim as Grand Pensionary, mostly because of 
continued requests of his family for “one office or another” and because Van der Heim was 
“far too long-winded and laborious in his speaking and writing”.ccvi It was an opinion, as we 
have seen, that was shared by Van der Goes and Gilles. Gijsbert Karel van Hogendorp (1762 – 
1834) also agreed (cf.  Gabriëls, 1989: footnote 540 to part VI) when he apparently once said 
how “M(onsieur) van der Heim n’a pas les vues très-etendues, et avec beaucoup de capacité et 
de connoissances, avec un grand pouvoir sur lui-même, il a l’esprit rétréci, il est servilement 
attaché aux anciennes costumes et il paroît manquer absolutement cette générosité, cette 
grandeur d’ame, qui confondent la politique et la morale, l’homme d’état et l’homme de bien” 
(Van Hogendorp, 1866-1903, part III: 21-22).ccvii Van Hogendorp thus characterises Van der 
Heim by a lack of vision, narrow-mindedness and, tellingly, as being stuck in old ways. 
Furthermore, according to Van Hogendorp, he confuses politics and morality, or the states-
man and the good man. 
Van der Heim was not just contested in court circles. In the Rotterdam town council he 
was contested even more. Of course, we can easily deduce this from his removal from the 
town council by his peers whenever the political circumstances allowed for it (in 1759 after the 
death of Anna, in 1782 with the end of the recommendations and, finally, in  1795 with the 
arrival of the French). His unpopularity also becomes apparent from other statements written 
down by Van Hardenbroek. Van der Goes, as we know one of the local opponents of Van der 
Heim in the town council of Rotterdam and fellow governor of the Rotterdam chamber of the 
East Indian Company (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part I: 949), had, according to Van Harden-
broek (1901-1918, part I: 98), dared to complain to the Stadholder about the “far reaching 
credit of Van der Heim in Rotterdam, how he abused it, making more enemies than friends for 
his highness, as did Bichon and d’Escury, who pulled everything close to them, by which his 
Hidden Morals, Explicit Scandals 
 
170 | 
highness lost his influence”.ccviii Clearly Van der Goes wants the Stadholder to think about one 
of the negative effects of the Stadholderly recommendations, that his confidants could also 
become too powerful. Similarly, Van der Goes (Krämer, 1901-1918, part IV: 433) had tried 
(but failed) to explain to the Stadholder how some in the Rotterdam town council were against 
Van der Heim, but that they did not know how to tell the Stadholder.ccix Again we see the a 
pro-Stadholder but anti-confidant stance on the shop floor. 
Another view from the shop floor is offered by some investigations that were launched 
by the Patriot Provisional Representatives of Holland in 1796 into the dealings of the Orangist 
regents of the past eight years. Much like the other prosecution of Van der Heim in 1795 (see 
earlier) this was a politically motivated move on the part of the Batavians to prosecute their 
former adversaries. This time a group of  twenty-nine members of the so-called Committee to 
investigate the political and financial behaviour of the members of the previous administration in Holland were 
charged by the Provisional Representatives from 14 April 1795 until 28 January 1796 (when it 
was replaced by a new committee that worked until 28 June 1796) to try and deal with any 
(Orangist) regent wrongdoing in the past (cf. Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 22: 23-24). 
While the committee presented a report on 15 May 1796, it did not generate any results 
(Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 5: 415-416), mostly because both committees were essentially 
shut down prematurely and a real investigation never got off the ground. Its members, among 
whom Gerrit Paape (the new Patriot leader in Dordrecht) and Reinier Leendert Bouwens 
(1755 – 1798) were, however, highly disappointed and would openly criticise the decision to 
stop the investigation.  
Especially Bouwens seems to have had an axe to grind. This former Patriot regent from 
Amsterdam had been dismissed after the Orangist crackdown of 1787. He had been banned 
from the province of Holland for his attempt to stop the Prussian army from entering 
Amsterdam, by inundating land around the city even after the official decision had been made 
not to resist the Prussian troops. He thus became one of the many Patriot emigrants in France 
who returned in 1795, making his motives for investigating the Orangists who had banned him 
at least dubious. At the very least, this explains his outright anger at the decision to stop the 
investigations. The publicised thoughts of Bouwens on the matter provide interesting shop 
floor perspectives. Bouwens (1797: 33-34) for instance focuses on the Fourth Anglo-Dutch 
war and blames the “most scandalous management during the war, and the neglect of the navy 
of the state which they [the Orangist regents, TK] should have been maintained in a respect-
able way, as the preservation of our commerce is the foremost source of our common-
wealth”.ccx Van der Heim is then made into an example of this behaviour. As one of the 
governors of the East Indian Company of Rotterdam, the “now fugitive Secretary Van der 
Heim” was, again, accused of neglecting the fleet in favour of Orangist (i.e., pro-English) 
interests.  
Van der Heim was held responsible for putting out to sea two ships (one commercial 
and one military) which “could have been saved if only they [Van der Heim, TK] had wanted 
it. Instead they chose, that is premeditated, to let these ships fall into the hands of the 
English”.ccxi Van der Heim had deliberately failed to use common sense to serve his pro-
English point of view. “This story”, Bouwens continues, “serves to show how the former 
regents openly favoured that pernicious system to help England […].ccxii Such accusations 
launched at Van der Heim for neglecting the fleet are interesting in relation to the accusations 
of profiting ‘personally’ from his work as Secretary of the Admiralty in dealing with (not) 
equipping the fleet Perhaps, as was the case in some public-opinion views on the matter, 
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personal profit had a more ideological meaning here: i.e., not harming the Stadholder’s 
relations with the English and not protecting the traditional commercial interests of the 
(Rotterdam) regents. 
 
7.5 Analysis and concluding remarks 
 
In the following I offer a brief synopsis of the main values and value statements found in the 
case. Then I provide an analysis of the main lines of arguments and the found values and value 
statements through a comparison of the different sources of values. Finally I will address 
questions of change and continuity of public values and perceptions of political corruption in 
the context of wider institutional developments in the Patriot period. 
 
Public values and value statements in the case 
 
The scandal of this chapter offers an extensive amount of public values and value statements 
with which public official behaviour was condemned or supported. While, interestingly, the 
actual word corruption has not been encountered in any of the sources, there were many terms 
to describe instances which we can, for practical purposes at least, label as such. On a very 
rudimentary level, we can find many personal characteristics that public officials should or 
(more often) should not possess. When taken together both positive and negative characteris-
tics provide quite a detailed picture of the ‘ideal’ public official. Good ones should, most 
notably, have a clean conscience and a good soul and be impervious to temptation. They 
should be diligent, eloquent, persistent or firm, bold, brave and courageous and at the same 
time be honest, reasonable, resolute, resolved, sincere, composed, conscientious, pious, 
cautious or prudent. Another important value (at least on the shop floor, see below) was 
maintaining harmony among the group of regents by following old procedures of rotation and 
seniority. Next to such positive statements and values we can find a string of negative ones. 
Foremost among them are being a courtier, a flatterer, a coward or someone with loose sexual 
morals. Such pejorative terms (compare also self-interest, degeneration, monarchy and slavery) 
were used to analyze and describe the political reality of the second half of the eighteenth 
century (cf. Klein, 1995: 149) and were juxtaposed with positive terms such as patriot, virtue, 
unity, republic and freedom. This was, of course, in line with general Patriot (best-opinion) 
ideology that considered the royal pretensions of the Stadholder as being a foreign element in a 
Republic, which could only lead to haughtiness, lust to rule, extravagance and wasteful 
behaviour. Other negative values and value statements included being boastful, boisterous, 
conceited, deceitful, dishonourable, indifferent, long-winded, meddling, narrow-minded, 
obstinate, seditious and/or scheming. 
 
Comparing sources of values 
 
Further analysis allows us to discuss public values in part based on the source of values in 
which they were uttered. Criticism against Stadholderly patronage and recommendations in 
general and against men like Repelaer and Van der Heim in particular, clearly allowed a 
complex variety of groups to present their arguments, protect their interests and argue with 
those who disagreed. Various groups in the Patriot period (in part representing different 
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sources of values) opposed each other on a number of fundamental administrative, political 
and moral issues. Between and within the various sources or ‘groups’ that were represented in 
the case, there were often different voices and arguments to be heard. Still, some coherent and 
persistent lines of argument can be distinguished if only because regents sometimes seemed to 
accuse each other of similar bad practices but as soon as they were in power all this was 
forgotten and they committed similar ‘crimes’. 
A first set of characteristics of bad – i.e., corrupt – government was mainly about arbi-
trary and therefore uncontrollable rule. It was a criticism with various meanings depending on 
context. On the shop floor it meant that Stadholder, confidants and their cabals were able to 
do as they pleased without consultation and were able to exclude some from office. Excluded 
fellow regents were not happy about Repelaer and Van der Heim because they disregarded the 
principle of harmony, i.e., existing formal and informal procedures and regulations such as 
contracts of correspondence and rotation via seniority. Circumventing these procedures and 
regulations meant that Stadholder, confidants and their cabals fundamentally disrupted long 
established ways of maintaining harmony between, first, competing groups in city and/or 
provincial governments and, second, between city and provincial governments and Stadholder. 
In shop floor regent opinion, the core of Dutch political organization – characterised by 
collegialism, particularism and compromise (see chapter four) – was therefore threatened by 
the illness or disease of political corruption and bad government. They believed that free 
deliberation (mentioned as such and referring to collegial practices) was better than bundling 
power in one person or only a few people and that offices should be given to people who have 
a right to them (i.e., through seniority and rotation). This meant, as mentioned earlier, that on 
the shop floor, values such as free deliberation and delegation of authority had little to do with 
popular representation and/or participation and accountability to ‘the people’ as Patriot best-
opinion, for instance, suggested. Instead the shop floor regents wanted to return to ‘true 
liberty’ and be free from the influence of Stadholder and his confidants. 
Best- and public opinion seemed to agree with this shop floor stance against violating 
old administrative principles or mechanisms, but for different reasons. Both sources cast a 
wider net as best- and public opinion considered breaking old procedures as detrimental to the 
general political and communal well-being of the Republic. They saw contracts of correspon-
dence, seniority and rotation as leading to oligarchy, closed-off politics and arbitrary rule. Best- 
and public opinion, then, took the shop floor argument against Stadholderly patronage and 
recommendations one crucial step further as the shop floor still regarded these mechanisms as 
crucial for maintaining harmony among the regent group (compare the forthcoming disserta-
tion of Michel Hoenderboom on the period 1650 – 1750). Public and best- opinion, however, 
saw these mechanisms increasingly as detrimental to ‘community’ well-being. They did not care 
about preserving regent oligarchy and this, I argue, is were morality on the shop floor and in 
best- and public opinion fundamentally clashed. On the shop floor the once excluded regents 
simply wanted to go back to the stability and security of the old ways. There were no calls for 
such things as participation, popular sovereignty or bureaucratization. This led best- and public 
opinion sources to state that the Stadholder, his clique and the regents with their ‘true liberty’ 
had all paralyzed the political system.  
A second set of characteristics of ‘bad’ (corrupt) government was mainly about de-
pendence – expressed through flattery and servitude – on personal interests in patron-client 
relationships. Again there is a distinction between shop floor sources and the other two (legal 
sources not taken into account for reasons mentioned). To excluded regents on the shop floor 
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being dependent on either Stadholder or confidant was a bad thing because it made you 
submissive (a term used as such) to another’s views and demands. This, so it seems, was 
regarded as the end (the corruption) of regent ‘true liberty’. Yet, here too, the other sources 
cast a wider net. There, dependence on anything other than the community, public interest or 
the nation’s well-being (all terms used as such) was a bad thing. To best- and public opinion, 
dependence of regents on Stadholder, confidants and each other meant that the interests of the 
people or the wider community were no longer served. This is visible, for instance, in the 
thought of Van der Capellen – in the end the most prominent Patriot best-opinion ideologue – 
who saw ‘aristocratic morality’ as the complete subjugation to the Stadholder’s whims; a 
morality that consisted of pleasing him only for personal gain  (cf. Klein, 1995: 144; Zwitzer, 
1987: 52). 
As such, in this second ‘set’, public values emerged that dealt with an elementary dis-
tinction between serving public and private interests, whereby the latter could (according to 
shop floor) or could not (according to best- and public opinion) interfere with the execution of 
a public office. On the shop floor, after all, a certain amount of self serving (sharing in the 
spoils of administration) was perfectly acceptable and even believed to be a prerequisite for 
proper administration. In best- and public opinion, on the other hand, serving one’s own 
(financial or social) interests was wrong whichever way you looked at it. It meant, simply put, 
that administrators were not performing their duties and were quite simply traitors to the 
common good only to make some money. To best- and public opinion self-interest was solely 
used as a pejorative term and was constantly juxtaposed to complementary terms such as the 
common good, the nation’s interest, the nations’ well-being or the (good and hard working) 
community. Selfish ‘tyranny’, ‘wallowing in luxury’ and ‘lust to rule’ were simply juxtaposed to 
the supposed altruism of good government by men like Gijselaar, De Witt and/or Oldebarne-
velt who became symbols of public officials loyal to nation, society, fatherland and the 
interests of the people.  
This fundamental distinction between the sources of values on public and private inter-
ests and a more narrow or a wider net also becomes apparent from different views on an 
‘Anglophile attitude’. This was condemned on shop floor and in public- and best-opinion but 
again for different reasons. The shop floor seemed to worry more about the apparent failure of 
Van der Heim to properly equip ships because of its effect on their own personal, commercial, 
interests. The other sources (again) debated such an issue in wider terms of harming public 
interests and the common good. Finally, self-interest could sometimes mean nepotism. Here 
too a distinction between sources can be made. While several public opinion pamphlets did not 
consider handing out offices to family members to be acceptable, the issue seems not to have 
been raised on the shop floor at all. 
 
Change and continuity of public values and perceptions of political corruption 
 
When we survey the case some questions concerning change and continuity of public values 
and perceptions of corruption still need to be discussed. First there is the question whether the 
vocabulary that was used was new or, rather, consisted of similar elements with new or 
reemphasized meaning. As Broersma (2005: 225) noted, many terms and accusations were of 
course politically motivated. Patriots purposefully used a quickly evolving political press and 
arena of public opinion to rally support. At the same time Patriot ideals of administrative 
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reform (and perceptions of political corruption?) were to a large extent sincere; so much so 
that, as Schama put it (1977: 102), their major liability was “their unheeding attachment to the 
letter and the spirit of those ideas [such as representative government and popular political 
participation, TK], which diluted the concentration of their strength and compromised the 
effectiveness of their organization”. Their ideals and values were also either new or reempha-
sized. Emphasis on community, common good, public interest, representation and account-
ability were certainly more prominent than before and sometimes gained new meaning. The 
Patriot concept of community and with it ideas on political corruption seem, for instance, to 
have been wider than those held by the Doelists before. The novelty of the Patriot political 
ideology (mostly expressed in best- and public opinion) becomes apparent from the fact that 
their ideas were considered completely alien to existing administration. This we can deduce 
from the simple fact that Orangist adversaries such as Elie Luzac (cf.  Velema, 1992, 1993) or 
R.M. van Goens (see for Van Goens’ political thought Klein, 1995: 197-206) claimed that the 
Patriots had, in the words of Israel (2007: 15), “totally subverted the true Dutch constitution, 
past and present, by dragging in wholly extraneous abstract principles”. Strong opposition 
from Orangists as well as the shop floor and the failure (ironically!) of any of the Patriot 
measures to really take effect, also in part show the novelty of Patriot ideology. 
A second and related question is whether any of this new or reemphasized language re-
flected a real change in moral attitude in the Patriot period. On a practical level of changing 
morality in town councils and provincial governing bodies, the Patriot cause does not appear 
to have had much lasting effect. Some cities witnessed a temporary changing of the guard 
around 1782 and 1787 – such as in Dordrecht and Rotterdam, but also the new Patriot town 
council in a city like Utrecht (cf. De Bruin, 1986) – but this was not translated in much moral 
change. Many (if not all?) of these new or purged town councils continued with established 
practices and ‘old’ ways. This is because, as we have seen, practices such as rotation, seniority, 
patronage and nepotism were still not considered to be bad things on the shop floor as long as 
all regents would benefit. It is also because the legal system was not willing or able to control 
or curb this shop floor attitude.  
On a more ideological (best- and public opinion) level, however, the cases above cer-
tainly show a more lasting change in moral attitude. These sources of values increasingly 
considered ‘old’ ways of doing things to be unacceptable. In this way Patriot ideology proved 
to be a crucial contribution to the later reforms of the French-Batavian era after 1795. Between 
the two periods there was indeed a “genuine continuity of ideas and practice” (Schama, 1977: 
68). The Patriots of the 1780s (many of whom would after all later be Batavians, see chapters 
four, five and eight) did in fact lay the groundwork for a lasting public value system in and 
following the French-Batavian era. 
When we acknowledge that established practices were indeed fundamentally questioned 
by certain parties and that there was a fundamental difference between various sources of 
values, a third and final question arises. In ‘Johnstonian’ terms, the question is whether we see 
a clash of different value systems and whether we can see that some sources of values were 
more potent drivers of public value change? A first obvious thing to notice is the lack of any 
public values from legal sources. The absence of legal codes (i.e., the fact that men like Van der 
Heim and Repelaer were not subjected to any form of judicial action) might show that legal 
codes lagged behind the codes in other sources. While undoubtedly also due to the kind of 
scandal, specific circumstances of legal inequality and an unfortunate lack of material, it is also 
a sign of a blurred boundary between formal (bureaucratic) and informal (face-to-face or shop 
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floor) rules and practices of the time and of the absence of – as mentioned – a Rechtsstaat. This, 
I argue, is corroborated by a striking general lack of legal values (consider justice, equality or 
‘due process’) in any of the other three sources. Apart from a few very general ‘bureaucratic’ 
statements (such as neutrality or adherence to oath and instruction) they simply did not seem 
to play any significant role. This is important as the apparent absence of legal codes from 
which to deduce any moral arguments is proof of the fact that strictly legal definitions of 
political corruption are not always feasible or useful. It also proves the use of the heuristics of 
this current study in that it also allows us to see what is not there.  
The lack of interest from all parties in bureaucratic measures to counter political cor-
ruption is also revealing. Whereas best-opinion (compare the Herstelling discussed in chapter 
five) and, occasionally, public opinion did make a case for bureaucratic measures, these were 
hardly represented in shop floor sources. This means that high ranking officials as Van der 
Heim and Repelaer were not really embedded in any bureaucratic structures of discipline and 
control, something that seems to have changed in the Batavian period (see chapter eight). 
Finally, a lack of references to religious views by the various sources is interesting as well. Not 
even the preacher Bareuth used references to the bible or religion when he argued his case for 
reform. With legal and/or bureaucratic and religious values (in a way) ruled out, this still leaves 
us with other sources. First, the codes of the shop floor seemed to have been crucial in 
‘conservative’ efforts to keep to old and mostly informal values, rules and regulations. This 
shows a remarkable resemblance to many cases from the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
century (cf. Hoenderboom, forthcoming) in which debates were equally about maintaining 
harmony on the shop floor as the all-important rule to uphold. Yet, one of the most interesting 
things about the cases discussed in this chapter is that the sources of best- and public opinion 
(indeed due to their growing importance in the period) now became truly dominant drivers of 
value change and started to offer crucially different views as opposed to the shop floor. There 
emerged ethical monism, a concept I will explore in greater detail in chapters eight and nine. 
Both best- and public opinion sources fundamentally questioned and disrupted the continuity 
of administrative practices and existing morality of maintaining harmony on the shop floor. If 
we have to describe this clash of value systems in any way perhaps the terms ‘aristocratic’ 
(meaning regent shop floor) and ‘democratic’ (meaning best- and public opinion) are not so 
bad after all. In the next chapter we will see just how these old ‘aristocratic’ practices would be 
fundamentally tossed aside, precisely as a result of major political, democratic and bureaucratic 
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In chapter four I discussed the main changes in the organization of the state in the French-
Batavian period (1795 – 1813). These changes led to a government that increasingly consisted 
of strong central or national and weaker provincial and more local institutions. They also led to 
more ‘top-down’ rather than ‘bottom-up’ administration. The beginnings of what is sometimes 
referred to as a ‘Napoleonic’ system of administration (cf. Lok, 2009; Van der Meer & 
Raadschelders, 1995; Peters, 2008; Wunder, 1995) would lead to increased bureaucratization 
and professionalization of the civil service and, eventually, to more government activity for a 
wider public sphere. The period also brought increased politicization and a changing political 
culture. Among the public values promoted by the Batavians were (limited) popular sover-
eignty, representative government, accountability and public responsibility. The fundamental 
institutional changes of the period were thus about more than new structures or organizations. 
They also included public values.  
For the French-Batavian period most attention has traditionally been directed towards 
the introduction of new institutions such as constitution and parliament. The underlying public 
values have been somewhat neglected. This is a missed opportunity since we can easily 
hypothesize how the fundamental changes of the period were also about new public values, 
about new assumptions of what government was or should be, and about new views on how 
public officials ought to behave. Because changes in values are inherently linked to changes in 
structures and institutions, this period – much like the periods around 1748 (chapter six) and 
around the 1780s (chapter seven) – can easily be viewed as an important driver of public value 
change. In this eighth chapter I discuss a scandal in the context of the dramatic events during 
the first years of the Batavian Republic. In the wake of the two coups d’état in January and 
June of 1798 (see chapter four) a ‘parliamentary’ investigation was launched by the moderates 
of June into the actions and morals of some January radicals. The result was a scandal 
involving bribery, high treason and the misappropriation of public funds for private benefit in 
a period when many already called for improving the morals of a nation thought to be in 
serious (economic, military and moral) decline (see chapter five and compare a large amount of 
moralist Spectator literature. See Hartog, 1872; Buijnsters, 1991: 32; Van Gemert & 
Sturkenboom, 2001: 123-124; Kerkhoff, 2007). With a detailed historical analysis I intend to 
help bring out some of the public values and perceptions of political corruption in the French-
Batavian period. Secondly, I also offer tentative answers regarding value change in this crucial 
period. This is done by means of an assessment of a hypothetical link between processes of 
                                                 
33 Parts of this chapter will be published in a special issue of the Journal of Modern European History (forthcoming, 2013) 
on corruption and the rise of modern politics in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, edited by A.D.N. 
Kerkhoff, D.B.R. Kroeze, and G. Corni. 
Hidden Morals, Explicit Scandals 
 
178 | 
state-formation, democratization and politicisation of the period on the one hand, and 
changing public values on the other. 
 
8.2 State formation, democratization and public value change 
 
It has been suggested that corruption became an important element in public and political 
discourse from the end of the eighteenth century onwards. Bayly for instance wrote how the 
French revolution and similar occurrences throughout Europe (including, I argue, the Dutch 
Batavian Revolution) started debates on the nature of good government in which representa-
tions of political corruption played a central role (2004: 101, 159, 286-288). In the French case, 
according to Bayly, this seemed to have happened within an already existing tradition of ‘civic 
republicanism’. For the Dutch case a similar suggestion can be made once we look at moral 
reform movements of the time (see chapters five and seven) which sought to tame the tyranny 
of the Stadholders and the regent corruption which supposedly threatened the Republic.  
According to Engels (2006) corruption in Germany and France likewise became a po-
litical issue from the end of the eighteenth century onwards and notions of political corruption 
also started to change which, we can assume, included public value systems. For Engels, this 
shift occurred partly as a result of democratization and politicisation which started a debate 
about the best non-corrupt form of political organization with bureaucrats who would 
safeguard the common interest as best as possible. Similarly, Asch, Emich & Engels (2011: 7-9, 
19-27) explained this change in the context of major processes of increasing bureaucratization 
and democratization. The idea that links existed between such processes and changing public 
values and perceptions of political corruption from roughly the 1790s onwards is also 
supported in various other recent contributions, such as those of Bösch (2009), Schattenberg 
(2009), Fahrmeir (2009), Kroeze (2008) and Kerkhoff et al. (2010; forthcoming). This makes it 
plausible and worthwhile to also hypothetically link processes of state-formation, democratiza-
tion and politicisation of the French-Batavian period to changing public values. The fast rise of 
a centralized bureaucratic, more democratic and politicised Dutch state could well have been 
an active catalyst of a ‘new and improved’ public morality (cf. Bayly, 2004: 245-284). The latter 
could well have evolved in processes of constitution-building, increased parliamentary control, 
growing popular influence and political participation, and changing ideas of political represen-
tation based on wider notions of popular sovereignty. Closely related is the question whether 
processes of state-formation, democratization and politicisation in the years around 1800 also 
caused a shift from early modern value pluralism (the co-existence of different and separated 
value systems) to modern coherent political ideologies that shared a single public value system. 
We already saw some movement towards ethical monism in the case of chapter seven. This, we 
can hypothesize, is likely to have gone ahead in later decades. Early modern value pluralism has 
been described by Von Thiessen who has shown how parallel norms existed within sixteenth 
and seventeenth century societies (2009: 94-98; 2010: 205-220).  
According to Von Thiessen, early modern administrators constantly had to deal with 
values from two distinct moral codes. The first involved legally and formally fixed norms in 
service of the community. The other consisted of the informal or ‘face-to-face’ norms of 
administrative praxis. Early modern diplomats, for example, were constantly finding a balance 
between these two (Nützenadel, 2009: 121-142; Von Thiessen, 2010: 211-212). Such balancing 
has also been described by Wagenaar (2010: 1-2) who examined face-to-face rules versus more 
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bureaucratic ones when looking at seventeenth century Dutch bailiffs. He described face-to-
face rules as functioning in a society “lacking central population registrations, large state 
bureaucracies, police files, social security, insurance companies and so on” consisting of 
members who “compensated by simply knowing anyone they had to do business with, and 
knowing his or her family”. These highly personal and ‘particularistic’ face-to-face norms 
befitted a political culture dominated by particularism, collegialism and patronage (see chapter 
four) and could sometimes come in conflict with the impersonal and ‘universalistic’ norms that 
were also already attached to early modern bureaucracy. In effect, early modern times were 
often characterised by two separate, co-existing value systems and administrators would often 
be judged according to both (cf. Hoenderboom & Kerkhoff, 2008). The following case study 
in part assesses whether, and if so how, this early modern world of value pluralism ended 
around the turn of the nineteenth century. Were different and separated public value systems 
indeed replaced by a single public value system based on shared public values and perceptions 
of political corruption and, if so how or why did this happen? Answers are offered by historical 
institutional analysis. 
 
8.3 Cases of political corruption 
 
As soon as the moderate Interim Directorate had taken charge after the second coup d’état on 
12 June 1798 (see chapter four), the leaders of the overthrown radical Provisional Directorate 
were arrested.34 On 12 June two companies of grenadiers, led by general Daendels (who had by 
that time turned against the radical regime) were sent to arrest the radical leaders Stefanus 
Jacobus van Langen (1758 – 1847), Wybo Fijnje (1750 – 1809) and Pieter Vreede (1750 – 
1837). As soldiers entered the room were the three were having dinner with Charles-Francois 
Delacroix – then French ambassador to the Batavian Republic – Van Langen was arrested on 
the spot and immediately imprisoned. Vreede and Fijnje however managed to escape through 
the window (Schama, 1977: 350). Vreede fled to Lierre in the Austrian Netherlands 
(Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1251) and would as a result not be arrested. Wybo Fijnje 
turned himself in on 24 August 1798 and was, like Van Langen, imprisoned. The other two 
members of the Provisional Directorate, Berent Wildrik (1754 – 1831) and Johan Pieter 
Fokker (1755 – 1831) were also arrested but allowed to leave prison after only a few hours. 
Apparently they had been left out of the loop by Van Langen, Vreede and Fijnje and seem to 
have been members of the Executive Committee in name only (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part 
II: lxxiii). Furthermore, since they had already promised to resign, they were left alone. In a 
letter to the French Directorate, dated 12 June 1798, the Interim Directorate of the Batavian 
Republic states how “les citoyens Vreede et Fijnje ont pris la flute, le citoyen Van Langen a été 
le seul aretté. Quand aux citoyens Wildrik et Fokker, indignes de la conduite affreuse de leurs 
collegues ills avaient deja dormés leur demission ce matin”.35 
Following the arrests of Van Langen and Fijnje, the Moderate Interim Directorate was 
asked by the first chamber of the Representative Assembly to launch what we might call the 
                                                 
34 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag [NL-Na-HA], Wetgevende Colleges 1796 – 1810, nummer toegang 2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 509: 
folder with loose documents entitled “Minutes of 12 June 1798”, document number [doc. no.] 25: Warrant for the 
arrest of Vreede, Fijnje and Van Langen, 12/06/1798. 
35 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag [NL-Na-HA], Wetgevende Colleges 1796 – 1810, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 509, “Minutes of 12 
June 1798”. 
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first ‘parliamentary’ investigation of the Netherlands into the actions of Van Langen, Fijnje and 
Vreede during the radical regime’s brief period in power. While initially undoubtedly designed 
as an instrument in the ongoing political strife between different factions, the reports and 
evidence published by the Interim Directorate – largely based on investigations led by attorney 
general Cornelis Felix van Maanen (1769 – 1846) (cf.  Kluit, 1953; Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 
3: 803) offer much evidence. The radicals (mostly Van Langen and a host of ‘lesser cronies’ but 
Vreede and Fijnje as well) had been guilty of all kinds of wrong behaviour, ranging from high 
treason to financial mismanagement and abuse of public funds for private benefit. 
 
Reports on political corruption 
 
The main report (Pijman, et al., 1798) – hereafter called Memorie – was presented on 1 August 
1798 and describes events leading up to and during the radical regime’s six months in power. It 
provides unique views on what was thought to be unacceptable public official behaviour at a 
time when the newly formed Batavian Republic was still trying to find its bearings. Despite (or 
perhaps because of) the fact that the case against the members of the radical Directorate was at 
least partly politically motivated, the Memorie offers a view on what both moderate regime as 
well as the lawyer Van Maanen believed to be wrong or ‘corrupt’ behaviour. Still, because the 
Memorie also served a particular purpose (to incriminate political adversaries) it most likely 
deliberately withheld or even changed some information (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: 
xii). Therefore,  the following makes use of other documents as well. These are, mainly, the so-
called Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij (Authentic appendices to the events of 12 June)36 made public 
by the Interim Directorate in eighteen separate issues in 1798 containing incriminating 
evidence (letters, bills of exchange, lists of expenses etc.) against Van Langen and others. Other 
documents used in the following were gathered and organized by Colenbrander. 
 
Use of public funds for private benefit 
 
When planning their coup of 22 January, Van Langen, Vreede, Fijnje and Theodorus van 
Leeuwen (on Van Leeuwen see Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: xlix; Geyl, 1948-1959: 473; 
Schama, 1977: 287) knew they needed French support and money. Past experience had taught 
them that French assistance would not be cheap (in 1795 the French had already ‘asked’ the 
Batavians for a hundred million florins – three times the amount of the Dutch annual tax 
income at the time. Cf. Pfeil, 1998: 126). When radicals in France took control in a coup on 4 
September 1797 – after a Royalist conspiracy against the French revolution had been unveiled 
(cf.  Rosendaal, 2005b: 21) – the radical democrats in the Batavian Republic saw an opportu-
nity to get support for their own plans from a French Directorate of kindred spirit (cf. Geyl, 
1948-1959: 472). The very first steps in approaching the French were not so much taken by 
Van Langen and co. but by an eclectic collection of individuals, aptly dubbed by Schama as the 
“Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle” (1977: 298), who functioned as intermediaries between the 
French and the Dutch radicals. Members of the circle included Jan Eykenbroek, Hobbe van 
Eberstein, Hendrik Nobbe, Wouter Struyk, Anthonie Boeseken, Brahain Ducange, and A.H. 
Bode. Some, like Eykenbroek and Eberstein, were returned Patriots who had fled the Republic 
                                                 
36 See NL-HaNA, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr 509 and NL-NaHA, Collectie 039 Gogel, 1752-1820, 2.21.005.39, inv.nr. 172. Present 
there are issues 1, 2, 3 and 7. 
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after the 1787 Orangist crackdown. Others, like Bode, Boeseken and Nobbe were ‘Amsterdam 
Jacobins’, fierce unitarians and members of Batavian clubs such as “Letter Z” (Molhuysen, et 
al., 2008, part 1: 1384) which were largely responsible for purging the Amsterdam Primary 
Assembly (cf.  Schama, 1977: 330). Despite some variation among these men they all belonged 
to what Schama has called “the throng of fortune hunters and office-mongers as well as more 
down-at-heel but reputable Patriots swarming like locusts around Paris” (Schama, 1977: 284). 
They were politically active ‘democratic’ radicals who were also mainly driven by personal 
financial interests (see below). All of them hoped to capitalize on the Batavian Revolution 
(Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: xlix).  
Vreede, Fijnje, Van Leeuwen and Van Langen hardly ever dealt directly with the French 
(this could be perceived as treason, as it later indeed would be!) but used their henchmen to 
convince the French into helping the radical Dutch cause. First contact with the French on 
behalf of the radicals seems to have been made by Bode. Attached to a letter to Vreede is a 
note from 27 October 1797 from Bode to Paul Barras, the most powerful member of the five 
man French Directorate and according to some notoriously corrupt and greedy (Molhuysen, et 
al., 2008, part 9: 1250; Schama, 1977: 285-287). The note reveals the first steps in negotiating 
with the French as it says how “the spirit is good in Holland, the majority wants the good. 
There is no shortage, neither of arms nor money, which will be offered to France as soon as 
the voice of the friends of their country is heard” (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 
527).ccxiii Following this initial contact, Bode, Eykenbroek and Eberstein were sent to Paris by 
Vreede and others for further negotiations (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: xlix). Eberstein 
furthermore asks Ducange to act as middle man between the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle and 
Charles Delacroix (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: lx-lxi).  
The Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle eventually managed to secure a deal with Barras. 
Colenbrander (1905-1922, part II: lxxv. See also Geyl, 1948-1959: 472-473) discusses the 
rounds of negotiations that begin with a French request for 1,000,000 guilders in return for 
their backing of the Dutch radicals. Eykenbroek is then authorized to get 200,000 guilders in 
cash (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1249-1250). The rest of the money will be paid in goods 
(gin, cloth and meat) meant as provisions for the French troops already camping in the 
Batavian Republic since 1795 (Kluit, 1953: 66-67; Rosendaal, 2005b: 21). Apart from the deal 
for French backing of the coup, another deal is also made in which the Batavians promise 
1,500,000 guilders (part cash and part goods) to the French in return for acquiring territory, a 
trade agreement, protection for Batavian property under a neutral flag and decreasing the 
number of French troops on Batavian soil (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 588: 717). 
On 11 February, Eykenbroek and Eberstein return to Paris with this offer but Barras comes up 
with a new one. He now wants 300,000 guilders in cash and the rest in goods for the French 
backing (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 592) and 3,000,000 guilders for the other deal. 
Van Langen agrees with the first deal but reduces the second to 2,500,000 guilders. The first 
million would be transferred by Eykenbroek as soon as the latter was sure the French would 
hold up their end of the bargain (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: lxxv. See also idem, doc. 
588 and footnote there; Pijman, et al., 1798: 165-167; Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 8: 1009-
1010 and part 9: 1250). 
For ready cash the radicals turned to the (public) funds of the former Dutch East India 
Company, since 1795 in the hands of the state and administered by the so-called East Indian 
Committee (EIC). It was convenient – but hardly a coincidence – that Van Langen was 
appointed member of this committee on the day of the coup on 22 January (Molhuysen, et al., 
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2008, part 8: 1010) and that Fijnje was already a member (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 1: 906). 
The remaining millions to be paid to Barras were, in part, acquired through bills of exchange 
from the EIC. These bills were orders made by one person to another to pay money to a third 
person. Much like a cheque today, it was a written order by a drawer to a drawee to pay the 
money to a payee. In this case Van Langen – virtually the only Directorate member directly 
dealing with money (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 8: 1009) – was the drawer who ordered the 
drawee P. de Munnick – the secretary of the department of finance for the EIC – to pay 
money to the payees Eykenbroek and others who then used it to pay Barras. 
In order to acquire the goods (gin, cloth and meat) for the French army the radicals 
turned to even more creative techniques. They decided to use their own businesses to supply 
these goods and pay themselves for it with EIC credit. Both Van Langen and Vreede were 
textile merchants who made sure their businesses would benefit from such a large order. 
Providing armies with equipment, clothing and food, the so-called “bonanza business of the 
1790’s” (Schama, 1977: 284) was indeed lucrative. Just after 22 January 1798 Vreede already 
supplied a first batch of cloth to the French (Legrand, 1895: note 2 page 162; Molhuysen, et al., 
2008, part 9: 1249) and paid himself for it with EIC credit. Van Langen would do the same. In 
a short note to Eykenbroek from 9 February 1798 Van Langen writes: “I have accepted the 
batch of cloth, now it is up to you to make sure it is shipped” (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part 
II: doc. 590).ccxiv Other actors in the negotiations with Barras turned out to be equally self-
serving. Many of the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle already dealt in supplies for the French and 
Batavian armies (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 525, doc. 526; Geyl, 1948-1959: 472). 
On 6 February 1798, a partnership between Struyk (conveniently a major in the citizens militia 
of The Hague and dealer in army supplies at the same time. See Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part 
II: 555, footnote 3), a certain Anthony Gertner and Jan Eykenbroek was, for instance, set up to 
supply uniforms (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 523, doc. 589; Pijman, et al., 1798: 
160-161, exhibit 19a). The partnership seems to have acted as a front for Vreede and Van 
Langen (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1249). Eykenbroek, furthermore, was a former distiller 
(Schama, 1977: 284) who might still have had connections in the field and Eberstein, finally, 
still owned a gin distillery at the time of the deal (Pijman, et al. 1798: 38-39, 160-161, exhibit 
19a). 
In short, it quickly became apparent after 12 June that Van Langen and others had used 
the credit of the EIC for purposes other than merely ‘arranging’ French support and ‘serving 
the Nation’s interests’, as Van Langen and others would later call it to defend their actions. 
The moderates, however, had rather different ideas about what the interests of the nation 
were. To them the coup of 22 January was nothing short of treason. Besides, the deal to pay 
part of the amount in cloth, gin and meat was a rather obvious way of serving private commer-
cial interests. The fact that much of the communication among the Eykenbroek-Eberstein 
circle was written in secret code perhaps testifies they knew what they were doing was wrong. 
Money was, for instance, referred to as corn (or smorfio) and Holland was called Africa. As 
such, a letter from Eberstein to Eykenbroek from 11 December 1797 suddenly makes sense as 
the former writes that Joseph (?) and the Rabbi (?) insist that they (Eykenbroek and Eberstein) 
sail to Africa and get corn before they are willing to do anything (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, 
part II, doc. 539: 561).ccxv  
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The deal to supply the French army with provisions and clothing was not the only scheme for 
which Van Langen and others used the trick of using EIC bills of exchange. Among the 
documents seized by Van Maanen37 was Van Langen’s personal business administration which 
revealed how he had often used EIC funds to settle personal debts and business affairs. The  
administration of Van Langen’s cloth factory revealed how EIC funds had been used to settle 
personal matters. Van Langen paid money to the Vreede’s cloth company (Authentique bylagen 
tot den 12 Junij, 1798, issue no. 5; Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1249), to Jan Pessers (a fellow 
cloth merchant from Tilburg and Assembly man (Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij, 1798, issue 
no. 5; Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 8, 1010) and to J.E. Guerin, a clerk in Van Langen’s cloth 
business. In part, these payments had already started before the coup of 22 January. Van 
Langen – by his own admission38 – would sometimes decide to keep money taken from the 
EIC for himself and buy parts of the cloth needed for the French army from people who still 
owed him money (Pijman, et al., 1798: 36).39 To settle his debts Van Langen’s cashier Guerin 
seems to have been constantly looking for, and receiving, EIC money (Authentique bylagen tot den 
12 Junij, 1798; Pijman, et al., 1798: 36-37). 
Van Langen and, albeit to a much lesser extent, Vreede thus made sure they were ser-
ving the revolution as well as their personal commercial interests. A letter by Van Langen to 
Eykenbroek, dated 21 February 1798, is especially revealing. Van Langen calls on Eykenbroek 
to keep on strengthening the ties with the French (i.e., Paul Barras) since his personal financial 
affairs are also on the line. He writes: “how I have had to sacrifice my commercial interests to 
the revolution”. The French, according to Van Langen, “should therefore keep on taking 
steps” and Eykenbroek should “keep this in mind, or else nothing will happen, then our other 
engagements [the supply of gin, cloth and meat? TK] would fail, you know what I am trying to 
say here” (Pijman, et al., 1798: 17, 67, appendix 1).ccxvi The French, in other words, had to stay 
on board to receive their payment which was beneficial to Van Langen and others. Further-
more, the longer the radical Directorate was backed by the French, the longer Van Langen and 
others could stay in power, enabling them to potentially reap even more financial benefits in 
the future. The fact that Van Langen and others had constantly used EIC money for a wide 
variety of purchases really does become apparent from the Memorie. One appendix (Pijman, et 
al., 1798, appendix 10: 88) provides a list of expenses on ‘luxury items’ found in Van Langen’s 
office by Van Maanen’s investigators. The list totals 15,926 guilders. There was, for instance, 
697 guilders for renting carriages; 242 guilders for buying hats and scarves as presents for the 
directors Wildrik and Fokker; 15 guilders for the repair of some furniture; 5 guilders for several 
tea cups and 2 guilders for the repair of a chess game. Another payment by Van Langen using 
EIC credit was 3,000 guilders to Pieter Ondaatje (1758 – 1818),40 a Patriot of the first hour and 
– incidentally – fellow member of the EIC as well as Secretary to the Agent of Internal Police. 
Perhaps the money was a bribe to keep Ondaatje quiet about taking EIC money? 
 
                                                 
37 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag [NL-Na-HA], 2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 509, “Minutes of 12 June 1798”, document number 
[doc. no.] 13: Order to La Pierre to seize all personal documents of Vreede, Fijnje and Van Langen, 12/06/1798. 
38 NA, Collectie 018 C.F. van Maanen (1900), 1717-1867, 2.21.114.03, inv. nr. 18. Secret letters by the removed 
representative Van Langen to Pieter Vreede during the former’s detainment at the Voorpoort in The Hague. Letter 3: 
Van Langen to Vreede, date unknown. 
39 Nationaal Archief, Den Haag [NL-Na-HA], 2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 508, item 399: “Rapport van Johan Philip Hildebrand 
en Adrianus Zeemans aan den burger La Pierre, agent van inwendige politie”, 27/06/1798. 
40 NL-HaNA,  2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 509, item 68, 06/07/1798. 
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Views on the case: different sources of public values  
 
The case revolving around Van Langen can be viewed from a variety of sources of values. 
Best-opinion has been largely described in chapter five but will sometimes return in the 
following because some key actors in the scandal (most notably Gogel, Vreede and Fijnje) were 
also key best-opinion moralists. Public opinion, shop floor and legal sources of public values 
also had an important part to play. Even though there is often much overlap between the 
sources (see chapter three) I will – as in the other two cases – separate them as much as 
possible. 
 
A mixture of sources: the Interim Directorate on bad government 
 
First there were documents from the Moderate Interim Directorate itself. Obviously there was 
the Memorie. This source of values in the case is, in reality, more of a mixture of sources. It 
holds personal (shop floor) views of members of the moderate Directorate who condemned 
the actions of the radicals. At the same time these views are also best-opinion stances from the 
new political leaders and (for instance in the case of Isaac Gogel) long time Patriot ideologists 
(see chapter five). The Memorie can also be regarded a legal source of public values. It was 
partly assembled by legal prosecutor Van Maanen and judgment by the Interim Directorate 
was therefore also based on legal arguments. Although the Memorie is by far the most elaborate 
and important source through which we can view the public values of the Interim Directorate, 
they also published the, already mentioned, Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij. Clearly, the 
Interim Directorate wanted to get public opinion on their side. In the following both sources 
are discussed. 
A first major line of critique in the Memorie entails broad or general critique at the politi-
cal corruption of the entire radical regime. Here we can recognize Johnston’s notion of 
classical political corruption as the corruption of the body politic in general. The moderate 
Directorate focuses on bad government by the radicals, which is especially reprehensible in 
times of political and economic hardship. They criticize, for instance, the purges following 22 
January 1798 which were – at least according to Colenbrander – generally detested (1905-1922, 
part II: lxxiii). Bad government also entailed the way in which the radicals had assumed power. 
This had resulted in a lack of legitimacy, problems of accountability and office hunting of the 
regime. The inability of the radicals to follow proper procedure and keep their administration 
in order was also criticized. The Memorie shows how the Interim Directorate was unanimous in 
condemning the coup and the behaviour of the previous regime. “Solid reasoning”, the 
Memorie (Pijman, et al., 1798: 27) states, “makes one understand that the administration of a 
nation cannot be left to men who, through a desire for self preservation and self elevation, 
have acted with so little tact that the building only just built [i.e., the Batavian Republic, TK] 
already had to collapse under its own weight”.ccxvii “One would have to search in vein”, the 
moderates continue, “for men of capability, loyalty and courage […] all of it testifies to their 
incapability, negligence, sloppiness and disloyalty” (Pijman, et al., 1798: 30).ccxviii  
Clearly, the Interim Directorate was critical. While undoubtedly politically motivated, 
their critique also consisted of a fundamental ethical positioning. A first set of ethical issues 
raised was the perceived lack of legitimacy and accountability of the radical regime. According 
to the Interim Directorate – as explained in the Memorie – Van Langen, Vreede and others had 
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formed an “unconstitutional and illegitimate” Directorate after 22 January. In the constitution 
of 1 May 1798 it had been stipulated that the Constituent Assembly should organize the 
election of a new Representative Assembly after which the former was to be dissolved. 
However, despite of this stipulation the radicals introduced a so-called ‘two-thirds’ rule. With 
this rule they decided that two thirds of the new Representative Assembly were to be former 
members of the purged convention that had come into being after 22 January (Elias, et al., 
1991: 11-12; Palmer, 1954: 31). In a way the temporary Constituent Assembly which had been 
purged of all ‘aristocratic’ elements had thus decided to elect itself as the new Representative 
Assembly on 4 May. The radical Directorate (Van Langen and others) also remained in power 
instead of stepping down. In applying the ‘two-thirds rule’, the radicals had, according to the 
Memorie, bypassed the constitution and ‘re-elected’ themselves without giving the population a 
proper chance to vote. They had thereby undermined the idea of popular sovereignty so 
essential to the Batavians. It had “attempted to secure and consolidate its position before the 
representative body had a chance to decide on the constitution and before the population had 
a chance to speak” (Pijman, et al., 1798: 26-27).  
The leaders of the Republic, as the Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij described it, had 
turned into “usurpers, trampling on the constitution” (issue no. 4: 13). The critique seems, at 
least with regard to Vreede, not completely fair. Someone like Vreede had always been one of 
the most fervent advocates of more and improved popular voting. His proposal of 24 January 
1797 (leading up to the ‘referendum’ of august 1797 to vote on a new constitution) to get rid 
of the system of electors in order “to link popular will and government” was, for instance, 
denied (Colenbrander, 1905-1922: xliv; Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1248; Rosendaal, 2005b: 
29-30). At the same time, however, the radicals had clearly wanted to push through and grasp 
the moment instead of lingering on in elaborate (bureaucratic) procedures and routines. By 
their own admission (see shop floor codes of Van Langen and Vreede below), their desire to 
provide the Batavian Republic with a new unitary constitution seems to have trumped their 
ability or desire to follow proper procedures, even when (or because?) it concerned their own 
rules. 
To the Interim Directorate,  lack of representation and proper procedure had resulted 
in a lack of legitimacy and accountability. This, according to the Memorie became apparent from 
the improper way of appointing people in office; among them was La Pierre, one of the 
drafters of the Memorie (see also below). While executive orders and letters by the radical 
regime showed how people had been appointed there were no official minutes of deliberations 
on such matters of any kind. This, to the Memorie, proved that “important offices were given 
without their parameters having been properly defined”. It also proved how “the lack of 
instructions designed for these officials lays bare how the interests of the nation have become 
dependent on the ability, honesty and moderation of a single person” (Pijman, et al., 1798: 
30).ccxix These offices were handed out without procedures, instructions or proper (parliamen-
tary?) supervision. The idea that lack of procedure and instructions led to a lack of accountabil-
ity and legitimacy is of course interesting and, potentially, new. The fact that La Pierre, himself 
a member of the moderate Interim Directorate and co-author of the Memorie which attacked 
people for similar reasons, felt comfortable to have his own name mentioned is interesting too. 
It could have been a case of double standards and/or a remnant of ‘old regent ways’ but 
perhaps a more fundamental assumption was made. Perhaps it was wrong to appoint officials 
without proper procedure but not wrong for the official to accept a position offered to him in 
this way?  
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Other nominees for important offices also proved dubious. Fijnje, for instance, had been 
persistent in his nomination of Pieter Weiland (1754 – 1842) for the post of Minster of the 
Interior. When Weiland, a Remonstrant preacher in Rotterdam, told Fijnje he did not want the 
office as he had no knowledge of such matters, Fijnje apparently told him one learns as one 
goes along. When Weiland still refused, Fijnje (without success) threatened to use force to keep 
him (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1251). We have to wonder why Fijnje was so adamant in 
appointing someone who was clearly unwilling and, by his own admission, incapable. Perhaps 
he wanted ignoramuses in important offices so that he himself could have more control? The 
selection of other ‘officials’ by the Directorate Directorate had also been shady. Eykenbroek, 
for instance, had been clerk of Van Langen’s business prior to the revolution (Molhuysen, et 
al., 2008, part 8: 1009-1010) and reappeared as Van Langen’s confidant in Paris. 
Various requests for offices were also directed at the new regime. Investigations by Van 
Maanen showed correspondence between Fijnje and certain members of the Eykenbroek-
Eberstein circle asking for jobs. Hendrik Nobbe (schout civiel in Amsterdam as of 15 March 
1798) asks if a certain G. Sonnevelt could get a post in the navy (cf. Colenbrander, 1905-1922, 
part II, doc. 542, footnote 2)41; H.H. Midderigh asked of a certain H.C. Hooft could be placed 
as clerk somewhere42; a certain Pieter Pijpers sent two letters asking for employment43; Lucas 
Butot (for Butot see Schama, 1977: 328-329, 330, 333) puts in a good word for a certain De 
Jonge and Gieseken who, Butot writes, will go to Fijnje to ask for a job as clerk or something 
similar. Butot says of them “they write well, speak French and English and have spirit enough 
to work in a capable way […] both families are loyal to the patriot cause and are brave, 
revolutionary and trustworthy […] I ask you, if possible, help them”.44 A certain Nozeman 
requests Fijnje to hire Pieter van Groeneveld45 who would in 1799 (see below) be indicted for 
conspiring to bring down the moderate government of the Batavian Republic.46 
Lack of proper procedure and keeping a good administration also caused problems of 
accountability as far as the Interim Directorate was concerned. The moderate directors seem to 
have been appalled by the chaos at the radical Directorate’s offices (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, 
part 9: 1251). It was so disorganized that it proved near impossible to check what the radical 
Directorate had done after they had assumed power. The minutes of their meetings were 
largely incomplete. Worse still, information that Van Maanen was able to find in all sorts of 
places could not be found in the official minutes. This obviously did not constitute open 
access to information or ensure proper accountability or control. To a suspicious eye (and by 
now there were many), it also hinted at irregular behaviour which the radical directors might 
have been anxious to conceal (Pijman, et al., 1798: 30).ccxx 
The purges of 1798 and the way in which the radical regime had appointed other new 
‘officials’ (apart from Agents like La Pierre and Wielema) was another problematic moral issue 
to the moderates. According to the Memorie, the purges had been the result of an insatiable lust 
for offices. Purging of both National Assembly and Primary Assemblies of “good patriots” 
had been followed by appointments of men “who were incapable and unsuitable […] who’s 
only asset was being able to shout real loud” (Pijman, et al., 1798: 45).ccxxi Some, like Bode and 
                                                 
41 NL-HaNA, Wetgevende Colleges 1796 – 1810, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr 508: Letters to Wybo Fijnje, letter 12, no date. 
42 Ibid., letter 13, no date. 
43 Ibid., letter 14, 15, no date. 
44 Ibid., letter 32, 02/02/1798. 
45 Ibid., item 91. 
46 NL-HaNA, Collectie 018 C.F. van Maanen (1895), 1709-1807, 2.21.114.02, inv.nr. 20, item 1, 28/06/1799. 
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Boeseken had “made arrests deviating completely from the common rule of law, stemming 
only from the conceit of the administrators […] thus weakening police and justice in the 
Batavian Republic” (Pijman, et al., 1798: 46).ccxxii The role these men played in the purges (cf. 
Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: lxx) was also criticized in the Authentique bylagen tot den 12 
Junij (issue no. 4: 12) in which it was asked “are not all able and respectable citizens driven 
from their offices by incapable and evil men? Are not thousands of innocent civil servants, 
with their wives and children, reduced to beggary, by incapable men, drunkards without 
morals?”ccxxiii It has been argued that Vreede and the other radicals simply “wanted to rid the 
National Assembly of the best and most honest people in order to have free reigns, so that 
their criticism would not hinder them” (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1248). 
Another batch of criticism was directed at the fact that radicals had surrounded them-
selves with (and trusted, see below) people of bad reputation and supposed ill character. Of 
course, this involved the likes of Eykenbroek, Eberstein and other members of the circle. The 
disdain for these men was great. The Memorie, for instance, targeted Boeseken “who’s spiteful 
spying and devious insinuations were rewarded by an offer [by the radicals, TK] to make 
himself useful to the nation” (Pijman, et al., 1798: 45).ccxxiv About Eberstein the Authentique 
bylagen tot den 12 Junij (issue no. 6: 8-11) state: “he will always be a chameleon […] sliding 
through the grass like a snake, showing himself only in the dark; he claims to have revolution-
ary principles but his true disdain for these principles becomes apparent from his tone against 
everything having to do with the revolution. He lives like a king but nobody knows where he 
gets his funds”.ccxxv  
In a note from Jacob Blauw and Caspar Meyer (both representatives of the Batavian 
Republic in Paris) to Vreede and Van Langen (Colenbrander, part II, doc. 617) of 18 March 
1798, the former complain about Eykenbroek (and others). They criticize his lack of experi-
ence and knowledge and his high-handed actions without following proper procedures 
(through Meyer and Blauw). They also state they had wondered whether it had been truly 
necessary to offer so much money to the French and that they questioned whether all that 
money had reached those it was intended for or had, instead, ended up in pockets of those 
whose authority only rests in making a show”.ccxxvi This was also true for Eberstein who is 
(again) called a chameleon and a snake who only comes out at night. Another favourite target 
was Ducange who the Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij (issue no. 8: 3) called “that scum of 
humanity […] that villain, whose life is nothing but a succession of atrocities” […] He who for 
a hand of gold served the party of the Stadholder and England, he who betrayed that same 
court as soon as the French gave him bread”.ccxxvii   
Clearly, accusations and suggestions launched at Eykenbroek and others served to criti-
cise Van Langen and others in the process. The second issue of the Authentique bylagen tot den 12 
Junij presents five letters from Boeseken to the radical Directorate. From these letters it 
becomes apparent, according to the Interim Directorate, “how the national time has been 
wasted in such a scandalous way by the previous Directorate Directorate, among other things 
by correspondences that had no other point than to keep for themselves the positions they had 
managed to nestle in, not for the people! Only for themselves. […] Now we will let the people 
judge in whom the Directorate power of the Batavian Republic put its trust without suspicion 
[…], whose wishes it granted without thinking […]. They used them only as tools for their 
disguised lust to rule” (issue no. 2: 3-4).ccxxviii It was a way to criticize the abuse of trust, the 
harming of the interests of the people, the lust for power, the misappropriation of power 
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under false pretences, wasting the national time (there were better things to do!) and serving 
private interests with public offices of the entire group. 
The Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle was perceived as foreign diplomats, or at least as use-
ful secret agents, by Van Langen and others but as detestable conspirators by the moderate 
Interim Directorate. In the name of the revolution, they had been, after all, mostly interested in 
making their own fortunes. According to Schama, Bode and Eberstein had, for instance, 
persuaded Eykenbroek to use his political connections with Barras for their mutual benefit, 
“adding that the successful outcome of their venture could only redound to the greater good 
of their beloved fatherland” (1977: 285). Also, a letter recommending Bode was sent by Van 
Leeuwen to Caspar Meijer, who would later arrest Eykenbroek in Paris (see Schama 1977: 340; 
Colenbrander 1905-1922, part II, doc. 602: 728) on 13 November 1797. The letter was later 
submitted to the Interim Directorate (on 27 July 1798) as evidence against the radicals 
(Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II, doc. 534; cf.  Geyl, 1948-1959: 473). Van Leeuwen 
recommends Bode to Meijer as being a “trusted friend, a brave patriot” and asks Meijer “to be 
so good as to trust him as you would trust me. Let him know everything you know […] point 
him which way to go so that he may achieve his goal. These services provided to him I will 
regard as services provided to me and mine; you will receive your reward in your con-
science”.ccxxix The letter was clearly given to the Interim Directorate to show how the radical 
Directorate had put all their trust and a huge responsibility in the hands of ‘thugs’ like Bode. 
According to Schama (1977: 286), Colenbrander’s interest in the individuals of the 
Eberstein-Eykenbroek circle gave them greater status and influence then they actually had. 
This might be so (this is not the place to discuss this) but when assessing the morals of the 
time, however, their position and actions are very relevant indeed. To the Interim Directorate 
(and others, see public opinion sources) men like Boeseken, Eykenbroek or Eberstein seem to 
have only been important because they were an easy target. Their existence enabled them to 
criticize the bad judgment and corrupt nature of the previous Directorate. Van Langen and 
others had, after all, put their trust, public money, matters of national importance and the 
national honour, in the hands of “fortune hunters and schemers” who abused the nations’ 
interests in favour of their own on useless schemes and intrigue.  
While the petty corrupt conspirators of the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle were thus rela-
tively unimportant in the grand scheme of things, their involvement in the revolutionary cause 
was important as it reflected poorly on the radical Directorate. This becomes clear from the 
eighth issue of the Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij (issue no. 8: 3-5) which promised “several 
letters of a man [Ducange, TK] who deserved being despised by all but who nevertheless had a 
decisive influence on the French emissary Delacroix and the majority of the Directorate 
Directorate of the Batavian Republic – and who manages as such to rule the Republic. You ask 
how is it possible that a man completely without morality, known to be despicable, can get the 
trust of the administration in such a way? These letters will tell you the answer: he starts with 
flattery, he grovels, he begs for favours, all means are welcome […] he does not know true and 
noble love for people”.ccxxx The Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij further commented that a 
revolution (i.e., the second coup of 12 June) had indeed been necessary when “the hard earned 
money of the citizen was not spent right or simply stolen”.ccxxxi The dishonesty towards the 
population was continuously stressed and unanimously condemned because representatives 
were there to serve the interests of the people and not their own: “it is indeed terrible to see 
such horrible deeds of men placed in high positions of power to serve our interests” 
(Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij, 1798, issue no. 5). 
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A second main line of critique in the Memorie and Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij was about 
specific individual acts of abuse of office and financial malversations. It concerned the 
condemnation of individual and specific acts of stealing, bribery and abuse of public funds for 
private gain. This is reminiscent of Johnston’s  notion of more ‘modern’ perceptions of 
individual (financial) political corruption (see chapter one). The critique focused, above all, on 
the use of public money for private benefit and luxury and the Directors’ inability (or unwill-
ingness) to keep their administration in order. From the outset the Memorie (1798: 33) ex-
pressed the desire for a thorough investigation “to find out the reasons for the scandalous 
theft of so much money”.ccxxxii It also reacted to an earlier report which Gogel and La Pierre 
had sent on 25 July 1798 to the other members of the Interim Directorate by stating how: “the 
Batavian people, so famous for its frugality and simplicity has apparently had to pay for the 
extravagant expenses of three of its fellow citizens, as Fokker and Wildrik occupied an 
expensive home in The Hague [and how] in these destitute times we have seen how the nation 
has paid for costumes, a theatre and carriages [for Van Langen, TK], meant to serve the 
Directors’ idle waste of time while so many citizens are so often waiting in vain to be heard” 
(Pijman, et al., 1798: 34)ccxxxiii  
Proof of this supposed idle waste soon emerged. According to a letter from the minis-
ter of justice on 4 July 1798, Van Langen had apparently indeed taken six thousand guilders 
from the EIC to pay for the renovation of the Amsterdam theatre (Authentique bylagen tot den 12 
Junij, 1798, issue no. 5). Vreede and Van Langen also seemed to have had a taste for opulence. 
They tried (but failed), for instance, to turn the court (The Noordeinde palace in The Hague) 
into their official residence (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1251). Just how much this kind of 
behaviour bothered the moderate Directorate becomes apparent from the fact that they 
published a letter from Ducange to Van Langen on the topic in the Appendices to June 12 (issue 
no. 3: 13-14) in which Ducange supported the Directors in their efforts to find ‘suitable’ 
accommodation and wrote: “is it not necessary indeed that with the high dignity with which all 
five of you have been bestowed, should come a certain amount of splendour?”ccxxxiv In a 
reaction to Ducange, the moderate Directorate wrote that “the splendour of Republicans is 
virtue, courage and sincerity and where these are lacking, affluence is a poor varnish to hide the 
stains”.ccxxxv 
The combination of a nation in decline (see chapters four and five) while its Directors 
were living the good life was strongly condemned by the moderate Interim Directorate. The 
Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij (issue no. 6: 8-11) speak of the poor citizens who “give the 
most precious interests of the fatherland in the hands of people that do not deserve any trust 
and who, as soon as they had gained power, no longer thought of its terrible state; they 
squandered treasures that were entrusted to them which they knew how to extort in such a way 
that any decent Dutchman can only shiver at the thought of it”.ccxxxvi The Interim Directorate 
goes on to say that “they know people are not without interests or cannot be disinterested with 
their own good and that of their family but that there are still times when the fatherland 
requires one to be virtuous. We cannot, therefore, be more astonished at the fact this hunt for 
offices, this affliction to the common good, becomes more common in times when so many 
sources of wealth are clogged or dried up” (Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij, issue no. 9: 3-5). 
ccxxxvii The accusation of using public funds for private benefit is mostly directed at Van 
Langen. In the initial report by Gogel and La Pierre of 25 July 1798 (see earlier) the two stated 
miserable the state of Van Langen’s financial administration was (cf. Memorie, 34, appendices 9 
and 10 and Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij, 1798, issue no. 5: 7).ccxxxviii However, they had still 
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managed to find enough evidence (such as the list of expenses for the chess game and tea 
cups) to warrant an extension of Van Langen’s arrest (see also legal codes later on) and further 
investigations into the case. As the investigations went on the Interim Directorate became 
increasingly convinced of the political corruption of Van Langen. His business deals with 
Pessers, Vreede and Van Marle became known and the list of bills of exchange made out to all 
sorts of people grew ever longer.  
What the Interim Directorate seems to have been especially concerned about was Van 
Langen’s use of EIC money to straighten his own disorganized financial affairs and to indulge 
in luxury. They wrote: “no matter how bad all of this is [the many expenses on luxury goods by 
all members of the radical regime, TK], it is nothing when compared to the reprehensible 
behaviour by Van Langen, being guilty of such vile behaviour of direct theft to keep his own 
mixed-up affairs in order at the expense of the nation” (Pijman, et al., 1798: 35).ccxxxix The 
Interim Directorate was also amazed to learn about the deals and secret negotiations by 
Eykenbroek and Eberstein involving payments in cloth, gin and meat. Having examined the 
evidence they quickly realized Van Langen’s (and Vreede’s) intent: “since this way the citizen 
Directors Van Langen and Vreede, being the suppliers, could also get some extra profit” 
(Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij, 1798, issue no. 8).ccxl 
Amazement quickly turned into outright condemnation when the Interim Directorate 
was confronted with “the shameless behaviour of one of the Directors [Van Langen, TK] in 
enriching himself with the Nations’ money”. “It is indeed difficult”, they continue, “to believe 
how a member of the Directorate could have such vile an intent as corruption” [the first of 
two occasions, see below for the second, in which the word corruption is used as such in the 
case, TK] (Pijman, et al., 1798: 40-41).ccxli The Authentique bylagen furthermore stated: “We 
shiver at the fate of our sweet fatherland when we see the desire to obtain offices become so 
widespread that people no longer ask whether the bread they receive from the fatherland is 
earned or not; whether the office one desires is earned or not. We shiver when we see that 
honesty and good faith are forgotten as soon as the opportunity arises to benefit on the 
expense of the common good, when people are indifferent about the way in which they satisfy 
their greed. It is, for example, unforgivable and harmful that those who have the highest rank 
abuse the power for their own benefit” (issue no. 9: 3-5).ccxlii 
 
Public values from legal sources 
 
While the Memorie and Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij already contained some legal codes of 
their own, there were also separate legal sources of public values. Verdict and sentencing of the 
accused based on Van Maanen’s investigations contains, for instance, a host of public values 
and (legal) condemnations and expectations of correct public official behaviour. The variety of 
actors in the case (from a trafficker and hustler like Eykenbroek to a distinguished Director like 
Vreede) makes for variety in sentencing and legal deliberations, providing us with many 
different legal codes. In any case, and this is interesting enough, it becomes clear that not all 
members of the Directorate were considered equally accountable or guilty in the eyes of the 
moderate Interim Directorate. Directors Berent Wildrik and Johan Pieter Fokker had, as 
mentioned, immediately been cleared of any involvement after 12 June and were soon released 
from prison (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 10: 1207). Although both were sometimes men-
tioned in relation to political corruption (in the sense of being extravagant, greedy and/or too 
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subservient to the other Directors) they were largely perceived to be merely ceremonial 
members of the Directorate and victims of the schemes of Van Langen, Vreede and Fijnje 
(Memorie 1798: 43).ccxliii Wildrik was considered of such insignificance in the whole affair, that 
the Interim Directorate appointed him as member of the new Provisional Assembly on 12 
June (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 10: 1207). He would retire from politics in may 1801. For 
the same reason as Wildrik, Fokker could become a member of the Interim Directorate 
Directorate until 30 July 1798. Some sources (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 1: 870-871) report 
how Fokker was eventually forced to leave The Hague as a result of his partaking in the radical 
Directorate but do not elaborate. In any case, he retired to his native province of Zeeland to 
practice medicine until his death in 1831. 
Pieter Vreede was not arrested or detained due to his escape to the Austrian Nether-
lands. However, already in July 1798 he was bold (or desperate?) enough to request the Interim 
Directorate to let him return to his hometown of Tilburg. His wife had died and he needed to 
take care of his children. At the end of August he was permitted to do so, which, perhaps, is 
proof that the Interim Directorate was not as cross with him as they were with Van Langen 
(see below). Vreede was granted his request despite the fact that he was often mentioned in the 
Memorie and Authentique bylagen. As some have correctly pointed out (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, 
part 9: 1253), Vreede had certainly been in the thick of it all along and appears, contrary to 
Fijnje but similar to Van Langen, to have also used EIC funds for his own personal gain, such 
as the deliveries of cloth to his and Van Marle’s firm. Furthermore, he seems to have been of 
somewhat ill character. Together with Van Langen he tried (but failed), for instance, to 
persuade Fijnje to deport Pensionary Van de Spiegel and his advisor Bentinck van Rhoon (see 
chapters four and five) as criminals to Surinam. Vreede was also not prepared to extend the 
kind of help and sympathy to others which he himself would later receive. When Van Marle 
(one of the 28 purged and jailed Assembly members and his business partner at that) requested 
to be temporarily released from jail to visit his dying son, the radical Directorate, including 
Vreede, had refused. A request by purged Assembly member H.H. Vitringa to visit his dying 
80 year old father was likewise denied (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 9: 1253). 
Wybo Fijnje and Jacobus Van Langen were, contrary to Vreede, both detained. They 
were also immediately accused (whereas the charges eventually launched at Vreede seem to 
have taken much longer to develop). Fijnje and especially Van Langen had been the financial 
administrators of the Batavian Republic between January and June and were for this reason 
accused of embezzling the nation’s money. The fact that both were member of the EIC and 
had used (abused?) its public funds was an important element in condemning them. An early 
report47 by Reinier Tadema, the first minister of Justice, to the Interim Directorate Directorate, 
dated 6 July 1798, displays his initial (legal) reflections on the case against Fijnje and Van 
Langen as it was evolving. He writes how he (or rather attorney general Van Maanen and the 
investigators Philip Hildebrand and Adrian Zeemans) had already found evidence of derelic-
tion and malversations of both men in spending public funds from the EIC using bills of 
exchange. He placed the blame squarely on Fijnje and Van Langenccxliv, especially since he did 
not believe the other members of the Directorate (mainly Fokker and Wildrik) had known 
what was going on. It is interesting to note Tadema’s initial logic concerning the use of EIC 
credit. According to him it was warranted to get money from the EIC but only as long as the 
                                                 
47 NL-HaNA, Wetgevende Colleges 1796 – 1810, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr 508, item 68, Report by Tadema to the Interim 
Directorate, 06/07/1798. 
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money was spent on the nation’s interests and as long as it was approved by the entire 
Directorate. Since neither condition was met, he thought Van Langen and Fijnje were surely 
guilty. Furthermore, Van Langen and Fijnje were (as yet) unable to account for their actions 
and explain where all the money had gone to. It might seem odd that Tadema did not include 
Vreede in this argument. Vreede, after all, had mixed public and private interests and was 
therefore at least as guilty as Fijnje who had ‘only’ used the money for revolutionary (but 
‘public’) purposes. At the same time, Tadema’s investigations were only just getting under way 
so we can imagine he did not have the full picture yet. 
The early investigations by Van Maanen in July (as it was partly disclosed in the later 
Memorie and Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij) led to the call by the Court of Holland for a 
more thorough legal investigation into the dealings of Van Langen and Fijnje.48 On 7 Septem-
ber, Van Maanen writes that the evidence has “raised serious suspicions that Van Langen and 
Fijnje are guilty of disloyal and for the nation disastrous and most criminal use of their office”. 
On 17 September Van Maanen reiterates the charges against Van Langen and Fijnje49 and adds 
they “were guilty of disloyal and to the nation ruinous occupation of aforementioned impor-
tant offices, in which they disposed of the nation’s money in a criminal, irresponsible, wasteful 
way, yes even stealing the nation’s money […]”.ccxlvVan Maanen also wrote50 how they had 
used or allowed others without qualifications [Eykenbroek cum suis, TK] to use this money, 
even before they were elected as members of the Provisional Administration”.ccxlvi This time, 
however, Van Maanen makes an interesting distinction between them. Although Fijnje was 
essentially guilty of ‘bad government’, for instance in taking the lead to appoint Pieter Weiland 
(see earlier), he had not (contrary to Van Langen and Vreede) used the embezzled EIC funds 
for other than revolutionary purposes. While Van Langen was served with a criminal indict-
ment (see below), Fijnje was only summoned to appear before court on 26 September 1798.51 
He was initially spared the more serious indictment because Van Maanen wanted more time to 
investigate matters.52 However, later he would get one after all on 1 October 1798.53 The 
reasons for Van Maanen’s change of heart can be found in his archives. Based on the interro-
gations of Van Langen (see below) it appears that Fijnje had known about the secret instruc-
tion to Eykenbroek to start negotiating with Barras (see Colenbrander, part II, doc. 588: 717. 
For the secret instruction see Ibid., part II: doc. no. 605). According to Van Maanen, Van 
Langen had told him54 that Fijnje had given him EIC money to pay Guerin on 18 January 
1798. Fijnje had, furthermore, known about Van Langen’s tricks with the bills of exchange and 
had, of course, also known about the use of EIC funds to bring about the revolution.ccxlvii 
While Van Maanen and others had been lenient towards Wildrik, Fokker, Vreede and 
(initially) Fijnje, it seems nobody needed much time to point to Van Langen as the main 
culprit. It had been Van Langen who had “made use of money for his own individual, personal 
purposes”. According to Van Maanen55, Van Langen was therefore “guilty of stealing from the 
nation”.ccxlviii Van Langen had also56 “been involved in the scandalous theft of the nation’s 
                                                 
48 NL-HaNa, Collectie 018 C. F. van Maanen (1895), 1709-1807, supplement 1, 2.21.114.02, inv.nr. 4: 402. 
49 Ibid., 419-420. 
50 Ibid., 449-450. 
51 Ibid., 460-461. 
52 Ibid., 465-469. 
53 Ibid., 473. 
54 Ibid., 472-473. 
55 NL-HaNa, Collectie 018 C. F. van Maanen (1895), 1709-1807, supplement 1, 2.21.114.02, inv.nr. 4: 449-450. 
56 Ibid., 419-420. 
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money, having made use of these funds [of the EIC, TK] before he was even elected as a 
member of the Directorate”. In short, the fact which made Van Langen’s behaviour wrong to 
Van Maanen (i.e., in a legal sense) was that he used EIC funds (public money) for private 
purposes while not (yet) being in the position to do so, i.e., before belonging to the Provisional 
Directorate on 25 January 1798.ccxlix Given the evidence, it is not strange that such accusations 
were mainly launched at Van Langen. Still, one gets the impression that he seems to have also 
become some sort of scapegoat or ‘token corrupt official’ for the entire radical regime. He, at 
least, would see it this way (see below). His escapades formed a perfect example with which the 
entire previous radical Directorate was to be set straight, something Samuel Wiselius (1768 – 
1845) as one of the leading Batavian politicians was, for instance, very anxious to do (Schama, 
1977: 360). 
It was certainly not just the former Directors that felt the sting of the Interim Director-
ate. The group of people of the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle was also prosecuted. Eykenbroek 
seems to have been the main target (cf. Schama, 1977: 360). He had been arrested in Paris on 
12 June by Meijer but was released by the French soon thereafter. Perhaps they were not too 
keen on keeping and investigating Eykenbroek because he could open up a big can of worms. 
However, to the Dutch moderate Batavians Eykenbroek’s release was not the end of the 
matter. The official resolution by the Court of Holland to prosecute and charge Eykenbroek 
(next to Boeseken and some others) is made on 4 December 1798. The whole group is 
charged57 with what Van Maanen calls: “these pernicious machinations against the safety of the 
state […] their treacherous and most criminal designs in Paris and Brussels to commit 
corruptions with money collected by citizens [Van Langen and others, TK] of this Republic”.ccl 
Here – incidentally – is the second and final time the term corruption is used as such in the 
case. Several members of the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle (among them Eykenbroek and 
Boeseken) would be charged with crimen perduellionis or high treason.58 Sentencing of this mixed 
bag of culprits was however delayed and postponed59 due to a failed attempt at yet another 
coup in which Eykenbroek and Boeseken were apparently also involved (Schama, 1977: 359-
361). Van Maanen seems to have gathered clues of a plan to assassinate the five moderate 
Interim Directors.ccli Eykenbroek, at least, was supposed to have made the highly provocative 
or suggestive comment to the French that there was a rumour that the Directors might get 
killed or were already dead.60 and had apparently added: “such rumours are usually good 
predictions of such things actually happening”.cclii For Eykenbroek these ‘machinations’ 
undoubtedly led to his recapture in Paris and sentencing “to be punished with the sword 
hanging over their head [traditionally a warning in most sentencing], to be imprisoned for 12 
years at his own expense and afterwards to be banished for ever from the Batavian Republic.61 
However, on 17 November 1798 the moderates and their case against the radicals re-
ceived a devastating blow when the Court of Holland received a letter from the representative 
assembly.62 The letter stated that the French had decided on a general amnesty which would be 
                                                 
57 Ibid., 659, 676, 678. 
58 Ibid., 667-668. 
59 Ibid., inv. nr. 20. 
60 Ibid., 8. 
61 NL-HaNA, Hof van Holland, 1428-1811, 3.03.01.01, inv.nr. 5670: 7-37. 
62 NL-HaNA, Collectie 018 C. F. van Maanen (1895), 1709-1807, 2.21.114.02, inv. nr. 4: extract van besluit van de eerste 
kamer van het vertegenwoordigend ligaam relatief S.J. Van Langen en W. Fijnje ontvangen en gesteld in handen van 
den Procureur Generaal omme consideratien”. 
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published in the Bataafsche Courant on 12 December 1798.63 The amnesty meant to “forgive and 
forget what had happened, to establish constitutional order and to reunite all friends of 
freedom and order behind the constitution”. All crimes of the past years that had been “so 
closely related to politics that indeed they are inseparable from each other” were to be 
pardoned.ccliii The argument is interesting. What, after all, is left of ‘political corruption’ if 
corruption that occurred in close relation to politics is pardoned? Perhaps the moderate 
Batavians saw it this way too. In the very least they were not happy about it. The French 
decision was a blow to them, not least because they had come to resent French involvement in 
‘internal matters’ (Schama, 1977: 401) and because it meant that the cases against the members 
of the radical Directorate were to be over. Despite overwhelming evidence of bad government, 
abuse of office and/or treason, the charges against a host of individuals thus had to be 
dropped. Vreede, who had by now been accused but still not detained or arrested, was cleared 
of any charges. According to the French64, the actions of Van Langen and Fijnje were clearly 
political in the aforementioned sense and they ought to be cleared of all charges too.ccliv Even 
Eykenbroek was to be released (Schama, 1977: 401).  
The reasons for the amnesty seem clear enough. To the French, any proceedings 
against Van Langen and others would be “dishonourable to their [French, TK] interests” (op 
cit. in Schama, 1977: 401). The French seemed  not at all sure that their own role in the coup 
of 22 January had been a good one. They wanted bygones to be bygones, forget about the 
whole thing and, importantly, they still had the influence to make it happen. In November 
1798, The moderate Interim Directorate and Representative Assembly, however, dug their 
heels in the sand one last time. In an attempt to still prosecute Van Langen and Fijnje despite 
of the French ‘request’, they instructed the Court of Holland to reassess the case against them. 
On the 17th they asked the Court to assess whether their crimes had really been ‘too closely 
related to political affairs’65 but it seems that French pressure was too much to withstand. On 
19 December 1798 minister of justice Tadema requested the immediate release of Van Langen 
and Fijnje, which happened the following day. A possible sign of a grudge against Fijnje might 
be that his salary for his time as Director would only be paid after his death in 1809. Van 
Langen reappeared in politics in 1799 and would even be elected by three constituencies but 
the Directorate, possibly still embarrassed by the Amnesty and/or also holding a grudge 
against Van Langen, decided to prevent the appointment (Schama, 1977: 359). That, perhaps, 
was their way of punishing Van Langen after all. At the same time Van Langen still received a 
yearly allowance from the Kings Louis Napoleon, William I and William II until the day he 
died (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 8: 1011).  
An attempt to explain to a wider audience why so many would in the end not be prose-
cuted also appeared in the Bataafse Courant of 12 December 1798. This shows the mixed 
feelings the moderate Directorate had about the case. On the one hand, they knew the case 
was lost because the French wanted it to be over. On the other, they knew that what Van 
Langen and Fijnje had done was considered wrong and corrupt across the board. Letting them 
go would look bad. The Interim Directorate, then, had to navigate with care through this 
minefield of politics and public opinion. For this reason, the article not only provides an 
interesting public (legal) motivation for letting Van Langen and others go although the 
                                                 
63 NL-HaNA, Collectie 039 Gogel, 1752-1820, 2.21.005.39, inv.nr  74. 
64 NL-HaNa, Collectie 018 C. F. van Maanen (1895), 1709-1807, 2.21.114.02, inv. nr. 4: 604 – 605. 
65 Ibid., inv. nr. 608. 
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Directorate was clearly against it. “If”, the article stated, “we were to judge the case by our 
initial feelings [and a large amount of evidence, TK] then it would have been decided already. 
We would have painted a picture of two men [Van Langen and Fijnje, TK] who have wasted 
the nations’ money and used it for their own benefit, or at least helped each other in this [thus 
accusing Fijnje of ‘indirect’ corruption, TK], who abused the high dignity of their office which 
obligate them to practice the virtues they preached to their fellow citizens and to avoid 
committing crimes they are supposed to find highly punishable in others, the abuse of the 
nation’s money and especially converting this money for their own use. We would have shown 
you how such actions result in prosecution and trial. We would have also shown you the 
dangerous consequences should criminal procedures against them be halted for political 
reasons, an act surely [to be] condemned by all parties”. Then, however, the appeasing of the 
French starts. To twist things around, the French logic is after all adopted as the proclamation 
reads that “the abuse of state funds and in particular the use of these funds for personal gain 
has indeed been very intertwined with political events”. Because, it states, “these crimes have 
originated in the political events in such a way that without the revolution of 22 January, they 
could not have been committed […] we have decided to apply the amnesty to both men”.cclv 
Jeremy Bentham (1824: 366) once stated how “abuse can only be defended by fallacies”, i.e., 
that which is wrong can only be made to seem right by the (deliberate) use of incorrect 
reasoning. This seems to have been the case here. 
 
Public values from public opinion sources 
 
While some of the documents discussed above were circulated as pamphlets and can thus be 
considered a form of public opinion, there were also other separate public opinion sources on 
the case. These mostly included pamphlets and political periodicals written and published in 
response to the Memorie and Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij discussing the scandal surround-
ing the coups of 22 January and 12 June and, more specifically, the cases of Van Langen and 
others. In general, the views and arguments of different sources of values (legal, shop floor, 
best-opinion) are all reflected in various public opinion media. This demonstrates how all 
parties and vested interests managed to get their views across to whoever was willing and able 
to read their papers. One important periodical was De Politieke Blixem, most likely written and 
published by Bernardus Bosch or J.C. Hespe (Colenbrander 1905-1922, part II: 732, footnote 
2). The periodical argued in favour of the unitarians and the coup of 22 January. It put forward 
similar arguments as Vreede, Van Langen and Fijnje (see below for a discussion of shop floor 
sources), and said something simply had to be done to end the continuous debating and to 
start working on the future of the state. To the Blixem, much like the radical Directors, the end 
justified the means of revolution. Lumping together aristocrats, Orangists and federalists, the 
periodical blamed them for their pride and lust to rule and thereby justified the coup of 22 
January (De politieke blixem, 1797-1798, issue 36, 13 February 1798: 281-282).cclvi It was a shame, 
though, that the radicals (or at least some of them) were guilty of exactly the same ‘offences’. 
A similar point of view was offered by J.C. Hespe’s De Constitutionele Vlieg, a series of commen-
taries revolving around a fly that, figuratively of course, managed to enter people’s homes 
unnoticed and listen in on their conversations, only to later comment on their arguments, 
views and opinions. The introduction of the first issue can be considered exemplary for many 
similar political writings in this period. In it the Vlieg says he will be “just and fair, but never 
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sparing anyone who deserves critique, like those who engage in pernicious ‘diabolocracy’ [the 
devils’ democracy or could it mean oligarchy? TK], those demagogues, those hunting for 
offices and engaging in party politics. The Vlieg wrote (Hespe, 1798, issue 1: 2) how he had 
been favourable to the coup of 22 January and vouched to help complete it by “exposing fake 
friends, double-hearted, self-interested people and plotters and schemers and distinguish them 
from true and virtuous believers in the revolution”.cclvii He promised to fight “those who stir 
up discord, schemers, fortune hunters, ignoramuses and unfettered and loud Patriots”.  
On 9 June 1798, in an attempt to attack bribery and other vices, the Vlieg tells the story 
of the Roman consuls Marcus Curius and Caius Fabricius; symbols of incorruptibility in 
administration whose depictions were, for precisely this reason, on the walls of the Amsterdam 
burgomasters’ chambers in the town hall (the story of Marcus Curius, who refused a bribe 
from the Samnites and chose turnips over gold, is depicted on the cover of this book with a 
painting by Govaert Flinck). To the Vlieg the Romans exemplified the good virtues of justice, 
honesty, and simplicity. They were steadfast and selfless. Bad characteristics, on the other 
hand, were chaos, lust to rule and self-interest (Hespe 1798, issue 3: 17-18). On 16 June 1798, 
four days after the moderate counter coup, the Vlieg discusses the case against Eykenbroek 
and, by association, Van Langen and others. He calls upon them to provide a full account of 
their dealings (Hespe 1798, issue 5: 34). At the core of the message lies the fact that what 
happened on and after 22 January is in principal not a problem. Only when those participating 
in it acted out of self-interest does the coup become questionable. Finally, Cicero’s On Duties 
(see book 1, chapter 25) referred to by the Vlieg to provide lessons in politics and administra-
tion. Most of all, administrators should serve the interest of the citizens who have entrusted 
their faith in them. They should serve the state’s interests instead of particular ones (Hespe 
1798, Issue 20: 43-44). 
In this way the journal echoes some of the (initial) legal arguments of Van Maanen and, 
we can say, the French. As long as actions had been public business (Van Maanen) or ‘political 
dealings’ (the French in their amnesty) things were not so bad. As it was, though, since the 
men of 22 January did not meet these requirements, the Vlieg was glad they had been removed. 
The members of the constituent assembly and the radical Directorate had, after all, made a 
mess of things: “they had trampled on the rights of the people, renounced reasonable and 
moral principles, had been blinded by lust to rule and had, by the mad urges of some of its 
members, thrown away the esteem they would have received otherwise”.cclviii Van Langen and 
others had, according to the Vlieg (Hespe 1798, issue 6), “jeopardized property and personal 
safety of civilians, given offices to ignorant debauched and blind members of their own 
faction, driven the best patriots from government, made use of services from a swarm of 
intriguing men”. Had they not, indeed, “pillaged the nations’ treasury to satisfy those who were 
bankrupt [Van Langen’s business? TK]. Yes, millions have been wasted to bribe the French 
government to help them in their cause”.cclix It was time, the Vlieg said, for the “justice, fairness 
and all honest principles that have been adopted in the constitution after so much trouble.”cclx 
Issue number eight went on to accuse Van Langen directly. It said “well now, former director 
Van Langen. It is a nice sum, to get fifty thousand guilders all of a sudden for your personal 
use” (cf. Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 8: 1011). But, the Vlieg continued, “quod non audet regnandi 
cupido – what does lust for power not bring about!” (Hespe 1798, issue 8: 33). The Vlieg warns 
of men like Van Langen and others who had “wasted the nations’ time. Heed those chame-
leons, showing their different colours at will, blowing in the direction of each new wind 
(compare the image of a wind vane discussed in chapter seven, see also Lok 2009). They are 
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hunters for office, did not serve the nation, and wanted only wealth and splendour for 
themselves. They hide behind a mask of love for freedom and the people but shunning the 
name of citizen like the plague. Under such men, treasuries do not have bottoms, laws do not 
have impartial protectors and the people have no protection” (Hespe 1798, issue 8: 71-72).cclxi 
“Yes, Batavian citizens”, the Vlieg went on to say (Hespe 1798, Issue 8: 72-73), “pay heed to 
doubters, traitors, the rich and shouting wallowing in abundance. Choose [in the upcoming 
elections, TK] an honest man, someone from among you, someone you know. Chose someone 
who loves people, is honest and affable and who has not, through conceit or haughtiness risen 
above his true status, who is virtuous, down to earth and cool headed. Chose those who know 
how to unite a lofty character, excellent merits, a great spirit, proven wisdom and political 
principles with a virtuous civic lifestyle.cclxii 
A final telling and quite common public opinion view is provided by the journal De poli-
tieke donderslag (Political Thunder, the follow-up of Political Lightning) which appeared from 23 July 
1798 until 17 September 1798 in 10 issues. In the very first issue (De politieke donderslag, 1798, 
issue 1: 4-5) the author explains his reasons for publishing the journal as he writes: “Keep an 
eye out, Batavians! For those creatures who speak with conviction to pick your pockets”.cclxiii 
He then explicitly mentions Van Langen, Fijnje and Vreede: “those infamous political 
charlatans” who had fortunately been “crude or extravagant enough to show their true colours, 
or else we would perhaps have been stuck with them for a long time to come, to all our ruin 
[…] never could the ex-director Van Langen have provided a better service to the nation than 
to use a lot of money in so little time; the sooner he would be caught out”.cclxiv The author 
speaks of the fact that Van Langen had been too slow to see what was coming on 12 June. 
Fijnje and Vreede, however, had been quicker on their feet (to escape trough the window, TK) 
as the author continues: “the great Pieter Vreede and Wybo Fijnje were more clever and took 
to their heels. Could these statesmen, with their escape, have proven even better that it is easier 
to swear on the battery [as in a group of large guns and the men handling them, TK] in service 
of the country than it is to be killed this way”.  
The author seems to say how the Directors had not stuck to their word, had only made 
easy promises and had let others (the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle?) do the hard work. He 
continues (De politieke donderslag, issue 1: 6-7) saying: “when we observe the mess that has been 
left by the three ex-directors, we have to wonder how it is possible that so much was still done. 
With so many unskilled skippers on the bridge who knew not of quay, ship or wind it is 
incomprehensible that they have not utterly ruined the fatherland, incomprehensible that the 
ship of state has not struck on a rock in splinters”.cclxv As it turned out, the author concludes, 
“we have been cheated by this miserable lot of war-horses, by the shining cover with which 
they concealed their true identity and learned, to our disgrace, that all that shines is not gold 
[…]. Piet Vreede writes nicely but throws dust in our eyes. When it comes down to it, deeds 
are lacking” (De politieke donderslag, issue 1: 6-7).cclxvi Perhaps the author makes reference to the 
Patriot pamphlets which Vreede had published (see for an overview Molhuysen 2008, part 9: 
1245ff). The comment here serves to state how the radicals talked the talk but not walked the 
walk or, in present terms, displayed a lack of integrity.  
In another issue of 27 August 1798 the author returns to Vreede and discusses whether 
it had been right to let him return to the Batavian Republic (De politieke donderslag, issue 7: 52). 
To the author, Vreede’s flight had clearly been an act of cowardice and his return could be 
dangerous. If, so the pamphlet reads, Vreede believes to be innocent than he should turn 
himself in since “the nastiness of a dungeon can not startle an honest heart”.cclxvii In the second 
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issue of 30 July the author deals with Eykenbroek cum suis as he notes how the constitution 
after 22 January was forced upon the nation and became a toy for fortune seekers and bullies 
(De politieke donderslag, Issue 2: 13). Another issue of 6 August provides an imaginary discussion 
between boss Piet [Pieter Vreede, TK] and his henchman Jacob [Van Langen, TK] in which 
Jacob confesses to Piet that the fourth of may [the day the ‘unconstitutional’ Representative 
Assembly had been elected out of the purged constituent assembly, TK] still weighs heavy on 
him (De politieke donderslag, Issue 3, 6 August 1798: 20). In the same issue, finally, a folk song is 
presented on Jan Eykenbroek and Pieter Vreede (De politieke donderslag, Issue 3: 23-24). It sings 
Pieter Vreede handed out offices to his friend and selected men who were only famous for 
their screaming. It sings of the use of public money to provide Eykenbroek with security and 
high office. It also sings of how Eykenbroek went to negotiate even though he had no 
knowledge of things and of Eberstein who was so skilled in cheating and acting like a wind 
vane in stealing money and breaking their oath and duty”.cclxviii 
 
Public values from shop floor sources 
 
While some shop floor accounts have been discussed in the previous as well, separate ones 
can, finally, be found too. In the following I will mainly focus on Van Langen and Vreede as 
they published their personal account of events in pamphlets. Their opinions are in part of 
course justification strategies of accused men. Still, their accounts simultaneously contain shop 
floor ideas on appropriate conduct. Their accounts tell us what values or norms they adhered 
to; whether there were differences of opinion between them and other sources and what they 
thought of the accusations. Also, I will focus on reports of their interrogations by the investi-
gators in the case to discuss how various actors in the scandal felt, thought and argued. Finally, 
I pay attention to private correspondence in letters, for instance between Eykenbroek and Van 
Langen and between Van Langen and Vreede, and notes as they have been gathered and 
organized by Colenbrander. 
On 9 October 1798, Pieter Vreede submitted a seventy page long account to the Repre-
sentative Assembly of his “public behaviour” which had resulted in his removal from the 
Assembly.66 With his account Vreede hoped to rehabilitate himself by “separating guilt from 
innocence and accusation from proven truth” (1798: 1-2).cclxix It was partly a direct response to 
the Memorie and Authentique bylagen tot den 12 Junij and provides an interesting view on Vreede’s 
shop floor views. According to Vreede, the federalists, aristocrats and Orangists had been the 
truly self-interested ones. This, together with the paralysis of the state due to the continuous 
bickering between moderates and radicals over the form of the state and the new constitution, 
had been sufficient reason for the coup of 22 January and the following purges. As Van 
Langen would later argue as well (see below), without a coup it would have been impossible to 
end “the paralysis and lack of administration and create an energetic government” (Vreede, 
1798: 9-12). Vreede (1798: 15), interestingly, then stresses the fact that the purging had been 
done irrespective of rank. Also, where mistakes had been made, they had corrected them.cclxx 
Furthermore, the accusation that he and the others had been guilty of acquiring offices and/or 
helping friends to them was ridiculous.  
                                                 
66 NL-HaNA, Collectie 001 Dumont Pigalle, 1780-1800, accessnumber 2.21.057, letter QQQQQ; NL-HaNA, Wetgevende 
Colleges, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 509. 
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To Vreede, appointing like-minded people and purging opponents might have constituted 
nepotism and/or favouritism but this was natural in times of revolution. He writes: “was it a 
crime or a duty that we began to purge all constitutional powers; and appoint those persons, in 
the departmental administrations and municipalities, whose views were the same as ours?” 
(1798: 56-57). Vreede then turns things around (as Van Langen would too, see below) and 
focuses on the many things others did wrong. He argues that any government will always be 
surrounded by people asking for offices. He, however, had never felt this hunger and had thus 
never satisfied it. Others, however, wanted to put their relatives in lucrative offices; others have 
always tried to come out on top with every change of government; others have come forwards 
as Patriots only to disappear to the back once they got their fat piece in their possession, but 
never had he acquired any position for himself for other reasons than doing his duty and being 
of use.cclxxi ‘Never’ probably had a peculiar meaning to Vreede as he admitted to have helped 
his second son Paul to a job at the ministry of foreign affairs. Importantly, Vreede does 
however sense this might have been a wrong move but tries to redeem himself by rhetorically 
asking: “is this lust for offices of a father who has six sons, who has never before taken 
anything for himself while always fighting for the cause of freedom?” (1798: 56-57).cclxxii 
Apparently, nepotism was alright according to Vreede as long as one also fights for ‘freedom’. 
Having defended the coup and the purges and having denied any wrongdoing in getting 
offices for himself or his family, Vreede (1798: 37) then goes on to counter other accusations 
made against him and the Directorate as a whole. He agrees that any criminal activity should be 
thoroughly investigated: “rightly so!”, he says, “investigate these evil deeds! Rightly so! Let the 
world know! Call it stealing, thievery, thievery of the land if you will. While I desperately hope 
that my colleague [Van Langen, TK] will be able to give a full account of his actions […] there 
is not a shred of evidence that I have been involved in any crime. It appears that no evidence 
has been found against any of my other colleagues [either]”.cclxxiii However justified it is to 
investigate crimes, Vreede (1798: 38) believes it is unfair how the entire Directorate should be 
held accountable for the actions of only a few of its members.cclxxiv A feeling Van Langen 
would also express (see below). 
Next, Vreede counters accusations launched in the Memorie (and various public opinion 
sources) that the Directorate had wasted public money on idle and extravagant display and 
food (1798: 39-41). He remarks that the Directorate had spent money on tablecloths and 
furniture (presumably for their new lodgings in The Hague) and on a big dinner for the corps 
diplomatique. He then launches a counter attack and asks: “does this deserve a reprimand? Is this 
excess? What am I to think of such an accusation? When the nation gives that money to the 
Directors, how can it be berated when they use it?” He sounds indignant now as he continues: 
“Yes, we have been to the theatre. Occasionally we needed relaxation from working all day, to 
keep on serving the nations’ interests at night with renewed strength, is that criminal? Yes, we 
have used carriages. The five Directors, the first civil servants of the Republic, rented two 
carriages a month! Would it even have been a crime had we bought five? Our dinner table was 
always sober and orderly, never wasteful. Never did we indulge in drinking. Why the commo-
tion about the costs of our expenses and lodgings? Why these accusations that we waste 
money meant for widows and orphans on useless things? Would the nation be better off if its 
Directors put money [which was apparently rightfully theirs to spend, TK] in a box without 
touching it?”cclxxv  
Not a word is, perhaps not surprisingly, said by Vreede about any deal with the French 
and the fact that his and Van Marle’s company had been involved in supplying cloth. He does 
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speak of the secret negotiations between the radicals and Barras and about the use of men like 
Eykenbroek. In a passage that would have made Machiavelli proud, Vreede (1798: 60) writes 
how secrecy and lack of morality is often a virtue. The end simply justifies the means as: 
“diplomacy follows different values, different morals and different duties. The honest man, 
used to sincerity and having an open mind, is unsuitable for it. He is fearful of the slippery 
paths that need to be taken, his morals prevent him from doing what needs to be done”.cclxxvi 
To Vreede (1798: 61), what he calls “Italian statecraft” is inevitable and can therefore never be 
a crime.cclxxvii The use of morally corrupt men like Eykenbroek is, consequently, not wrong 
either which Vreede explains with two simple analogues. In the first (1798: 62) he writes: “a 
flamboyant nobleman, arriving with his horse and carriage, ringing the doorbell of a house and 
finding out he is not allowed to enter, surely is less suited for diplomacy than a civilian who 
arrives on foot, goes through the back door and gets things done”.cclxxviii In a final analogy 
(1798: 63) Vreede notes that like a general on a battlefield, he knows “to expect something 
different from his spy than from his chaplain”.cclxxix 
Van Langen also did not remain silent on the affair. In a public statement somewhat 
similar to Vreede’s, he discusses the coup of 22 January, his own part in it and addresses some 
of the accusations against him.67 Since 12 June, Van Langen had been arrested, prosecuted and 
detained for months. Although he was eventually freed in the general amnesty he had, 
arguably, been hit hardest by the entire ordeal and desperately tried to clear himself if only to 
stop his cloth business from going under (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 8: 1011). On the coup 
and purges after 22 January, Van Langen was clear and brief. To him the removal of political 
adversaries, “those not belonging to our system” had been perfectly in order. The end justified 
the means since without the purges and removals, nothing would ever have gotten done 
(Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: 605). In the process of clearing himself, Van Langen 
accused others of immoral behaviour just like Vreede had done. While trying to drag others 
along in your fall and spreading the responsibility is, perhaps, a logical or human response, it 
also provides an interesting view on Van Langen’s own morals. After all, the accusations he 
made tell us something about what he believed or knew to be wrong. At the very least it tells 
us what he knew others would consider wrong or morally corrupt behaviour.  
Van Langen wrote how the Directorate had had to ‘thank’ General Barthélemy Joubert, 
representative of the French army in the Batavian Republic (Molhuysen, et al., 2008, part 7: 
687) and Delacroix with ‘proper’ gifts. Joubert was offered a couple of horses which the 
Frenchman apparently refused, replying he wanted a thousand guilders instead (Colenbrander, 
1905-1922, part II: 615). Delacroix received ten thousand guilders according to Van Langen. A 
note by Van Leeuwen to the Directorate seems to confirm Van Langen’s story at least partly 
when Van Leeuwen discusses the gift when he writes: “I have to tell you that since we are up 
to our elbows in money [EIC credit? TK], we should honour our commitment to minister 
Delacroix and give him a present so he can buy furniture and other nice things” (Pijman, et al., 
1798, appendix 22, 6 February 1798).cclxxx The simple note caused quite a row when it was 
disclosed, as the Interim Directorate considered it proof of how the radicals had carelessly 
wasted the money entrusted to them (Pijman, et al., 1798: 40-41).cclxxxi Van Langen, however, 
seemed to want to show how much worse some others were compared to him. At the very 
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least, it proved he was not alone in seeking riches or wanting to profit from political circum-
stances. 
Van Langen (like Vreede) also discusses the scramble for offices that erupted immedi-
ately after 22 January. General Daendels had reminded Van Langen of his services to the coup 
of 22 January and had demanded offices for himself, for one of his nephews and for his friend 
J.C. Hespe (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: 603).cclxxxii Apparently Deandels was refused 
these favours, something which according to Van Langen had caused Daendels’ ‘betrayal’ on 
12 June (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: 607). Van Langen recounts how others had equally 
tried but failed to acquire offices through him which had turned them into enemies of the 
Directorate. One of them was Admiral Jan Willem de Winter, who was taken hostage by the 
English after the disastrous Dutch defeat at the battle of Camperdown on 11 October 1797. 
De Winter had, according to Van Langen, asked for compensation for his dining expenses 
while imprisoned. When Van Langen told him that “since he technically was not in command 
of any fleet, let alone a ship, he could not possibly expect this to happen”. De Winter had not 
been amused. After 12 June, incidentally, the Interim Directorate would still pay the Admiral 
21,600 guilders for his expenses while in England (Colenbrander, 1905-1922, part II: 607).  
In his public statement Van Langen (like Vreede) does not mention the deal with the 
French or his attempts to straighten his own business with public money. However, he does so 
in other places. The archives of attorney general Van Maanen contain several personal 
accounts from Van Langen concerning the case as he was detained and questioned. He also 
apparently started an illegal correspondence with Wybo Fijnje who was also incarcerated in the 
same prison in The Hague68 in which he provides an account of his interrogations which are 
otherwise not to be found in the official case files. These letters and notes provide detailed 
accounts and excuses of what he had done and offer a unique and honest-as-can-be view on 
how Van Langen perceived his case and behaviour.69 After all, to each other the ‘accomplices’ 
Van Langen and Fijnje might not have had many secrets. Furthermore, the fact that the letters 
were intended to remain secret add to the truthfulness of these accounts compared to public 
statements intended for a wider audience. As it was, however, the notes were intercepted. 
During the first interrogation, when questioned on possible bribery by Van Langen, the 
latter denied ever to have bribed anyone. The sums of money taken from the EIC for his 
personal use had instead been meant for “travel expenses and correspondence”. The bills of 
exchange found by the investigators – a great number of handwritten bills are attached to the 
file as evidence – could, according to Van Langen all be accounted for. When asked why the 
investigators could not find any proof of this, Van Langen responded that he had made verbal 
instead of written agreements with the rest of the Directors. The money and cloth given to 
Eykenbroek to conduct business with the French could not be considered bribery either. 
Rather this was meant for “secret negotiations”. When asked whether Fijnje was aware of these 
bills of exchange, Van Langen answered yes. Finally, Van Langen was confronted with his 
letter to Eykenbroek (where he had insisted on proceeding as planned). When asked what he 
had meant by this, he answered that this was simply to protect “the system of 22 January and 
                                                 
68 NL-Ha-NA, Collectie 018 C. F. van Maanen (1895), 1709-1807, 2.21.114.02, inv.nr. 27. 
69 NL-Ha-NA, Collectie 018 C. F. van Maanen (1900), 1717-1867, supplement 2, 2.21.114.03, inv.nr. 18: Secret letters by 
the removed representative Van Langen to Pieter Vreede during the former’s incarceration at the Voorpoort in The 
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to serve the nation”.70 His own commercial interests had nothing to do with it. The second 
interrogation mainly served to find out why Van Langen and others had continued using the 
funds of the EIC even after they had gained legal access to funds from the committee of 
foreign affairs (once they had become the Directorate). Van Langen says they at first did not 
know of these other funds. When they eventually found out it was easier, he said, to keep on 
using the credit of the EIC. Besides, he added, many people working at the EIC had had a 
hand in the coup of 22 January (remember the 3000 guilders Van Langen paid to Pieter 
Ondaatje, see earlier). This made sticking to EIC funds a logical choice. Van Langen denies 
they used the EIC to keep withdrawals hidden. Again he remarks that he had verbally asked 
and gained consent from Vreede and the others.71 
After a while the interrogators seem to have gotten annoyed with Van Langen. When, 
finally, they ask whether he really thinks he does not need to take any personal responsibility 
and account for his actions, Van Langen continuously refuses to do so.72 He tells them that if 
they had a problem with the way things had been done they should ask the entire (former) 
Directorate and not just him. Everything he had done had been on behalf of the Director-
ate.cclxxxiii Apparently he considered himself a scape-goat (see earlier). Whether he actually 
meant this is impossible to tell but he did remain consistent just as his interrogators remained 
convinced that he could not hide behind the other directors and kept applying pressure.73 They 
told Van Langen outright that “this way it will take a long time before we can make any 
progress with your case. You can’t deny personal responsibility or call on the other Directors. 
We will need a different answer”.cclxxxiv This they would not get, even when they confronted 
Van Langen with paperwork showing the deals with Pessers and Guerin. Importantly, from his 
answers it becomes clear how he did not consider it wrong in any way to use his own firm and 
settling his private business with public money from the EIC. Much like Vreede had argued, as 
long as the nations’ interests were served as well it did not matter to Van Langen where the 
money went. There was, in other words, no sense of any conflict of interest on his part. 
Besides, Van Langen recounts saying to his interrogators in another letter74, the other Direc-
tors knew everything and also did it, which made it alright.cclxxxv Van Langen might have had a 
point here. Resolutions from the radical Directorate show, for instance, how Vreede had 
approved of getting 400,000 guilders from the EIC.75  
 
8.4 Analysis and concluding remarks 
 
In the following – as in previous chapters – I will conclude this case study with a brief 
overview of the main public values in the case. I will also provide a comparison between the 
various sources of values and will then address questions of change and continuity of public 
values in the context of wider institutional developments (such as democratization and 
politicisation) in the French-Batavian period. 
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Public values and value statements in the case 
 
The case study has provided an extensive amount of public values, value statements and 
notions of political corruption. The first thing that becomes clear is that wrong public official 
behaviour could mean many different things to different actors. This conclusion is not as 
trivial as it may seem. It tells us there was quite a large variety of terms and concepts with 
which to condemn or condone public official behaviour. Furthermore, when we survey the 
third case study and the large amount of values, value statements and notions of political 
corruption, these can roughly be classified in two categories. 
First, there seems to be a category of values and value statements that were either new 
or at least re-emphasized. This included having a lust for power and the abuse of power which 
were considered wrong or immoral especially since both were often regarded as a betrayal of 
common good and popular sovereignty; concepts that seems to have acquired new meaning or 
gained importance in the period (see below). According to many, it was wrong to abuse the 
power that people had invested in an office (and not, importantly, so much in a person). This 
requirement is interesting as it denotes the existence of the idea among various actors that the 
power of administrators was derived from a mixture of trust and a mandate which they had 
been given. We also find bureaucratic and behavioural or personal requirements as part of this 
first category of values and value statements. It concerns skills, capabilities or merits that were 
desired, supported or condemned. A large amount of desirables can be discerned in the case. 
Public officials should, for instance, act with tact, be calm, courageous, orderly, frugal, honest, 
trustworthy, virtuous, impartial, neutral in their work, be of lofty character, of good faith, 
moderate in their behaviour, reasonable, unpretentious, have ‘true and noble love for people’ 
and do as they promise. Undesirables, of course, also abound. Saying one thing but doing 
another (a lack of integrity?) was frowned upon and so was being disorganized in one’s 
administration. Public officials should not act like chameleons (i.e., ‘double-hearted’ traitors 
who change sides or ‘colours’ as they see fit), be conceited or haughty, doubtful, devious or 
loud. They should also not be plotting and scheming (faction strife), be drunk, sloppy, spiteful, 
stirring up discord, throw dust in someone’s eyes, or – in a very general and unspecified sense 
– be without morality or be incapable. 
Second, there is a category of values and value statements having to do with wasting 
money and time in general, and wasting public money and time in particular. In times of 
economic hardship and military defeatism, wasteful and excessive behaviour and an exuberant 
lifestyle, hunting for fortune, squandering money, idly wasting time and/or having a ‘blinding’ 
lust for offices and power were considered shameful and, we can say, corrupt. For example, 
the condemnation of the use of public EIC funds to pay for a coup d’état was considered to be 
mismanagement of public funds. Crucially, this was not the same as stealing, which seems to 
have been a accusation in its own right. Mismanagement and wasting public money and time 
denoted a lack of administration. The subtle but important distinction between taking public 
funds for personal benefit and wasting public funds on excesses while in office also becomes 
clear from a third category of values and value statements pertaining to the use of public funds 
for private benefits. This was called direct theft or stealing, satisfying one’s personal interests 
or fortune, lining one’s pockets at the expense of someone else, self-interest or expediency and 
self-preservation. Self-interest versus that of a wider community was an essential part of late 
eighteenth-century political corruption debates.  
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The term corruption only comes up twice in the case. First, it is used by the moderate 
Directorate when the radials are accused of enriching themselves with the nations’ money. 
Second, it is used when the Court of Holland prosecutes and charges Eykenbroek and others 
for their machinations against the safety of the state. Both instances have quite a different 
denotations, signifying abuse of public money for private benefit in the first instance and 
harming the state in the second. Political corruption, then, seems to have been used in both its 
wide classical and more narrow modern meaning (see chapter one). Furthermore, while the 
term itself only surfaces twice, its many surrogate terms also show that wrongful public official 
behaviour pertained to the moral decay of the whole body politic (a degenerated state of 
politics in which fraud, treason, sluggishness, indecisiveness etc. went hand in hand) as well as 
the individual behaviour of public officials who were stealing public money for private 
purposes. 
 
Comparing sources of values 
 
Interestingly, the morality expressed by a majority of different actors in the various sources of 
values was similar in several important ways. Nearly all sources had similar perceptions of what 
was corrupt and what was not. Wasting the nation’s time and money, engaging in party politics 
and/or faction strife, abusing the faith and trust invested in them by the people and having a 
lust for power and a desire to acquire offices were condemned across the board. Most of the 
other undesirables and desirables in the glossary also essentially seem to have been beyond 
dispute. The main actors in the scandal simply did not seem to propagate or endorse very 
different public values or views on right or wrong behaviour. When we compare some of the 
shop floor codes to political pamphlets, legal opinions expressed by Van Maanen or the 
moderate Directorate and best-opinion (see chapter five) we find they were essentially all in 
agreement that it was wrong to take public money for private purposes, to usurp power, to 
commit treason, to lie or to be disorganized (i.e., not keeping your administration in order). 
Again: while most groups and actors essentially argued from the same set of values they simply 
disagreed on whether they were guilty of such offences. Vreede, for example, wrote that he 
should indeed be tried if only he had actually committed the crimes he was accused of.  
Another example can be found in the fact that the moral reasons for the moderate 
counter coup of 12 June were similar to those of the radical coup of 22 January. The radicals of 
22 January believed they were fighting ‘the good fight’, just like the moderates after them 
would believe. In their declaration of 22 January the new Constituent Assembly had, for 
instance, said they wanted to stop the confusion and uncertainty of the past three years, they 
wanted to stop those who, for their own megalomania tried to prevent a unified administra-
tion. They wanted actions instead of words and wished to end lack of administration, rowdy or 
boisterous lust to rule, abuse of state funds for bribery, self-enrichment with the fruits of the 
people’s labour and strife and partisanship.76 These were all values and value statements that 
we also find among the moderates after June 12 and explains in part why some of the 
moderates of 12 June, like Gogel, had initially been on board on the 22nd but later decided to 
counter with a moderate approach to a shared ideal of a unitary state. In short, radicals and 
moderates in part argued from a similar or shared value system. 
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However, at the same time there were some striking differences in the public values and 
assumptions of proper behaviour between some of the actors and sources of values, mostly 
about the way the shared ideal was to be reached. The radicals of 22 January meant to secure a 
unitary constitution through purges, arrests and a parliament that was devoid of opposition. 
Long-winded procedures and tiring deliberations were all ‘democratic’ and fair but ultimately 
stood in the way of progress and the quick results that were required. In the end the radicals 
decided for the latter as becomes apparent from the motives expressed by Van Langen, Vreede 
and Fijnje. The end simply justified the means even if this required some form of ‘Italian 
Statecraft’, meaning secrecy, hole-and-corner-agreements and circumventing proper bureau-
cratic, political and/or shop floor procedures. The decree from the Constituent Assembly of 
22 January 1798 shows how this worked.77 To restore order, special measures are allowed “so 
that one understands that a temporary sacrifice of parts of our civic freedom do not serve any 
other purpose than to acquire a good constitution, through which we will ensure ourselves of 
an even greater pleasure of that freedom”.cclxxxvi  
While moderates like Gogel initially agreed with circumventing procedures by staging a 
coup to get things done, they soon disagreed with the measures and behaviour of their radical 
peers which resulted in the ‘parliamentary inquiry’ and the Memorie. A similar position was 
taken by political pamphleteers. While initially enthusiastic about 22 January the behaviour of 
the directors and the way the coup was executed eventually rubbed them the wrong way. The 
radical Directorate’s choice to remain in power, even when their own constitution essentially 
required them to step down, was equally unacceptable to public opinion in general and the 
moderates in particular. The appearance of what seemed to be a bit of ‘true liberty’ (see 
chapters four and five) left in the radicals (a small group deciding for the rest), was not 
appreciated either. Both moderates and political pamphleteers, in contrast, constantly argued 
how parliament and people were to be respected and how the purges had only led to the 
removal of good and honest men. The radicals, while initially on the right track, had simply 
gone too far. Circumventing proper elections and using the likes of Eykenbroek and their 
‘immoral’ characters for their schemes led to illegitimacy and a lack of accountability. It meant 
deception, treason, usurpation and the abuse of public trust and showed a lust for power and a 
desire to rule and to obtain offices at all expense.  
Finally, it is important to conclude that the payments of large sums of public money for 
French support seems not to have been the most problematic issue to either moderate 
Directorate, legal codes or public opinion. The real problem was the fact that some had tried 
to benefit personally from the common cause (compare what I mentioned earlier about the 
distinction between stealing and wasting public money). The only real difference between best-
opinion and public opinion on the one hand and some of the shop floor sources (Van Langen 
and Vreede) on the other therefore concerned the fact that some had tried to benefit person-
ally from the common cause, and had thereby mixed public and private affairs. Whereas the 
moderate Directorate, the legal investigators and the pamphleteers thought such a mix was 
wrong, Van Langen and Vreede (as well as the various members of the Eykenbroek-Eberstein 
circle) clearly thought otherwise. They seem to have thought it was perfectly in order to use the 
deals with the French as a private business opportunity. Van Langen and Vreede remained 
defiant in their position that it had been all right to obtain private gain from public office 
because it helped bring about the ‘common good’ of a unitary constitution which everyone 
                                                 
77 NL-HaNA, Wetgevende Colleges 1796 – 1810, 2.01.01.01, inv.nr. 33: 32. 
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wanted. However, to the other sources private gain from public funds meant a line had been 
crossed. Of course, Van Langen was probably right in pointing to the hypocrisy of others. 
After all, he had not been the only one trying to personally benefit from the Batavian Revolu-
tion. 
 
Change and continuity of public values and perceptions of political corruption  
 
At the beginning of this chapter a central question concerning changing public values and 
perceptions of political corruption in the French-Batavian period was put forward. This was 
the question whether the case study is able to show how the period’s increased state-formation, 
‘nation-building’ and democratisation (including politicization) together with a changing 
political culture (see chapter four) led to changing public values and perceptions of political 
corruption. Was the period, in other words, an important driver of public value change much 
like the periods around 1748 (chapter six) and the 1780s (chapter seven)? Also, a hypothesis 
was discussed concerning the possible end of early modern value pluralism. I will assess both 
issues in the following. 
When considering the first question we can note that the scandal does indeed show 
new or at least re-emphasized public values and perceptions of political corruption. Political 
corruption, so it seems, was increasingly framed in terms of modern public values, i.e., those 
linked to state-formation and democratisation of the period. These were in turn linked to a 
wider and more modern understanding of the common good and the public interest (compare 
chapter one on classical and modern definitions). The public value of representation now 
meant representing ‘the people’ instead of one’s friends, family or patron. A similar change can 
be seen in the value of accountability and/or responsibility. Now, public officials were 
accountable to and responsible for their lawful superiors (people, parliament and elected 
officials). Wider notions of the public interest and the common good (now entailing the 
Batavian nation rather than particularistic and autonomous provinces and cities) were of equal 
importance to new or reemphasized core public values such as loyalty (to nation, parliament 
and people instead of one’s family, friends or colleagues) and legitimacy (act in accordance 
with representative institutions and a constitution, instead of shop floor harmony and collegial 
office rotation). Endless political bickering, especially in times when the nation as a whole was 
in trouble, was often not condoned. For this reason, demagogy, usurpation and trying to rise 
above ‘one’s true status’ were rejected. 
It is in this context in which we can understand what was meant with phrases such as 
trampling on the constitution, trampling on the rights of the people and abusing the high 
dignity with which officials were bestowed by the people instead of by collegial bodies and 
mechanisms of office rotation. A similar conclusion concerning the changing meaning and 
increasing importance of common good and public interest can be drawn from another often 
recurring perception of political corruption in the case study: Van Langen and others did not 
just waste money and/or appropriated it for personal benefit. They wasted public money that 
belonged to the nation which (so it was apparently commonly felt at the time) desperately 
needed all the funds it could get to avoid a national military and economic catastrophe. 
According to all parties involved (apart from people like Van Langen and Vreede, see earlier) 
such conduct led to inadequate administration and amounted to nothing less than undermining 
the moral, economic and cultural revival of the new Batavian nation.  
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In addition to this first conclusion we can see how the fast rise and growth of a centralized 
Dutch state and the growing presence and power of its administration also seem to have had 
an effect on public morality. The case shows how the general actions of the Batavian govern-
ment as well as the individual actions of Van Langen and others sparked heated discussion on 
the correct form and functioning of the new state. As soon as representatives in parliament 
and Directorate government were placed in power by means of elections (no matter how 
limited as yet!) debate occurred about what these people should or should not do with their 
power. No longer were administrators supposed or expected to act only in accordance with 
their own beliefs and value systems. Again, it appears from this that the times of ‘true liberty’ 
in which a small group of regents decided what was best for all, were – although slowly – 
coming to an end. Furthermore, as administrators were indeed getting access to growing 
amounts of (public) resources (compare the EIC credit at their disposal) and offices (compare 
appointing ‘secret’ agents from the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle) questions naturally arose 
whether money had been spent well and whether appointments had been correct. Increased 
bureaucratization of a new ‘public service’ did in fact bring about increased or reinforced 
attention for values such as professionalism, merit, expertise, clear rules and regulations, clear 
hierarchy, loyalty to your superior and neutrality in the execution of your public duties.  
Similarly the voice of ‘burghers’ was more often expressed in political pamphlets which 
also might have influenced changing public morality. Perhaps from decades of reform from 
Doelists to Patriots to Batavians, many had come to believe they ought to have a greater stake 
in political life (i.e., participation) and a bigger say when things were handled wrong. This is 
expressed in the political literature of the time. Finally, democratization also led to faction 
strife based on ideological differences and the start of ‘parties’ and political debates on 
fundamental issues. It seems that in the midst of significantly restructuring the Dutch state 
attention was therefore also directed towards shaping and improving morality underlying 
public administration largely in line with the morally charged reform program of best-opinion 
Batavians (see chapter five). At the same time, as always, we should not be too hasty to draw a 
line in the sand. Old ways (nepotism, venality, patronage and family interests) were certainly 
not over after 1798 (cf. Schama 1977: 424-425). 
A second conclusion requires an answer to the question whether early modern value 
pluralism indeed ended around the turn of the nineteenth century in the Batavian Republic. 
Some of the assumptions from the beginning of this chapter (by Bayly, Engels and others) can 
now be confirmed as early modern value pluralism did in fact seem to be gone almost entirely. 
The fact that the case shows a basic agreement between the various actors and sources of 
public values proves, I argue, how the French-Batavian period witnessed a shift from the co-
existence of different and separated public value systems (such as shop floor versus legal-
bureaucratic) to modern coherent ideas of a unified value system and shared ideas on political 
corruption. In an early-modern sense, political corruption occurred when actions such as 
patronage, nepotism, not honouring seniority or rotation conflicted with face-to-face codes on 
the shop floor of everyday collegial political practice. The other sources of values, hosting 
other value systems, had little to do with it. In the early modern debates of chpaters six and 
seven, weak legal and bureaucratic standards usually came into play only after shop floor 
principles of harmony and face-to-face relations had been disrupted. The Batavian case, on the 
contrary, shows that there were not just different values and perceptions of political corruption 
at play (see earlier) but that there were also different debates going on between the various 
sources of values and formerly different and separated value systems.  
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Now, especially public opinion and best-opinion seemed to be able to counter and overcome 
long-since established shop floor dominance of face-to-face values. It is true that a few 
remaining shop floor actors in the case (such as Van Langen, Vreede, the various henchmen of 
the circle and all those who petitioned the radical Directorate for offices) still displayed an 
‘early modern’ mindset. However, despite these few remaining ‘pockets’ of value pluralism 
(change does not happen overnight) the case does show how modern perceptions started to 
become dominant in the debates. It became more difficult for administrators or politicians to 
be in two worlds at the same time and to hold on to early modern notions of administration. 
Instead, the Batavian case shows the clear emergence of a more coherent and increasingly 
accepted political view on corruption which we can still see today. The disambiguation of value 
systems had the effect of harmonization of shop floor, legal and public opinion norms into 
one single concept of the public office as distinct from the realm of private interests or social 
life. 
The case has therefore provided a view on how clashes between new ideas (such as 
popular sovereignty and adherence to a constitution) and established shop floor routines (such 
as office rotation or privately benefiting from public duties) led to the proposition and 
discussion of new public values and/or a renewed emphasis on existing ones. The institutional 
changes in the French-Batavian period thus caused old and new ways to fundamentally collide. 
Acts that had in previous decades been more or less accepted were now increasingly consid-
ered immoral and unacceptable. In this sense the Batavian Republic, and more specifically its 
two coups d’état, can be considered something of a critical juncture: a pivotal moment in the 
formation of a new direction taken not just in ‘politics’ but in morality as well. It is true, as 
already mentioned, that the Batavians of the 1790s owed much to the Patriots of the 1780s and 
even the Doelists of the 1740s. Still, it is clear that the Batavians succeeded where others had 
previously failed, also with regards to morality even though many new codes of conduct 
sometimes still had to sink in on the shop floor level. Research on other scandals in later 
periods will have to show whether, how much and why the ‘new’ ethics proposed by Batavians 
made a lasting impression. 
 






In the introduction I spoke of the need to find a way out of the quagmire of public morality. 
The contingency, normativity and intangibility of public values and ideas on good or bad 
administration might be inherent but it is not, I argued, enough to then say that the meaning of 
such concepts depends on who, where and when and simply leave it at that. Rather, the para-
mount importance of improved knowledge concerning the normative foundations of govern-
ment calls for explicit theoretically inspired historical-institutional research. When we revisit 
Michael Caiden’s parable from the introduction, then the ‘missing elephant’ (i.e., a historical-
institutionalist approach) has to lead us out of the quagmire. It has to help us understand 
public values, ideas on right or wrong public official behaviour (i.e., perceptions of political 
corruption) and change therein over time. Such an approach has required asking big questions, 
taking a long-term perspective and studying the intricate links between a complex and 
changing institutional context and public value change. More specifically, the aim of this study 
has been to investigate changing public values in Dutch history between 1748 and 1813 as they 
have become apparent in explicit scandals. This essentially served to help assess the moral 
grounding of power in the Netherlands in this period (with an emphasis on Holland) in order 
to substantiate, correct and complement existing knowledge. The study also aimed to connect 
with the other time frames in the wider research project and, last but not least, served to draw 
conclusions about the use of certain theoretical and methodological approaches to the study of 
changing public values. The research question was: which changes in public values and public value 
systems become apparent from scandals of political corruption in the Netherlands between 1748 and 1813? 
In this final chapter I will answer this research question and will revisit the aims of this 
study. This is not to repeat what has already been said in previous analyses and conclusions to 
the empirical chapters five to eight. Instead I focus on broad strokes, main lines of argument 
and overarching conclusions. Taken together, the individual snap-shots of the three scandals 
provide a view on which public values were at stake, what exactly constituted political 
corruption or right or wrong public official behaviour between 1748 and 1813 and allow us to 
assess diversity, change and continuity of public values. Although the term corruption itself 
hardly seems to have been used there were plenty alternatives with which right (as in positive 
public values) and wrong (as in negative public values) were indicated. In the following a 
general overview on public values and perceptions of political corruption throughout the 
period will first be provided as they became apparent in the examined sources of values. Then 
I turn to the question whether and if so when, why and how we can see any  public value 
change between 1748 and 1813. Conclusions regarding the use of theory (see chapters one and 
two) and methodology (see chapter three) are not treated separately but are provided through-
out.
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9.2 General conclusions 
 
Perspectives from best-opinion 
 
We have seen how various best-opinion proponents of three successive administrative reform 
movements between 1748 and 1813 explicitly articulated and proposed certain public values to 
morally improve public administrative behaviour. While there was much variety as well as 
disagreement (the movements did span half a century marked by profound social and political 
change), the movements and their representatives undoubtedly also had many things in 
common. There was ideological continuity from Doelists to Patriots to Batavians that can be 
seen as proof of the existence of a continuous current of revolutionary zeal and desire for 
administrative moral reform. The Batavian revolutionaries of the 1790s explicitly looked back to 
the Patriots of the 1770s and 1780s. In fact – and this shows an important personal continuity – 
both movements often consisted of the same people. The Patriots, similarly, had much in 
common with Doelist agitators of the 1740s, whether they realised it or not. Overall, we can say 
that while Doelists and Patriots initially failed politically they did have more permanent ideological 
success in the long run due to Batavian successes. As I have argued, in terms of practical 
application of ideas each later movement was, in hindsight, more successful than the previous. 
Shared ideals of Doelist, Patriot and Batavian best-opinion authors seem mainly to have 
consisted of achieving more political participation for ever larger and different groups of 
people and having a wider understanding of popular sovereignty, community and the common 
interest. Attached were shared understandings of political corruption that were tied to core 
public values such as loyalty, integrity or justice. These values were in turn explicitly connected 
to changing notions of ‘people’, ‘community’ and/or ‘common interest’. As a result, the 
position, functioning and proper moral behaviour of public officials was constantly reassessed 
and redefined. These shared ideals also expanded, gained momentum and increasingly became 
institutionalized between 1748 and 1813. The various Doelist demands of men like Van 
Gimnig or Rousset de Missy, such as greater political participation for a wider group of people 
and politics serving a wider common interest, were initially ignored in 1748/1750 but essen-
tially similar (although now expanded) public values returned with a vengeance in the 1770s 
and 1780s.  
In those later decades further refined and redefined notions of popular sovereignty, 
common interest, participation and representation became big issues (i.e., important public 
values) and perceptions of political corruption changed accordingly. Men like Van der Capellen 
and the authors of the Herstelling meant to ensure that public officials were to be humble 
custodians of the people’s interests rather than haughty despotic usurpers who ruled with 
impunity. They expected public officials to be loyal and accountable to people outside 
oligarchic regent circles and to adhere to principles not belonging to ‘traditional’ regent 
thinking that consisted of maintaining harmony, rotation of office and protecting family 
interests. In the works of various best-opinion authors in the 1770s and 1780s a new sense of 
political community – increasingly an actual union rather than a collection of autonomous 
provinces and cities – was therefore explicitly connected to a new sense of political corruption. 
A good and virtuous (i.e., non-corrupt) Patriot was to uphold his oath and duty to the nation 
and was meant to subordinate particular interests to himself, his family and his fellow regents 




to those of the ‘common land’ such as general wealth and prosperity. Such ideals reached their 
temporary peak in the Batavian state and its constitution after 1795.  
Batavian best-opinion authors took the earlier Doelist and Patriot lines of argument 
several decisive steps further. The bulk of the Batavians wanted to create a nation and with it 
community and common good became more fully developed and widened notions. These now 
slowly but steadily came to stand for all provinces and cities. Through new central institutions 
such as parliament and constitution, public values such as representation, accountability and 
legitimacy were either new or acquired new meaning. To many reform-minded Batavians, such 
as Gogel and Ockerse, political corruption constituted behaviour that did not fit such widened 
notions of community. It now explicitly meant betraying trust and power invested in you by 
the people. This signalled the beginning of the end of regent ‘true liberty’, which slowly but 
steadily came to be replaced by new ideals. To many Batavians, political corruption meant 
harming the newly built unitary and centralized nation. This harm was done, in particular, by 
engaging in faction strife, by serving personal instead of communal interests, by extravagant 
spending and lavish living, by bowing to foreign – first English and later French –  pressure 
and interests and by allowing particularism to continue. 
One can therefore conclude that best-opinion texts between 1748 and 1813 had a ra-
ther ‘classical’ or wide understanding of political corruption as the general decay of the body 
politic (see chapter one). When individuals were accused of political corruption this was often 
done in terms of the supposed polity-wide impact of their actions. This can for instance be 
deduced from the fact that to the Doelists selling personal offices for money was fine as long 
as that money went into the town’s coffers to serve ‘the community’. This would also ensure 
that regents could no longer build networks of patronage to stay in power. In best-opinion 
texts throughout the period, political corruption therefore by and large meant the decay or 
collapse of the political community and/or communal welfare and seems to have denoted 
selfish behaviour as opposed to altruism. Political corruption, as mentioned, usually meant not 
taking a wide enough view, according to Doelists, Patriots as well as Batavians, on the 
common good or public interest.  
In addition, especially from the Patriot period onwards, it was quite literally described in 
a very ‘classical’ sense as the degeneration or sickness of the body politic that was being 
invaded by the poison of corruption. To be sure, this could still mean different things in 
different times, allowing for a constantly differing meaning of political corruption. To many 
Doelists, for instance, a healthy system in which the guilds still had much power in the town’s 
government was being corrupted by selfish regent oligarchies. According to various Patriot 
best-opinion authors, the healthy body of a Republic was being invaded by the political 
corruption of the princely pretensions of a Stadholder and the abuse of his cronies. Likewise, 
to many Batavians the healthy, because unified, Batavian nation was threatened by political 
corruption in the shape of still prevailing particularistic tendencies and faction-strife. The 
pervasiveness of a classical understanding in the sphere of best-opinion can, finally, also be 
deduced from the fact that moral decay was often inextricably linked to decay (or corruption) 
in other key areas of society, such as politics, economy and culture. In this sense, fighting 
political corruption was closely linked to eighteenth-century attempts at moral rejuvenation of 
Dutch state and society.  
Of course, accusations of political corruption by best-opinion authors were also often 
based on more narrow standards. Firstly, accusations of political corruption based on a public 
office standard can sometimes – albeit rarely – be found. Occasionally best-opinion authors for 
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instance accused people of deviating from the formal duties and roles belonging to their office 
although these were mostly general references to upholding one’s oath and/or instruction. 
Sometimes best-opinion authors would also accuse people of not adhering to formal and 
informal rules of office rotation and seniority. Among the authors of the Herstelling we find – 
perhaps – the most elaborate vision on political corruption as the deviation of formal (legal-
bureaucratic) rules of office. However, there emerges a general lack of references to legal 
public office standards in best-opinion. This is understandable given the general absence of 
legal codes and bureaucratic rules of office in the cases described here.  
Secondly, best-opinion authors hardly ever referred to market-centred definitions of 
political corruption. Only occasionally, was political corruption linked to individual misconduct 
of ‘maximizing’ public officials. This happened, for instance, when Doelists referred to city 
administrators enriching themselves or when Van Langen was accused of stealing public 
money in 1798. Yet I argue that even these allegations were meant to emphasize a rather 
classical understanding of political corruption, which held that not being corrupt required 
transcending specific individual interests. Throughout the period it seems to have remained 
largely acceptable according to best-opinion authors for public officials to personally and 
financially benefit from their public office but only as long as communal or polity-wide 
interests were not harmed. This may have had mostly to do with the fact that certain structural 
bureaucratic arrangements (such as salaries) were not yet in place, but this is not a straightfor-
ward causal connection.  
Third, best-opinion authors had a decidedly neo-classical understanding of political cor-
ruption. That is to say: ‘classical’ wide notions were mixed with ‘modern’ narrow standards. 
Harming the general public interest (which could, admittedly, mean different things) as well as 
more narrow standards (such as the rules of public office), were both condemned as politically 
corrupt. This underscores the conclusions drawn earlier (see chapter one) that each standard 
on its own is not enough to define political corruption and that classical notions should not be 
taken out of the equation when trying to understand political corruption in past as well as 
present. It also relates back to a fundamental question asked in chapter one whether the 
changes or shifts in notions of publicness or common good as described by authors such as 
Weintraub or Münckler & Fischer actually occurred in the Dutch eighteenth-century context 
and what this means for assessing public value change between 1748 and 1813. Based on the 
aforementioned we can conclude that different notions of publicness (in the form of a 
‘classical Republican virtue model’ based on protecting the common good and in the form of a 
‘liberal economic model’ based on self-interest and/or individualism) indeed existed. At the 
same time the idea of a fundamental shift from the former to the latter has to be denied based 
on the research conducted here. From eighteenth-century best-opinion (as from various other 
sources, see below) it becomes clear that the Republican virtue model and a broad classical 
notion of political corruption never went away and remained very much alive alongside an 
emerging liberal economic model. In fact these two continuously clashed and the former seems 
to have even had the upper hand in the cases examined.  
 






Following Hoetjes’ heuristics, the views from best-opinion can be traced and compared to 
views held by other sources of values in the three case studies. While there was hardly any 
explicit link between best-opinion authors and their usually abstract and general ideology on 
the one hand and the legal, public opinion and shop floor views on the other, implicit 
connections can certainly be made by means of interpretation and comparison. In the 
following I provide an overarching perspective on public values and perceptions of political 
corruption from the other three sources for every case study. This serves to complement 
instead of repeat the conclusions and analysis sections at the end of each of case study. Again, 
main empirical conclusions are offered in combination with methodological and theoretical 
ones. 
 
Taxes, political corruption and moral reform 
 
Chapter six allows one to draw interesting empirical conclusions if only because tax collecting 
was a crucial and typical early modern task of public administration in the Dutch Republic. It is 
therefore likely – although this requires more research – that tax collecting stood as a model 
for other forms of public service delivery and that bureaucratization equally affected morality 
in other spheres of government. Chapter six shows that public authorities in various spheres 
took an active stance in improving both the system of taxation as well as the underlying 
morality of what was essentially a first-of-its-kind form of near complete public service 
delivery. In separating the public and private sphere and setting up a public system of tax 
collecting, the authorities – spurred on by an angry populace and a small band of active 
reformers – were forced to think of the moral standards that should be upheld by the new now 
public officials. As we have seen, for instance, the aim to increase tax revenue was subordinate 
to the aim to decrease ‘corrupt’ behaviour. Changes in the way taxation worked and its officials 
were supposed to function were not primarily instigated because of financial interests (after all: 
how could people have known beforehand that ‘going public’ would increase tax revenues?). 
This allows for a critical evaluation of institutional-economic views on anti-corruption efforts: 
reform occurred instead because of popular moral protest and opposition. This forced even 
Stadholder William IV and the Holland regents to allow men like Van Wesele and Vosmaer to 
devise a system of tax levying on a more equal footing. In addition, a system of taxation that 
had until then been based on utilizing self-interest for maximum financial gain for authorities 
as well as tax farmers was now thoroughly revised to end abuse of office, smuggling, nepotism 
and extortion. This happened in the interest of a new common good based on new bureau-
cratic ideals of public service delivery. Furthermore, the case study shows that economic self-
interest can hardly be described as the main or sole reason for either the occurrence of or the 
fight against political corruption.  
Chapter six has been able to tell us that being corrupt increasingly consisted of not ad-
hering to bureaucratic values or not working within a bureaucratic framework. We have seen 
how values such as loyalty to one’s superior, neutrality in the execution of one’s duties, 
maintaining hierarchy in a system, keeping one’s administration in order and/or displaying 
professional expertise and punctuality were either new or reemphasized. It also became wrong 
to mix public office with private interests – arguably the most crucial underlying element in 
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Weber’s ideal type – which was a revolutionary thought in a world that barely knew such a 
separation. Even more revolutionary, perhaps, was the fact that authorities actually largely tried 
to uphold the new or reemphasized bureaucratic rules. Reijers, Vaster, Cras and a host of 
‘lesser’ officials were by and large (but not yet entirely) held accountable according to the new 
bureaucratic standards. When looking at the other sources of values in the case we can see that 
political corruption also meant self-enrichment and wallowing in luxury, especially in times of 
economic hardship. It could also mean not serving the interests of the city by selling offices for 
personal benefit (compare – incidentally – a main Doelist demand as mentioned earlier) or 
extorting innocent and ‘hard-working’ taxpayers.  
Even though some old elements of the system of taxation remained after 1748 and 
some new or supposedly ‘modern’ elements already existed before 1748 the case shows 
definite changes in the relationship between public authorities, tax officials and tax paying 
citizens. The bureaucratic reforms went beyond bringing about centralization or uniformity in 
the system; they went to the heart of a changing public morality. Chapter six was suitable to 
investigate the use of Weber’s ideal type of bureaucratization to assess changing public values 
(compare chapter two in which I mentioned how different theories or models can be applied 
depending on the case at hand). The chapter has shown the theoretical and empirical relevance 
of the ideal-type in this way. From a theoretical point of view the benefits of using the ideal-
type and a ‘before-and-after’ approach to assess public value change seem paramount. 
Furthermore, the idea of bureaucratization as a catalyst for moral reform and public value 
change has, I argue, been able to partly fill the ‘Johnstonian hollow’. The ‘plane of fracture’ of 
1748 together with bureaucratic reform provided an important impulse for changing expecta-
tions, assumptions, rules and regulations that is likely to have guided and helped shape public 
official behaviour of decades and potentially even centuries to come. Chapter six provides little 
evidence of value pluralism. Continuing discontent, difficulties in functioning within the new 
system and even fraud after 1750 were not, I argued, evidence of clashing value systems. All 
actors, including the tax officials themselves, essentially seemed to agree on the new bureau-
cratic rules, regulations and values, perhaps because the system was now set up differently. 
Paying people salaries for instance made them less dependent on bribes and/or gifts. 
Finally, debates on the behaviour of corrupt tax officials such as Reijers, Vaster, Cras 
and others displayed both a narrow and a broad view on political corruption. The corrupt 
behaviour of individual officials was framed in terms of stealing money, extorting people, 
serving personal interests and not following the bureaucratic rules of one’s office. The latter 
was a significant change because here, fixed and elaborate bureaucratic rules of office became 
dominant. They essentially became the only standards required by such a narrow notion. What 
one can see here, as opposed to the other two case studies, is the beginning of dominant 
‘modern’ and narrow standards, that were mostly public-office centred, with which political 
corruption was defined. At the same time, echoing best-opinion views, a wider and more 
classic view on political corruption can also be seen. Public opinion was for instance quick to 
link the actions of Reijers, Vaster, Cras and essentially all other corrupt tax officials to the 
general decay of society embroiled in radical political and social change. Indeed, the entire tax 
riots might not have occurred on such a scale had other tensions not been around. The latter 
underscores the basic institutional design argument that changing institutions shape or change 
behaviour. Political corruption and moral reform in the field of taxation were linked to 
deviance from accepted norms and standards of tax official behaviour that had caused 
uncertainty and disorder. After 1748/1750 – compare the case of Cras – one was corrupt when 




one ignored the new collective institutionalized bureaucratic practices. This, in turn, can be 
linked to a final theoretical conclusion from chapter six that underscores the use and benefit of 
structural functionalist theoretical approaches and explanations. Based on the research of this 
study one cannot conclude that an increase in formal bureaucratic rules and regulations led to a 
decrease in tacit arrangements or that it led to a decline in political corruption. However, one 
can say that it was the express aim of men like Vosmaer and Van Wesele to bring into play new 
bureaucratic elements that would decrease the need for tax collectors to rely on ‘private’ (i.e., 
‘corrupt’?) elements. With this, a distinction was being made between private and public 
behaviour and each had their own time and place.  
 
Princely patronage and patriot cause 
 
In chapter seven, an altogether different sphere and level of government was investigated in 
the context of altogether different times. In part due to the rise of new political ideologies, 
such as those in North-America and France, the Dutch Patriots stressed and reemphasized 
ideals of popular sovereignty, civic freedoms and political participation. The times were also 
marked by the emergence of a distinctly political press. In many ways, although different 
sources of values showed different opinions (see below), the Patriot period witnessed full-
fledged attempts to finally get rid of ‘old’ structures of office rotation, collegial harmony on the 
shop floor, nepotism and princely patronage of a hereditary Stadholder and his clique on the 
one hand, and ruling regent oligarchies on the other. Princely confidants such as Van der Heim 
and Repelaer were powerful symbols and ‘proof’ to many that these old corrupt ways were 
destroying the once virtuous Republic. The system of princely patronage was not just targeted 
by ideologically inspired Patriots such as Van der Capellen, the authors of the Herstelling or the 
various political pamphleteers of the day. Practically motivated and self-serving excluded local 
regents also targeted it. Ironically, we have seen how both these ‘groups’ fought against the 
system of patronage but that they each had their own reasons for doing so and their own 
frames of reference. The first group of ‘innovators’ turned against nepotism, patronage, 
rotation of office and venality because these practices harmed the public interest, understood 
by them to entail popular sovereignty, participation, protection of the citizen against arbitrary 
and/or despotic rule and the rejuvenation of commerce and trade. The second group of 
‘conservative’ excluded regents were, so it seems, merely looking for ways to neutralize the 
Stadholder and his confidants so they could return to the old ways of ‘true liberty’ and town 
council politics based on collegial harmony and rotation. 
Political corruption, accordingly, could mean two very different things in Patriot times. 
The shop floor regents adopted a specific kind of public office centred definition. To them the 
single most important measure for political corruption still seems to have been harming 
collegial shop floor harmony that was still inextricably tied to the core of what it meant to hold 
public office. To the shop floor regents it was corrupt not to honour contracts of correspon-
dence, whether formally written down or not. To them political corruption – in an institutional 
design sense – therefore clearly meant not acting in accordance with institutionalized practices 
of the bigger collective. The disregard of seniority and office rotation meant that expectations 
were not being met and implicit promises were not being kept. For this reason, the patronage 
and scheming of the princely confidants clearly did not make sense to them and did in fact 
create uncertainty and disorder. The shop floor regents had no intention of widening the 
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political sphere or the idea of common good to include a wider variety of people in the 
political process. What still mattered most to this regent oligarchy was keeping power away 
from Stadholder, reform-minded Patriots or ‘populace’. To best-opinion and public opinion 
however, political corruption meant exactly the opposite: a corrupt public official took care of 
his own interests or those of a small group instead of looking out for the bigger community. 
Here a public interest definition was adopted.  
In addition, this core contrast between the two ‘groups’ is proof that there now started 
to emerge some sort of ‘ethical monism’. Although different parallel value systems (i.e., value 
pluralism) still existed, it was increasingly less possible or desirable to adhere to both systems – 
shop floor harmony on the one hand and best-opinion and public opinion ideas of the 
common good on the other – at the same time. It was a process that would be shaped much 
further at the end of the eighteenth century (see below). Finally, we should again consider the 
fact that both narrow and classical views played a role in the debates surrounding the actions 
of men like Van der Heim and Repelaer but that the latter again did seem to have the upper 
hand. Individual acts of princely confidants were continuously framed as acts that harmed the 
entire body politic. Gathering wealth and keeping offices for oneself were wrong in the sense 
that  this deprived others from a ‘fair’ share of the pie. To the Patriots these old practices 
literally and figuratively stood in the way of moral, political and economic rejuvenation. They 
wanted to make society healthy again, if only to bring about a new glorious ‘golden age’. To the 
shop floor regents the acts of princely confidants corrupted their old and ‘just’ system of 
administration based, again, on seniority, rotation and above all harmony. Between both 
groups we therefore find little evidence to support institutional economic approaches that view 
political corruption as purely financial maximization. The Patriots seemed to have a wider 
agenda and to the shop floor regents the principle of harmony entailed more than financial 
gain. It is also difficult to take a Weberian ideal-typical view on the case. Bureaucratic standards 
hardly seemed to have been in play. Apart from some references to oath and instruction, true 
legal-bureaucratic arguments to assess political corruption or to change system and/or 
behaviour do not emerge from the cases. The above means, again, that the findings from 
chapter seven demonstrate the need for a ‘neo-classical’ approach to corruption and changing 
public values.  
 
Gin, cloth and meat: political corruption in the Batavian Republic 
 
In many ways the third and final case in chapter eight has offered a view on the final fulfilment 
of various attempts at moral and administrative reform, although not in any absolute or 
teleological sense. The ideals of the Patriot movement appear to have been only dormant and 
thus resurfaced towards the end of the eighteenth century. With the French Revolution 
breaking all sorts of barriers regarding previously nonnegotiable issues, the Dutch Batavians 
seized their chance to construct a unitary and centralized state that was based on improved and 
yet again widened political ideals and public values such as popular sovereignty, civic freedom 
and ‘true’ political representation. State-formation, politicization and a rudimentary initial step 
towards democratization thus had a profound effect on public values of the time. The shift 
away from particularism and towards a centralized unitary state seems to have also been based 
on a new and wider notion of common good and public interest and therefore on new public 
values. A central unitary state with a parliament, a constitution, a new political-administrative 




apparatus with more standardized procedures (such as a uniform code of law) brought about 
fundamental discussion about how the new government was to behave. It brought debates on 
how the state’s power – now more or less directly derived from the people through actual 
elections – should be exercised. It also brought further politicization and ideological strife with 
regard to proper and improper public administration. Especially in the first years of the 
Batavian republic – in many ways the birthplace of the present Dutch political system – 
discussions were held over political corruption and integrity. In these discussions, so the case 
concerning Van Langen and others shows us, fundamental and often new questions were 
asked regarding public values and/or political ideals such as representation, legitimacy of 
government and administration, responsibility and accountability and a stricter separation 
between public and private sphere. From the case it becomes clear that mixing public office 
with private commercial interests was ever less tolerable to a growing number of people. Here 
too, extravagant individual behaviour was not done in times of national hardship. The often 
heard accusation of wasting the nation’s time was, for instance, exemplary for this attitude. A 
similar conclusion arises from the fact that ‘Italian Statecraft’ (hole-and-corner dealings, 
scheming, plotting and using EIC credit) was acceptable as long as it could alleviate the 
nation’s troubles. Essentially, the case often shows structural functionalist arguments why 
political corruption was a necessary evil.  
Political corruption in Batavian times was therefore framed rather differently than be-
fore. The line between corrupt and non-corrupt behaviour now came to be based on ‘new’ or 
at least re-emphasized public values, an even broader notion of the public interest and a clearer 
separation of public and private. Political corruption seems to have been used in both its wide 
classical and its more narrow modern meaning. It was used to refer to the individual wrongful 
behaviour by Van Langen and others who served personal interests. Here we mainly find a 
market-centred definition with which Van Langen’s behaviour was essentially condemned for 
his attempts to maximize profit. Again, apart from some references to oath and instruction, 
legal codes did not seem to be a criterion with which to assess or condemn behaviour as 
corrupt. As in chapter seven, a  public office centred definition of political corruption was 
lacking in the case study. Instead, a public interest perspective was again dominant. Political 
corruption mainly denoted behaviour that contributed to the general moral decay or degenera-
tion of the nation and the new Batavian structure. The case on Van Langen and others, finally, 
also showed a more fundamental transition from early modern value pluralism to a late 
eighteenth century coherent political view. Some ‘pockets’ of value pluralism undoubtedly 
remained: people like Van Langen and members of the Eykenbroek-Eberstein circle still 
behaved as though they could function according to a different value system and still believed 
(or wanted to believe) they could mix public and private as long as it was in some way still in 
the interest of the nation. However, due to a clearer demarcation between the public and the 
private spheres their behaviour was increasingly condemned. In many ways, the case thereby 
showed the completion of ‘ethical monism’ started in Patriot times and the beginning of the 
end of value pluralism. Public functionaries like Van Langen could no longer really be in two 
worlds at the same time. Now, there was only one public world in which one set of norms and 
values was idealized and enforced, of which the personal (private) sphere should no longer 
form a part. As a result the debate in chapter eight could simply not have occurred fifty years 
earlier. 
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9.3 Explaining political corruption and public value change 
 
So far we have gained a detailed insight of public values and perceptions of political corruption 
between 1748 and 1813. Of course, we have seen much continuity. Old and new were often 
still intertwined, things did not change overnight and attempts at reform could take a long time 
to find their way into the everyday practice of political-administrative life. In this respect it is 
certainly useful – if not necessary – to think of public value change as something that happens 
in different social spheres and are expressed in different sources of public values which are not 
always synchronous. The cases show significant public value change. Public official behaviour 
that had by and large been acceptable around 1750 stood a good chance of being fiercely 
condemned a mere fifty years later. In this section I assess how, when and why this change 
possibly occurred in so far as I have not already discussed this in concluding sections of the 
various preceding chapters. For answers I turn to the fundamental methodological and 
theoretical approaches adopted in this study. 
 
A neo-classical point of view on sources of public values 
 
A first set of conclusions concerning public value dynamics is derived from the methodology 
and heuristics employed in this research. This concerns Johnston’s neo-classical approach to 
understand and investigate political corruption in the context of scandal and debate and the 
use of sources of public values as distinguished by Hoetjes. The use and benefits of a Johnsto-
nian approach are now paramount. The cases have shown how a closer look at debate and 
conflict surrounding scandals of political corruption has been able to uncover many otherwise 
hidden public values and ideas on proper administration. We have also seen how individual 
approaches to defining and understanding political corruption (market-, public office-, public 
interest- or public opinion centred, see chapter one) are useful but that these single standards 
alone do not help us understand such a complex issue. Only a combination (such as in fact 
suggested by Johnston) provides more detailed insights into the contextual and contingent 
nature of changing public values and political corruption. Other conclusions stem from the 
connection between Johnston’s idea of change occurring through clashes, debates and 
contestation on the one hand and Hoetjes’ heuristics of (potentially clashing, overlapping 
and/or mutually reinforcing) sources of public values on the other. Despite some overlap and 
the fact that not all sources were always equally represented in every case, a combination and 
comparison of sources of public values has provided interesting perspectives on public value 
dynamics, or possible transitions from ‘old’ to ‘new’.  
A first conclusion to be drawn in this regard is that some sources were not well repre-
sented and therefore seem to have had less impact than others. Especially public values from 
legal sources have proven to be scarce. The reasons for this have been discussed throughout 
this study. Most importantly, a unified legal code did not really exist as the Rechtsstaat still had 
to come into being. The Republic’s particularism, its bottom-up administration and slow 
processes of codification are likely to have been major reasons for the latter. Also, legal 
motivations for sentencing were commonly lacking and higher public officials (compare the 
likes of Vaster in chapter six, Van der Heim and Repelaer in chapter seven or Fijnje in chapter 
eight) were often in the end not tried, and this was most likely due to social standing. Equally 
interesting with regard to the questions of this study is that legal codes consistently seemed to 




lag behind the codes on the shop floor and ideas expressed in best-opinion and public opinion. 
With the exception of the case study on taxation (although legal codes were also not always 
enforced there), legal codes could be there in theory but were mostly irrelevant in the actual 
practice of a scandal. Although for different reasons, in the cases of Van der Heim and 
Repelaer and in the case of Van Langen and others, prosecution and condemnation did not 
happen by means of legal codes.  
The question when and why legal codes truly became embedded as a standard for pub-
lic rectitude and a measure of political corruption will have to be further explored. Perhaps the 
single set of public values (as a result of a movement towards ethical monism, see earlier) that 
arose towards the end of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century only 
became firmly embedded after 1813 with the development, more firm institutional establish-
ment and codification of legal codes (introduced by the French) and, after 1848, the establish-
ment of the Dutch constitutional monarchy in a Rechtsstaat. Another conspicuously absent or 
underexposed element in discussions surrounding the scandals were religious views. Only very 
occasionally do the cases show writers (in essence only Bareuth) who offered a somewhat 
religiously inspired view. To clarify, this is not to say that religion did not have an influence on 
changing public values but that I have not found any references to such sources or arguments 
in the cases investigated here. This is surprising, given the representative nature and the size of 
the scandals and therefore offers interesting avenues for further research. Perhaps, it was due 
to an already quite advanced separation of state and church in the minds of the ruling regents. 
After all, as mentioned, they did not seem too willing to let any preacher teach them moral 
lessons on how to behave in public office. 
A heuristics of sources of values and an emphasis on ‘Johnstonian’ contest and debate 
have, finally, offered more than a view on what we did or did not find. Both tools have allowed 
us (again: despite some overlap) to see whether public values from some sources conflicted 
with other sources and/or whether special attention by administrators to one particular public 
value or set of public values resulted in the displacement of another. We can conclude that 
there have certainly been conflicts between the different sources. Corruption clearly acquired a 
different meaning depending on the source of values and/or the social sphere or group by 
which it was discussed. In general, the codes of the shop floor often conflicted with ideas 
expressed in legal sources – if at all applicable – in best-opinion and public opinion. Especially 
the rise of best-opinion and public opinion as sources of potentially new and/or reemphasized 
public values seems to have been a key factor in displacing shop floor views and changing 
public morality. At the same time differences and value pluralism have not occurred as often as 
one might have expected (see chapter one). The cases have shown an increasing alignment of 
opinions about which public values were important and what constituted political corruption. 
Possibly, the increased dominance of especially best-opinion, public opinion and, to a lesser 
extent, legal-bureaucratic values (i.e., at least visible in chapter six) over the shop floor and the 
emergence of some form of ethical monism demonstrates an important clash that itself 
functioned as a driver of public value change. 
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Historical intitutionalism and other theoretical explorations 
 
A second set of conclusions concerning public value dynamics is based on the historical-
institutionalist approach of this study combined with insights taken from the theoretical 
explorations of institutional design, structural functionalism, institutional economics and Max 
Weber’s ideal type of bureaucratization (see chapters one and two). With regard to historical 
institutionalism, we have been able to see how the interplay between continuity (slow moving) 
and radical (fast and sudden) changes in social and political processes in Dutch history between 
1748 and 1813 is able to partly explain changing public values in Holland in that period. The 
notions of path dependence (continuity) and critical junctures (radical change) have proven 
useful to explain how decisions and actions were at least in part shaped and determined by 
decisions and actions in previous decades. Any change in public values at the end of the 
eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century was due to a longer history of protest 
and attempts at reform. Furthermore, Doelists, Patriots and Batavians were part of an 
important yet slow moving series of attempts at moral reform and changing public morality 
but the actual realization of their ideals needed critical junctures such as tax riots, Patriot revolt 
and Batavian revolution.  
Other explanatory elements hypothesized by historical institutionalism can equally be 
seen in the cases. For one, existing institutions (defined broadly in chapter two) did in fact 
partly circumscribe the options for change and reform. Reformers like Van Wesele or Vosmaer 
could not change the system of taxation overnight, even if they had wanted to. Having fixed 
salaries to counter corruption seems, for instance, to have been an alien idea to many. The 
notion of self-interest as a driver of public service delivery proved equally difficult to eradicate. 
We have seen this in chapter seven, for instance, from the fact that it proved impossible to 
change overnight existing procedures of informal office rotation, patronage and acquiring 
public positions based on public standing or family ties. In addition, we have seen how 
asymmetries in power relations did play a role in determining what or who was or was not 
corrupt. The impact of social standing of public officials on their prosecution, for instance in 
the case of Reijers and Vaster, speaks volumes. Furthermore, a historical-institutional approach 
to public value dynamics has uncovered how misappropriation of (public) funds became 
increasingly unacceptable in times characterized by economic, social, political and/or military 
difficulties. A feeling of economic decline clearly led to debates on political corruption and 
cries for moral reform (as well as more government) between 1748 and 1813. The threat of 
war and/or the inability of government to deal with it, for instance with regard to the threat of 
the French armies in 1747 and the disaster of the fourth Anglo-Dutch war between 1780 and 
1784, equally led to repeated calls for more and different administration and public morals. 
This, we might say, is a rather timeless mechanism of public value change, which historical-
institutional research in general (and this study in particular) brings out into the open. Even 
today accusations of political corruption seem more prominent due to the credit-crunch, 
banking crisis and economic uncertainty. In difficult times fundamental questions concerning 
public official behaviour (such as the use and spending of public money) seem to arise 
inevitably. 
The historical institutionalist approach of this study has also other offered plausible ex-
planations of the relationship between changing institutions and public value change in Dutch 
history between 1748 and 1813. More precisely, the study has shown how the connected 




processes of bureaucratization, state-formation, democratization and politicization were indeed 
important catalysts for moral reform. A Weberian ideal-typical approach centring on bureauc-
ratization has proven highly promising to investigate and discern changing public values and 
perceptions of political corruption. As we have seen in chapter six, bureaucratization (at least 
in the area of tax collecting) also had an important impact on changing public values and 
public morality. While it is not possible to point at a clear one-way causal direction between the 
two (see chapter three, paragraph five), the link is there all the same. In short: new bureaucratic 
rules and regulations and a new attitude towards public service delivery visible in the area of 
taxation must have had a deep impact on the way people behaved. Of course bureaucratization 
was itself also the result of new values and attitudes.  
With regard to state-formation, democratization and politicization we can return to 
Koselleck’s Sattelzeit-hypothesis which can now, largely, be confirmed. Changing public values 
and perceptions of political corruption between 1748 and 1813 in the Dutch context can be 
related to some of the explanatory elements that he and others distinguished. Most impor-
tantly, democratization did lead to a broader public of readers and the emergence of new 
genres of communication. The rise of a political press (i.e., public-opinion) had a major impact 
on changing public values because it allowed crucial discussion. It gave a voice to new groups 
of people who wanted a bigger share in politics. This had a direct influence on public values 
and perceptions of political corruption because it ended, in many ways, long-standing ideas of 
‘true liberty’ in which all parties (rulers and ruled) believed that regent oligarchic administration 
based on shop floor codes was best for everyone. Also, democratization together with 
politicization did make certain concepts (such as ‘aristocrat’ and ‘democrat’ but also various 
public values and value statements more dynamic and contested, not least because they were 
connected to major political conflicts of the time and because they sometimes seemed to 
represent entire value systems. The ideal-typical notions of ‘aristocrat’ and ‘democrat’, for 
instance, did serve a purpose if only to describe and explain two opposed (equally ideal typical) 
value systems of the eighteenth century. 
Another important explanation for public value change that belongs to this second set 
of conclusions is that complex processes of bureaucratization, state-formation, democratiza-
tion and politicization were responsible for a slow but steady widening of crucial notions of the 
common good, the public interest or the community. This, in turn, led to subsequent new 
and/or reemphasized public values such as representation, loyalty and accountability. A shift in 
the entire idea of the state and the role of government – from an emphasis on local sovereignty 
and particularism to an emphasis on national centralization and uniformity of rules – caused a 
change in ideas on right and wrong public official behaviour. It led, for instance, to changing 
ideas about the interests that a public administrator was supposed to serve. From the afore-
mentioned we can therefore tentatively conclude that we can support institutional design’s 
assumption that institutions shape behaviour and that some systems (i.e., bureaucratic, 
centralized and parliamentary) are indeed less prone to political corruption than others (i.e., 
non-bureaucratic, particularistic and decentralized). Also, a change in the form of the Dutch 
state seems to have decreased the need for ‘corrupt’ practices and at the same time increased 
intolerance of various forms of political corruption. It seems impossible to offer a straightfor-
ward causal link and/or direction between changing structure and changing morality. Instead, 
the two seem to have been mutually reinforcing.  
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Yet, we can say conclude that such acts as patronage and/or brokerage, bribery, price-fixing or 
nepotism increasingly became intolerable and inappropriate because they lost their function in 
political-administrative life. They became unacceptable because of a fundamental change in the 
specific structure of early modern society. While some forms were still occasionally deemed 
necessary – for instance in the use of private interests to further public interests or circumvent-
ing procedures because the end justified the means (see chapter eight) – on the whole this 
certainly changed. We see this change most clearly, as mentioned in the above, in the case of 
taxation in chapter six when new bureaucratic structures literally took away the need for certain 
‘corrupt’ practices. It can also be deduced from the other cases. Aims to end (princely) 
patronage in Patriot times included attempts to formally or informally restructure city 
governments and to improve ways of appointing officials in order to decrease the need for 
patronage and/or brokerage. Since patronage, according to many Patriots, was no longer 
considered to have a beneficial function in political-administrative life, its raison d’être had to be 
removed. Similarly, an improved hierarchical, centralized and more or less representative 
structure of political-administrative activity around 1798 (i.e., the emergence of a strong state) 
was meant to decrease the need for patronage, brokerage and other ways of ‘informal’ 
delegation and use of power and authority. The strength of a structural-functionalist theoretical 
point of view is that it tells us that political corruption was ever less needed to make politics 
and administration work because its place was increasingly taken over by bureaucratic 
structures and new political-administrative arrangements (such as salaries, promotion, standard 
procedures and formal hierarchical structures).  
A final conclusion in this second set can now be drawn. The ‘success’ of aforemen-
tioned theoretical approaches to explain public value change allows us to conclude that a sole 
perspective from institutional economics (a rational-economy and/or principal-agent ap-
proach) is not desirable or likely to provide enduring answers. Its main limitation, noted among 
others by Rothstein (2010) and Williams (1999) (see chapter one) can now be corroborated 
because the cases do show the limitations inherent in focusing solely on economic motives and 
rational behaviour. Emotionally motivated political corruption employed for non-economic 
purposes does largely fall outside its scope. Furthermore, institutional economics seems unable 
to explain political corruption outside formal, office-centred, and interpersonal relationships 
(Johnston, 1996: 326) and seems especially liable to affect or distort historical research into 
political corruption. It often turns out to be quite difficult, for instance, to determine who is 
‘principal’ or ‘agent’.  
In reply to such criticism, Rose-Ackerman recently wrote that “whether the principal is 
a single, named superior or a diffuse body like the public at large, the essential point is that 
corruption represents the violation of an obligation or a duty in return for private benefit”. She 
added that “it [the institutional economic and principal/agent approach, TK] may fail to take 
account of dynamic factors and social forces, but it provides a valuable place to start and 
places the burden of proof on those wishing either to add additional complementary factors 
[…] or to substitute an entirely different approach” (2010: 48-49). I agree with this last 
assertion and believe that we should indeed look for complementary factors and different 
approaches if we are to understand better what political corruption is, what causes it and what 
we can do to stop or prevent it. This study has provided evidence for this theoretical and 
methodological conclusion. The existence of broad and neo-classical notions of political 
corruption and the value of a historical institutional approach indeed enable us to add 
additional complementary factors to an institutional economics approach in order to better 




understand what political corruption is and how, when or why public values change. When 
political corruption is often referred to as the general decay or deterioration of the entire body 
politic this means, for instance, that it is more than the violation of an obligation or a duty in 
return for private benefit. When ‘calculus’ and ‘cultural’ factors are equally important in 
changing public values, it furthermore means that any one-sided emphasis on either of them is 
not the way forward. 
 
Final considerations  
 
Historical research and subsequent insights into public value dynamics also (naturally!) have 
consequences for some present (or timeless?) dilemma’s of public (value) management, 
administrative morality and/or fighting corruption. For one, it makes it clear that at present, 
definitions of political corruption that are based on any single (quantifiable?) ‘standard of 
goodness’ are too limited. Instead, political corruption acquires meaning through broader 
contextual and institutional processes. Historical research shows how public values and change 
therein are socially constructed in an ever changing institutional setting. This should serve as an 
important realization for our current understanding and study of political corruption, the fight 
against it, and public values and their dynamics. 
Furthermore, historical research tells us how it is essential to widen our scope when de-
fining current political corruption and assessing public value systems. A wider understanding 
of political corruption as both narrow individual abuse of office and broad ideas on political or 
societal decay, proves applicable in current situations. As soon as one realizes that political 
corruption and specific public values (or a lack thereof) is best regarded as a problem stem-
ming from and affecting the entire body politic, one realizes it should not be solely considered 
as an individual act of public officials. Fighting political corruption (i.e., taking away its causes) 
in any context therefore means tackling broader processes and ideas, for instance through 
investigating disagreement between various current sources of values. It is not a very useful 
approach to target the individual without paying attention to the system in which that 
individual functions. 
By extension, something can be said about the failure of many attempts to bring about 
change in public morality (for instance through codes of conduct). Historical research shows 
us that current public values have been shaped in centuries of social-political development and 
that they are here for a reason. This means that any current public morality cannot – should 
anyone wish to do so – be changed either quickly or easily. In addition, to understand better 
how, when and why to improve public morality a broader approach that considers the 
contextual and contingent nature of public values (as expressed in a large variety of sources) 
seems essential. It could lead one to conclude that there is no timeless code of conduct able to 
please everyone. A historical perspective on changing public morality that underscores the 
contextual nature of public morality could also lead to an important realization of ethical 
relativism: current times are not necessarily more or less corrupt than past times and different 
public moralities acquire meaning in their own contextual frames of reference. People should 
do well to take such a historical vantage point and realize their own context-bound morality 








This bibliography is divided in three categories to provide a more clear overview of the variety 
of sources used for this study. The first category, Manuscript sources, consists of non-
printed archive material. The second category, Printed sources, consists of non-archival 
material and is divided into two parts. Contemporary works and printed documents contains seven-
teenth, eighteenth and nineteenth-century primary works and contemporary material that has 
been collected and compiled by others. Pamphlets and periodicals contains (often anonymous) 
printed contemporary pamphlets and political writings. The third category, Secondary 
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Samenvatting 
 
Verborgen moraal, expliciete schandalen: publieke waarden en politieke 





Publieke waarden vormen de kern van het openbaar bestuur. In het stellen van politieke doelen 
en het uitvoeren van beleid gaat het immers onherroepelijk om het maken van keuzes en 
waardeoordelen. Dat betekent dat er vaak verschil van mening bestaat over welke publieke 
waarden van belang zijn. Het betekent ook dat publieke waarden altijd aan verandering 
onderhevig zijn als gevolg van veranderende (politieke, sociale, economische) omstandigheden. 
De vraag wat goed bestuur is hangt altijd in sterke mate af van door wie, waar en wanneer die 
vraag gesteld wordt. Allereerst hebben verschillende mensen verschillende waarden en 
opvattingen. Ook kunnen vergelijkbare handelingen verschillend worden ervaren of geïnterpre-
teerd en kennen andere tijden andere opvattingen over goed bestuur. Gedrag wat ooit 
toelaatbaar was is dat tegenwoordig niet altijd meer en wat wij tegenwoordig acceptabel vinden 
kan in de toekomst evengoed weer worden afgekeurd. In deze studie is onderzoek verricht 
naar hoe, wanneer en waarom veelal impliciete publieke waarden veranderden in de Neder-
landse geschiedenis aan de hand van onderzoek naar openbare corruptieschandalen. Dit 
onderzoek is van belang omdat het fundamentele kennis oplevert over sociaal-politieke 
interactie. Een analyse van publieke waarden en corruptie verschaft ons inzicht in veranderen-
de opvattingen en verwachtingen ten opzichte van goed bestuur, het algemeen belang en de rol 
van de overheid. Het geeft ons ook een beeld van veranderende opvattingen over de verhou-
ding tussen bestuur en bestuurder, tussen staat en samenleving en tussen publiek en privaat. 
Om zicht te krijgen op publieke waardeverandering in de Nederlandse geschiedenis is 
in september 2006 een door de Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek 
(NWO) gefinancierd onderzoeksproject van start gegaan. Het project “Under Construction: the 
Genesis of Public Value Systems” is opgezet om de geschiedenis en ontwikkeling van publieke 
waardestelsels te onderzoeken in Nederland tussen 1650 en 1950 in drie deelprojecten die ieder 
honderd jaar voor hun rekening nemen. Het project wilde veranderende opvattingen over goed 
en slecht bestuur en de achterliggende publieke waarden onderzoeken door middel van een 
combinatie van historisch en sociaalwetenschappelijk onderzoek naar corruptieschandalen. Het 
doel was om bestaande kennis over verandering van publieke waarden in Nederland aan te 
vullen. Deze studie richt zich op het tweede deelproject over de periode tussen 1750 en 1850 
en beperkt zich hierbinnen tot het specifieke tijdvak 1748 – 1813 en in geografisch opzicht tot 
het gewest Holland. De centrale onderzoeksvraag luidt: welke veranderingen in publieke waarden en 
publieke waardestelsels worden zichtbaar in corruptieschandalen in Nederland tussen 1748 en 1813? 
Corruptie is in deze studie zowel een middel om veranderende publieke waarden te  
onderzoeken als een zelfstandig object van onderzoek, dat wil zeggen een (negatieve) publieke 
waarde op zichzelf. De onderzoeksvraag verbindt empirische, theoretische en methodologische 
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doelstellingen. In empirisch opzicht wordt aan de hand van enkele casussen bekeken welke 
publieke waarden en opvattingen van corruptie eigenlijk bestonden in een belangrijke periode 
in de politieke en bestuurlijke geschiedenis van Nederland.1 In theoretisch en methodologisch 
opzicht heeft het tot doel om door middel van historisch en sociaalwetenschappelijk onder-
zoek betekenisvolle relaties aan te tonen tussen verandering van publieke waarden enerzijds en 
de bredere historische institutionele context anderzijds. 
 
Publieke waarden en politieke corruptie 
 
Hoofdstuk een bevat een uiteenzetting van de twee basiselementen van het onderzoek. Ten 
eerste gaat het om publieke waarden die – in navolging van Barry Bozeman (2007: 13-14) – 
gedefinieerd worden als voorkeuren van mensen met betrekking tot de rechten en plichten van 
burgers en hun vertegenwoordigers. Een waardesysteem wordt vervolgens (cf. Oyserman, 
2001: 16151) gedefinieerd als een verzameling van waarden die fungeren als criteria door 
middel waarvan gedrag wordt beoordeeld en sancties worden opgelegd. Uiteraard kunnen er 
meerdere verschillende waardesystemen naast elkaar bestaan. Ook kunnen er als gevolg van 
complexe sociaal-politieke ontwikkelingen verschuivingen binnen en tussen waardesystemen 
plaatsvinden.  
Politieke corruptie vormt het tweede kernelement dat in het eerste hoofdstuk aan bod 
komt. De bespreking betreft vooral de voor- en nadelen van verschillende wetenschappelijke 
benaderingen die corruptie bestuderen en trachten te verklaren. Vier theoretische benaderingen 
(neo-institutionalisme, structureel-functionalisme, institutionele economie en een Weberiaanse 
ideaaltypische aanpak) worden kritisch besproken en in deze studie geheel of gedeeltelijk 
toegepast. Hoofdstuk één gaat daarnaast over de moeilijkheid om tot een sluitende definitie 
van politieke corruptie te komen en over de nadelen van het gebruik van enkelvoudige, te 
nauwe, definities. Het hoofdstuk bespreekt zodoende een algemeen – en zoals zal blijken 
fundamenteel – onderscheid tussen ‘klassieke’ en ‘moderne’ definities. In de klassieke opvatting 
betekent corruptie veelal het algemene morele verval van het politieke lichaam en het onver-
mogen om de politieke gemeenschap te dienen. In meer recente en ‘moderne’ definities wordt 
corruptie daarentegen vrij eng gedefinieerd als individueel misbruik aan de hand van enkelvou-
dige standaarden die als maatstaf van corruptie dienen. Het gaat dan veelal om juridische 
standaarden verbonden aan een publiek ambt, om het behalen van persoonlijk gewin uit een 
publieke functie of om het schaden van publieke belangen. 
Het onvermogen van eendimensionale definities om corruptie in verschillende verschij-
ningsvormen en in historische context te verklaren en/of beter te begrijpen leidt tot een 
alternatieve benadering van corruptie. In de neoklassieke benadering van de Amerikaanse 
politicoloog Michael Johnston wordt corruptie gedefinieerd als “the abuse, according to the 
legal or social standards constituting a society’s system of public order, of a public role or 
resource for private benefit” (1996: 333). Daarmee benadert Johnston corruptie als een zuiver 
contextueel en sociaal geconstrueerd fenomeen waarbij zowel de klassieke als enkelvoudige 
‘moderne’ dimensies worden gecombineerd. Johnston nodigt ons vervolgens uit te onderzoe-
                                                 
1 Nederland bestond nog niet tussen 1748 en 1813 maar de naam wordt omwille van meer duidelijkheid wel gebruikt in 
deze studie en haar vraagstelling. In feite is er sprake van verschillende benamingen en staatsvormen in deze periode: 
de Republiek der Verenigde Nederlanden (1555 – 1795), de Bataafse Republiek (1795 – 1806), het Koninkrijk Holland 
(1806 – 1810), de inlijving bij het Franse Keizerrijk (1810 – 1813) en het Vorstendom der Nederlanden (1813 – 1815). 




ken hoe de inhoud of betekenis van begrippen als ‘abuse’, ‘public role’ en ‘private benefit’ in 
een bepaalde tijd en plaats wordt bevochten en schrijft dat corruptie datgene is wat op een 
bepaald moment als zodanig wordt ervaren in een bredere institutionele context. Economi-
sche, politieke en sociale strijd tussen individuen en groepen in een samenleving zal bepalen 
wanneer en waarom een bepaalde handeling als corrupt wordt beschouwd en welke publieke 
waarden wel of niet langer algemeen gedeeld of gepropageerd worden. Diezelfde strijd is veelal 
de oorzaak van verandering in publieke moraal en Johnstons benadering loopt zodoende als 
een rode draad door deze studie. Tot slot wordt in hoofdstuk één het onderzoek geplaatst 
binnen het corpus van bestaand historisch onderzoek naar corruptie en publieke waarden in de 
Nederlandse geschiedenis. Het gebrek aan specifiek onderzoek naar deze onderwerpen en de 
manier waarop corruptie en publieke waarden in het verleden veelal zijn bestudeerd geeft 
eveneens de noodzaak aan van een nieuwe ‘Johnstoniaanse’ en contextuele benadering. 
 
Bestuursgeschiedenis en de dynamiek van publieke waarden  
 
Hoofdstuk twee gaat in op de mogelijkheden die worden geboden door een combinatie van een 
meer historische en een meer sociaalwetenschappelijke benadering voor het beantwoorden van 
de hoofdvraag. Het hoofdstuk bespreekt hoe de historische aandacht voor context, detail en de 
lange termijn goed samen gaat met sociaalwetenschappelijke aandacht voor padafhankelijkheid, 
theorievorming en het gebruik van modellen en ideaaltypen om mechanismen en processen in 
de geschiedenis (zoals veranderende publieke waardesystemen) te duiden en te verklaren. In 
deze context worden in dit hoofdstuk de twee laatste theoretische en methodologische 
elementen aan het onderzoeksraamwerk toegevoegd. In de eerste plaats gaat het om Max 
Weber’s ideaaltype van bureaucratie en zijn notie van bureaucratisering. Het ideaaltype en de 
bureaucratisering worden in deze studie ingezet om veranderingen in publieke moraal te 
onderzoeken. Zoals uit de casussen – en vooral in de eerste casus in hoofdstuk zes – naar 
voren komt, gaan bureaucratisering (zoals de komst van meer regels en richtlijnen) en een 
veranderende publieke moraal hand in hand. Ten tweede gaat het in hoofdstuk twee om het 
benutten van inzichten uit het historisch-institutionalisme waarin aandacht wordt besteed aan 
fundamentele processen van sociale verandering over langere perioden in een historisch 
vergelijkend en sterk contextueel perspectief. Zowel Weber’s ideaaltype als het historisch 
institutionalisme bieden handvatten om de complexiteit van het verleden intact te laten maar 
tegelijkertijd te zoeken naar mogelijke verklaringen voor processen en mechanismen van 




In hoofdstuk drie komen de eerder besproken elementen en theorieën bij elkaar in een onder-
zoeksopzet. Cruciaal is de doelstelling om veelal verborgen publieke waarden en opvattingen 
van politieke corruptie zichtbaar te maken. Dat gebeurt door middel van een analyse van 
schandalen van corruptie in drie casussen (zie onder) waarin de zienswijzen (i.e. publieke 
waarden en opvattingen van politieke corruptie) van verschillende – potentieel tegengestelde – 
groepen en actoren naast en tegenover elkaar worden gezet. In een schandaal wordt het 
impliciete expliciet gemaakt: het toont ons wat als goed of fout publiek gedrag wordt gezien. 
Corruptieschandalen laten ons publiek debat zien en geven ons een idee van het ontoelaatbare 
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en daarmee ook van het toelaatbare. Schandalen bieden een uniek beeld van de strijd tussen de 
zienswijzen van verschillende groepen en individuen op basis waarvan (vergelijk Johnston 
eerder) publieke waarden en politieke corruptie betekenis krijgen. Deze zienswijzen van 
verschillende groepen zijn – in navolging van de bestuurskundige Ben Hoetjes (1982) – vervat 
in een typologie van vier bronnen van publieke waarden. Het gaat daarbij om de moraal van de 
tijd zoals deze wordt uitgedragen door morele autoriteiten en ‘opiniemakers’ (1), om juridische 
uitingen in wetgeving en rechtspraak (2), om de publieke opinie in pamfletten en politieke 
bladen (3) en om de zienswijzen van functionarissen zoals die gelden en geuit worden in de 
alledaagse praktijk van bestuur ‘op de werkvloer’ (4). Per casus worden deze vier bronnen van 
publieke waarden rondom een corruptieschandaal geanalyseerd. Dat levert een gevarieerd en 
gedetailleerd beeld op van zienswijzen. Het biedt ook zicht op de dynamiek van publieke 
waarden en opvattingen van corruptie wanneer bepaalde grenzen worden overschreden en er 
onder druk van bepaalde bronnen veranderingen optreden in het denken over publieke moraal. 
Dat gebeurt bijvoorbeeld als gevolg van opkomende publieke opinie in de tweede helft van de 
achttiende eeuw waardoor gedrag ‘op de werkvloer’ feitelijk voor het eerst openlijk bediscussi-
eerd en bekritiseerd wordt. Het is daarbij eveneens interessant om te zien dat er zo ook 
voortdurend nieuwe verantwoordingsrelaties ontstaan. Bestuurders zien zich bijvoorbeeld 
steeds vaker gedwongen om verantwoording af te leggen aan een steeds grotere groep mensen.  
In hoofdstuk drie worden ook casusselectie en noodzakelijke beperkingen van het on-
derzoek besproken. De casussen zijn, zoals gezegd, in geografische zin beperkt tot het gewest 
Holland. Een blik op publieke waarden en politieke corruptie in Holland zegt, vanwege het 
particularisme van de Republiek (zie hoofdstuk vier) niet per definitie iets over de situatie in de 
overige gewesten. Tegelijkertijd was het echter zo dat Holland het economische, politieke en 
bestuurlijke centrum van de Republiek was en daarmee representatief kan worden geacht voor 
een aanzienlijk deel van het totale bestuur. Het aantal casussen is verder beperkt tot drie. Die 
keuze heeft vooral te maken met de hoge eisen waaraan zij moesten voldoen. Iedere casus 
moest een groot schandaal zijn waarbij sprake was van veel ophef en discussie in zoveel 
mogelijk verschillende bronnen van waarden. Met deze selectiecriteria bleek het niet eenvoudig 
meer dan drie grote casussen te vinden (wat uiteraard niet betekent dat deze er per definitie 
niet zijn). Daarnaast was deze beperking noodzakelijk gezien de beschikbare tijd en ruimte in 
samenhang met het gebrekkige en nauwelijks geordende bronnenmateriaal.  
Een laatste beperking betreft een beperking in tijd. Er is gekozen voor drie casussen uit 
kenmerkende deelperioden van de Nederlandse geschiedenis tussen 1748 en 1813. De drie 
perioden (1748 – 1756, de jaren 1770 en 1780 en de periode 1795 – 1813) vallen samen met de 
opkomst van drie gerelateerde populaire hervormingsbewegingen (achtereenvolgens Doelisten, 
Patriotten en Bataven) die zowel de verbetering van bestuur als van bestuurlijke moraal hoog 
in het vaandel hadden staan. De keuze om te stoppen in 1813 (en niet in 1850) heeft andermaal 
te maken met beschikbare ruimte en tijd. Tegelijkertijd zijn er voor deze beperking ook 
inhoudelijke redenen. Ten eerste moet de periode 1813 – 1850 als een fundamenteel andere 
periode dan daarvoor worden beschouwd vanwege de komst van de (later constitutionele) 
monarchie in 1813. Ten tweede komt de beperking voort uit de idee – en dit gaat tegen het 
gangbare denken in – dat de fundamenten voor de ‘nieuwe’ periode na 1813 grotendeels gelegd 
werden in de periode daarvoor. Onderzoek naar de periode 1748 – 1813 vormt zodoende 
tegenwicht tegen de idee dat er ten tijde van de Republiek weinig veranderde in publieke 
waarden en waardestelsels, bureaucratisering en de fundamenten en structuur van de Neder-




op een typisch gebied van bestuurlijke activiteit en strijd in de periode. Casus een (hoofdstuk 
zes) speelt zich af tegen de achtergrond van belastinginning en bureaucratisering. Casus twee 
(hoofdstuk zeven) speelt zich af in de context van strijd over patronage, nepotisme, venaliteit 
en de vormgeving van stedelijke regeringen. Casus drie (hoofdstuk acht) speelt zich af in de 
context van staatsvorming, democratisering en politisering na de Bataafse revolutie van 1795. 
 
Politieke geschiedenis, politieke cultuur en de ‘moraal van de tijd’ 
 
In hoofdstuk vier wordt aandacht besteed aan het beschrijven en analyseren van de context van 
de latere casussen. Dit hoofdstuk biedt in de eerste plaats een overzicht van de belangrijkste 
politiek-bestuurlijke ontwikkelingen tussen 1748 en 1813, zoals de opbouw en werking van de 
belangrijkste bestuurlijke niveaus, structuren, processen, personen en groepen in het openbaar 
bestuur van die tijd. Het hoofdstuk besteedt daarnaast aandacht aan enkele fundamentele 
karakteristieken van de Nederlandse politieke cultuur tussen 1748 en 1813. Het betreft hier 
eveneens essentiële context voor een goed begrip van de casussen en de veranderende publieke 
waarden die hierin naar voren komen. Zonder basale kennis van de politieke cultuur (formele 
en informele omgangsvormen tussen politieke actoren en/of niveaus) is het niet mogelijk te 
beoordelen wanneer iets wel of niet als corrupt werd beschouwd en waarom dat zo was en 
mogelijk veranderde. 
Het eerste empirische hoofdstuk van deze studie is hoofdstuk vijf. Hierin wordt de eerste 
bron van publieke waarden (de vooraanstaande morele autoriteiten en ‘opiniemakers’) – in 
tegenstelling tot de andere drie bronnen – apart besproken in de context van de drie eerder 
genoemde hervormingsbewegingen. Enkele geschriften van auteurs tussen 1748 en 1813 
worden onderzocht op de publieke waarden en de opvattingen van corruptie die hierin naar 
voren komen. De nadruk ligt op kenmerkende personen die als boegbeeld van hun beweging 
en/of periode fungeerden en die protest aantekenden tegen de status quo. De kritiek en de 
alternatieven die zij leverden geven belangrijke informatie over hoe er in progressieve en/of 
hervormingsgezinde kringen gedurende een langere periode over moraal van bestuur werd 
nagedacht. Uit deze bespreking blijkt in ieder geval dat er naast verschil vooral veel continuïteit 
te zien is. Tussen 1748 en 1813 is herhaaldelijk gelijksoortige kritiek geuit op bestaande 
publieke moraal en zijn er gelijksoortige oplossingen geboden. Deze oplossingen (zoals een 
einde aan venaliteit en meer bureaucratie) waren als gevolg van wisselende politieke en 
sociaaleconomische omstandigheden (zoals economische malaise en militaire tegenspoed die 
leidden tot onrust en protest) steeds succesvoller. In de kern blijkt het – ondanks de nodige 
verschillen – bij zowel Doelisten als Patriotten als Bataven te zijn gegaan om nieuwe danwel 
herbevestigde principes zoals politieke participatie, volkssoevereiniteit, representatie, politieke 
verantwoording en publieke verantwoordelijkheid. Corruptie werd goeddeels gezien (in een vrij 
klassieke zin, zie eerder) als het algehele verval van staat en samenleving als gevolg van 
eigenbelang, patronage en nepotisme. Daarbij blijkt er onder de besproken auteurs in toene-
mende mate sprake te zijn geweest van een hernieuwde en bredere connotatie van de politieke 
gemeenschap en het publieke of algemene belang die niet of niet voldoende in acht werden 









De laatste drie hoofdstukken van deze studie bevatten de drie corruptieschandalen die 
plaatsvonden tussen 1748 en 1813. Deze hoofdstukken bieden voor iedere periode veel 
informatie – afkomstig uit verschillende bronnen van publieke waarden – over wat wel en niet 
geaccepteerd was of als corruptie werd gezien en waarom dat het geval was. Daarnaast biedt 
ieder hoofdstuk afzonderlijk – en de drie hoofdstukken gezamenlijk (zie hoofdstuk negen) – 
zicht op enkele fundamentele processen en/of mechanismen die van invloed zijn geweest op 
veranderende publieke waarden en opvattingen over corruptie in de onderzochte periode.  
Hoofdstuk zes toont aan de hand van een corruptieschandaal met betrekking tot belas-
tinginning rond 1750 aan dat bureaucratisering van dit belangrijke onderdeel van het achttien-
de-eeuwse bestuurlijke apparaat ook leidde tot een veranderende houding ten opzichte van 
bestuurlijke moraal. De casus laat zien hoe grootschalig protest tijdens het zogenaamde 
Pachtersoproer in 1748 tegen een corrupt en grotendeels ‘privaat’ systeem van belastinginning 
(door middel van verpachting) leidde tot het opzetten van een nieuw publiek belastingsysteem. 
In dit proces werden morele standaarden waar dit apparaat aan moest voldoen door lokale en 
centrale overheden expliciet opgesteld. Het protest en de reactie van lokale en centrale 
overheden laten zien dat het vorige systeem (grotendeels gebaseerd op eigenbelang en 
individueel financieel gewin als motivatie voor een efficiënte belastinginning) in morele zin niet 
langer voldeed. Corruptie betekende in toenemende mate het niet naleven van bureaucratische 
waarden zoals hiërarchie, expertise, punctualiteit en/of neutraliteit. Het vermengen van een 
publieke functie met private belangen door belastingfunctionarissen werd op termijn eveneens 
steeds minder getolereerd. Dit was een revolutionaire gedachte in een wereld die een scheiding 
tussen publiek en privaat voorheen nauwelijks kende. Belastingfunctionarissen moesten ook in 
toenemende mate in een sterk bureaucratisch raamwerk functioneren. Zij kregen, bijvoorbeeld, 
steeds vaker een vast salaris om corruptie tegen te gaan. Ook moesten zij zich houden aan 
strengere regels, procedures en instructies waar zij vanaf de jaren 1750 ook daadwerkelijk in 
juridische zin op werden afgerekend. Daarnaast betekende corruptie, zeker in de ogen van 
veelal anonieme pamfletschrijvers, vooral ook het vergaren van rijkdom en weelde in tijden van 
verondersteld economisch verval. Integere publieke belastingfunctionarissen zouden daarbij 
slechts het belang van de stadskas en dat van de burger in een bredere politieke gemeenschap 
voor ogen moeten hebben. 
In hoofdstuk zeven wordt een sprong gemaakt naar de jaren 1770 en 1780 waarin ander-
maal fundamentele ontwikkelingen plaatsvonden op het gebied van publieke waarden en 
bestuurlijke moraal. De opkomst van nieuwe politieke ideeën, deels verspreid door een 
ontluikende politieke pers en publieke opinie, bracht ook de Republiek in revolutionair 
vaarwater. In de jaren na 1770 kwam er van de zijde van de Patriotten hevige kritiek op het 
corrupte politieke systeem van een steeds machtiger wordende Stadhouder op centraal niveau 
en de regerende oligarchieën van stedelijke regenten (en prinselijke vertrouwensmannen, zie 
onder) op lokaal niveau. De Patriotten baseerden zich op deels nieuwe ideeën als volkssoeve-
reiniteit, vrijheid, politieke participatie en representatie. Zij wensten deelname van een grotere 
groep mensen in de besturen van de Republiek en zetten zich in voor ‘morele herbewapening’ 
om het gecorrumpeerde regime weer gezond te maken. Hoofdstuk zeven laat zien hoe de 
Patriotten vooral een moreel gevaar zagen in de corrupte vertrouwensmannen die door de 




vergroten en zijn belangen te behartigen. In de tweede helft van de achttiende eeuw werd dit 
stelsel van stadhouderlijke patronage en lokale ambtenbegeving zowel door ideologisch 
geïnspireerde Patriotten als door praktisch gemotiveerde – want van bestuur uitgesloten – 
lokale regenten, fel bekritiseerd en bestempeld als ‘corruptie’. In de ogen van veel Patriotten 
werd het ‘publieke belang’ – dat nu ook bestond uit zaken als volkssoevereiniteit, politieke 
participatie, bescherming van de burger, wederopleving van handel en welvaart en een einde 
aan de ‘tirannie’ van de Erfstadhouder voor wie geen plek was in een Republiek – door deze 
functionarissen duidelijk niet behartigd. Voor regenten die door middel van de stadhouderlijke 
patronage buitenspel waren gezet, uitte de ‘corruptie’ van de vertrouwensmannen zich in het 
niet honoreren van aloude principes van senioriteit, toerbeurt en ‘harmonie’ tussen regenten 
onderling. Vooral dat laatste lijkt voor de regenten op de werkvloer in deze periode nog steeds 
de belangrijkste bestuurlijke waarde en maatstaf voor corruptie te zijn geweest. Zo bezien 
vonden uitgesloten regenten en Patriotten elkaar tijdelijk in hun afkeer van bestaande bestuur-
lijke praktijken maar hadden beide groepen heel andere ideeën voor de toekomst. De regenten 
wilden vooral terug naar de oude praktijken. De Patriotten wilden echter naar een nieuw en in 
hun ogen meer integer systeem. Uiteindelijk (zoals ook beschreven in hoofdstuk vier) trokken 
de Erfstadhouder en zijn clique als gevolg van Pruissische militaire interventie aan het langste 
eind. In de praktijk en op de lange termijn kwam er zodoende weinig terecht van hervormings-
plannen. Nieuwe ideeën waren echter wel degelijk gezaaid en zouden na 1795 terugkomen en 
vanaf dan meer structureel worden doorgevoerd. 
In hoofdstuk acht komt de laatste casus aan bod in de periode na de Bataafse revolutie 
van 1795. Dit was een tijd van grote politieke en sociale verandering waarin vrij resoluut een 
einde werd gemaakt aan het oude federalisme en particularisme van de Republiek. Onder druk 
van Fransen en Bataven kwam een sterke eenheidsstaat tot stand, gebaseerd op een staatsrege-
ling of grondwet en een nationale vergadering. Publieke waarden en opvattingen over corruptie 
veranderden zodoende als gevolg van verregaande staatsvorming. Centralisatie en het optuigen 
van een nieuw politiek-bestuurlijk apparaat met meer gestandaardiseerde procedures (zoals 
uniforme wetgeving) en een professioneler ambtenarenapparaat kwamen echter niet zonder 
slag of stoot tot stand en hadden ook consequenties voor debatten over corruptie en publieke 
waarden. Het leverde vooral fundamentele discussies op over hoe een sterke centrale overheid 
zich had te gedragen en waar macht vandaan kwam. Soevereiniteit werd immers in toenemende 
mate aan ‘het volk’ toegedicht. Door middel van vooralsnog rudimentaire verkiezingen – in 
wat een beginnende democratie kan worden genoemd – konden burgers zich uitspreken over 
hoe deze macht het beste uitgeoefend moest worden.  
Hoofdstuk acht laat zien dat discussies over corruptie in de eerste jaren van de Bataafse 
Republiek vooral gingen over nieuwe en/of opnieuw gewaardeerde fundamentele publieke 
waarden als representatie, legitimiteit van bestuur, verantwoording en verantwoordelijkheid. 
Ook de scheiding tussen publiek en privaat was onderwerp van debat. De casus met betrekking 
tot de corruptie van enkele leden van het Uitvoerend Bewind in 1798 laat zien dat het 
vermengen van publiek en privaat steeds minder getolereerd werd door steeds grotere groepen 
mensen (i.e. verschillende bronnen van waarden). Ook nu was extravagant gedrag van 
overheidsfunctionarissen bovendien niet toelaatbaar in tijden van een (vermeende) nationale 
economische crisis. Publieke functionarissen werden geacht een ‘nieuw’ publiek belang (het 
morele en daarmee economische en politieke herstel van de Bataafse natie) te dienen. Corrup-
tie werd door het gros van de Bataven zodoende anders gedefinieerd dan voorheen. De 
scheidslijn tussen corrupt en niet corrupt was nu veelal gebaseerd op een breder idee van het 
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publieke belang en/of de politieke gemeenschap en op een strikter scheiding tussen publiek en 
privaat. De term corruptie werd zowel in de klassieke als in de moderne betekenis gebruikt 
maar de eerste had toch (nog steeds) de overhand. Corruptie werd in de Bataafs-Franse tijd 
direct gekoppeld aan het verval van de natie. 
 
Veranderende waarden en opvattingen van corruptie 
 
Hoofdstuk negen bevat een overkoepelende analyse en antwoorden op de hoofdvraag. Het 
hoofdstuk laat zien dat veranderingen in publieke waarden en opvattingen over corruptie in de 
eerste plaats op de lange termijn speelden. Oude en nieuwe opvattingen bestonden vaak lange 
tijd naast elkaar en het duurde – voor zover dat überhaupt met zekerheid is na te gaan – vaak 
enige tijd voordat nieuwe ideeën in de dagelijkse praktijk terug waren te zien. Ideeën over goed 
bestuur zoals die door de Bataven werden uitgedragen waren, bijvoorbeeld, immers deels al in 
een of andere vorm door Patriotten en zelfs door Doelisten geuit. Op eenzelfde manier was 
het effect van nieuwe bureaucratische regels op een veranderende publieke moraal (bijvoor-
beeld op het gebied van de belastinginning in hoofdstuk zes en voor het verkrijgen van 
publieke ambten in hoofdstuk zeven) eerder geleidelijk dan abrupt. Er werden weliswaar op 
cruciale momenten nieuwe ankerpunten uitgezet (zoals regels, procedures en opvattingen van 
goed bestuur) maar daar ging altijd een lang proces aan vooraf. Bovendien waren deze 
ankerpunten lang niet altijd vanaf het begin zo gezaghebbend dat zij ook daadwerkelijk meteen 
werden nageleefd. Het is dus noodzakelijk om verandering van publieke waarden te zien als 
iets wat op verschillende niveaus en in verschillende tempo’s gebeurt. Dat neemt echter niet 
weg dat de periode tussen 1748 en 1813 wel degelijk enkele fundamentele institutionele 
veranderingen kende die van invloed waren op veranderend denken over corruptie en 
bestuurlijke moraal. Enkele kernelementen van publiek gedrag en politieke cultuur die rond 
1750 vrijwel algemeen geaccepteerd waren (zoals ambtenbegeving, patronage, een regering 
door een kleine groep regenten en het vermengen van publieke middelen en privaat voordeel) 
werden rond 1800 sterk veroordeeld. In grofweg zes decennia was het beeld van de integere 
publieke functionaris – weliswaar geleidelijk en niet volledig, maar toch fundamenteel – 
veranderd. 
 
Een neoklassieke blik op bronnen van publieke waarden 
 
Hoofdstuk negen levert enkele algemene verklaringen en conclusies met betrekking tot 
publieke waardeverandering. Een eerste set van conclusies komt voort uit de theoretische en 
methodologische aanpak en doelstellingen van deze studie. Johnstons neoklassieke benadering 
en Hoetjes’ heuristiek bewijzen in de casussen hun waarde. De casussen laten zien dat 
expliciete corruptieschandalen en discussies tussen verschillende bronnen van waarden een 
goed – want zeer gedetailleerd – beeld geven van hoe er daadwerkelijk over goed en slecht 
bestuur werd gedacht. De casussen tonen ook aan dat eendimensionale benaderingen van 
corruptie (bijvoorbeeld een ‘public office’ of ‘public opinion’ benadering, zie hoofdstuk een) 
alleen in combinatie nuttig zijn om inherent contextuele en contingente publieke waarden en 
opvattingen over politieke corruptie te kunnen begrijpen. Daarnaast wordt in hoofdstuk negen 
besproken dat een combinatie en vergelijking van verschillende bronnen van publieke waarden 




waarden en opvattingen van corruptie veranderen. Uit de studie blijkt bijvoorbeeld een relatief 
gebrek aan en/of minder belang van juridische bronnen van waarden. Dit is mogelijk niet 
verrassend gezien het ontbreken van een rechtsstaat en kan ook liggen aan de casusselectie. 
Desalniettemin is dit een interessante observatie. Het toont (met uitzondering van hoofdstuk 
zes) een relatief gebrek aan bureaucratisering in de vorm van codificatie en laat daarmee zien 
dat definities van corruptie die enkel geënt zijn op juridische en/of bureaucratische standaar-
den niet afdoende zijn. Uit de studie blijkt ook een relatief gebrek aan religieuze visies op 
corruptie en publieke waarden. Ook hier kan casusselectie een rol spelen, hetgeen net als in het 
geval van de juridische bronnen dus meer onderzoek vereist. Het is echter een interessant 
gegeven gezien de rol die religie over het algemeen wordt geacht in te nemen in de achttiende-
eeuwse Nederlandse samenleving. Wij leren uit de studie, tot slot, ook dat toe- of afnemend 
belang van bepaalde bronnen van waarden zelf een belangrijke katalysator van waardeverande-
ring lijkt te zijn geweest. Zo lijken de publieke opinie en de morele autoriteiten (merkbaar in 
een toename van pamfletten en politieke geschriften) in de onderzochte casussen belangrijker 
motoren van waardeverandering te zijn geweest dan de ‘werkvloer’ en het recht. Die laatste 
twee lijken toch vooral eerder volgers dan trendsetters te zijn geweest. 
De voorgaande observatie leidt ook tot andere belangrijke conclusies inzake een alge-
mene verschuiving als gevolg van al dan niet botsende waardesystemen. De casussen laten zien 
dat hierin tussen 1748 en 1813 wel degelijk ontwikkelingen zichtbaar zijn. In hoofdstuk zes is 
te zien dat, op termijn, vrijwel alle partijen in ieder geval in theorie akkoord gingen met de 
nieuwe morele en bureaucratische uitgangspunten van het nieuwe belastingapparaat.  
Tegelijkertijd konden verschillende mensen echter nog steeds opereren binnen verschillende 
waardesystemen. Het nieuwe bureaucratische waardesysteem werkte nog veelal naast (en niet 
in plaats van) oudere informele systemen gebaseerd op andere waarden. Het gegeven (uit de 
tweede casus in hoofdstuk zeven) dat rang en stand uitmaakten dat de ene persoon niet werd 
veroordeeld en de andere wel, is hier een typisch voorbeeld van. In de tweede casus zien wij 
echter tegelijkertijd een begin van het ontstaan van een soort ‘ethisch monisme’. Hoewel er 
ook in de Patriottentijd nog steeds verschillende waardestelsels parallel aan elkaar bestonden, 
zagen bestuurders zich vanaf de jaren 1770 en 1780 vaker gedwongen een keuze te maken 
tussen een bureaucratisch en formeel waardestelsel enerzijds en een patrimoniaal en informeel 
waardestelsel anderzijds. Het lag volgens de meeste hervormingsgezinde Patriotten duidelijk 
niet langer voor de hand dat publieke functionarissen in beide stelsels tegelijkertijd konden 
functioneren. De derde casus toont het (voorlopige) hoogtepunt in deze periode in de 
verschuiving van waardepluralisme naar ethisch monisme. Uiteraard waren ook hier nog wel 
overblijfselen van pluraliteit te zien, zoals in de mening van enkelen dat publieke middelen en 
privaat gewin nog wel samen konden gaan of de idee dat een zekere mate van wat wel 
eufemistisch ‘Italiaanse Staatkunde’ werd genoemd, onontbeerlijk was om zaken nu eenmaal 
gedaan te krijgen. Uit het merendeel van de bronnen van waarden in de casus uit de  
Bataafs-Franse tijd komt echter naar voren dat publieke functionarissen niet langer in twee 
werelden tegelijkertijd konden opereren. De ‘nieuwe’, formele en bureaucratische wereld kreeg 
duidelijk de voorkeur. De casus laat bijvoorbeeld zien dat corrupte (hoge!) functionarissen nu 
wel werden gearresteerd en gevangen werden gezet en dat zij zonder tussenkomst van de 
Fransen hoogstwaarschijnlijk voor langere perioden zouden zijn veroordeeld. 
 
 




Historisch institutionalisme en overige verklaringen 
 
Een tweede set conclusies is ten eerste gebaseerd op inzichten uit het historisch-
institutionalisme en de aandacht hierin voor de invloed van een veranderende bredere 
institutionele omgeving. Zo kunnen wij concluderen dat de noties van padafhankelijkheid (de 
idee dat beslissingen en handelingen in het heden deels zijn bepaald door beslissingen en 
handelingen in het verleden) en van continuïteit en verandering van belang zijn. Het eerste is 
nuttig om aan te geven dat gebeurtenissen en opties rond 1800 inderdaad sterk geworteld 
waren in voorgaande decennia. De casussen laten zien dat moraal en publiek gedrag niet op de 
ene of andere dag veranderen. Nieuwe regels inzake belastingheffing hadden, bijvoorbeeld, 
veel tijd nodig om uiteindelijk in de praktijk volledig te functioneren. Wij zien ook continuïteit 
en verandering in de bewegingen van Doelisten, Patriotten en Bataven. Zij hadden veel 
gemeen maar de daadwerkelijke realisatie van gezamenlijke (morele) programmapunten kon 
pas tot stand komen door een gunstige institutionele omgeving na de Bataafse Revolutie en de 
tussenkomst van de Fransen. Zo zien wij dus ook dat naast continuïteit ook zogenaamde 
‘critical junctures’ wel degelijk van belang waren voor een veranderende publieke moraal.  
Een andere conclusie ten aanzien van veranderingen in de publieke moraal op basis van 
bredere institutionele ontwikkelingen is dat onbehagen met betrekking tot vermeend moreel, 
economisch en/of militair verval of tegenspoed (vergelijk de onrust in 1747/1748, de verliezen 
in de vierde Engelse Oorlog tussen 1780 en 1784 en verdere economische tegenspoed in de 
jaren na 1795) er ook toe heeft bijgedragen dat misbruik van publieke middelen steeds minder 
getolereerd werd. De studie laat daarmee een haast tijdloos mechanisme zien dat beschuldigin-
gen van corruptie en aandacht voor publieke waarden juist in slechte tijden te horen zijn; wat 
nog maar eens bewezen wordt in de krediet- en bankencrisis van de afgelopen jaren. Nog weer 
andere betekenisvolle relaties tussen een veranderende institutionele omgeving en veranderen-
de publieke waarden zien wij terug in de invloed van bureaucratisering, democratisering en 
politisering. Bureaucratisering (zoals het geval van belastinginning in hoofdstuk zes laat zien) 
kon hand in hand gaan met aandacht voor een nieuwe publieke moraal. Een begin van 
democratisering kwam op gang door de opkomst van een breder lezerspubliek, politieke 
commentatoren en nieuwe vormen van communicatie in de tweede helft van de achttiende 
eeuw.  
Dergelijke processen hadden ontegenzeggelijk invloed op een veranderende publieke 
moraal omdat het discussie en debat over publieke waarden en corruptie mogelijk maakte 
tussen nieuwe en grotere groepen mensen. Een begin van democratisering leidde ook tot een 
begin van de roep om bredere deelname aan het politieke proces en toenemende kritiek op de 
oude politieke cultuur van kleine gesloten regentenelites (gestoeld op de idee van ‘Ware 
Vrijheid’, zie hoofdstuk vier). Processen van bureaucratisering, democratisering en politisering 
bleken nadrukkelijk verbonden met bredere opvattingen van algemeen goed, publiek belang, 
politieke gemeenschap en nadruk op waarden als verantwoording, representatie en legitimiteit. 
Deze publieke waarden kregen een andere betekenis omdat de functie van de overheid ter 
discussie werd gesteld in de loop van de achttiende eeuw. Als gevolg van het groter worden 
van de politieke gemeenschap en een meer omvattende notie van het algemeen belang werden 




De casussen in deze studie kunnen ook leiden tot andere, theoretisch geïnspireerde, conclusies 
op basis van inzichten uit ‘institutional design’, structureel-functionalisme, Weber’s ideaaltype 
van de bureaucratie en ‘institutional economics’ (zie hoofdstuk twee). In de eerste plaats 
kunnen wij – met betrekking tot de idee van ‘institutional design’ – de tentatieve conclusie 
trekken dat bepaalde institutionele staatsvormen (bureaucratisch, gecentraliseerd, parlementair) 
inderdaad minder vatbaar zijn voor corruptie dan andere (patrimoniaal, particularistisch, 
gedecentraliseerd) en dat bepaalde instituties (zoals bureaucratische organisaties en een 
geschreven grondwet) direct van invloed zijn op publiek gedrag. Ten tweede toont de studie de 
kracht van een structureel-functionalistische benadering van corruptie. Met het veranderen van 
de institutionele structuur (bijvoorbeeld van decentraal naar centraal of van collegiaal naar 
eenhoofdig bestuur) werden verschillende vormen van corruptie niet alleen minder acceptabel 
maar ook simpelweg minder noodzakelijk om te functioneren in het systeem. Praktijken als 
patronage, makelaardij, nepotisme, venaliteit en het geven van douceurs of het behalen van 
persoonlijk voordeel uit een ‘publieke’ functie waren enkel noodzakelijk in een wereld zonder 
strikte scheiding van publiek en privaat, zonder sterk bureaucratische procedures en zonder 
sterke centrale staat. Zodra er alternatieven voorhanden waren was het minder aanvaardbaar 
om dit soort dingen te doen en nam de verontwaardiging over dergelijke praktijken toe. Dat 
zien wij in het geval van veranderingen in het belastingsysteem wellicht het duidelijkst. Het is 
echter ook te zien in de poging van de Patriotten om nieuwe formele structuren en processen 
ten aanzien van (het aanstellen van) stadsregeringen in te stellen. Ook het streven van de 
Bataven naar meer hiërarchie, centralisatie en een representatieve overheid diende deels om de 
formele noodzaak van patronage en andere vormen van informele delegatie van macht en 
autoriteit uit te bannen.  
Dit hangt samen met een derde conclusie dat een Weberiaanse ideaaltypische aanpak 
zeer vruchtbaar is om veranderende publieke waarden en waardestelsels te onderzoeken. 
Bureaucratie en bureaucratisering bieden belangrijke aanknopingspunten op te begrijpen hoe 
en waarom de publieke moraal verandert. Met de komt van salarissen, promotiekansen, 
standaard procedures en formele hiërarchische structuren veranderen ook denkwijzen met 
betrekking tot correct bestuur, hoewel de causale richting in deze beweging niet met zekerheid 
is vast te stellen. Ten vierde toont de studie en haar neoklassieke en historisch-institutionele 
benadering de beperkingen van verklaringen op basis van ‘institutional economics’. Zuiver 
rationele en/of ‘principal-agent’ benaderingen blijken nauwelijks geschikt om publieke 
waardeverandering en veranderende opvattingen van politieke corruptie te kunnen verklaren. 
Theoretische benaderingen die, met andere woorden, enkel aandacht hebben voor economisch 
en rationeel strategisch gedrag binnen helder omlijnde formele structuren zijn zeer beperkt 
bruikbaar. Zij hebben immers geen oog voor publieke waardeverandering en veranderende 
opvattingen over politieke corruptie als gevolg van informele structuren en emotionele (dat wil 




Het negende en laatste hoofdstuk biedt tot slot ook enkele overpeinzingen met het oog op het 
heden en de toekomst. In de eerste plaats is het van belang dat wij ons realiseren dat corruptie 
zal moeten worden verklaard en aangepakt op basis van een (‘Johnstoniaanse’) neoklassieke 
definitie die in staat is de brede context en institutionele veranderingen mee te wegen. Dit 
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betekent dat wij bij de strijd tegen corruptie de zogenaamde klassieke opvatting van dit begrip 
niet uit het oog moeten verliezen. Wanneer corruptie ook tegenwoordig als uitkomst van een 
breder maatschappelijk en politiek proces wordt gezien dan biedt dat de mogelijkheid om niet 
alleen individuen te bestraffen maar om ook een brede basis of voedingsbodem tegen het licht 
te houden en eventueel aan te pakken. Ethische codes of handvesten voor publieke organisa-
ties zijn in dat opzicht wellicht niet zelden te kleine pleisters op de wond. Daarbij leidt dit, ten 
tweede, tot de conclusie dat de oorzaak van corruptie nooit alleen bij individuen maar juist ook 
bij het systeem waarin zij werkzaam zijn moet worden gezocht.  
Ten derde is het van belang dat men erkent dat opvattingen over corruptie in heden en 
verleden tijdgebonden en sociaal geconstrueerd zijn. Dit heeft gevolgen voor de interpretatie 
en betekenis en verandering van hedendaagse publieke waarden en levert hopelijk een 
genuanceerder aanpak op voor het begrijpen en beoordelen van het hedendaagse openbaar 
bestuur in het algemeen en haar publieke waarden in het bijzonder. Het voorgaande betekent, 
ten vierde, dat een historisch perspectief op veranderende publieke waarden met aandacht voor 
context en contingentie ook kan leiden tot een gezonde dosis ‘ethisch relativisme’. De huidige 
studie laat zien dat wij niet kunnen zeggen dat tegenwoordige tijden meer of minder corrupt 
zijn dan voorheen (ondanks dat er wel sprake is geweest van waardeverandering!) en dat het 
evenmin verantwoord is om het ene publieke waardestelsel bij voorbaat te verkiezen boven het 
andere. Ieder publiek waardestelsel (bijvoorbeeld binnen samenlevingen tussen verschillende 
groepen of tussen landen in een internationale context) is het product van een unieke omge-
ving en referentiekader en moet als zodanig bekeken worden. Het zou goed zijn als men zich 
bewust is van de contextgebondenheid van de eigen waarden voordat er een discussie 
plaatsvindt over die van een ander of voordat waardesystemen uit een deel van de wereld aan 
anderen elders ter wereld worden opgelegd.  
Tot slot laat historisch onderzoek naar publieke waarden ons zien dat onze huidige 
waarden vorm hebben gekregen in decennia, zo niet eeuwen, van bewuste én onbewuste 
sociaal-politieke ontwikkeling. Dat is wellicht een open deur maar de consequenties reiken ver. 
Het betekent namelijk boven alles dat het succes van pogingen om de publieke moraal te 
veranderen of te verbeteren – vergelijk bijvoorbeeld de introductie van de Balkenende-norm – 
niet zelden ook af zal hangen van tijd, geduld en toeval. Tegelijkertijd neemt dat echter weer 
niet weg dat men niet ook doelbewust kan streven naar een minder corrupt en meer integer 
openbaar bestuur. 
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Appendix: Original Texts and Citations 
 
In this book, I have translated citations and passages from eighteenth- and early nineteenth-




                                                 
i “Gelyk er niets beter is, en niets een koninkrijk of vryen staat en volk gelukkiger maakt, dan een 
onderlingen eensgezintheid ondersteunt door een rechtvaardig bestier der regenten, en een gewillige 
liefde en onderdanigheid des volks”. 
ii I: “Om alle ampten, officien en beneficien van deze stadt en jurisdictie van dien dependeerende, die 
tegenwoordig open zyn, en in ‘t vervolg van tyd open zullen vallen, publicq op het raadhuis dezer stadt, 
op te veilen, en aan de meest daar voor biedende te verkoopen, mits dat de koopers van de protestant-
sche religie zyn, en dat het hen vry zal staan, om hunnen gekogte ampte en officien aan anderen te mogen 
verhuuren […] waar door het zal gebeure dat veele gegoede lieden, ‘t zy voor haar zelve, of voor hunne 
kinderen, twee, drie en meer ampten, officien en beneficien zullen komen te kopen, […] daar zy een 
beoorlyke intrest jaarlyks van kunnen trekken”. 
iii II: “ten tweeden: stellen wy aan de edemoedigheid der edel achtbare vroedschappen voor, of het niet 
heilzaam en noodzakelyk waren voor onze stadt, dat de heeren regenten hunnen particuliere ampten, en 
die van hunne kinderen en familien […] dezelve kordaat tot reddinge des lands en styvinge der finantien, 
offereerden”. 
iv Dat “mede zoo zal worden gehandelt [i.e., de verkoop van eigen functies en die van kinderen en familie, 
TK], niet alleen uit kordaatheid en genereusheid, in navolging van onzen heere stadthouder; maar zelfs als 
strydig zynde tegens hunne caracters en fatsoen; ja zelfs tot groot disrespect van eer, glorie en achting, 
van onze, zoo aanzienelyke stadt Rotterdam”. 
v “ …Opdat de ampten, officien en beneficien dezer stadt, van tyd tot tyd, op ‘t raadhuis dezer stadt 
publiek opgeveilt, en aan de meest daar voor biedende zullen worden verkogt…” [...] “Penningen by de 
verkooping van de voorszegde ampten, officien en beneficien te provenieeren, zuiver en zonder eenige 
afzondering, zullen komen ten profyte van deze provintie, en van tyd tot tyd zullen worden gebragt aan 
het comptoir generaal van Holland…”. 
vi Daar er immers “geen acht kan werden genomen op de bequaamheid van de persoonen die dezelve 
moeten bedienen, een van de voornaamste en hoofdzakelyke requisiten die by die aanstellingen vereischt 
werden, en dat daar op een deur zoude werden opengesteld tot allerlye knevelaryen, tot merkelyk bezwaar 
en ondienst van burgerye en Ingezetenen”. 
vii “… Gedeclareerd afte zien van alle de voordelen die voor hunne perzoonen, familien en vrinden uyt de 
vacature vande posteryen mogten ontstaan…” [...] “En is goet gevonden burgemeesteren te bedanken 
voor derzelver cordaaten afstand; en verstaan dat het provenu van de vacante te vervalen posteryen 
zullen worden geemployeert ten nutte van de stad, en dus ten nutte van de goede Ingezetenen van 
dien…”. 
viii “… Alle amptenaren van eenige regeringe, zouden onderhevig zyn aan een speciale eed van zuyvering, 
van niets voor het verkryge derzelve gegeven of belooft te hebben”. 
ix “De veertig jaarige ontberinge van een stadhouder […] had dezen staat en de provintien van onze unie, 
reeds gebragt door verzuim, hebzucht, onbekwaamheid, factie, heerszucht, en verwaarlozinge der 
onderschydene en menigviuldige bestierdders, en overheerschers […] omme voor eeuwig onzen vrijheid 
overheerscht te zien”. 
x “[…] Alzo deze heeren niet onderzogt zijn geworden, maar met bedanken zyn vry gekomen, zonder het 
te onregt geworven geld wederom gerestitueerd te hebben […]” 
xi “Burgers wie gy ook zyt, die den scepter en het roer van staat zy magtig geworden, zoo gy in een over 
de herten wilt regeeren, ontdoed u van alle hoogmoed en dwingelandye, betragt in alle uwe deliberatien 
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alleen de gerechtigheyd en billykheyd, en legt af alle eygen belang en voordeel, laaten beraadslaagingen en 
besluyten met het zeegel van zagtmoedigheyd en vriendelykheyd omtrent uwe burgeren geteekend zyn, 
dus te werk gaande zult gy van ons alleen geerd en geagt zyn, en wy voor altoos getrouwe ingezeetenen 
blyven.” 
xii “In het verleden koos men de dappersten, wijsten, deugdzaamsten. Men liet zich niet regeren door 
mensen die hun (het volk) geen rekenschap gaven. Het volk was bovendien strijdbaarder en gewapend. 
Vroeger hadden vorsten geen vette en tevens onnoodige ambten te vergeeven als onze prinsen en konden 
dus zoo groot getal van hongerige, trotsche, kaale edelen en andere veragtelijke grooten zo gemakkelijk 
niet aan zig verbinden, en in de hooge vergaderingen, daar nogtans over het geluk of ongeluk van onze 
geheele natie wordt gehandeld en beslooten, zodanig laaten stemmen als hun het behaagd, schoon nog 
zoo zeer tegens het heil den den voorspoed van het land aanloopende, overeenkomt”. 
xiii “Maurits was goed geweest als hij net zo veel deugd en vaderlandsliefde had als heerslust […]. Hij was 
een man van allerslegste zeden: een wreedaart, een valsch mensch en een overmaatig geile boef, die 
gewoon was elke schoone vrouw, evenzoveel of zij maagd, getrouwd of weduwe waren, te bejagen en tot 
zijne booze lusten te lokken”. 
xiv “Het zijn de grooten, o medeburgers, daar gijlieden u voor wagten moet. De prins heeft ze meest allen 
aan zijn snoer. Voor ambtpen en commissien, voor eene maaltijd aan het hof doen zy alles, eed en plicht 
en het welzijn van het vaderland gaat hun doorgaans weinig ter harte”. 
xv “Het land hoord ulieden met malkanderen toe en niet den prins met zyne grooten alleen, die ulieden 
behandelen als hunnen erflyken eigendom, als hunnen ossen en schaapen, dewelke zij naar hun 
goeddunken of scheeren of slagten kunnen en mogen [...] wie het ook is die enige post in die maatschap-
pij bekleed, zyn maar enkel directuers, de bewindhebbers, de rentmeesters van die maatschappij, en in 
deze qualiteit, minder dan de leden van dezelve [...] al hun gezag is van ulieden ontleend [...] zy zijn aan 
het meerdergetal van ulieden onderworpen en rekenschap en gehoorzaamheid schuldig”. 
xvi “God, onze gemeene vader, heeft de menschen geschapen om gelukkig te worden, en aan alle 
menschen, niemand uitgezonderd, de verplichting opgelegd om elkanderen zo veel in hun vermogen is 
gelukkig te maken”. Om dit te doen worden maatschappijen opgerigt waarin mensen “van nature allen 
egaal en aan elkanderen gelyk zijn en de een niet is onderworpen aan de ander”. 
xvii “Tegen zijn medeburgeren beleefd, vriendelijk en gedienstig; een voorstander van ‘s lands vrijheid, 
voorregten en welvaart, een regtschapen Patriot te zijn, helpt hier niet alleen niets, maar is integendeel 
hinderlijk. Die hier enig fortuin zoekt moet daartoe een heel andere weg inslaan. Het is enkel de gunst 
van de stadhouder die hij nodig heeft en deze weten en zien wij allen dat niet te winnen is door zig 
deugdzaam te gedragen; door beleefd, vriendelijk en gedienstig  tegen zijn medeburgeren te zijn”. 
xviii “Wie wordt er met uw vetrouwen vereerd dan alleen zulken welken gy reeds als schurken kennen, of 
daar gylieden hoop en verwachting van hebt dat zy het worden zullen? zijn niet verre de meesten van uwe 
lievelingen de slechtste, de zedelooschte schepzels, hoereerders, echtbrekers, dobbelaars, zwelgers? Dit 
soort mensen kiest u in hoge colleges: mensen die hunne stemmen aan u verkopen of te onkundig of 
vreesachtig zijn om zig tegen u te verzetten. Nee! Den eerlijken, den kundigen, den stouten patriot, den 
man die spreken durft en kan, beschouwt gy als uw vijand, met afkeer, schrik, vrees”. 
xix “Laaten wy met onze constitutie ook onze zeden verbetren […] dan zal de staat zich weder opbeuren 
en zyne verstrooide leden zich weder vereenigen. Het groot gebouw der unie dat op eene zandgrond 
gebouwd zynde en aan alle kanten wegzinkt zal een vasten grondslag verkrijgen en uit den schoot der 
algemene deugdzaamheid zullen de moed, de nayver, de nyverheid en de vaderlandsliefde, en met deeze 
goede hoedanigheden ook de oude eer en macht der Republiek herboren worden”. 
xx Verkiezing der regenten hing niet af van “redelykeid, regtmatigheid of het verstand”, maar “van een 
schitterend fortuin, van een gelukkig voorkomen, of van de genegenheid van een onnozel meisje”. 
xxi “Hoe schrander, hoe deugdzaam, hoe onvermoeid, hoe goedwillig – met één woord, hoe volmaakt een 
stadhouder moge bedacht worden, is het echter mooglyk, dat hy de verkiesbaarste perfoonen tot de 
verscheidene bedieningen der regeering in alle de steden en plaatsen der Republiek zou kunnen kennen”. 
xxii “Hy moet derhalven, ten deezen einde, of alles aan het geval overgeeven, of zich tot zyne onderrich-
ting van zodanige lieden bedienen, die, onder den naam van premiers, en van lieutenant-stadhouders 
bekend zyn”. 
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xxiii “Deeze lieutenant-stadhouders veilige en getrouwe leidslieden kunnen zyn. In Friesland had deeze 
gewoonte der steden de regeering van een volk, zo vry als ‘er ooit een volk onder de zon was, in eene 
soort van alleenheersching veranderd. De geheele burgerlyke regeering en de bcdelling van allen de 
arapten der steden hingen daar niet alleen af van een’ enkelen regent”. 
xxiv “Is het niet zeer natuurlyk, dat, hoe meer een regent van het stadhouderlyk hof afhangt, hoe minder 
hy van zyne medeburgers afhanglyk is? In deeze onnatuurlyke betrekking vind hy een steunsel, dat hem 
ongevoeliger wyze daartoe brengt, om van des volks genegenheid weinig werk te maaken”. 
xxv “Dezelven worden niet zelden begeven aan kleine wargeesten kleine deugnieten, en kleine listontwer-
pers, welker kleine begaafdheden, die aan de hoven genoeg zyn om tot aanzienlyke ampten te geraaken, 
enkel trekken om hunne onbekwaamheid te doen zien, wanneer zy eenmaal daartoe verheven zyn. De 
manlyke en republikeinsche deugden zyn gehaat, en verdacht in de verderflyke lucht van een vorstelyk 
hof. De onafhanglykheid van de ziel, de edele fierheid der denkbeelden, die doorgaans met de waare 
verdienden gepaard gaan, zyn daar genoegzaame hoedanigheden om van alle ampten en waardigheden 
uitgefloten te worden. Men kan daar tot gcene verheffing geraaken dan door laage listen, lafhartige 
vleijeryen, en misdaadige inschiklykheden, die niet kunnen voortkomen dan uit bedorven harten, en 
bekrompen geesten”. 
xxvi “Een aristocratisch regent bezit deeze laagheid niet; maar zyne trotsheid is niet minder ondraaglyk, en 
veel gevaarlyker. Men heeft voordeezen in eene van onze grootste steden een burgemeester gezien, die 
een deftigen burger, wanneer deeze zyne klagten by hem kwam inbrengen, van het hoofd tot de voeten 
bekeek, en tegen hem op een’ trotschen toon durfde zeggen; wel kerel! Wie ben je? Het volk is in de 
oogen der aristocraaten niets meer dan een gemeene hoop, enkel geschikt om hunne trotsheid te 
verdraagen, aan hunne grilligheden te gehoorzaamen, en een werktuig ter bevordering van hunne 
belangen te zyn. Zodanige aristocraaten leeven echter niet zonder vrees. Dewyl zy melkanderen geduurig 
moeten ontzien om den buit, dien zy onderling te deelen hebben, en om de partyen in evenwicht te 
houden, heerscht in hun gantsch gedrag eene beuzelachtige en kleinhartige omzichtigheid. Zy zyn niets 
minder dan gelukkig. Gedwongen om in eene geduurige jaloesie te leeven, zyn zy onophoudelyk bezig 
met eikanderen in acht te neemen, heimelyk te bestryden , en bedekte laagen te leggen”. 
xxvii “In eene volksregeering zullen, zo de wyze van verkiezing niet wel is ingericht, mooglyk eenige 
burgers, die naar bedieningen slaan, zich eenige vernederingen laaten welgevallen, om daartoe te geraaken; 
maar deeze hunne handelwys zal altoos gepaard gaan met eene zekere grootheid, die dezelve voor het oog 
bedekt, degeenen, die daarna staan, zullen trachten zich bekend te maaken door daaden van 
grootmoedigheid, milddaadigheid, en menschlievendheid”. 
xxviii “Schoon de beweegreden niet geheel vry is van eigenbelang, is het middel echter niets minder dan 
laag of  vernederende, dewyl het een grooten man nooit kwaalyk voegt naar de gunst van het volk te 
staan”. 
xxix “In eene volksregeering kan een man van verdiensten altoos op zyne bevordering staat maaken. Men 
ziet op zyn gelaat eene zekere fierheid, welke, schynt aan te duiden , dat hy den streelenden, den 
roemryken eertitel van hoofd, van representant des volks alleen aan zyne verdienstelijkheid te danken 
heeft; maar deeze fierheid word altoos getemperd door eene spraakzaame minzaamheid, dewyl hy weet, 
dat hy zelfs den geringste burger moet ontzien. Hy zet zyne voornemens met onvermoeiden yver door, 
omdat hy zichzelven befchouwt als belast met de belangen van eene geheele natie, en hy verdedigt die 
met standvastigheid, omdat hy kan aantoonen, dat bet niet zyne byzondere maar de algemeene belangen 
van het volk zyn”. 
xxx “Zohaast het volk tot rechter gesteld word over die verdienden, die iemand moet bezitten om tot de 
gewigtige ampten van de wetgeevende magt bevorderd te worden, word de spruit en wortel van alle 
misnoegen en scheuring uitgerooid, en tevens ook het kwaad, dat daaruit zou kunnen voortspruiten. Het 
volk is ingenomen met zyn eigen werk; wanneer die wyze van verkiezing zoveel als mooglyk is de weg 
toesluit voor alle indringingen eu kuiperyën, van dat oogenblik af, heeft men eene wezentlyke, regelmaati-
ge, en heilzaame volksverbeelding en volksregeering. Het vertrouwen tusschen de regenten en het volk is 
voor altoos hersteld”. 
xxxi “Het zyn niet eenige weinige persoonen, die zichzelven en hunne vrienden en bloedverwanten zoeken 
te verryken van den algemeenen buit en voordeelige ampten het is het geheel lichaam des volks zelf, dat 
hierm het hoogst belang heeft, dat de zaaken van den staat behoorlyk bestuurd worden. De belangen van 
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den staat en die van het volk zyn dezelfden. Dus is het voorzeker zyne zaak bekwaame lieden te verzen 
om dezelven te bestuuren”. 
xxxii “Het volk, dat de souvereine magt in handen heeft” zegt Montesquieu, moet alles, dat het naar 
behooren kan doen, zelf doen, en alles, dat hetzelve niet naar behooren kan doen, door zyne staatsdie-
naars [laten] uitvoeren. De staatsdienaars kunnen geene volksdienaars genoemd worden, wanneer zy niet 
door het volk zyn aangesteld. Het is dus in deeze regeeringsvorm eene grondwet dat het volk zyne eigen 
staatsdienaars, dat is te zeggen, zyne regenten benoeme. Het volk heeft, even als een vorst, en zelfs meer 
dan een vorst, noodig om door eene raadsvergadering voorgelicht te worden. Maar om in die raadsverga-
dering vertrouwen te kunnen stellen, moet het volk zelf de leden van dezelve benoemen; het zy dan, dat 
het dit voor zichzelf doe, gelyk te Athenen of dat het dit doe door een collegie, dat de magt heeft om die 
te verkiezen, gelyk dit gebruiklyk was te Rome by fommige gelegenheden te twyfelen aan de natuurlyke 
bekwaamheid van het volk om de waare verdienden te onderkennen, zon men slechts het oog behoeven 
te slaan op de lange aaneenschakeling van bewonderenswaerdige verkiezingen, welke de Atheniënzen en 
Romeinen gedaan hebben, en die men niet aan het bloot geval kan toeschryven”. 
xxxiii “Van den anderen kant kan het afdanken van een’ amptenaar, die zyn’ pligt behoorlyk waarneemt, 
den staat berooven van een’ noodzaaklyken dienaar in netelige omftandigheden. Men loopt gevaar van de 
ampten aan onbekwaame lieden over te geeven wanneer zy, die daarmede belast zyn, dezelven nederleg-
gen éér zy die te recht hebben leeren kennen”. 
xxxiv “De gelykheid is de grondslag van de volksregeering; deeze zou vernietigd worden wanneer het gezag 
altoosduurend bleef, en derhalven moet hetzelve rondgaan. Altoosduurende regeeringen blusschen de 
hoop uit, doen de yverzucht verflaauwen, en verzwakken de verknochtheid aan het Vaderland, Dezelve 
worden doorgaans waargenomen met eene traagheid, die niet zeer gunftig is voor het publiek welzyn; 
degeenen, die dezelve bezitten, vervallen tot eene trotsheid, welke voor de algemeene vryheid aanstoote-
lyk is”. 
xxxv “Regeeringspersoonen, die nimmer verpligt zyn weder tekeeren tot den staat van byzondere burgers, 
raaken ligt in de verbeelding dat zy de meesters zyn van die wetten, waarvan zy slechts de dienaars zyn. 
Omkooping, strafloosbeid, vergetelheid, willekeurigheid, en kwaade bestuuring der publieke zaaken, 
vloeijen altoos voort uit de langduurigheid van het gezag”. 
xxxvi “Dus is het eene zeer goede instelling, dat de burgemeesters, de schepenen, en het grootse gedeelte 
der ondergeschikte rechters veranderbaar zyn; maar het zou voor de ingezetenen een groot nadeel weezen 
wanneer de rechtbank van hoogste uitspraak onderhevig was aan afdankingen, en geduurige veranderin-
gen. In deeze gewigtige bediening zyn de diepste betrachting en de langduurigfte oefening van het geheel 
leven naauwelyks toereikende om den staat naar behooren te kunnen dienen”. 
xxxvii “In de tyden toen de processen minder netelig waren, en de chicane geene helpers vond om dezelven 
nog meer te verwarren, konden het gezond verftand, en de oprechtheid genoegzaam de plaats der 
rechtsgeleerde kundigheden vervullen; maar met andere tyden en zeden worden ook andere bekwaamhe-
den vereischt” 
xxxviii “Dat niemand tot den rang van schepen zou kunnen verheven worden, die niet alvoorens blyken 
vanzyne bekwaamheid in de rechten gegeven had door het toonen van eenigc gewonnen pleidooijen”. 
xxxix “Een regent kan ook in het geval komen van tot eenige gewigtige commisfie benoemd te worden ; 
het is zelfs somtyds zyn pligt eene zaak in eene souvereine vergadering voor te stellen, nader open te 
leggen, en te verdeedigen. Hy moet kennis hebben van het recht der volkeren, van het publiek recht van 
zyn vaderland, en van alles, dat eenige betrekking heeft tot het staatkundige, tot onderhandelingen, tot 
den koophandel, tot den landbouw, enz. En zou men dan niet behooren te vorderen, dat zulk een man 
blyken van zyne bekwaamheid gegeven had? Zou men voor het minst niet moogen vaststellen, dat een 
benoemeling, wie zyne academische studien volbragt heeft, en daarby de overige vereischte 
hoedanigheden bezit, de voorkeur zou hebben voor iemand die, in zulk geval niet was?”. 
xl “Behalyen de bekwaamheden heeft, men altoos het bezitten van eenige goederen gevorderd, om tot de 
regceringsampten te kunnen geraaken; omdat men doorgaans minder of meerder verknocht is aan een 
land, naarmaate van de goederen, die men in hetzelve bezit […]. Allen, die eenige bezittingen, of 
bedieningen in een vreemd land hebben, moesten voldrektelyk uit alle staats-collegiën en vergaderingen 
worden uitgesloten. De renteniers hebbén des te minder betrekking tot het vaderland, omdat hunne 
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inkomsten aan de gewoone schattingen niet onderhevig zyn, en men doorgaans zijn hart by zyne schatten 
heeft”. 
xli “Intusschen zou het dan, het zy dan om, van tyd tot tyd, eenig recht te doen aan de gelykheid, welke de 
grondsteun der volksregeering is, het zy om aan te toonen, dat verdienden boven, de schatten moeten 
geacht moeten worden niet ongeoorloofd zyn. Somtyds lieden te benoemen, die geene andere rykdom-
men konden aantoonen dan hunne uitsteekende verdiensten; maar in zulk een geval zou het volk, dat 
hem verkozen had verpligt zyn hem een jaargeld toe te leggen, om zyn ampt met behoorlyke vaardigheid 
te kunnen bekleeden, in dit zou ook kunnen geschieden door hem eenige voordeelige bediening daarby te 
geeven”. 
xlii “Dus was steeds het oogmerk der ouden zo in de krygs- als in de flaatkunde uit te munten. Dus 
bestuurden de gebroeders De Wit met dezelfde bekwaamheid, de overweegingen van eene 
staatsvergadering en de beweegingen van een leger, of van eene vloot. Men zou ook het voortreffelijk 
systema der ouden kunnen navolgen, van naamlyk op de lyst der verkiesbaaren en stemgerechtigden 
niemand te plaatsen of hy moest in staat zyn om de Republiek als vrywilliger te dienen”. 
xliii “Zou men niet nog daarby kunnen bepaalen, dat iemand, om verkiesbaar te weezen, gehuwd zou 
moeten zyn, of geweest zyn, tenzy hy by zyn vader, of by zyne moeder inwoonde? Zouden vader en 
zoon, broeders, oomen en neeven, broeders- of zusterskinderen, schoonvader en schoonzoon, of 
behuwdbroeder, zitting moogen hebben in de regeering, of in den magistraat van dezelfde plaats? Zou 
men dit zelfs niet moogen uitstrekken tot meer verre bloedverwanten, volgens de grondwetten en 
gebruiken der verscheiden gewesten?” 
xliv “[…] Goede zeden, goede wetten, en een uit beiden voortgevloeid bestuur zijn de enigste bronnen van 
het geluk der maatschappij in ‘t algemeen en van elk lid in ‘t bijzonder”. [Handel volgens] “de goddelijke 
voorschriften: doe aan een ander hetgeen gij wilt dat u gebeurd etc.” “een deugdzzam man is ontwijfel-
baar een patriot. De liefde voor het vaderland, voor zijne medeburgers, voor zijne natuurgenoten, doet 
hem aan hun belang alle daartegen strijdende zelfbelangen opofferen […] nimmer zullen hem slinksche 
oogmerken tot onderdrukking of verderving van zijn vaderland bezielen – of hij houdt op een deugdzaam 
man te zijn”. […] “te groote winzucht” […] uit toenemende rijkdom kwam weelde – pracht – overdaad - 
en ontucht […] de regenten en aristocraten beschouwden zich als boven t volk verheven […] zedeloos-
heid, ontrouw en knevelarij namen de overhand. De ambtenaren zagen geen noodzaak beter te zijn als 
het volk of hunnen zogenaamde meesters. Verscheidenen soorten van landsdieverij werden slegts met 
zachte namen bestempeld en hielden op misdadig te zijn – elk plukte elk roofde wat hij kon en ‘s lands 
financien gingen te gronde”.  
xlv “een systeem waaraan de heerszucht en het eigenbelang zich met gretigheid gekleefd houden […] het 
geliefkoosd stelsel van de begunstigers der bijzondere provinciaalse heerszucht en de hoop van allen die 
bij de revolutie de grote belangen des vaderlands aan hun eigen belangen wilden onderwerpen”. 
xlvi “Een volk dat vrijheid wil, en geen orde kent; dat zich van de ergste slavernij, die der ondeugden en 
driften, niet weet te ontslaan; een volk dat den eenen dag bestuurders verkiest, hen den tweeden dag 
mistrouwt, den derden vervloekt, en echter wenscht zijne belangen wel bestierd te zien; een volk dat 
geene toegevendheid, geen broederschap kent, waarin honderd verschillend denkende partijen worden 
gevonden die elk om een andere oorzaak elkander schelden en vloeken, zonder aan elkander iets te willen 
toegeven; een volk zonder eenige consistentie van buiten, afhangende van de genade van een naburig 
gemeenebest, onzeker van zijn lot, onzeker van zijne bezittingen, aan alle gevaren blootgesteld, veracht of 
niet geteld, en echter de verkrijging zijner onafhankelijkheid dagelijks opofferende aan binnenlandsche 
twisten, aan personen, aan kleinigheden, aan harsenschimmen”. 
xlvii “Burgers! Ziedaar eene korte, zwarte, maar waarachtige schets van den algemeenen staat der zaken na 
eenen driejarigen strijd! Burgers, mögt ik onwaarheid spreken, wanneer ik u den wissen val des 
Nederlandschen volks voorspelle, indien niet eenstemmigheid en eendracht eerlang onze schandelijke 
twisten vervangen; indien niet in weinig tijds een welingericht bestuur, met de noodige macht bekleed om 
elk tot zijn plicht, tot heil van het algemeen te dwingen, de tegenwoordige orde van zaken vervange. 
Indien eigenbelang en heerschzucht, menigmaal als volksvrienden vermomd, niet worden geweerd; indien 
het mistrouwen des volks op zijne bestuurders, en van deze op het volk blijft voortduren, indien woeste 
driften de stem der waarheid en rechtvaardigheid, of het dol geschreeuw des on Verstands, of 
amptenhonger, de zachte stem der wijsbegeerte onder hun bulderend geluid blijven versmoren, indien de 
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keuzen tot het bestuur zich alleen op hen bepalen die uiterlyk hoofden van partijen of gezindheden zyn, 
en kunde, eerlijkheid en goede zeden worden voorbijgegaan”. 
xlviii “Een eerlijk man, een belangloos ijveraar voor de goede zaak des vaderlands, ziet zich niet gaarne 
gelijk geschat met eenige doldriftige en zedelooze fortuinzoekers, die alleen door eigenbelang en lage 
driften bewogen worden”. 
xlix “Alles is slijm, slapheid, gebrek aan energie, afwijking van de principes en helling tot aristocratie en 
stedelijk foederalisme”. 
l “Het wierd tijd, dat de klove gedempt werd, welke men gevestigd had tusschen een geregelde orde van 
zaken en het wanstaltig bestuur van eene op zich zelf oppermachtige en in schijn zaam verbonden 
volken: een bestuur waar van ons vaderland zo veelmalen de rampzalige gevolgen heeft ondervonden […] 
een bestuur welk’s schadelijkheid ons op elke bladzijde van de gedenkrollen onzes vaderlands overtuigend 
word bewezen” […] het “doen ophouden van dien staat van verwarring en onzekerheid, deze heeft de 
zenuwen van onze welvaart verlamd, de stem van het volk gesmoord en ons gebragt op den rand van een 
jammerpoel” […] “het was tyd, dat men de plannen vruchteloos maakte van hen die om hunner eigen 
grootheidswille het bondgenootschapelijk bestuur tracht tegen te houden”. Het is tijd “een einde [te] 
maken aan de “heerszucht en regeringsloosheid”. 
li “Zie hier een ruuwe schets van Van der Kok, een pachter, aan Rijn en Vecht befaamt door zyne 
knev’lary, Den opper-belsebub, vol trotze hovaardy; zo trots, dat zelfs zyn huis geleek van voor tot 
achter, eer een paleis van een voornaam Venetiaan; zyn heimelyk gemak alleen (‘k meen wel te weeten) 
heeft meer gekost, als ik in myn leven heb bezeten”. 
lii “Myn eisch ging altijd door; daar hielp ook geen geklag. Hoe groot was doe myn magt! Hoe deftig myn 
gezag! ‘t Was, geeft, en heb je niet, men zal ‘t je wel leeren, al zouden ‘t zelfs het wyf en kinderen 
ontbeeren”. 
liii“Wat ben ik duivels wys geweest! / Ik was een gaauwert, een verlakker / Ja de allermalste koekebakker 
/ ontbloot van reden en van geest / Dat ik ging boter-pachter werden / Ô spijt! Die naauwelyks is te 
herden”. 
liv “‘t geval komt altyd wel van pas / Nu woed de raazende gemeente / Om dat ik knaagde op hun 
gebeente / En wist niet wat conscientie was / Ik moet myn woekerzugt ontbeeren / Den schat zien na 
zyn oorsprong keeren”. 
lv “Ach! Wee my! Armen ouderling! Dat ik zo slinks my heb vergreepen, En andere lui hun beurs 
gekneepen, toen ik het tolnaarsampt ontfing. Ik heb myn eigen zelfs bedroogen, en niemand is met my 
bewogen”. 
lvi “Men heeft hunne huizen, hunne prachtige paleisen niet onder den voet gehaalt, om dat zy pachters 
waren; veel min is zulks uit verachting voor de bevelen van de overheid geschied; maar vermits zy zo vele 
onmedogende bloedzuigers, knevelaars en waren tyranne der burgers waren”. 
lvii “by betaamelyke ingezeetenen gerespecteert werden, dat er pachters zyn wien in vorige dagen 
verklikkers, gemeene soopjes- en bierverkopers zyn geweest, die na twee jaar nauwelyks tot de pacht zyn 
getollereert, een chaisse, by het derde een faëton, en verders anderen, een buitenplaats, koets en 20 à 30 
paarden in hoogmoet hebben. Dit onhebbelyke geslagte, als uit een stam herkomstig by wie het fatsoen 
geen plaats heeft, stelt autoriteit in woeker- en schraapzuchtigheid, waar door een eerbaar burger zich 
moet schamen dat zulken in eerlyken gezelschappen worden getollereert, veel minder dat heeren van 
aansien [i.e., de regenten] zulke woekeraars in hunne associatien toe laten”. 
lviii “…se [de onlusten, TK] tot doel zouden hebben eenige wil of begeerte om sigh aan de lasten tot 
onderstand van de gemeene saak te willen onttrekken”. 
lix “Zal worden geintroduceert, een egaale practycq door onze geheele provincie, en de penningen daar 
van te provenieeren richtelyk in ‘s lands kasse zullen koomen, en onze ingezeetenen worden bevryd van 
de vexatien, die dikwils onder de verpachte middelen hebben plaats gehad, en waar door vervolgens de 
reedenen van het ongenoegen, dat wy voor deeze tegens de verpachte middelen hebben bespeurt, alle zyn 
wechgenoomen en koomen te cesseeren”. 
lx “Dat zy zich de lasten tot behoud van het gemeene best, niet zullen willen onttrekken, en waar door te 
gelyk te leur zullen worden gesteld de zoo verderffelyke machinatien van qualyk geintentioneerden, en de 
waare zucht en liefde tot behoud en conservatie van het lieve vaderland en al wat dierbaar is, op het 
krachtigste zal worden beweezen”. 
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lxi “By defraudatie, dat is willens en weetens, met opzet, van den impost profiteerden en die aan het land 
onttrekken”. 
lxii “Alle Baatzoekende van het pleegen van fraudes, zoo veel in ons vermoogen af te schrikken, en dus 
voor te koomen, dat die geene die ‘s lands lasten gewilliglyk draagen, door de fraudes en sluikeryen van 
anderen niet worden gedrukt en bezwaart”. 
lxiii Zij “sullen meede gehouden zijn haar op hunne comptoiren tot gerief van een yeder dagelijcks ten 
minsten te laaten vinden op de volgende uyren, te weeten, van den eersten Maart tot den laatsten 
September des voormiddaghs van aght tot twaalf uyren, en des namiddags van twee tot ses uyren, en van 
den eersten October tot den laatsen Februari des voormiddaghs van twee tot vyf uyren”. 
lxiv Zij moeten bovendien “yder jaar van de collecte en ontfangh van alle Impositien moeten houden twee 
boecken of registers, gefolieerd, geseegelt en geteekent ter financie van Hollandt […] sonder die het zy 
onder preatext het oock soude moogen weesen, in eenige kladtboecken, ofte op aparte pladeren Papier te 
moogen annoteeren”. 
lxv Zo moest deze funtionaris “de vaste posten van recherche aan de poorten, boomen, koornmolens, 
hallen of waar ook verder mogten geplaatst zyn, ten minsten eens daags op onzeekere uuren visiteeren en 
verneemen of de bedienden, aldaar fungeerende hun post en wagt behoorlyk waarneemen, en zig nugter 
en bequaam bevinden”. 
lxvi De collecteur zal de accijns [van de pachter, TK] innen “sonder met yemant te conniveeren, ofte gratie 
te doen of in eeniger manieren, directelijck of indirectelijck, min dan de juiste gerechtigheyt te ontfangen 
[…] voorts sullen vervallen in een boete van twee hondert guldens”. 
lxvii Diegenen die in “eenige publicque hooge ofte minder employen zyn gesteld, sullen vanwege hare eedt 
ende plicht [moeten] betrachten, met die suyverheydt en integriteyt, die alle vroome en cordate regenten 
ende beambten betaamt […] sonder [zich] door giften of gaven te laten bewegen en corrumpeeren”. 
Mensen die een ambt wilden vervullen moesten zich nu dus “by solemnelen eede suyveren, dat noch sy 
selve, noch (met haar weeten) haare Huysvrouwen, Kinderen, die van haar Familie. Ofte yemandt anders 
haar aangaande, eenige giften, gaven ofte geschenken, selfs of door andere, directelijck ofte indirectelijck 
hebben genoomen, ontfangen ofte genooten”. 
lxviii Dat zij zich in alles zouden “punctueelyk moeten gedraagen na de instructie voor haar gearresteert, en 
noch te arresteeren […] en zich “in alle opsigte exactelyk gedraagen na den inhoud van de ordonnantie 
op de collecte van de voorschreeve regten”. 
lxix “Heeft bekomen behoorlijke commissie en instructie, en daar op heeft afgelegd den behoorlijken eed”. 
lxx Zo zegt hij tijdens het tweede verhoor “dat hij wel bewust zijnde dat ‘s lands pennigen de zijnen niet 
waren en dezelve voor zijn privé of negotie niet vermogt te gebruiken, ja zelfs niet te melleeren met zijne 
particuliere penningen [onderstreping in origineel, TK]. 
lxxi Een “verregaande trouwelooshied en meineedigheid” [...] Dat alle zijne behandelingen omtrent ‘s lands 
zaaken zijn allerslegtste daaden; dat zij zijn strijdig tegens eed en pligt […] en te kwader trouw daarvan is 
meester gebleeven, ‘s lands bediendens daar mede bedrogen en zig als een trouwloos en meineedig 
mensch gedragen heeft […]”. 
lxxii Dat hij “met den koord om den hals wel strengelijk met roeden gegesled en gebrandmerkt te worden 
en voorts in een tuchthuis geconfineerd te worden voor den tijd van 25 jaren om gedurende dezelve met 
zijnen handen arbeid de kost winnen en naar expiratie van dien tijd voor altoos gebannen [uit de 
provincie, TK]”. 
lxxiii To avoid fraud it was necessary “zig tot dat einde alleen bedienen van de boeken haar uit de financie 
bevoorens gegeeven, welke boeken in de financie zalen worden gefolieerd, en op het eerste blad door een 
commies of boekhouder het getal der folie genoteerd en ondertekent, en voorts de eenden van het garen, 
waar meede dezelve zyn ingenaaid, op het eerste en laatste blad met het cachet van Holland verzegelt”. 
lxxiv “[…] En dat hem bekend sijnde, dat de ordre van het land medebrengt en van hem vordert, dat hij 
alle de hem aangegevene posten aanstonds moet brengen in de boeken van het land sonder deselve 
alvoorens op losse bladeren te mogen noteeren, hij evenwel dit laaste heeft gedaan […]. 
lxxv Ook heeft Abraham “meer dan eens posten [heeft] ontfangen die hij in de boeken heeft laten 
openstaan even als of deselve niet betaald waren […]”. 
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lxxvi Abraham heeft iedere (onvolledige) maandstaat beeindigd met een “Declaratoir op den eed aan den 
lande gedaan”. Hij heeft nu echter moeten erkennen dat “de declaratoiren onder sijne maandstaaten 
gesteld niet sijn conform de waarheid […]”. 
lxxvii Zij zullen “de bedienden die hun ter assistentie zyn toegevoegd, moeten houden tot hunne 
verplichting en nakoming van hunne instructie als meede tot observantie van de ordonnantiën […] doch 
zullen den gaarders ‘s lands bedienden tot hun leider particuliere of huisdiensten niet moogen gebruiken” 
lxxviii Zo moesten “de officieren of collecteurs alle omzichtigheid gebruiken en zich onthouden van onder 
pretext van de voorschreven recherche en visitatie de goederen te beschadigen, op poene van dubbel de 
vergoeding der toegebrachte schade”. 
lxxix  “Op poene dat de schade, die daar door, zoo wel als door alle verzuimen aan het land wordt 
toegebracht, ten hunne laste zal worden uitgetrokken; ten waare [tenzij, TK] zy eenige wettige of 
voldoende reedenen van belet konden legeren”. 
lxxx “Gaarders of collecteurs sullen gehouden zyn ten behoeve van het gemeene land en tot securiteit van 
het selve te stellen zodanige cautie als onze gecommitteerde raden […] van haar sullen koomen te 
rekwireren”. 
lxxxi “De gaarders of collecteurs sullen niet vermoogen eenigsins minder te ontfangen van ‘s lands regt by 
de ordonnantien gesteld […] en ook niet te composeeren op eenigerhande wyse anders als haar by 
particuliere ordonnantien sal syn gepermiteert op laste van twee honderd guldens voor iedere compositie 
zoo wel van den gaarder of collecteur als tot lasten van die geene die met haar gecomposeert sal hebben 
[…]”. 
lxxxii “De gaarders met niemant over eenige middelen moogen composeeren, nog accordeeren, dan 
wanneer hun zulks by de respectieve odonnantien word gepermitteerd […] en zullen de gaarders aan 
niemand crediet van den impost moogen geeven […]”. 
lxxxiii “De collecteurs de collecte haar toevertrouwt selfs of door iemand van haar familie sullen moeten 
waarneemen, en responsable zijn voor die geenen die sy van haar familie bij absentie, siekte of ander 
wettig belet daar toe gebruiken”. 
lxxxiv De mededeling dat de “de collecteurs de collecten haar toevertrouwd zelfs en in eygene persoon 
sullen moeten waarneemen, en geensins door een ander, zelfs niet door iemand van haare familie doen 
waarneemen […]”. 
lxxxv “Magistraten, Regenten of andere persoonen geen denuciatiën teegen den ophef van de gemeene 
middelen moogen doen”. Verder mogen zij ook “geen interpretatie geeven of verhindering toebrengen, 
en mogen [zij] selfs sig daar meede niet bemoeyen, direct of indirect op poene van gesuspendeert te 
worden van haare Officien voor den tyd van een jaar”. 
lxxxvi  “Zy zullen moeten weesen, nugtere en bequaame manspersoonen, van een eerlyk comportement en 
gedrag”. 
lxxxvii “Zullen moeten weezen ordentelyke lieden, oud boven de vijfentwintig jaaren”. Zij zullen bovendien 
“elk en een yder met alle vriendelykheid moeten bejegenen, en hen zoo spoedig helpen als maar 
eenigzints mogelyk is, en vooral zorgen, dat die burgers, niet worden opgehouden”. 
lxxxviii “De commis fiscaal zal weesen een habil en neerstig persoon, van de waare gereformeerde religie, of 
defelve toegdaan, als meede een geboore Hollander, een regtsgeleerde of een zeer goed costumier en 
practizyn, vooral ervaren in het stuk van den opheeve van des gemeene lands middelen en imposten”. 
lxxxix  Vergelijk: “geen regenten, derzelver ministers, officieren, ontfangers en derzelver bediendens, zullen 
moogen worden aangesteld tot gaarders of collecteurs”. 
xc “Ten einde het gemeene land te beeter en gestaadig van deselve mag werden gediend, geen ampten of 
officien beneevens het zelve binnen of buiten de provintie van Holland en Westvriesland moogen 
bedienen”. 
xci “Dewyl de gaarders of collecteurs in effecte zyn te considereeren als kleine of minder soort van 
ontfangers soodanig dat de gelden en penningen door haar ontfangen werdende directelyk koomen in de 
kasse van het gemeene land […]. Dat een ieder van dien na syn qualiteit en conditie door het gemeene 
land na billykheid sullen werden gesalarieerd en beloond […] het mitsdien veel natuurlyker , billyker, en 
met den aard der saaken meer overeenkomstig is dat de portien in de boetens […] directelyk ook koomen 
in de kasse van het gemeene land, als dewelke door de fraudes direct en alleen in haar inkoomen werd 
benadeeld”. 
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xcii In a reaction against violence towards tax officials in Oostzaandam in 1727 Gecommitteerde Raden, 
for instance, write: “we declare hereby to safeguard all tax farmers, collectors and their servants, and 
forbid threats or misbehavior towards them and their goods and homes”. Of: “alle pagters, collecteurs en 
haare bediendens, by deesen verklaaren te neemen in Onse sauvegarde en souveraine protectie […] 
verbiedende eenen iegelijken … te dreigen of in het minste te misdoen, of haare huisen en goederen aan 
te tasten”. 
xciii It concerns: “persoonen die ‘s lans rechten tot ondersteuning van ‘s lands finantie directelyk voor het 
land ontfangen, of daar aan de hand leenen, volgens hun eed en plicht”. 
xciv “Alle feytelykheden en geweld, teegen deselve bediendens gepleegt, [zullen worden beschouwd, TK] 
als begaan directelyk teegen de hooge Overheid zelfs”.  
xcv Requesting “den opziender Vaster en hooftgaarder Reijers van de wijnen te Amsterdam, te 
beschrijven, om voor den ontrouw van deze te werden gehoort en daarvan kennise te geeven aan de 
schepenen commissarissen”. 
xcvi “Met alle opregtheid niet te weeten dat ‘t teegens gemelde schepenen commissarissen eenige 
indecentie of irreverentie zouden gebruykt oft eenige intentie daartoe gehad hadden” 
xcvii “Van die genereusheid te zijn zulks te verklaren aan gemelde schepenen commissarissen oft den 
president een excuse te verzoeken wegens datgene waar in zij zig buyten hun weeten en teegens hunnen 
intentie mogt misgrepen hebben” en zeiden zij “dat zij niet wisten eenig offensie gedaan te hebben 
immers geen intentie daartoe gehad te hebben en evenwel executie te verzoeken van hetgeen waar in 
scheepenen commissarissen oft den presiderende heer dagte door hen te zijn geoffendeert het welk bij 
hen is aangenomen. Waarmede zij heeren commissarissen hoopten en wagten dat genoegen zoude 
werden genoomen”. 
xcviii De schepenen-commissarissen meldden in hun reactie op het bericht van de Gecommitteerde Raden 
dat zij “van gedagten waren dat de defensie bij hen lieden gedaan vrij aannemelijk was voorgekoomen”. 
Tegelijkertijd waren zij ook van mening dat “den opziender [Vaster] en gaarder [Reijers] te ongelijke 
personen waaren om parralel gesteld te worden”. 
xcix “De lichtmis Ryers, los van kop / Die zonder complimenten, 
Juyst eer hy selve kreeg den schop / Ging loopen met ‘s lands renten, 
Is als een schelmsche collecteur / Der wynen, sans courage, 
Met achttienduysent guldens deur / Dat maakt hier veel ombrage”. 
c “Op dat hij worde een baron, prins of graaf, o! dat es bon; Zo kriegt ‘er met ‘er tyd weer grasie, En 
speelt aan ‘t hof voor Jan Pottasie”. 
ci “Alon messiers doe nou je eed,  
zweer dat je bloed en etter zweet,  
zweer dat jou niet een duit zal sluiken 
maar ondertussen vullen al die magere buiken”. 
cii  “Zomtyds”, zo schrijft hij, “overvallen my duizenderhande gedachten wegens myne leugenen en 
valsche eeden, en dan wederom overdenke ik den staat des menschdom, ‘t geen my troost. Wy alle zyn 
min of meer zondig, doch gelukkig die de minste is; de geheime misdaden alleen die ik tegen den hemel 
begaan heb, drukken my aldermeest”. Hij vervolgt zijn boetedoening door te schrijven: “het besteelen 
van ‘s lands kasse is een myner minste misdryven, de geringe opvoeding, heeft my onbekwaam gemaakt 
om eerlyk te zyn”. 
ciii  “Dat ik lachte over alle staatkundige streeken waar door alles in vuur en vlam gesteld wordende, ik 
ondertusschen rustig en lustig in myne vuist lache, en myn kleinen schat beschouwende, met luister en 
plaisier onder een vreedzamer horoscoop zal leeven. O Dios! Hoe is ‘t mogelyk? Dan men aan een 
jongman, wiens moeder met pan-aal langs de straten geloopen heeft, die van alle konsten, zeeden en 
opvoeding ontbloot is, zal toevertrouwen een ambt, dat de nobelste en eerste van een stadt toekomt; hoe 
is ‘t mogelijk zeg ik andermaal dat de staatsdienaren byna de schranderste van geheel europa ons boeven 
schuim van collecteurs niet alleen patrocineeren [patronage, TK], maar zelfs door een dreigend placaat op 
de minste benaming de braafste luiden af-schikken om ons met den regten naam te doopen […] als men 
de plakkaten naleezende geene opmerking maakt, om zyne fortuin uit dien chaos te zoeken, dat men als 
dan zot is, want alles moet absoluut in Holland tot een caos vervallen”. 
civ “Vervloekte Eygenbaat! Uit afgrond voortgeteelt, 
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Die, door bedrog gesterkt, ‘t gemeenebest verbeelt, 
En, tragt in deezen schyn, de weerelt te verblinden: 
Verbergt u agter ‘t griekx, men kan u Vaster vinden, 
Een waardig Patriot, in ‘t Middelburger pak, 
Schud u ‘t vermomde tuyg, waarin bedrog u stak, 
Roemruchtig uit, en zal in ‘t kort nog toonen, 
Dat gy, ontwaardig zyt, in Amstels vest te woonen. 
cv “Men huurd tot zulk bedryf het Rapiaansche rot, 
Dat roem op wetbreuk stelt, en, met het Heil’ge spot, 
Haar eed en pligt vergeet, en ons nog voor durft dragen, 
Dat al hun wanbedryft aan Friso kan behagen, 
Maar is ‘t allan genoeg ‘t eenvoudig volk misleit, 
En ‘s prinsen naam misbruikt, waar voor de deugd dus pleit 
Nooit zal die groote ziel regtvaardigheit doen bukken, 
Of door een linkze daat, het volk en vryheit drukken”. 
cvi “Dat, de impost op ‘t gemaal, en and’re eedb’re waar, 
Verligt zou worden voor ‘t gemeen, wie ziet niet klaar, 
Dat dit weer ‘t deuntje, om elk in slaap te wiegen 
Denk niet gehuurden hoop, ‘t gemeen dus te bedriegen” 
“Des Vaster, Raap en al, die tot uw miskraam hooren,  
Men haat en vloekt u, ja, men heeft uw val gezwooren”.  
cvii “Ik betuige echter en wil zulks met honderd duizend eeden bevestigen, dat myne intentie nooit 
geweest is om het land te besteelen; alleen heb ik de kas maar voor zekere som zoo lang willen crediteren, 
tot dat eene myne oude nigt de wereld ontruimd had, uit welker erfenis het saldo dan suppleren kon”. 
cviii “Wiste de regter eens dat zyne meening in ‘t begeeven der ampten door uw toedoen en dat van uwe 
complicen, om geld verkogt wierden, uw lot zouw gewisselyk erger zyn dan het myne”. 
cix “Waarom word myn confrater Ryers, alias mooi Pietje, (zoo beroemd by alle hoere en ligtekoyen) dus 
kragtelyk beschermd? Daar ieder bewust is, hoe hy, behalven het onderhouden van een pragtig huysgezin, 
en een heel party hoeren, nog een nimfje mainteneert […] want welk weet dat hy zoo wel als ik met zyn 
gat vol schulden aan de collecte kwam”.  
cx “ik verkreeg nogtans door deze en andere bravoures [zijn aandeel in de Doelistenbeweging, TK] den 
tytel van Patriot en wierd door myn stemmig uitgestrekte trony en kleding by sommigen voor half, by 
andere voor driekwart zalig, dat is in den tyd, zeer vroom aangezien, en raakte eindelijk tot myn beleid tot 
den eeretrap van collecteur van de turf en koolen over Den Haag en Haag-ambagt […] in welken post ik 
my zoo dapper kweet, dat ik in ‘t eerste jaar, aan de kas van ‘t gemeene land, ruim twee duizend guldens 
moest leenen, om myn soberen staat wat te verbeteren; en door een valsche restant staat en kwade maand 
staten te formeeren, bragt ik het eindelyk zoo ver, dat men my bij openbare sententie meineedig, eerloos 
en infaam verklaarde”. 
cxi  “Buijten pijn en banden van ijser bekent dat hij bij de introductie van de collecte is aangesteld tot 
hoofdgaarder van het regt op turf en coolen alhier in ‘sHage en dat hij als doen heeft gedaan den eed van 
suijvering en ook als doen heeft bekomen een instructie”. 
cxii “Dat hij de som van f 2024 dewelker hij in sijn maandstaat over december 1750 minder in ontvangst 
heeft gebracht als hij werkelijk heeft ontvangen alsmede niet zijn gevonden in de cas van ‘t land, en dat hij 
de gelden tot gebruijk van sig en sijn familie heeft geemployeert”. 
cxiii “dat de nood hem heeft gedwongen om dat geld te gebruijken voor sig zelfs en sijn huishouden en dat 
sulks sig van langsamerhand soo heeft toegedragen, dat hij van tijd tot tijd eenige geld van het land heeft 
gebruijkt  […] dog dat sulks sijnde geschied met intentie om dezelve tot den laatsten penning [weer] aan 
het land te voldoen”. 
cxiv “Een seer vergaande ontrouwigheijd gepaard met mijneedigheijd en falsiteijt vallende te gelijk met 
diverij, dewelke gevolglijk in een land van justitie niet konnen werden geleden maar ter exempel […] 
behooren te worden gestraft”. 
cxv De gevangene “sal werden verklaard mijeedig, eerloos en infaam […] en met het swaard over het 
hoofd werden gestraft en voorts sijn leeven lang gedurende gebannen”. 
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cxvi Over de collecteurs is zeer veel aan “sinistere practyken, snoode bedryven, schelmsche handelingen en 
vuile bedriegeryen” te melden. Datgene wat de auteur hier verhaalt over “het godloos gedrag der drie op 
den tytel genaamde bandyten of vlugtelingen” moet echter genoeg zijn om een indruk te krijgen van 
Doelisten an andere “confraters van deze canailjeuse lands-dieven” te krijgen. Deze informatie moet 
genoeg zijn om “de directie van ‘s lands middelen op een beter voet te regelen”. Dit werkje dient om iets 
tegen de “enorme schelmstukken die er van de zyde der valsgenoemde Patriotten, ten nadeele van het 
algemeen, gepleegd zyn” te doen. 
cxvii “Als een banjerheer den gebraden haan spelen”. 
cxviii “Ik denk er wat mooy weêr mee te maken, en als myn moertje, die myn borg is, alles voor my 
vereffent heeft; dan weer als voren naar Amsterdam by myn geliefde dames d’amour als een banjerheer 
den gebraden haan te spelen, en de rest van vaartjes Indiaansch gewoekerd geld door het gat te lappen”. 
cxix Cras was “verpligt geweest nauwkeurig toe te sien oft de hooft en andere collecteurs of gaarders heur 
boeken in behoorlijke ordre hielden”. 
cxx In zijn reactie voor de Gecommitteerde Raden verklaarde Cras dat “hij door het niet doorbladen van 
de boeken, de gepleegde vrijligheden hem niet sijn gekomen onder het oog […] en dat hij evenwel na 
dode van den gaarder Nolla […] aan Haar Ed. Mog. heeft geschreven dat het comptoir geduurende de 
siekte van den gaarder Nolla behoorlijk was waargenomen”. 
cxxi Bij vragen tijdens het proces hoe dit toch kon moest Cras dan ook “volmondig bekennen dat sulks 
niet mogelijk was geweest, so hij in sijne qualiteit de goede ordres tot voorkominge van so een trouwlosen 
handel gesteld had nagekomen […] en dat hij door sijn [nalatig, TK] gedrag als opsiender gehouden, de 
oorsaak is van het imposant nadeel dat het gemeeneland komt te leijden”. 
cxxii “Het nadeel wat hij aan het land berokkend heeft”. 
cxxiii Dat hij “wel heeft geweeten en ook uyt de cas boeken gesien dat de gaarder Nolla ieder maand een 
seker somme minder verantwoorden als het casboek opleverde”. 
cxxiv “Alle dewelke saaken sijnde van dangereuse gevolgen die in een bediende van ‘t land niet konnen 
worden getollereert”.  
cxxv “Verpligt om in cas hij eenige ontrouw ofte quade directien van den gaarder mogt ontdekken, daarvan 
kennisse te geeven aan de gecommitteerde raden, en dat die selfde fijne instantie verder meede brengt dat 
hij van een ontdekte ontrouwigheid geen kennis gevende, voor mede complice moet worden gehouden”.  
cxxvi “Bovendien had hij zich verplicht zig “in alles met alle getrouwigheid, vlijt en naarstigheid te 
gedraagen”. 
cxxvii “Dat hij [Ramak, TK] de declaratoiren onder de maandstaten sedert het jaar 1751 iedere maand heeft 
geteekent, dat hem nogtans is bekent, dat ieder maand een sekere somme minder is verantwoord, als het 
casboek opleverde, en dat hij gevolglijk moet erkennen […] dat hij sijn instructie niet heeft nagedient, en 
dat de gaarder Nolla hem sulks heeft geordonneert, en met brutalitijt daar toe gedwongen, en dat de 
opsiender Cras de cas boeken verschijden maal heeft nagesien en hem daarover nooit [heeft, TK] 
onderhouden”. 
cxxviii Ramak verklaarde verder dat hij zodoende “van niemand eenige onderrichting [kreeg, TK], en dat hij 
voor sijn oogen zag dat door het niet overbrengen van de te kort verantwoorde somme voor het volgend 
jaar die te kort verantwoorde somme verduistert wierd, maar dat hij het so niet soude hebben begrepen”. 
cxxix Zo schreven zij: “op dat dezelve tot het volbrengen van hun plicht in staat mogen zyn, zullen zy zich 
in de ordonnantien, zoo generaale, als particuliere, publicatien, en resolutien, die op de invordering van ‘s 
lands middelen geëmaneert zyn, moeten kundig maaken, en speciaal moeten observeren”. 
cxxx Indiscretie of onomzichtigheid and indecentie of onbehoorlijkheid. 
cxxxi “De kleine dieven hangt men tusschen hemel en aarden, maar de grooten ryden in koetsen en te 
paarden; en die meerder hebben gestoolen werden landen en steeden bevoolen”. 
cxxxii “Vrijheid boven schat, eer boven leven stelden 
wier arm der dwingelandij manmoedig weerstand boodt 
wij roemen uwe deugd, den ed’len grijsart waerdig” 
cxxxiii “De omkooping is geweerd. Den stoel der burgervaderen 
Zal ‘t volk voortaan niet meer door vleiers zien gedrukt 
Geen laffe slaaf zal meer uwe achtbare raadzaal na’dren 
Die om genot van gunst, voor de overheersing bukt”. 
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cxxxiv “Dat Repelaer en al de zijnen 
Gehaat van ‘t volk, van hartseer kwijnen! 
Men vindt ze in ied’re stad – rechtvaardig God!; doe recht! 
Dat uwe wraak dien hoop verplette! 
Bescherm hem die voor t land het al ten beste zette! 
Dat gy de zegekrans op zynen schedel hecht” 
cxxxv “De heerszugt wist soms, in dit land, ook laffe zielen uit te vinden 
Die zij met een vergulde hand, Aan haar belangen kon verbinden 
Zo dat het land door haar gedrukt, zich voor een tijd wel kromt en bukt 
Maar nimmer kon zij t overleven, zodra de Batavier ontwaakt 
Het monster kent dat hem ontwaakt, zag men wel ras de kans verkeren”. 
cxxxvi “Men vind weer mannen in den raad, die wijsheid voor slaafsche eer verkiezen, in spijt van laster, 
hoon en smaad”. 
cxxxvii “Hun die vervreemd van eed en plicht / Haar [vrijheid, TK] hoonden in het aangezicht  
Een muilprang op den neus zetten / Zo moet het zulke bozen gaan 
Die alles ‘t onderste boven keren / Zich niets ontzien maar ‘t al bestaan  
Om willekeurig te regeeren, Men zette hun met hoon en smaad / Uit het bestier van stad en staat  
Maar zulken die het alles wagen / Voor burger, stad en vaderland 
Zij door der vrijheid milde hand / Een eeuwig eerkroon opgedraagen”. 
cxxxviii Het is een “nuttige en alleszins noodige resolutie” om “namelijk de ambten en commissien naar 
toerbeurten en rang te doen bedienen en begeeven, zonder dien aangaande meer agt te slaan op de hooge 
recommendatien van den erfstadhouder [...] maar de groote vraag in deze is of die resolutie in waarheid, 
uit eigen belang om mede een vetten brok te mogen hebben (daar nu alle door eenige weinigen worden 
ingepikt) of uit den ouwen wrok tegen ‘t huis van Oranje spruit, dan wel uit een waar patriottismus”. 
cxxxix “Hebben zij die groote les van ‘t geweten doet aan een ander niet dat gij niet wilt dat u geschiede, in 
deze agt genoomen?” 
cxl  Is het “de overweeging van pligt de instandhouding der privilegien hunner steden” of “het eigenbe-
lang, voordeel, en de drift die men heeft om den stadhouder te kortwieken, om hem weder afhandig te 
maken, het geen men hem ‘t zij uit laagheid of vrijwillig zelven heeft opgedraagen”. 
cxli  “Genieten nu de gilden hunne rechten ten vollen? Zijn er geene geschonden, in onbruik geraakt of 
vervreemd? Dan is alles regt. Maar, is dit zoo niet? Laat dan deze groote Patriotten die voorstanders der 
vrijheid eerst den balk uit hun eigen oog wegdoen, eer zij den splinter die in t oog van zijn hoogheid is 
aanroeren”. 
cxlii “Dan, jaa! Dan alleen zullen zij den toegezwaaiden lof als waare Patriotten verdienen, dan eerst op 
dien een wettig regt hebben, en in waarheid gehouden worden, voor die geene waar van zij nu slechts 
alleen maar den blooten naam voeren”. 
cxliii “Hebbe ik daar[in] geen meer belang dan mijne medeburgeren”. De auteur vraagt zich af waarom de 
Vroedschap zo lang heeft gewacht “alvorens door het maaken van een conventie, paalen te zetten aan de 
willekeurige recommandatien ter begeving der ambten en commissien”. 
cxliv Repelaer heeft “het vertrouwen welke de vorst in hem stelde, niet anders gebruikt dan om voor hem 
en zijne kinderen op de illegaalste wijze alle ampten en faveurs aan de regering gehegt na zig te sleepen, 
uitwijzens het aantal van bedieningen, welke die heer buiten zijn tour en alleen door gunst van den 
stadhouder verkregen heeft” 
cxlv “Dewijl zoo ras iemand zich er wat ziekelijk bevind of schijnt aftenemen, die heer er op uit is om 
deszelfs bediening voor zich of zijn kinderen te bespreken, het welk hem te ligter valt omdat de prins een 
onbepaald vertrouwen in hem stelt en meent dat niemand zijn person en huis meerder toegedaan is en 
dat dus die heer van zijn kant alles zal toebrengen wat het stadhouderlijk gezag en den invloed die de 
prins altoos op de regeering van Dordrecht gehad heeft kan vorderlijk zijn” 
cxlvi “En de prins niets overblijft dan zig gehaat te maaken bij alle andere regenten, die billijk te onvreede 
moeten zijn dat alle ambten meest al aan een persoon en zijn kinderen, schoon nog zo jong, begeven en 
besproken worden; dat nu den heer Hugo Repelaer voor alle genooten ambten en commissies niets heeft 
toegebragt wat het stadhouderlijk gezag binnen Dordrecht heeft kunne bevorderen,” 
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cxlvii “Dat hij in plaats van door gepaste middelen de harmonie tussen de prins en de regeering te bewaren, 
integendeel alle de cordaate resolutien van de regering, betrekkelijk de onlusten met Engeland genoomen, 
heeft uitgekreten, als of het geschiedde om den stadhouder minagting aan te doen, zonder te willen 
begrijpen dat de regenten die wel wisten hoe hinderlijk dit aan hun personeel belang was het alleen tot 
welzijn van hun vaderland deden”. 
cxlviii “Van zijn willekeurige goedheid te moeten afhangen, ter verkrijging van douceurs, die hun volgens 
de ordre van der regeering waren toegekomen, te meer daar met zijn gezag is gepaard gegaan met een 
onverdraaglijken hoogmoed, lesive houding en minagting tegens zijne mede regenten, zig voorgevende te 
zijn een man (en niet te onregt) zonder wiens intercessie geen ambten of commissien in Dordrecht 
begeven wierden”. 
cxlix “Velen zijn hier van gedachten dat de zeven heeren, die alleen hun tijdelijk belang in het oog hebben 
gehouden, wijl zij anders wel begrijpen dat zodanige een conventie of schikking van een oneindig nut 
voor de burgerij is door de vrije deliberatien die de regering erdoor verkrijgt”. 
cl De auteur verdenkt de zeven weigeraars ervan de drie weken te hebben doorgebracht “met 
onophoudelijk handelen, af en aangaan bij den prins tot dien laatsten dag toe […] men kan ligt begrijpen 
de waare redenen en motiven van deze handelingen en consideratien dier zeven heren en dat zij in dezen 
alleen te werk zijn gegaan en er op uijt zijn geweest om zig aan die partij over te geeven die hun het 
voordeligste zoude voorkomen”.  
cli “Het is te hoopen voor al die heren dat de heer Repelaer zijn woord in die engagementen en beloften 
zal houden en dat hij niet te groote portie voor alle die besproken ambten voor hem of zijne kinderen 
daar af zal nemen” en “dat zijn crediet binnen kort zeer zal verminderen als den prins eens zal beseffen 
dat het alleen door toedoen van dezen raadsman is dat hij zoo veele injustities in de Dortsche regering 
begaan heeft” 
clii “Gedeputeerden te hebben daar men staat op kan maken die zig gesubordineerd gevoelene aan de 
verantwoording van hunnen principalen, die vrijheidminnende gevoelens hebben en die eindelijk 
cordaatheid genoeg bezitten om op zaaken waarop zij niet volkoomen gelast zijn (als het nood is) met 
hunnen kundigen pensionaris toestemmen, dat de stem van de stad naar het heerschende idee derzelve 
word uitgebragt”. 
cliii “Om ten alle tijden en in alle zaken een vrije deliberatie te hebben, waar op men nooit kan vertrouwen 
zoo lang men recommendatien admitteert; wijl hoe magtig, hoe belangeloos ook een regent is, het dog ten 
uiterste hard valt, zig, om cordaat en naar zijn geweeten ten welweezen van zijn land gestemd te hebben, 
door een laffen vleijer en hoveling beroofd te zien van een ambt of commissie, dat hem toekwam, dit 
heeft egter mede reets plaats gehad in deze stad […]”. 
cliv “Dat de oorspronkeljike magt, van verre het grootste gedeelte onzer regeering bij de steden huisvest, 
dat de eerste bronnen zijn, waar uit dezelve ontstaat; welke bron te aanmerkelijker is, om dat de 
opbrengts der geldmiddelen, die voornaamste zenuw van den staat, voornameljik uit de steden moet 
komen; wanneer derhalven deze bron niet zuiver is, moet noodzakelijk de geheele regeeringsvorm 
beroerd worden; wanneer hier eenige ziekte schuilt, moet het onheil zich spoedig door alle de takken der 
hooge regeering verspreiden en zijne verderfelijken invloed wel dra overal doen gevoelen”.  
clv Veele regenten ook reeds langs deze weg van recommendatie in de regeering geraakt, en met ambten 
begiftigd rekenden zich (en vele rekenen zich nog) verpligt, uit dankerkentenis aan hunnen begunstiger 
deze gewoonte te onderkennen, of ten minsten niet tegen te gaan. En ik behoef u niet te doen opmerken, 
dat sommigen wier grootste drijfveren glorie, heerszucht en eigen belang zijn, zich langs deze weg altoos 
in het bezit der gelegenheden handhaven konden om deze het menschelijk hart zoo bedwelmende 
neigingen bot te vieren”.  
clvi “Rot vrij in iedere stad by een!  
Verschaf u recht door bloote klingen [getrokken zwaarden, TK] 
Verderf des princen gunstelingen! 
En styv’ ten nut van t algemeen 
Die braaven, dien de glans van ‘t goud niet kon verblinden 
Noch in wier ed’le ziel geen schanddaad was te vinden” 
clvii “Wat zijne jeugd betreft, daar van zyn zyne daden even min roemrugtig, als dezelve naderhand 
geweest zyn. Heerszuchtig in woorden, lafhartig in daaden, met dat gevolg dat zyne landgenooten het 
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pleit voor hem meer dan eens moesten opneemen, wilden zy hem niet tot ‘t doelwit van smaad en 
veragting gesteld hebben”. 
clviii “Hij trouwde, na verscheide voorafgegaane amourettes, genoegzaam bekend, in den jare 1758 eene 
beminnenswaardige, deugdzame, en Godvreezende vrouwe: ach! …hoe haare Godsvrugt zelve hem tot 
last ware en hoe zyne ontrouw door al te zeer in ‘t oogloopende nauwe conversatien met twee vrouwen, 
heiden reeds overleeden, mogelijk een nagel aan haar doodskist geweest is!” 
clix “Dus is de lust [van Repelaer vanwege excuses die hij aan had moeten bieden, TK] om wraak te 
oeffenen, waar toe hy geen slingsche streeken of vuilaardige verdigtsels, zelve onder ‘t schyn van ‘t 
interest van ‘t land te behartigen, gespaard heeft”. 
clx “Voor de hele stad bekend als een rechten hoveling, dat uwe edelen uit dit schilderij [deze beschrijving, 
TK] genoegzaam iemand zult kennen die, ter bereiking van zyn oogmerk, met verzaaking van eed, eer, 
plicht en conscientie tot alles bequaam is”. 
clxi “Niet lang in de regeering geweest zynde greep hy de eerste geleegenheid aan om de werktuigen, die 
hem alleen bestuuren, heerszucht en eigenbaat ten toon te spreiden en wel even na de dood van mevrouw 
de princesse gouvernante in ‘t jaar 1759. Hij voegde zich bij “eenige weinige leden die over de vorm van 
regering malcontent waren. Geene kuyperijen, intrigues, of slinksche weegen, om zyn oogmerk te doen 
gelukken, wierden door hem nagelaaten”. 
clxii “Evenwel met dat gevolg dat de groote meerderheid zig toen aan zyn ondraaglyke heerszucht nog niet 
behoevende te onderwerpen”. 
clxiii “Zyn woelzieken geest”: “geene zaak konde er byna voorvallen daar die heer zig er niet mee 
bemoeide, en daar hy niet met de grootste verwaandheid en meesterlijk gezag zyn oordeel velde”. 
clxiv “In dat jaar [1766, TK] was de tyd geboorden dat onze luitenant stadhouder de geheele stad van 
Dordrecht aan zyne onbepaalde staatzugtige overheersching zoude gaan dienstbaar maaken”. 
clxv “Altoos de opgaande zon aanbiddende” verzette Repelaer zich tegen beslissing die door Anna van 
Hanover voor haar dood waren genomen. Nu “zoude hy in Dordrecht de belangens van de prins 
behartigen en door zyne influentie alles na deszelfs intentie dirigeeren, mits evenwel de prins aan zyn 
grootste oogmerk ook voldeed, met hem in de eerste plaats en voorts die aanhangers, die hy niet missen 
kon met ambten en commissien vet te mesten: ja als dat maar vast stond was geen schelmstuk te groot 
om door hem ten uitvoer gebragt te worden,” 
clxvi “Zonder dat er voor de oude regenten eenige kans overbleef”. 
clxvii “Dit konde zijn hebzugt niet verdragen”. 
clxviii “Om opentlyk beide die considerabele ambten te vraagen mogt in ‘t oog loopen”. Dus declareert 
Repelaer het ambt bij burgemeester Stoop die de functie van dijk-graaf voor zijn neef de heer Van 
Puttenbroek wilde hebben. Tegelijkertijd echter stelt Repelaer, “teegen alle gewoonte aan” eene 
commissie (bestaande uit uitgezogte vrienden en een bloedverwant van den heer Repelaer) gedeerneet 
naar den Prins, ten einde dien Vorst te solliciteren in deszelfs recommendatie tot dijk-graaf toch het oog 
te willen vestigen op een kundige en daartoe geschikte persoon. De prins, de goede voorzorg van dat 
collegie bewonderende, vroeg, wie de heeren daar dan best toe zouden despicieeren? Toen was de zaak 
gezond. Niemand beter als de heer Repelaer, was ‘t antwoord”. 
clxix “De prins werd bevestigt in zyne uitgeleezene keuze van zoo een bekwaam en gelieft man tot zynen 
nieuwe lieutenant stadhouder gevonden te hebben”[…] “de heer Repelaer had de gelegenheid zyn 
attachement voor den prins te toonen, van malgré lui, om den prins dienst te doen, zo een lastige post 
[van dijkgraaf, TK] die maar op zijn best een paar zakken guldens opbrengt, te aanvaarden. Zo verre gaat 
de arglistigheid van ‘s menschen hart, als men alles aan zyn eigen belang opoffert”. 
clxx Stoop had “medegewerkt op een ongehoorde, ongewone, ja aan alle ingelanden geheel onbekende 
wyze, die de paalen van eerlykheid volstrekt te buiten ging”. 
clxxi “De eene dienst is d’andere waard”. 
clxxii Repelaer was “ten top van alles verheeven, en de gantsche stad moest hem aanbidde, en na zyn pypen 
dansen: had iemand de couragie om buiten zyne toetsemming eene commissie of wat ‘t ook ware te 
vragen, die verwierf zyne ongenade”. 
clxxiii “Lukte het hem minder zijn heerszucht den teugel te vieren, als in den stad van Dordrecht. Hy moest 
dus de scepter van zyne heerszucht alleen in Dordrecht zwaayen, alwaar zonder hem niet t minste bagatel 
mogt verricht worden en hy zig ook van alles de eer aanmaatigde” 
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clxxiv “Hy vond in Dordrecht al weinig voedzel meer voor zyne eerlooze onbeschaamdheid”. 
clxxv “Om ‘t juk van zoo een tiran van hunnen halsen te schuiven, om voor ‘t welzyn van t vaderland, 
hunne stad en vryheid met kragt te waaken, en hunnen regerings constitutie die door inkruiping en laffe 
toegeevendheid tot dat uiterste vertreeden was, weder te handhaaven, met dat heilzaam en billyk oogmerk 
om aan elk regent op zyn tyd zo wel de agrementen van de regeering te doen smaaken, als hy de lasten 
heeft moeten draagen, en voor te komen dat laffe en laage vleyers om veel eigen belang, om ambten en 
commissien die thans genoegzaam altoos in vaste handen waaren, hun eed en pligt met voeten treeden”. 
clxxvi “By wien in alle opzigten bedaardheid met voorzigtigheid, kloekmoedigheid met wysheid, en 
eerlykheid met ongemaakte Godvrugt gepaard gaat”. 
clxxvii “Uwen braaven, kundigen, volyverigen, eerlyken en cordaaten de Gyzelaar, hem mag men zonder 
laffe vleiery dien lof toezwaaien, dat hy boven alle verleiding is, dat men op zijn onwankelbaren trouw als 
op een koperen muur kan rekenen en dat hem eerder de tong uit de mond zal vallen dan dat hy zyn 
ontvangen last om iemand te believen zoude verdraaien of te buiten gaan”. 
clxxviii “Wyl het niet met hun interest, DE EENIGE DRIJFVEER [hoofdletters in origineel, TK] van hun 
doen en laten niet overeenkomt”. 
clxxix “En toens komende op de historie van Rotterdam hoe daar geld op d’admiraliteit zijnde, gegeven soo 
door Van der Heim als door den equipagemeester, het meer dan een geluk was, dat de saken niet tot het 
uiterstens waere gekomen […] Des hij, Van der Goes, hesiteerde om de prins alsnog te gaan spreken 
nopens van der Heim, D’Escury etc…” 
clxxx “Dat die alle saken soo duister en verwardt maakte, dat er geen uitkomen aan was, dat hij, Gilles in 
een uur meerder met Bisdom konde uitvoeren als in agt dagen met Van der Heim, welke Van der Heim 
in qualité van secretaris van d’admiraliteyt immense sommen hadde geterokken van die aangenome nieuw 
gebouwde schepen, ‘t gunt hem niet toekwam. Dat er voorts niets nopens die admiraliteyt behoorde te 
worden afgedaan sonder communicatie van den Raad van State, waardoor due collegien oneindig beter in 
ordre souden worden gehouden […]” 
clxxxi “Kent gy den moord’naar van uw vrijheid, Batavieren! 
Den roover van uw geld, uw bloed, uwe eerlaurieren? 
‘t Is Jakob van der Heim, dat vet gemeste beest: 
Die, daar hij hel nog hemel vreest, 
Uit vuige vleizucht, voor den Bagchus van Oranje, 
Ons dierbaar vaderland verkogt aan Groot Brittanje 
Ô gy die vreiheid mint! Verzaamelt u te gaader! 
Val aan, val aan op dien verraader: 
En breek dien snoodaart hals en been; 
Rold dan zyn ronde pens door slyk en modder heen. 
Geef hem dan voorts tot spys der raven; 
Want, zoo dien vuilik wierd begraaven, 
De duivel waarde om zijn graf, 
En, wilt ge de oorzaak hier van weeten? 
Hy heeft voor langen tyd zyn snoode ziel bezeeten. 
Nu vergde hy willigt, dat me ook zyn romp hem gaf. 
Of zoud ge voor vervolging vreezen; 
‘t is slechts canaille dat hem mind, 
Alleen door ydlen waan verblind, 
Geef slechts dat woeste vee een borrel brandewyn, 
Zy zullen ook uw vrienden zyn. 
Voorts is ‘t een klein getal verachtelyke slaven, 
Die voor hem kruipen draaven, 
En dat voor een hand vol goud, 
Waar op hy met den prins, al zyne sterktens bouwd. 
Vel slechts die guiten met hem neder! 
Zoo vest de vryheid als voor heen, 
In weer wil van ‘t verblind gemeen, 
282 |                                                Hidden Morals, Explicit Scandals 
 
                                                                                                                            
In dit haar vaderland den ouden zetel weder”. 
clxxxii “Gy waagt uw leeven dan voor eenen dronken-prins 
wel meester Van der Heim zijt gij waaragtig kins? 
Of denkt gij door dien vent ons Neerland te regeeren? 
Verdomt het Amsterdam zal u wel moris leren”. 
clxxxiii “Het loon van eenen held die Neerland dorst verraaden 
Zij in dees korten spreuk, vertrap hem om zijn daaden! 
Wagt dan dit zelfde loon voor uw gevloekte daên” [...] 
“Om een hand vol gouds een’man ten troon te voeren 
Een man die zig vermengt met freules, snoode hoeren 
En daar zijn lieve vrouw zo vaak om zugten moet 
Is dunkt mij schurken werk en schelmen in hun bloed” 
clxxxiv “Ik haat Van der Heim doch min de prins in mijne hart”. 
clxxxv “Door in zyn beroep zuiver te zijn; zig door geen geschenken, ja door gansche zakken vol Engelsche 
guinies te laten omkoopen om iets ten nadeele van zyn naaste te onderstaan”. 
clxxxvi “Zag ik drie andere, waar van een dik vet man was, zeer wel uitziende, hy was Jacob genaamt; een 
tweede die ook by hem hoorde, had een groote ronde pruik op gepoeierd als een duif, of zoo als de 
Fransche zoude zeggen comme un pigeon: de derde had een stalkapje of een Callot d’ecury op het hoofd. Dit 
aardige driemanschap maakte myne nieuwsgierigheid gaande, om aan de faam te vraagen; heer wie zyn 
deze? Deze zyn, was zyn antwoord, mannen van name; zy hebben schepen opgehouden in plaats van te 
gebruiken; zy hebben ‘s lands vyanden bevoordeeld, en zig bespottelyk gemaakt; het zyn lage zielen, die 
haar geruste conscientie, die haar vaderland, ja ik zou haast zeggen, die haar ziel ten beste zoude geven 
om ampten voor haare kinderen te krygen”. 
clxxxvii “Vetrouw nog verhef al die verdacht zynde aarslikkers van den hertog, geboore acht-en-veertigers, 
in eeuwigheid niet. Alsdaar is die trotsche verblindende griffioen, gesprooten uit de hoogadelyke afkomst 
van een stadsboden en een vroemoer [?, TK]; die om zyn hoffiaans- en hertogsgezindheid, balliuw voor 
zyn tyd gemaakt is, vertrouwt hem niet, hy is de cameleon gelyk; verwisseld zo dikwils als hy wil van 
couleuren, houd enkel het oog ‘er maar op, dat hy een boezemvriend is van voorn: Quarles de Mey. Zyn 
vader was al een groote hoffiaan by de tyd van Willem 4e en viel de gouvernanten mede ten respecten van 
Engeland, en ten nadeelen en der Amsterdamsche kooplieden, waar dor dat hy groot gemaakt is 
geworden. Een hoffiaan door hart en merg hertogsgezind, nog geen twee jaar geleden door behulp van de 
dikke duc burgemeester gemaakt, zyn zoon een ampt gekregen, en hy door het canaal van zyn neef Van 
Riel commies van ‘t cabinet en dykgraaf van Woerden geworden om dat hy in staat is water en vuur te 
gelyk in een hand als men zegt te draagen, verdets is bekend is hy de boezemvriend van de Engelsch en 
hertogsgezinde Rotterdamsche burgermeester Van der Heym”. 
clxxxviii “Van die by Rotterdams volk verwenschten Laurens van der Meer, de gehaate en veragte 
Amsterdamsche Raap, Gimnig en de Utrechtse verfoeilyke lobedanus”. 
clxxxix “Als een willekeurige heerschappy van eenen monarch, of van weinige aristocraten over de 
gewigtigste belangens der maatschappy bestelling maakt”. 
cxc “Als men de goede hoedanigheden van deugd en verstand in haare doorluchtige persoone beschouwd, 
dan die hier dan meerendeels, zo als nu ook, slegts bestaat in praalvertooningen, gala’s, pragtige soupés en 
andere dartelheeden, wier uitwerkselen niet zelden de natie meer en meer verwyven, de zedeloosheid 
bevorderen, den vorstelyke luister ontcieren, en ‘s lands schatkist nuuteloos bezwaren [...]”. 
cxci “Den braaven, eerlyken, den nyveren en onvermoeiden burger met schattingen doen overlaaden, 
terwyl zyne vrijheid, goederen en bezittingen niet alleen beschermloos worden gelaaten […]”. 
cxcii “Maar men ook door brooddronkenheid en weelde als buiten zig zelven gebragt, op den schamelen 
burger als eenen slaaf neder ziet, zyner gelykheid vergeet, en ten langen lesten zig zo verre verkloekt dat 
men met afhangelyken en vleiers die eeven zo zeer ondeugend als hunnen meester zyn, ja naar mate zy 
kundiger zyn, te afschuwelyker moeten beschouwd worden eenen gemeenen beurs maakende, hen van 
wien men de magt ontvingen by wien die alleen berust op de nek treed, aan yzeren kluisters hegt, ja zo 
gedwee als schapen voor zig heenen dryft”. 
cxciii “Dat het thans tevens de tyd is om zig van alle lafheid te ontdoen, de inbreuken te herstellen” […] 
“…den oorsporng van het meeste bederf en nadeel geweest is, namentlyk de onverschoonelyke 
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agteloosheid en verwaarloozing van verscheide zaaken, die in ons midden bestaan, en die zo als de twee 
vaderlandsche ridders de edele Capellen van den Marsch en den Patriottische Nyvenheim […] hebben 
aangemerkt”. 
cxciv “Van de vrijheidminnende en meterdaad bevorderderende stad Dordrecht die door de mannelijke 
kloekmoedigheid, vaderlandsche trouwe en onbesweeken standvastigheid van den kundigen pensionaris 
Gyzelaar in de uitvoering van de cordaatste en kragtdadigste […] zo luisterlijk uitblinkt, anderen voorlicht 
en billyk ter navolging van haar voorbeeld kan en vermag voorgesteld worden”. 
cxcv “Men juicht er elkander alomme toe en de naamen van eenen de Gyzelaar, de Witten van Jaarsveld en 
andere braave Patriotten zweeven gedurig o paller tongen. De minste dagloner doet hen met  lof 
vermelden. Op alle maaltyden en gezelschapen van wat rang of staat drinkt men op hun welzyn”. 
cxcvi “Is er wel immer een tijd geweest dat de braafste regenten en haare ministers den eigendom, vrijheid 
en rechten der goede gemeente, en derzelver interest zo significant, zo ongemeen verdienstelijk en zo 
allezins edelmoedig hebben gehandhaafd, mitsgaders de betrekkingen zo rondborstig erkend in welke zy 
met de gemeente staan?”. 
cxcvii “Rotterdam doet volstrekt niets […], dit moet ik u toestemmen, dan concedeer my tevens, dat ik u 
verzoeke de burgery hier van niet geheel en al de schuld te geeven. Maar u slegts een Van der Heim, een 
Bichon, een Collot d’Escury op te noemen, en gy zult ras de oorzaaken bevinden, deeze laffe Afhangelin-
gen en vergulde slaaven, die om hunne ambitie en heerszucht te streelen, den burgeren vryheid en 
belangens opofferen en nog onlangs ter vergadering van eenen ingewortelden verdorven aart en 
voornametlyk de eerste [Van der Heim, TK] want die toont allerwegen de schandvlek en onderdrukker 
zyner stad te zyn”. 
cxcviii “Deezen Van der Heim is het alleen te imputeeren dat Rotterdam even als ofze niet aanweezig 
waare, in deesen daagen ter staatsvergaaderinge zig gedraagt; en haat interest by de heilzamste voorstellen 
als uit het oog wordt verlooren. Deeze hoveling, de burgermeesterlyken digniteit onwaardig, is het 
genoeg, dat hy geduurig a latere principis mag zyn, en stoort zig even daarom niets met al aan de klagten 
zyner kooplieden. De kooplieden en burgers zyn daar even zo min als elders verblind door hunne en ‘t 
algemeen welzijn” [cursief in origineel, TK]. 
cxcix “Dan door Van der Heim en de zynen wordt alles gecontrequareerd, als het niet overeenkomstig zyne 
begunstigste oogmerken is. Hy weet door zynen invloed de meerderheid der regenten te doen overstem-
men, want denkt niet dat de stad geheel en al ontbloot is van welmeenenden regenten”. 
cc “[…] Of als deeze Van der Heim eens uit zyne commissie raakt, ik my verbeelde, dat de zaaken eene 
anderen keer zouden neemen, en men deeze geforceerde slaaven, ten eenemaal zig zoude zien gedraagen, 
als het onafhangelyke regenten, die op de vryheid en regten hunner medeburgeren, onafscheidbaar altoos 
met de hunnen gemeen den behoorlyken prys stellen en volgens eed en pligt zig voor God almachtig 
daartoe verbonden hebben, betaamt”. 
cci “Geene gedwongen meerderheid de vryheid en heilwerkende pogingen eener braave minderheid 
tegengaan en vereidelen”. 
ccii “En zo lange Van der Heim niet gefnuikt word, zal Rotterdam, hoe zeer ‘t my smert van haare braave 
koplieden, burgers, regenten en ingezeetenen, met den schandelyke blaam van Engelschgezindheid 
overladen worden en een al te lydelyke gehoorzaamheid onteerende en vernederende voor haar in 
aanmerking van haare nabuurige vrye landgenooten, die van Dordrecht en Schiedam inzonderheid 
beschouwd worden”. 
cciii “Ongemeen gemakkelyker zoude veele zaaken in de uitvoering zyn, indien de burgery op die plaatsen, 
daar een zekere geesteloosheid en onverschilligheid, uit wat voor oogpunt zal ik daar laaten, alzo die 
verschilllende zyn, als daar zyn ambitie, heerszucht, eygenbelang, onkunde, lafheid, bekrompenheid, van 
denkbeelden, famileibelangen en dergelyke veragtelyke dryfveeren meer, heerscht, zig met eenpaarige 
stemmen vereenigde, haar bezwaaren voorstelde”. 
cciv “Het vaderland vereischt nu meer dan ooit de dienst van mannen [cursief in origineel, TK] die het zelve 
toonen getrouw te zyn, hunne medeburgers als vry en behoorlyk erkennen, en der goede gemeente 
rechten, voorrechten en dierbaare belangens, tegens alle inbreuk en verwaarloozing of onverschillige 
behandeling, kloekmoedig volgens hun eed en plicht voorstaan, verdedigen en bevorderen” […] “Er zyn 
ook nog een aantal kloekmoedige regenten en helden die voor de vrijheid en der burgeren welvaart bereid 
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zyn alles opte offeren, hun vaderland trouwe en bescherming gezwoorden hebben, en nimmer zullen 
toelaaten dat men der overheerschinge ten prooije zoude worden”. 
ccv “Heerszucht, winderigheid, dubbelzinnigheid, afhangelykheid, onverschilligheid, bekrompenheid van 
oordeel en verslaafdheid aan eenige weinigen [...] dog met verstand, beleid, welspreekendheid, moed en 
standvastigheid begaafden pensionaris Gyzelaar patrocineert […] deeze waardige pensionaris in wine de 
deugeden van Brutus en Cicero zamengevoegd zyn, is een luister voor Dordrecht in de uitvoering haarer 
kloekmoedige besluiten […] als De Wit in deugd gelyk, in trouw aan Barneveld”. 
ccvi Volgens Brandsenburg zou de prins te kennen hebben gegeven dat hij Van der Heim niet als 
Raadspensionaris wilde hebben vanwege de voortdurende vragen van zijn familie om “d’een of andere 
post” en omdat Van der Heim “veel te langdradig en omslaggelijk in sijn spreken en schrijven is”. 
ccvii “Mijnheer Van der Heim heeft geen uitgestrekte visie, en met veel vermogen en kennis, met grote 
vermogen over zichzelf, zijn geest is versmald, hij houdt slaafs vast aan de oude gebruiken en het lijkt 
hem absoluut te ontbreken aan vrijgevigheid, grootheid van de ziel, hij verwart politiek en moraal, de 
staatsman en de goede man”. 
ccviii Van der Goes heeft zich krachtig uitgelaten tegen het “verregaande crediet van Van der Heim in 
Rotterdam, hoe die daarvan abuserende, sijne hoogheid veel meerder vijanden van vrienden maakte, ook 
soo Bichon en d’Escury, die alles naar hun en de hunne trokken, waardoor sijn hogheydt sijn invloed 
aldaar aanmerkelijk verloor, want dat nu de saak nopens de recommendatien misschien staken soude” 
ccix “In Rotterdam kwamen sommigen van de minderheydt ook aan de handt en spraken als uit eene 
mondt, hoe sy tegens Van der Heim waren, dan wisten niet hoe dat met de prins ten opzigte van Van der 
Heim te maken…”. 
ccx “Allerschandelykste directie [die] men, geduurende dien oorlog, gehouden heeft, zo omtrend de 
verwaarloozing der marine van den staat, die men in een respectablen ftaat had behooren te brengen en te 
houden, als het eenigfre behoud onzer commercie, de voornaamste bron, waardoor ons gemeenebest 
beftaan en floreeren moet”. 
ccxi “Kunnende hier van als een enkel verhaaltje bygebragt worden, de conduite, gehouden door een 
bewindhebber der O:I: Compagnie ter kamer Rotterdam, op den 25e December 1781. En die van den 
toenmaaligen en nu voortvlugtenden secretaris Van der Heym, betrekkelyk het laaten uitzeilen van het 
Oost Indische Compagnieschip van Capt. Van Prooyen en het Oorlogschip Rotterdam Capt. Volbergen, 
welke men had kunnen behouden, zo men gewild had; maar welke men verkoos, liever dus gewillig, of 
wel gepraemediteerd, in handen van de Engelschen te doen vallen, dan daar indenoodige voorziening te 
gebruiken, om hun uitzeilen voor te komen; zo als hun is aangebooden geworden, om zulks te effectuëe-
ren, gelyk door geloofwaardige getuigen kan beweezen worden”. 
ccxii “Deze uitstap medeburgers, hebben wy ons veroorloofd, om die gewigtige poincten van 
beschuldigingen, tegens de toenmaalige regenten, die in ‘t openbaar favoriseerden het verderfelyke 
systhema, om Engeland in de hand te werken […]”. 
ccxiii “L’esprit en Hollande est bon; la majorité veut le bien. Il ne manque rien, ni bras ni argent; l’un et 
l’autre sera offert à la France lorsque la voix des amis de la patrie pourra se faire entendre”. 
ccxiv “Ik hoop deze u fris en gezond te Parijs zal aantreffen; ik schrijf u alleen om te berichten, dat ik de 
partij lakenen geaccepteerd hebbe; gij moet nu maar maken dat die geëxpedieerd kan worden, en mij de 
paspoorten zenden en elucidecren of er ook attestation bij moeten zijn, dat het inlands fabriek is nu 
Janbaas vaar voort, wij zullen het hier ook doen. Groet hartelijk Meyer”. 
ccxv “Nauwlijks waart gij vertrokken, of de zeemeerminnen begonnen in plaats van te zingen zoo ijselijk te 
brullen dat ik het benauwd kreeg; de barometer stond op orcaan; ik dagt de boot is verloren; maar door 
middel van de makelaar is de erfenis geassureerd geworden. Met Joseph is niets te doen; hij zingt 
hetzelfde deuntje als de Rabbi; zij willen dat wij naar Africa zeilen en hun koorn zenden; zonder dat 
willen zij niets hooren, naar niets luisteren. Van dezen avond zal ik zien wat ik met de lijst uitvoeren kan. 
Nopens de makelaar, wanneer hij in de boot zijn zal wil hij de schippers geheel en al buiten haar 
kostwinning zetten, en goede boeren in de plaats nemen; hij is slim maar bedaard; hij wil het testament 
klaar maken. Het kleintje heeft mij ook zeer omstandig over de toestand van dit alles gesproken; men 
moet met vertrouwen werken zegt hij, zonder dat zal hij met zijn familie de erfenis reguleeren. Het 
kleintje weet van de tien last, en heeft mij in vertrouwen gezegd, dat die zaak heilig moet zijn, en dat hij 
gelast was mij daar in vertrouwen over te spreken. Ik hebbe hem alle mogelijke verzekering gegeven”. 
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ccxvi “Hoewel ik daaraan totaal mijne commerciele belangens moet opofferen” Hiervan, zo vervolgt Van 
Langen, “moet door of van weges het Franse gouvernement, een demarche gedaan worden; houd dit in 
het oog, want anders komt het er niet […] dan zoude het met onze verdere engagementen in de war lope, 
gy begrijpt hiermede wat ik zeggen wil”. 
ccxvii “Koele redeneerkunde begrypt, dat het bestuur van eene natie zeer slegt aan mannen is toever-
trouwd, welke, door zugt tot zelf behoud en zelf verheffing gedreven daarop en daarop alleen schijnen 
bedagt geweest te zyn, en dit hun voornaam werk met zo weinig beleid hebben behandelt, dat het 
nauwelijks opgetrokken begouw door zijne eigen zwaarte noodwendig instorten moest”. 
ccxviii “Vergeefsch, zoude men, by het vernietigd uitvoerend bewind, als uit mannen bestaande, wier 
kunde, getrouwheid en moed, als drangredenen hunner wederrechtelijke continuatie ter constituerende 
vergadering opgegeevn zijn, meerder beleid in de behandling der zaaken van den lande verwagten” […] 
“alles bewijst onkunde, nalatigheid, slordigheid en ontrouw”. 
ccxix Zonder dat “hare grenzen bepaald, of eenige instructien, hoe ook genaamd, voor de agenten is 
ontworpen en in deze onbeslistheid s lands wezenlyke belangens grootendeels van de kunde, de 
eerlykheid en de gematigdheid van een enkel persoon afhankelijk [is] gemaakt”. 
ccxx “Zo vindt men, geduurende de eerste zes weken na deszelfs aanstelling, herhaalde reizen stukken, en 
in het bijzonder van missives van schijnbaar aanbelang, vermeld, omtrent welker wezentlyken inhoud en 
dagteekening volstrekt niets in de notulen te vinden is”. 
ccxxi “Goede vaderlanders zijn uit uit hun post ontzet [ten gunste van] lieden die onkundig en ongeschikt 
[waren] [en die] een woest en overdreven geschreeuw tot eenige aanbeveling hadden”.  
ccxxii “Wij bedoelen nog andere arrestatien welke geheel afwijkende van de gewone rechtspleging aan den 
eigendunkelyken wil der bewindslieden alleen hunnen oorsprong verschuldigt zijn geweest”. 
ccxxiii “Dat de duizende onschuldige amptenaren, die zich met vrouw en kinderen aan den bedelzak 
gebragt zagen, en zich niets kwaads bewust waren, tot wanhoop moetsen gebragt worden, mede klaagden, 
daar zij zich door onkundigen zuipers, zedenloze wezens zagen verdringen”.  
ccxxiv “Eenen Boeseke, wiens hatelijk bespiederswerk en zijdelingse insimulatiën werden beloond door 
eene aanmoediging om zich verder bij het vaderland verdienstelijk te maken”. 
ccxxv “Eberstein is en blijft een cameleon […] hij kruipt als een slang in het gras, en vertoont zich nimmer 
dan in de duisternis; hij affecteert de groote principes der revolutie te zijn toegedaan maar zijn afkeer 
tegen dezelve straalt door in zijnen eeuwigdurenden toon, tegen alles wat de revolutie toegedaan is – hij 
leeft allerdeftigst en niemand weet waar hij de fondsen vandaan haalt”. 
ccxxvi […] “Was het wel noodig geweest, ter verkrijging van het appui van dit gouvernement zoo groote 
pecunieele sacrifices aan te bieden? Zijn die aanbiedingen wel gedaan, en zijn die penningen wel gekomen 
ter plaatse daar ze behoorden, of zijn dezelve gevallen meestal in handen van menschen, wier gezag niet 
anders is of bestaat, als in de parade die zij daarvan maken?”. 
ccxxvii “Dat uitvaagsel der mensheid” […] “die booswicht, wiens leven eene aaneenschakeling van 
gruweldaden is” […] Hij, die voor een handvol goud, de partij van den stadhouder en van Engeland 
diende; - hij, die op hetzelfde oogenblik, dat het Fransche hof hem aan brood hielp, dat hof aan den 
gemeenen vijand verraden konde”. 
ccxxviii “Hoezeer de nationaale tijd op eene schandelijke wijze door het voormalig Uitvoerend Bewind 
verkwist weird, onder anderen met correspondentien die geen andere strekking hadden, dan alleen om 
zich vast te nestelen in die posten, waarin men zich gedrongen had, niet om het volk! maar OM 
ZICHZELF! […] wij zullen aan dat volk nu en vervolgens laten beoordelen, wie zij waren wien de 
uitvoerende macht in de Bataafsche republiek zijn vertrouwen waardig keurde […] zonder den minste 
agterdocht zich en hunne belangens toevertrouwden, wier wenken zij zonder nadenken volgden, deze 
mensen bedrogen en hun alleen als werktuigen der vermomde heerszucht gebruikten” [hoofdletters in 
origineel, TK]. 
ccxxix “Brenger dezes is mijn vertrouwde vriend, een veel waardig, doorzichtig en moedig Patriot: wees dus 
zoo goed hem geloof, en uw vertrouwen, evenzoo als gij aan mijzelven of iemand onzer geven zoudt, te 
schenken. Berigt hem alles ten aanzien van het onderzoek dat hij bij u en anderen zal willen doen; 
antwoord hem als landgenoot op alle zijne vragen betreklijk zijn voornemen; wijs hem den weg dien hij 
moet bewandelen; ondersteun hem door alle mogelijke middelen op dien weg, opdat hij tot zijn doel zal 
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kunnen geraken. Deze diensten aan hem zal ik rekenen aan mij en de mijnen bewezen; gij zult daarvoor 
het waarachtig loon in uw  geweten omdragen”. 
ccxxx “Wij zullen in dit nummer eenige brieven plaatsen, van eenen man, die de verachting van elk, met 
recht verdiende, en nogthans eenen beslissende invloed, zo op den Franschen afgezant Delacroix, als op 
de personen, of ten minsten de meerderheid der personen van het Uitvoerend Bewind der Bataafse 
Republiek wist te verkrijgen – en door die weg de Republiek te beheersen” […] “Gij vraagt hoe is het 
mogelijk dat een een en al geheel zonder moraliteit, bekend voor verachtelijk, het vertrouwen van het 
bestuur in zulk eenen hoogen graad wee tte verkrijgen? Deze brieven zullen u dit beantwoorden: hij 
begint met vleien […] hij kruipt, hij bedelt om gunst, alle middelen zijn goed […] hij kent die waare, 
groote edele menschenliefde niet”. 
ccxxxi “Revolutie is noodzakelijk wanneer de gelden door den burger opgebragd, de vrugten van zijnen 
bloedigen arbeid, of kwalijk bestuurd, of verkwist, of gestolen wierden”. 
ccxxxii “Wij wenschten, ten minsten, in het goed gebruik het welk van deeze penningen gemaakt is, eene 
genoegdzaame drangreden te vinden […] vermits wij ons, in dien gevalle, niet zouden moeten bedroeven 
over de schandelijke wijze op welke sommige van deeze penningen verspild over de misdadige wijze op 
welke andere ontstolen zijn”. 
ccxxxiii “Zo heeft dan het Bataafse volk, die natie zo zeer wegens haare zuinigheid beroemd, en 
eenvoudigheid, boven alles, by haare bestuurderen verlangende de penningen door weduwen en wees met 
zoo veel moeiten te zamen gebragt zien dienen om eene kostbaare huishouding voor drie harer 
medeburgeren gaande te houden, als hebben de burgers Fokker en Wildrik nimmer het hotel betrokken; 
zo hebben wy in deeze geldelooze tyden, door de natie en het costuum en den schouwburg en het rytuig 
zien betaalen, welke haare bewindslieden dienden, om hunnen tyd in een ydele vertooning te verspillen, 
terwyl een groot aantal ingezeetenen dagen op dagen vrugteloos verlangden om voor weinige ogenblikken 
te worden gehoord”. 
ccxxxiv “Is ‘t niettemin, waarde burger, noodig, dat met de verhevene waardigheid, waarmede gij alle vijf 
bekleed zijt, ook gepaard gaa een zekere luister”. 
ccxxxv “De luister der republikeinen is deugd, mannenmoed en oprechtheid, en waar deze ontbreken, is de 
pracht een te armzalig vernis om de vlekken te verbergen”. 
ccxxxvi “Zij de dierbaarde en tederste belangen van het vaderland in handen gaaven van menschen die geen 
vertrouwen verdienden en die nauwlijks den vaderlijken grond waren afgetreden of zij dagten niet meer 
aan het gebrek en den jammerlijken staat van het vaderland; – en verkwistten schatten hun toevertrouwd 
en welke zij door ijdelen drang wisten aftepersen op eene wijze daar de braave nederlander niet dan met 
huivering aan konde denken”.  
ccxxxvii “Wij zijn verre af, om te gelooven, dat de mensch over het algemeen belangloos in den 
dweependen zin van dat woord, dat is, onverschillig omtrent zijn lot omtrent het lot van zijn huisgezin 
kan zijn! Er zijn ook maar enkele oogenblikken waarin het vaderland dit vordert, waarin dit geen 
hersenschim, maar eene waarlijk verheevene, eene waarlijk eerbiedwaaridge deugd is. Wij kunnen ons ook 
het niet verwonderen dat de ambtenjagerij, eene schadelijke, aan het heil van het algemeen zo zeer 
nadeelige ziekte, meer algemeen wordt, in eenen tijd, waarin zo veele bronnen van welvaat of verstopt of 
opgedroogd zijn!”. 
ccxxxviii “Dat zy [Gogel en la Pierre, TK] niet alleen geene behoorlyke ingeschreevene boeken, maar zelfs 
geene geringste aanteekeningen van ontvangst noch uitgaaf hebben gevonden” […] en dus: “hebben 
kunnen te werk gaan, naar dat geene wat door hun, zoo op de kamer van gemelden Van Langen als elders 
uit een chaos van verwarring is kunnen opgemaakt worden”. 
ccxxxix “Hoe laakbaar ook dit alles, hoe slegt het laatste ook moge zijn, het is egter nauwlijks iets, wanneer 
men verder den burger Van langen de laagheid zo ver ziet brengen van zich aan een rechtstreekse dieverij 
schuldig te maken om zyn eigen verwarde zaaken ten kosten van den lande staande te houden”. 
ccxl  “En gedeeltelijk in lakens etc. want dan zat er voor de burgers directeuren Van Langen en Vreede, als 
leveranciers, ook noch een extra winstje aan”. 
ccxli “Dat deeze verbazing verdwijnt zoodra men beschouwt dat een der directeurs […] niet ontzag zich 
zelven schaamteloos met ‘s lands geld te verrijken”. […]”Nauwelijks kan men geloven dat  een lid van het 
bewind […] een zoo laag oogmerk als corruptie najaagt”. 
Appendix | Original Texts and Citations 
 
| 287 
                                                                                                                            
ccxlii “Maar wij sidderen voor het lot van het lieve vaderland; wanneer wij zien dat deeze zucht zich zo 
verbazend verre uitstrekt dat men ophoudt te vraagen, of dat stuk brood, het geen men uit de hand van ‘t 
vadelrand ontangt, verdient, of niet verdient word? Of men in staat is de post, welke men bekleed of 
bekleeden wil, al of niet waarteneemen? Wanneer wij zien dat eerlijkheid en goede trouw geheel worden 
vergeeten zo ras de gelegeneheid daar is, om zich ten kosten van het algemeen te kunnen bevoordeelen; 
dat men onverschillig is omtrent de wijze waarop men zijne hebzucht voldoet, wanneer dezelve slegts 
voldaan wordt. Het is, bij voorbeeld, onvergeeflijk en schadelijk dat zij die in den hoogsten rang geplaatst 
zijn misbruik maken van de magt hun toevertrouwd, tot het bejag van verfoeilijk eigenbelang”. 
ccxliii “[…] dan met drie leden, een stuk van zulk een aard, op naam van een geheel collegie, op te maken, 
[…] en zyne onschuldige amptgenoten (Fokker, Wildrik en het hele gouvernement) aldus bloot te stellen 
aan het rechtmatig ongenoegen van een volk hetwelk lang schijnt te sluimeren maar welks ontwaken 
schrikkelijk is”. 
ccxliv De leden van het inconstitutioneel bewind zijn “aansprakelijk voor deeze somma’s, immers voor het 
geen betaald is geworden en behoorende aan te toonen dat de sommen ten nutte van het land zijn betaald 
[…] wijders behoorde men mijns inziens wel in acht te nemen dat er tot nog toe geene wissels gevonden 
zijn welke getrokken waaren door de burger Fijnje maar wel door den burger Van Langen ofschoon 
Fijnje zeker van eenige traittes kennis heeft gedragen”. 
ccxlv “Dat uit het examen der voorzegde stukken [de Memorie, TK] [het] aan den procureur generaal is 
voorgekomen dat dezelve opleveren hevige vermoedens dat beide de voorn. Gearresteerden zich 
bijzonderlijk zouden hebben schuldig gemaakt aan een trouwlooze voor den land ruineuze en 
hoogstmisdaadige waarneeming der voorgemelde posten in welke zij hebben gefungeerd; en wel speciaal 
aan een onverantwoordelijke dilapidatie, ja zelfs ontvreemding van ‘s lands gelden [...]”. 
ccxlvi Fijnje en Van Langen hebben “zich schuldig gemaakt aan eene trouwlooze en voor den lande 
ruineuse waarneming der voorgemelde gewichtige bedieningen in welke zij hebben gefungeerd of zich 
hebben laten employeeren onder anderen speciaal aan eene onverantworodelijke dilapidatie van en 
misdaadgie beschikking over ‘s lands gelden mitsgaders dat zij zulks reeds hebben gedaan of met hunne 
voorkennis, medeweeten en goedvinden hebben laaten doen, immers buiten eenige qualifactie over ‘s 
lands penningen hebben gedisponeerd of laaten disponeeren voordat zij tot leden van het provisioneel 
uitvoerend bewid verkozen of naderhand door datzelve gemachtigd waren […]”. 
ccxlvii “Ook Fijnje [heeft] kennisse gehad aan de instructie voor Jan Eijkenbroek […]. Dat Wijbo Fijnje aan 
S.J. van Langen uit de cas van het committé tot de zaaken van de oost indischen handel ten privé 
behoeve van laatstgemelden, op den 18 januari 1798 heeft verstrekt een somma van f 7,000 door 
denzelven te permitteeren om voor die somma op die cas te assigneeren” […] “Dat hij [Fijnje, TK] ook 
op verzoek van zekere club of gezelschap welke werkzaam was tot het daarstellen der revolutie van de 22 
januari 1798 voorzien is geweest van zekere credit op de cassa van het voorz. committé; waar door die 
club over de die cassa heeft kunnen disponeeren”. 
ccxlviii “Ten zijnen bijzonderen behoeven te hebben gedisponeerd en alzoo zich bovendien aan 
landsdieverij te hebben schuldig gemaakt”. 
ccxlix “Mitsgaders dat de gearresteerde Van Langen zulks zelfs heeft gedaan: immers buiten eenige 
behoorlijke qualificatie over ‘s lands penningen heeft gedisponeerd: voor dat hij tot lid van het 
provisioneel uitvoerend bewind verkoren of naderhand door het zelfde tot het disponeeren over eenige 
gelden gemachtigd was”. 
ccl “Verzoek en uitvoering van procureur generaal om provisie van justitie tegen Boeseken, Eijkenbroek 
en een hele schare anderen vanwege “verderfelijke machinatien tegen de veiligheid van de staat en de 
correspondentien daarover gehouden […] dat bijzonderlijk gemelde Jan Eijkenbroek, A. Boeseken […] 
tot het doen gelukken van hunne verraderlijke en hoogstmisdadgie oogmerken te Parijs en Brussel 
werkzaam zijn geweest daar toe aldaar corruptien hebben gedaan of trachten te doen met penningen op 
hunnen aandrang bij ingezeetenen dezer republiek opgezameld […]”. 
ccli Van Maanen schreef dat zij “plannen projecten [hebben] gemachineerd strekkende om den toenmali-
gen staat des lands te renverseren, de gestelde machten op eene feitelijke en geweldadige wijze van het 
bewind te verwijderen, ja zelfs te vermoorden”. Dan schrijft hij: “uit deze stukken verstaat de procureur 
generaal allerduidelijkst de violente en bloeddorstige oogmerken der personen door dewelke zij [de 
brieven, TK] geschreven zijn […] gewaagd word van den generaal Daendels zijnen kop te krijgen, van het 
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daarstellen van een coup d’état, waardoor de voornaamste schurken, zo daarbij gezegd word, om zeep 
moesten geraaken; en van de verwachting dat de vijf directeuren en de generaal Daendels vermoord 
zouden worden”. 
cclii “Zij [het Franse gouvenment, TK] zijn deerlijk misleid met den 12 juni en wij zijn verzekerd zo er een 
coup d’etat plaats had zoo dat den voornaamste schurke om zeep waren […] sinds agt dagen loopt hier 
het gerucht dat er een revolutie is dat den 5 ministers directeurs vermoord zijn en dat er 5 andere leden 
benoemd zijn […] deze gerugten zijn meest altijd voorzeggingen die plaats grijpen in het vervolg”.  
ccliii In de amnestie verklaring sontd: “inbegrepen worden: allen welke zich tot op den 31 juli 1798 uit 
hoofde van verschillende doelens omtrent het staatkundige aan eenige misdryven of excessen mogten 
hebben schuldig gemaakt zodanig dat deze misdryven of excessen alleen in voorschreve verschil hun 
oorsprong hebben gehad of ten minste zonder hetzelve niet zouden zyn of niet hebben kunnen 
bedreven. Te verleenen volledige kwijtschelding en vergiffenis van hetgeen zy mogten hebben misdree-
ven […]”. 
ccliv “Tot nut eener algemeene vergetelheid van het voorleedene zoo het de vestiging der constitioneele 
orde van zaken als tot vereeniging van alle vrienden van vrijheid en orde rondsom de staatregeling” […]. 
Het gaat om misdrijven die “met hunne politieke betrekkingen zoo nauw verbonden zijn dat zij daar van 
niet kunnen worden gesepareerd” […] “en dat dierhalven ook de opheffing der procedures  tegen S.J. 
Van Langen en bij consequentie dan ook die tegen W. Fijnje daar onder moet begrepen zijn”. 
cclv “Wilden wij deze zaak beoordelen naar de eerste opwellingen van het gevoel dan was dezelve bij ons 
ten spoedigste beslist […] wij zouden u de beide personen schetsen beschuldigd van ‘s lans penningen te 
hebben verspild en ten eigen nutte te hebben gebruikt of ten minsten elkander daartoe behulpzaam te zijn 
geweest. Wij zouden van hun beide tonen daartoe te misbruik makende van de hoge waardigheid met 
welke zij waren bekleed en als zodanig bijzonder verplicht tot het beoefenen van deugden welke zij 
telkens aan hunne medeburgeren moesten prediken, tot het vermijden van misdaden welke zij in anderen 
als ten hoogsten strafwaardig moeten beschouwen. Wij toonden geheel het Bataafsche volk en een deel 
van Europa, met ongeduld en nieuwsgierigheid afwachtende, wat het einde zoude zijn van het proces 
deze twee burgers aangedaan. Wij schetsten u tevens alle de gevaarlijke gevolgen van hun politiek ontslag 
en van het sluiten en schorsen van der tegen hun ontgonnen procedures, als een daad die door alle 
partijen zal worden miskend” […]”[…] het misbruik van ‘s lands penningen, en vooral het converteren 
dezelve voor eigen gebruik […] dit misbruik en deze verspilling [zijn] zodanig met de grote gebeurtenis-
sen in ons vaderland verknogt dat van tien punten van beschuldiging door den procureur generaal 
ingebragt, enkel de twee laatste geheel gaaf en ongeschonden kunnen worden behandeld [echter als deze 
twee punten  nader worden onderzocht zal blijken dat ook] de oorsprong dezer misdrijven aan politieke 
gebeurtenissen zal worden toegeschreven of ten minste vrij waarschijnlijk kan worden betoogd dat 
dezelve zonder het vooruitzicht der revolutie van 22 januari dezes jaar niet zoude kunnen worden 
gepleegd”. 
cclvi “Zie daar d’ aristocraat bespot […] / zijn trotsheid kende perk noch paal”  
Zijn heerszucht deedt ‘s lands vrijheid beeven / en trouw en deugd mogt zegevieren, 
De foederalist werd ook verplet / Ja vijheid mag de kruinen sieren 
Van hen die in den hoogsten nood / Haar redden mogten van den dood” 
cclvii “De vlieg zal recht doen en niemand ontzien – niet op de wijze van hen, welke met die gulde spreuk 
slechts speelen, maar zoals die zonder verderfelijke diabolocratie, demagogerie, en ambtbejagende 
partijzucht […] Zij zal het heil van den 22 januari 1798 helpen volmaken – doch tevens derzelver 
schijnvrienden en dubbelhartige ja eigenbelangzchtige bewerkers onderscheiden van waare en 
deugdzaame bevorderaads en ieverige voorstanders […] zij zal iedere intrigant ontmaskeren”. 
cclviii  “Had de meerderheid van de constituerende vergadering vreemde invloed uit haar midden geweerd 
– had zij haar eigen werk niet verkragt – het volksrecht niet met voeten getrapt – de rechten van den 
mensch niet geschonden – redelijke en morele beginzelen niet verloochend, waarlijk zij zoude de achting 
van alle volkeren waardig zijn geworden; maar heerszucht verblinde haar en door de dolle driften van 
eenige weinigen haarer leden [Van Langen c.s] werd de roem door enige cordate stappen verkregen [i.e., 
de actie van 22 januari, TK] verdonkert”. 
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cclix “ […] wierden niet ‘s lands schatkisten gespolieert om banqueroutiers te verzadigen, ja miljoenen 
zouden verspild zijn waare het mogelijk geweest het hele Franse gouvernement tot derzelver snoode 
oogmerken om te kopen”. 
cclx  “Het was dan gewis hoog tyd dat er eens een einde kwam aan zoo groote euvelmoed – aan zoo veele 
en geduurige inbreuke op de na zo veel worstelingen aangenomen constitutie – op ‘t regt, de billykheid en 
alle eerlyke principes […]”  
cclxi “Hoe onverantwoordelijk en strafbaar in de eerste en tweede nationaale vergadering met beuzelachti-
gen en nuttelooze voorwerpen de kostbaare Nationaale tijd wierd verspild […] en eindelijk in de 
constituteerdende vergadering zich wel dra eene factie vormde, die door woestheid en heersucht 
gedreven al wat recht, billykheid en taalkunde mag genoemd worden, veragtende, door tallooze en 
ongehoorde dwaze buitenspoorigheden den reuzen arm van eenige groote mannen wapende, om dezelve 
te verdelgen, zoo zal ‘t er alleen op aankomen” […] “wagt u voor die cameleons die naar believen met alle 
kleuren pronken, en gelijk het riet door de zwakste wind heen en weder worden geslingerd – zy zijn 
belangzoekers, ambtjagers, zy dienen u en het vaderland niet” […] “wagt u voor die pragtzieke Nababs, 
die in rykdom, wellust en weelde verzonken, een fier hoofd boven de smalle gemeente uitsteken, den 
naam van burger als de pest schuwen – onder hun bestier hebben de schatkisten geen bodems, de wetten 
geene onpartijdige voorstanders en het volk geen bescherming”. 
cclxii “Ja, Bataafsche burgers! Wagt u voor wyffelaars, draaijers en [in] overdaad zwelgende ryken en 
schreeuwers […] volgt u eigen gevoel en vraagd u zelven: kiets uit uw midden een eerlijk man – kiets uit 
uw midden iemand wien gy kend, een menschenvriend, die de armen weldoet, wiens gedrag eerlijk, wiens 
houding minzaam en die dan een volksvriend is. Die nimmer door opgeblaazenheid en trotsheid zig 
boven zijn staat verhefte, nimer door roekelooze verkwisting zijn huishouden veraarloosde – vertrouw 
aan hem die zedig, eenvoudig, bedaard en deugdzaam is […] die een verheven caracter met uitsteekende 
verdiensten, grootheid van ziel, met een beoefend verstand, wysgeerige en politieke beginzelen, met een 
deugdzame burgerlijke levenswijze wist te verenigen”. 
cclxiii “Houdt het oog Bataven! Op die wezens, welke aldus van overtuiging spreken, om u de beurs te 
ligten en aan de dijk te jagen”. 
cclxiv Deze “beruchte staatkundige kwakzalvers” [waren] “gelukkig lomp of wellevend genoeg om zeer 
spoeig hun rokje van de binnenzijde te latenzien, anders hadden wij misschien nog lang, tot ons totaal 
bederf, met hen opgescheept geweest […]. Nimmer kon de burger ex-directuer Van Langen de natie 
meer dienst bewijzen als om in weinig tijd veel geld te gebruiken, des te eerder liep hij pal”. 
cclxv “De grote Pieter Vreede en Wybo Fijnje waren echter beter bij de hand […] en kozen het hazen-pad. 
Konden deze staatsmannen, beter dan door hunne vlucht, bewijzen: dat het gemakkelijker is te zweren 
van op de batterij in den dienst des vaderlands te sterven of te zegepralen dan om zich op dezelve te laten 
ombrengen? […] wanneer wij het rommelzootje van die drie ex-directeurs […] gadeslaat, dan moet men 
waarlijk zeggen: het is een wonder dat er nog zoo veel van de boel terecht is gekomen. Zo veel onbedre-
ven stuurlieden aan het roer, die van schip, wal noch wind wisten en meestal in de keuken of kelder te 
zoeken waren – onbegrypelijk dat zy het vaderland niet aan den grond gestuurd hebben – incroyable dat 
het schip van staat niet tegen de klippen aan spaanders gestoten is”. 
cclxvi “Wij hebben ons laten bedriegen, door dat ellendig zooitje ijzervreters, door het blinkend dek-kleed 
waar achter zij hunne ware gedaante verborgen en tot onze schade geleerd: dat alles wat blinkt geen goud 
is” […] “Piet Vreede schrijft een schone styl, maar des te minder moeite kost het hem om ons zand in de 
ogen te werpen. Daad zaken daar komt het eigentlyk en alleen op aan”. 
cclxvii “De wrangheid van de kerker kan het eerlyk hart niet verschrikken” 
cclxviii Het liedje ging als volgt:  
“Toen groote Piet de hoofdrol speelde / En ambten aan zijn vrienden deelde, 
Toen rees de domheid uit haar niet / Men zogt helaas! Tot ambtenaaren 
Hen dien beroemd door schreeuwen waren / En vrienden van apostel Piet 
Kon Eykenbroek dus ook niet reeknen / Dat hij weldra iets zou beteeknen 
En delen van der burgren geld? / O ja! De bazen moesten zorgen 
Dat broeder Jan ook wierd geborgen / En op een hogen post gesteld 
Wel haast ging Jan uit negotieeren / Dat hy niet kende kon hy lezen; 
In Frankrijk werkt men niet alleen / Een Eberstein, volleerd in ‘t drajen –  
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Met vaan en wimpel om te wajen / Toog als een mentor met hem heen 
Was Jan dus tot een werk geroepen / Waar van hy wel wat kon versnoepen, 
Adres aan Taddeman bericht! /Hij speelde een rol waar door de schyven 
Niet in de schatkist konden blyven / Maar eclipseerden uit ‘t gezigt 
Maar vraagt men: wat heeft Jan bedreven / Waar door de Handel kon herleven? 
Wat heeft hy voor ‘s lands geld verricht? / Dan moet men onbewimpeld schrijven; 
Jan ging – hy werkte – ontving veel schyven – / Vergat als landdief eed en plicht” 
cclxix “Verantwoording van myn publiek gedrag aen de natie en aen haere vertegenwoordigers. Immers ik 
ben door haar en in haar naam geroepen geworden, tot een der aanzienlijkste posten. Ik ben met 
veragting uit denzelven gestooten en heb moeten ophouden haare mij aanbetrouwde belangen, langerte 
behartigen”. Vreede spreekt de hoop uit dat aangezien de gemoederen inmiddels wat bedaard zijn, er nu 
de mogelijkheid is tot “koel onderzoek der onfeilbare rede waarin schuld van onschuld onderscheiden, 
betichtging van bewezen waarheid onderkend”. 
cclxx “Federalisten; voorstanders van eenen hoogere aristocratie; eigenbelangzoekers; misschien in ‘t 
geheim ook vrienden van oranje”. In de vergadering “werd de tijd doorgebragt met eindeloze haarklo-
veryen, daar werd niets afgedaan, niet een groot beginsel werd aangenomen, en in al zijn gevolgen 
mannelyk toegepast […] bekrompen bepalingen vernietigde straks wat men in een vlaag van gezonde 
regeerkunde gelukkig had ontworpen. Eene regeringsloosheid had met de daad plaats. Het volk was 
bovendien te onvreeden, om dat alle posten en bedieningen de republikeinen genoegzaam altijd werden 
aan voorbijgegaan” […] “en daarin het rigtsnoer vinden, waar langs zal moeten worden afgemeten, of ik 
mij in den opgedragen post onbesproken of strafbaar gedragen heb” […] “om de geconstitueerde magten 
voor een nieuwe verbastering te bewaren; en weder een dodelijke verlamming der staatsmachine te 
beletten. Was het dan een misdaad, of ene pligt in ons dat wij begonnen met alle geconstitueerde magten 
te zuiveren; en zodanige personen, in de departementale besturen en municialiteiten aan te stellen van 
wier denkwijze wy ons meende te kunnen verzekerd houden? […] hoe zoude zonder eene zodanige 
remotie de voorige verlamming en regeeringsloosheid voorkomen zijn en zich een energiek gouverne-
ment hebben doen kennen? Dit ware zonder dat onmogelijk” [er] was de bereidvaardigeid om alles te 
verbeteren wat door hun kwalijk was gedaan geworden en hun te straffen die ten dezen van opzettelijke 
ontrouw konden beschuldigd en overtuigd worden […] wij hebben zonder aanziens van personen 
hebben willen doen, waar onrecht geschied was”. 
cclxxi “Ik gelove veeleer dat ieder gouvernement om ‘t eeven wat het is, zich altijd door een digten drom 
van hongerige vragers zal omringd en belemmerd vinden, zoo dra er maar een vooruitzicht komt dat er 
wat zal te knappen vallen […] betuig ik, voor zover mijn persoon betreft dat ik dien honger nooit 
gevoeld, en dus nooit verzadigd heb. Dat anderen hunne naaste bloedverwanten in vette posten gesteld 
zien zodat er ter nauwer nood onder hun talrijk geslagt eenen enkelen onbezorgden te vinden is; dat 
anderen zich in allerly bogten wringen en door alle omwentelingen heen en bij alle bovendrijvende 
partijen ambten en bedieningen weten af te bedelen; dat anderen zich op den voorgrond van het 
patriottisme vertonen tot zij een vetten brok in hunne magt hebben, en dan eensklaps van het groot en 
glibberig toneel des staatsbestuur afsluipen om hunnen ambtshonger aan dien brok te verzadigen – ik zag 
daar dat ik nooit ten dezen aanzien enige begeerte had, met onverschillige ogen derzulken geluk aan […] 
ik ben nimmer tot eenige post opgestegen of mijne beweegredenen waren: pligt; en mijne eenigste 
bedoeling was: nuttig te zijn. Dit bezweer ik voor een alziend en alweetend Opperwezen”. 
cclxxii “Ik heb nooit aan een mijner bloedverwanten eenige bediening toegevoegd, mijn tweede zoon 
Paulus alleen uitgezonderd. Die is door ons op het bureau van buitenlandse zaken geplaatst […] is dat 
ambtshonger in een vader die zes zoonen heeft, die nooit iets genoot en zo veel voor de zaak der vrijheid 
gedaan heeft, en opgezet?”. 
cclxxiii “Te regt! – men spoort die euveldaad na – te regt! Men maakt ze kenbaar! Te regt – men noemt het 
steelen, dieverij, landdieverij. Tot zoo ver zeg ik is alles volkomen goed, schoon ik vurig verlang en 
verwagt dat mijn collega zich ten vollen zal kunnen verantwoorden – maar men vindt spoor, nog nota, 
nog tittel – en al kon men alle mijne daden, alle mijne voornemens en gedagten met een enkelen oogwenk 
overzien, men zou voorzeker spoor, nog tittel, nog nota vinden, dat ik mij met die misdaad bezoedeld 
heb – het blijkt ook niet dat men iet in dit opzigt ten lasten van mijne overigen collegas gevonden heeft”. 
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cclxxiv “Echter kan men goedvinden die misdaad van stelen en landsdieverij niet enkel toe te kennen op die 
enklen persoon die men er van beschuldigd; maar men brengt het thuis op het geheele bewind […] van 
een misdaad waarvoor men geen het mionste bewijs in handen heeft […] gen grond zelfs tot het geringste 
vermoeden. Heb ik dan geen reden ten dezen my met volle regt te beklage?” 
cclxxv “Verdient dat berisping? Is dat overdaad? De natie zelfs in de aangenomen constitutie ligt in die 
zelfde tijd van vijf maanden geen zestien, geen twintig, maar wel vijf en twintig duizend gulden aan het 
uitvoerend bewind toe. Wat moet ik dan van zoo een beschuldiging denken! De natie geeft dat tractement 
aan de directueren, hoe kan het dan bij mogelijkheid berisping veridenen, dat zij het gebruiken?” [...] 
“Maar de directeeren zijn naar de komedie geweest? Dat zijn we. Na een arbeid van den geheele dag, die 
de meesten tijd nog ‘s avonds moest hervat worden, hebben zij van tijd tot tijd een uur of twee a drie met 
tusenpoozing genomen, dikwijls verzeld eenige hunner agenten, om door een onschuldig vermaak zich te 
herstellen; en met vernieuwde kragten weder aan het behartigen der vaderlandsche belangen handen aan t 
werk te slaan. Is dat misdadig? Maar ze hebben in koetzen gereden? Dat hebben we. De vijf directeuren, 
de eerste ambtenaren van de republiek, hebben met hun vijven, twee koetzen bij de maand te huur gehad; 
zou het schande zijn geweest, dat zij er vijf in eigendom bezeten hadden? Onze tafel was ordelijk, dikwerf 
sober, nooit verkwistend – en onze dronk volkomen vrij, en is niet éénmaal, en in geen een geval de 
paalen der gestrenge matigheid te buiten gegaan. Vanwaar dan zoo veel ophefs van kostbaarheid en 
verteering? Vanwaar dan het geroep van zo veel overdaads in het directoriaal hotel? Van waar die 
weduwen en wezen die hun penningske zo zuur moeten opbrengen om de praal en wellust der directeu-
ren te voeden? “Indien hij [de directeur, TK] nu dat tractement in zijn kist sluit en zijne geldliefde 
verzadigd, is dan de natie er beter aan dan dat hij ordentelijk overeenkomstig zijn staat leeft […]”. 
cclxxvi “In de diplomatie treft men andere waarheden – andere deugden – andere pligten […] de eerlijke 
man, gewoon aan opregtheid en openhartigheid – gestreng op de volbrenging zijner zedelijke 
verplichtingen, en schuw voor alle kronkelpaden, ziet zich op dien vreemden en glibberige baan, veelal 
niet weinig onbelemmerd: en bij iedere voetstap die hij optreed voelt hij opwellingen van het hart die hij 
alleen kan te boven komen, door een gestrenge beredenering en ontwikkeling van het geen zijn plicht, in 
de bijzondere omstandigheden en betrekking, onvermijdelijk van hem vordert”. 
cclxxvii “Zeker is dat zy [geheime uitgaven en stille diplomatie, TK] zedert dat de Italiaansche Staatkunde in 
de hoven van Europa is binnengeslopen, genoegzaam onvermijdelijk; soms voor de belangen van het 
vaderland zeer noodzakelijk zijn geworden. Dit althands is onbetwistbaar dat zij geen burgerlijke misdaad 
in zich opleveren”. 
cclxxviii “Een Jonker, die met een koets aankomt, aan de voordeur aanschalt en niet gehoord word, verdient 
voorzeker in dit geval de voorkeur niet boven een burgerman, die te voet aan loopt, een agterdeur ingaat, 
en de zaak zijn beslag geeft”. 
cclxxix “Vordert men als een pligt in een generaal dat zijn veld prediker en zijn spion mensen moeten zijn 
van dezelfde deugd, eerlijkheid en onbesproken gedrag? Als de veld prediker was als de spion dan zou hij 
weinig uitrichten, en als de spion was als de veld prediker dan zou de generaal voorzeker niet veel van de 
vijand te weten komen”. 
cclxxx “Ik moet u berichten dat daar wij tot de ellebogen toe in het geld tasten, het meer dan tijd is dat 
woord gehouden worden aan den Minister La Croix, naamelyk om hem het gewoone present ter aankoop 
van meubelen en andere veraangenaamingen”. 
cclxxxi  “Al wilde men eerst veronderstellen dat zy zich zelven niet wilden verryken, dan nog gewoon zijn, 
geld, het geen hun niets kost welks waarde zy nauwelijks kennen, met een ruime hand uitreiken en 
dikwijls buiten noodzakelijkheid te verspillen; geen wonder dat men hun van tonnen spreeken, van 
tonnen beloven hoort, wanneer men een hunner gemeenzame vrienden, met den naam van volksverte-
genwoordiger vereerd, maar dien naam onwaardig is, wanneer men, met een woord, den burger Van 
Leeuwen van onze toestand hoort zeggen, daar wij thands tot de ellebogen in het geld zitten en daar met 
hem, op deezen grond,  het doen van een geschenk aan den franschen minister ziet aandringen”. 
cclxxxii “Op het oogenblik dat wij onze functiën begonnen wierden wij bestromd van sollicitatiën om 
geëmployeerd te worden: onder deze was de generaal Daendels, die mij zijn diensten herinnerde, en mij 
kwam verzoeken om een missie buitenslands voor zijn neef Grasveld, en een ampt van f 4,000 voor zijn 
vriend en adjudant Hespe. Ik antwoordde hem, dat zoo wij zulke lieden direct moesten helpen, die tot 
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nog toe posten hadden bekleed en nog hadden, wat er dan van die arme ongelukkige Bataven worden 
zou, die tot heden toe zoo onbarmhartig voor het hoofd gestooten waren?” 
cclxxxiii Antwoord: “ik heb mij nooit van ene verantwoording willen onttrekken, maar daar het een besluit 
was van het hele bewinden ik alles geconcureerd [?, TK] heb. Zoo ik er al bij tegenwoordig of present was 
zal ik daarom alleen verantwoordelijk zijn daar mijne collegas die aan deze besluiten ook deel hebben niet 
alleen hun vrijheid maar een in het wetgevend lichaam zitting heeft, zijn deze dan niet verantwoording 
schuldig, maar is er dog enig bewijs te vinden in de notulen dat zij niet tot besluit geconcureerd hebben 
laat staan geprotesteerd hebben, en kunnen zij zig beroepen dat zij van alle de handelingen geen kennis 
hebben gedragen. Is het daarom dat het wel deeglijk door de leden van het uitvoerend bewind verant-
woord moet worden.. 
cclxxxiv “Op deze wijze kan het nog lang duren voor dat wij met uwer zaak kunnen vorderen. Dewijl gij in 
uw particulier verantwordelijk zijt en geen recht hebt u op het bewind te beroepen en wij zullen dus een 
en andere explicatie [antwoord] daarop moeten hebben”. 
cclxxxv Van Langen zegt bijvoorbeeld: “dat ik die som geld in betaaling zoude strekken voor J.P. Pessers, 
welke mij op die tijd dat die assginaties getrokken zijn, die sommen schuldig was […] voorts moet ik hier 
nog bij voegen dat voor de partij lakens te accepteren ik het bewind verwittigd hebbe dat voornoemde 
Pessers mij die pennings schuldig was gelijk ook Vreede en Van Marle en dat wij die pennings als betaling 
zouden trekken daar Pessers [daar] in genoegen heeft genoomen […] heb ik telkens niet meer getrokken 
als dat ik kan aantonen dat Pessers mij dier tijd schuldig was”. 
cclxxxvi “Dat men begrype dat de tijdelijke opoffering van eenige grotere gedeeltens van onze burgerlijke 
vrijheid nergens anders toe strekt dan om eene goede staatsregeling te verkrygen en door dezelve een veel 
groter genot dier vrijheid ons verzekerd zullen zien”. 
